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The time has come for human cultures to seriously think, to diligently 
conceptualize, and to earnestly fabulate about all the nonhuman critters 
we share our world with, and to consider how to strive for more ethi-
cal cohabitation. Reconfiguring Human, Nonhuman and Posthuman in 
Literature and Culture tackles this severe matter within the framework 
of literary and cultural studies. The emphasis of the inquiry is on the 
various ways in which actual and fictional nonhumans are reconfigured 
in contemporary culture – although, as long as the domain of nonhu-
manity is carved in the negative space of humanity, addressing these is-
sues will inevitably clamor for the reconfiguration of the human as well.
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Literary and cultural criticism has ventured into a brave new world in 
recent decades: posthumanism, ecocriticism, critical animal studies, the 
new materialisms, the new vitalism, and other related approaches have 
transformed the critical environment, reinvigorating our encounters with 
familiar texts, and inviting us to take note of new or neglected ones. 
A vast array of non-human creatures, things, and forces are now emerg-
ing as important agents in their own right. Inspired by human concern 
for an ailing planet, ecocriticism has grappled with the question of how 
important works of art can be to the preservation of something we have 
traditionally called “nature.” Yet literature’s capacity to take us on unex-
pected journeys through the networks of affiliation and affinity we share 
with the earth on which we dwell – and without which we die – and to 
confront us with the drama of our common struggle to survive and thrive 
has not diminished in the face of what Lynn White Jr. called “our ecolog-
ical crisis.” From animals to androids, non-human creatures and objects 
populate critical analyses in increasingly complex ways, complicating our 
conception of the cosmos by dethroning the individual subject and dis-
mantling the comfortable categories through which we have interpreted 
our existence. Until now, however, the elements that compose this wave 
of scholarship on non-human entities have had limited places to gather to 
be nurtured as a collective project. “Perspectives on the Non-Human in 
Literature and Culture” provides that local habitation. In this series, read-
ers will find creatures of all descriptions, as well as every other form of 
biological life; they will also meet the non-biological, the microscopic, the 
ethereal, the intangible. It is our goal for the series to provide an encounter 
zone where all forms of human engagement with the non-human in all pe-
riods and national literatures can be explored, and where the discoveries 
that result can speak to one another, as well as to scholars and students.
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As Donna Haraway (2015, 160) argues, “[i]t matters which stories tell 
stories, which concepts think concepts. Mathematically, visually, and 
narratively, it matters which figures figure figures, which systems sys-
temize systems”. The time has come for human cultures to seriously 
think, to diligently conceptualize, and to earnestly fabulate about all 
the nonhuman critters we share our world with, and to consider how to 
strive for more ethical cohabitation.
The aim of this book, Reconfiguring Human, Nonhuman and Post-
human in Literature and Culture, is to try and tackle this severe matter 
within the framework of literary and cultural studies. The emphasis of 
the inquiry is on the various ways actual and fictional nonhumans are 
reconfigured in contemporary culture – although, as long as the domain 
of nonhumanity is carved in the negative space of humanity, addressing 
these issues will inevitably clamor for the reconfiguration of the human 
as well.
The challenge of mapping the tangled relations between humans and 
nonhumans has recently been accepted by diverse disciplines, as scholars 
across academia must come to terms with the social, economic, cultural, 
environmental, and technological changes that surround, penetrate, and 
affect their methods and fields of study with unprecedented rapidity. This 
struggle to adapt has already resulted into a wealth of new approaches, 
research questions, and conceptualizations, but neither the saturation 
point nor the demand has quite been met as of yet. On the contrary, 
the need to find new ways of encountering, discussing, and thinking 
of entities and environments where human and nonhuman  entangle in 
 increasingly intricate patterns has never been more urgent.
So far at least, one of the key tools for approaching these changes 
has been the concept of the Anthropocene. Humans are now molding 
even the Earth’s strata, which has prompted geologists to propose a new 
epoch (Crutzen and Stoermer 2000): it is commonly argued that the 
Anthropocene marks the time in history when the sum of human ac-
tions has a larger influence on the geology, hydrosphere, and biosphere 
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of the Earth than all the naturally occurring cataclysms combined. In-
deed, even though the contributors of this volume actively seek new, less 
anthropocentric perspectives, the humankind’s growing influence on the 
planet cannot be ignored. Climate change, the sixth global mass extinc-
tion, deforestation, pollution, nuclear devastations, agricultural devel-
opments, intensive animal farming, extensive land-use, ever-increasing 
consumption of natural resources, and human population growth have 
had, and continue to have, serious consequences for the entire Earth 
system and for all the life forms it sustains. This includes human beings, 
who are hardly equal in relation to these problems either: some are more 
responsible for the exploitation of the natural resources, and gain short-
term benefits from it, while the less privileged ones are situated closer to 
the receiving, powerless end of the exploitation, along with the myriad 
nonhumans.
Scholars around the world are now calling for interdisciplinary re-
search that would help us to understand how the Anthropocene came 
into being, and how it affects humanity and the planet. In natural sci-
ences, for instance, anthropogenic environmental developments, like de-
forestation, ocean acidification, chemicalization, mass extinctions, and 
climate change, are no longer observed simply as separate phenomena 
but as systemic processes affecting the entire Earth. This has given rise 
to such fresh fields of research as Earth system science and global change 
research. At the same time, expectations for a greater convergence be-
tween natural sciences, social sciences, and the humanities are amount-
ing (Sörlin 2012; Palsson et al. 2013; Holm et al. 2015; Brondizio et al. 
2016; Heise 2016).
Bringing profoundly different disciplines to contribute in the same dis-
cussion and problem-solving will require substantial and long- standing 
efforts, however, and critics have already highlighted possible gaps and 
conflicts. Some have criticized natural sciences’ tendency to ignore the 
ways the historical, economic, national, and social distinctions in hu-
man societies have all hastened the end of the Holocene. Various al-
ternative coinages, like “Capitalocene”, “Sociocene”, “Econocene”, 
“Anglocene”, “Chthulucene”, and “Neganthropocene” (Davis and 
Turpin 2015, 6–11; Haraway 2015, 2016; Wark 2016; Stiegler 2017), 
aspire to seize these ongoing global changes from different angles and 
call for new ways of understanding humanity itself. Others, meanwhile, 
have dismissed the very notion of the Anthropocene as altogether “too 
anthropocentric” (e.g. Haraway 2016; Wark 2016). For example, Claire 
Colebrook (2017, 10) declares it problematic to view “the Anthropocene 
as an epoch, as a line or stratum whose significance would not be in dis-
pute. Rather than think of this line as privileged or epochal, we might 
ask for whom this stratum becomes definitive of the human”. Following 
Colebrook and Tom Cohen’s (2016, 8) argumentation, humans are not 
only regarded as the conceptual antithesis of the nonhuman, but, in a 
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very concrete way, nonhumanity is what humanity denies, excludes, and 
destroys. In sum, humans are simultaneously world-changing agents 
and witnesses to processes they cannot wholly understand, predict, or 
manage. It is thus crucial to consider who the privileged human of the 
Anthropocene actually is (Colebrook 2017, 10).
Overall, definitions of humanity have grown more and more unstable 
in natural sciences and in philosophical discussions alike, which has led 
to a so-called crisis of humanism (see Badmington 2004; Braidotti 2013; 
Koistinen 2015, 58). Meanwhile, the material parameters of human ex-
istence have been reconfigured, for instance, by in-vitro meat, the hu-
man genome project, custom-made pharmacology, artificial intelligence, 
and many other manifestations of scientific and technological progress 
(Twine 2010; Åsberg 2013; Koistinen 2015, 59) – if progress it can be 
called. It is usually not that difficult to find an angle from which human 
innovations do not appear purely advantageous – and more often than 
not, those angles are more or less nonhuman in nature. A number of 
scholars have therefore proposed a new concept of the posthuman and 
accompanying theories of posthumanism, which call into question the 
anthropocentric biases of humanist thought, the belief in technological 
progress, and the ethics of current human–nonhuman relations (see e.g. 
Wolfe 2003a, 2003b, 2010; Badmington 2000; Åsberg 2013; Braidotti 
2013; Åsberg and Braidotti 2018).
Because these posthumanist ways of thinking are, all in all, motivated 
not only by practical and epistemological but also by ethical interests, 
much of the theoretical work produced under the moniker has, to date, 
focused on the ethical dimensions of the (post)human. As many research-
ers have noted, global cultural hegemonies have labeled only a selected 
few as prototypes of the ideal humanity, while those deviating from this 
white, masculine, healthy, heterosexual standard – that is, most of the 
world’s population – are branded varying shades of subhuman (e.g. Wolfe 
2003a, 6–8; Butler 2004, e.g., 1–4; Koistinen and Karkulehto 2018). 
Thus, while the chapters of this book mostly scrutinize various ethi-
cally loaded relationships between humans and nonhumans, they also 
resonate with the ethics of encountering the so-called “others of Man” 
in Euro-American cultures (see also Åsberg 2008, 264–269;  Koistinen 
2015, 45; Braidotti 2017, 21–31; Koistinen and Karkulehto 2018).
The cultural meanings given to nonhuman animals often reflect and 
coincide with the attitudes and assumptions held toward repressed or 
marginalized groups, whereby the treatment of animals and nonhumans 
is connected to the treatment of the humans who are, in varying con-
texts, viewed as lesser, weaker, subordinate, or substandard (Herman 
2018; Wolfe 2003a, 6–8). This includes, for instance, women (as well 
as children and elderly people), “other races”, people with disabilities, 
and those who are not readable as members of acceptable genders, as 
Judith Butler (2004) has noted. Theorists of ecocriticism, critical animal 
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studies, queer and disability studies, feminist theory, and several other 
disciplines have time and again challenged the notions that situate (cer-
tain kind of) human beings above all the “other” creatures (e.g. Åsberg 
2013, 10; Grusin 2017; Koistinen and Karkulehto 2018). Despite the 
supposed crisis of humanism, these long traditions in exposing and rene-
gotiating social and the humanities structural hierarchies actually make 
different branches of the humanities quite well-equipped for addressing 
the hegemonies and dependencies as well as the divides and continuities 
between humans and nonhumans.
In the intersection of these theoretical traditions and the newly sur-
faced concerns of the Anthropocene, forms feminist posthumanism, 
a  streak of posthumanist thought that has been influenced by the es-
sayistic writings of Donna Haraway (see Koistinen and Karkulehto 
2018). Even though Haraway (2008, 2016) has criticized the concepts 
of posthumanism and the Anthropocene alike – because they both over-
emphasize the Anthropos, the human – her work on “significant others” 
and “companion species” highlights the mechanisms of differentiation 
and the ethical problems of humanist conceptualizations in ways that 
are overtly relevant to the discussions about posthumanism and the 
Anthropocene. Haraway’s (2008, 69–82) thoughts on killable and livable 
species also relate to the ideas of several feminist thinkers; with  Butler’s 
(2006, 2010) grievable, ungrievable, and livable lives, and Ahmed’s 
(2004) livable and lovable lives (Koistinen 2015, 58). Both  Butler (2004, 
12–13) and Haraway (2008) have maintained that the concept of a 
 livable life should be extended to nonhuman life-forms. Furthermore, 
as  Koistinen (2015, 58–59) has argued, both have advocated for open-
ness and curiosity toward the potential new understandings and futures 
humans and nonhumans could share (Butler 2004, 204–231; Haraway 
2008, 289, 300–301). The only way to tackle the ethical and political is-
sues surrounding “killable” animals is “to reimagine, to speculate again, 
to remain open”, and to recognize that “ways of living and dying mat-
ter” to other animals as much as they matter to human beings (Haraway 
2008, 88, 93). Haraway’s non-anthropocentric thinking culminates in 
the concept of “Chthulucene”, “an ongoing temporality that resists fig-
uration and dating and demands myriad names”. This challenges the 
problematic concept of the Anthropocene, which, for Haraway, “is not 
an idiomatic term for climate, weather, land, care of country, or much 
else in great swathes of the world” (Haraway 2015).
Meanwhile, the more epistemological concerns of posthumanism – 
the (im)possibility of cross-species understanding – have been linked to 
cognitive sciences and methodologies, to the so-called problem of other 
minds, and the evanescent, private nature of experience itself. These 
connections were already drawn in 1974 by philosopher Thomas Nagel, 
whose essay “What Is It Like to Be a Bat?” has inspired many of the con-
tributors of this volume as well. In this brief but influential classic, Nagel 
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notes that the instruments of natural sciences are unfit for discussing the 
subjective textures of lived experiences, and their grasp of minds and 
consciousness, whether human or nonhuman, is therefore rather limited. 
That is, even if natural sciences’ findings of animals’ behavioral patterns 
and their mentalistic motivations are reliably based on (certain types of) 
empiricism, such hypotheses and experiments only produce abstractions 
and generalizations valued by (certain types of) anthropocentric institu-
tions. By contrast, they tell us little of how being a bat feels through a 
bat’s body, or to what kind of action potentials or horizons of meaning 
this specific embodiment is bound.
Although these questions of embodiment are now being asked with 
new-found urgency by enactivist theorists, it is still up to debate whether 
or not these contextual, holistic, first-person qualities of nonhuman ex-
perience can ever be studied scientifically at all; the “objective phenom-
enology” proposed by Nagel (1974, 449) still remains to be developed. 
What is clear, however, is that humanistic approaches like philosophy of 
mind can think about nonhuman experiences in ways that the reductive, 
objectifying methods of natural sciences do not allow or value. More-
over, if philosophy of mind is understood as an informed kind of spec-
ulation (cf. ibid.), literature and other art forms can be situated on the 
same methodological continuum: they also tend to speculate about the 
unfamiliar, the unrealized, and the unknown, only on a more concrete, 
embodied, contextualized, and/or personal level. In other words, litera-
ture and art specialize in imagining, examining, and fostering the sub-
jective, embodied aspects of (nonhuman) experience, which the methods 
of natural sciences have traditionally bypassed. Yet, this experiential di-
mension is where empathy and other types of personal engagements take 
place, whereby increasing our understanding of nonhuman creatures, 
especially on this level, is likely to have notable epistemological and eth-
ical repercussions (cf. Bernaerts et al. 2014).
It also stands to reason that triangulating something so difficult to reach 
or comprehend through several different disciplines and  methodologies – 
such as natural sciences, philosophy, and arts – will result in more de-
tailed and accurate insights and approximations than the employment 
of just one approach. Artistic takes on the nonhuman, and academic 
interpretations of these artworks, are thus an invaluable part of the 
 posthumanist exploration; they cover some of the blind spots of natural 
sciences and other humanist approaches (cf. Herman 2018).
the Nonhuman in Literature and Culture
So, how is the nonhuman discussed and imagined – or, in Haraway’s 
words, storied and figured – in the literature, art, and culture of the world 
that has entered a new era, be it the Anthropocene, the Capitalocene, the 
Sociocene, the Econocene, the Anglocene, the Neganthropocene, or the 
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Chthulucene? What practices of storytelling, representation, visualiza-
tion, communication, and meaning-making do we humans employ in 
our relations to the nonhuman or posthuman – and, more importantly, 
what practices could we employ and what do these practices do?
Not only scholars but also authors and artists have recently taken a 
keener interest in the nonhuman. However, where posthumanist (an-
imal) studies are mostly rethinking the current ethical and political 
changes “in light of new knowledge about the life experiences of nonhu-
man animals”, as Cary Wolfe (2010, xxix) maintains, arts and literature 
have concerned a wide variety of possible and impossible nonhumans, 
and their various relations to humans, all along. The European tradition 
of fables, for instance, dates back to Ancient Greece, and the myths 
of all pre-literary cultures are rife with metamorphoses and chimeric 
creatures. Experimental and speculative literature and art have since 
elaborated on these tropes and created many new ways of colliding and 
merging humanity with the vast domains of life, sentience, and agency 
that reside outside of it – for what is a story without a conflict and its res-
olution? So far, scholars interested in the reconfigurations of the nonhu-
man or posthuman in narratives, arts, and media have turned especially 
to science fiction, because the various possible worlds and alternative 
futures imagined within the genre often organize the relations between 
humans and nonhumans in novel ways (see Haraway 1991, 2008, 217, 
2016; Braidotti 2002, 182–184, 203–204; Graham 2002; Badmington 
2004, 13–15; Vint 2007, 2014; Koistinen 2015).
Practitioners of ecocritical literary studies (e.g. Soper 1995; Scigaj 
1999) have, however, leveled stark criticism toward literary representa-
tions of nonhumans since the 1990s: among others, and especially fol-
lowing Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, David Gilcrest (2002) has deemed 
any and all attempts at speaking on behalf of nonhumans misguided. 
Writing is a distinctively human activity, and, to a large extent, very 
deliberate, intentional, and interpersonal. These assumptions mainly 
close nonhumans outside of the spheres of literary interest, influence, 
and  action. However, according to posthumanist, new materialist 
and object- oriented strands of reasoning (Malafouris 2013, 119–139; 
 Morton 2013), lack of interest, influence, or bodily or cognitive abil-
ities does not necessarily negate the possibility of nonhuman agency. 
On the contrary, many literary scholars now recognize that nonhumans 
influence, both materially and semiotically, the ways we perceive them, 
represent them, and write about them (e.g. Herman 2018). Nonhuman 
beings or environments thus do steer the production of literature, both 
directly and indirectly, although these processes are often difficult to 
track and explain.
Serenella Iovino and Serpil Oppermann (2014) have recently fused ec-
ocriticism with Karen Barad’s agential realism, creating a new approach 
they call material ecocriticism. Following Barad’s ideas, this framework 
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reconfigures nonhuman literary agency as intra-action that allows hu-
man and nonhuman bodies and meanings to co-emerge and, respectively, 
establish meanings in and through textual and material bodies – or in 
what Iovino and Oppermann (2014) call “storied matter”. The city of 
Naples, for instance, is a porous entity, both materially and semioti-
cally, which means it is constantly open to new human and nonhuman 
histories, which can be produced and read in cultural texts – such as 
literature, architecture, or sculptures portraying the city – as well as in 
the landscape itself. According to Iovino (2016, 39), this idea of storied 
matter holds great ethical and political potential:
when human creativity “plays” together with the narrative agency 
of matter, intra-acting with it, it can generate stories and discourses 
that “diffract” the complexity of our porous collective, producing 
narrative emergencies that amplify reality, also affecting our cogni-
tive response to this reality.
The stories we spin – and the images we make – about certain places 
reflect and stem from these intra-actions, meaning that the places them-
selves make us experience and think about them in the ways we do expe-
rience and think about them.
Bruno Latour also discusses nonhuman literary agency briefly in his 
essay “An Attempt at a ‘Compositionist Manifesto’” (2010), which in-
cludes a curious footnote about animism. “The redistribution of agen-
cies is the right purview of literature studies”, Latour claims (2010, 489), 
implying that humanists and literary scholars are especially fit to address 
the liveliness and effectiveness of nonhumans, tuned as they are to fic-
tional characters. He is, of course, right in noting that literary characters 
are always nonhuman, artificial constructions, no matter how often and 
easily they are perceived and discussed in human terms. Their agencies 
are mostly limited to thematic levels – to raising questions about and 
building scenarios around all kinds of fictional subjectivities, some of 
which may be posed as human and some of which may be posed as 
nonhuman. These questions and scenarios constitute the text itself and 
play into its reception, possibly influencing the reader or the viewer. It 
is important to note, however, that these agencies of fictional charac-
ters mostly mediate, or are at least rather dependent on, the creative 
and interpretive processes of their human producers and audiences (cf. 
Bernaerts et al. 2014; Varis 2019). The question of nonhuman poetic 
agency – of real nonhumans’ possibilities of participating in the actual, 
fleshly act of writing – is a slightly different matter, and one that is also 
attracting growing interest (e.g. Moe 2014; Lummaa 2017; Tüür 2017).
Examining these two previously overlooked nonhuman forces – the 
characters participating in the texts and their reception “from the in-
side”, and the co-agencies molding them “from the outside” – calls for 
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distinct but intertwined methodological strands, which should allow for 
tracking of the nonhuman currents in language and typography, as well 
as for describing the ways in which nonhuman agents are gathered or 
composed in and around the texts under investigation (following  Latour 
2010, 2011 and Haraway 2016). In other words, narrative studies should 
develop new methods of taking into account not only the traditional 
trinity of text, the author, and the reader but all the relevant agents and 
factors contributing to a given text, whether they are beings, spaces, or 
historical, natural, textual, cognitive, or social processes. Furthermore, 
it should be recognized that the meanings and experiences emerging 
from these processes are never fully human or nonhuman in their origin 
or ontology (Varis 2019, 94–104).
The hierarchies and tensions between human and nonhuman perspec-
tives have also underlain the interests of – and the debates between – 
cognitive and unnatural narratologies. At the end of the 20th century, 
Monika Fludernik’s (1996) “natural narratology” redefined narrativiza-
tion as an activity that both organizes and is deeply permeated by human 
experientiality – a view that has proved influential in at least two ways. 
On the one hand, later cognitive narratologies have largely developed 
along the anthropocentric trajectories demarcated by natural narratol-
ogy: they tend to anchor both the readers’ meaning-making processes 
and the value of literature on social, probably quite species-specific, cog-
nitive capabilities (e.g. Herman 2013). That is, many cognitive thinkers 
believe that we place value and interest in fiction and art only insofar as 
they tell us something about other humans’ minds and motivations, and 
train our folk-psychological skills. On the other hand, other theorists 
have been inspired to speak against natural narratology and, by associa-
tion, its anthropocentrism. A notable portion of literary fiction includes 
elements – nonhuman narrators, impossible space-time, and improbable 
occurrences – which are blatantly at odds with humans’ everyday real-
ity. According to the now-dwindling group of unnatural narratologists, 
explaining this kind of “strange” fiction in terms of “natural” commu-
nication and encyclopedic cognitive structures restricts their interpreta-
tion, and possibly even the very definition of fiction. What if the main 
purpose of literature is not to give us deeper understanding of our im-
mediate social and narcissistic realities but to reach beyond them? Why 
settle for some fellow human’s diary when one might as well engage 
with a narrator who is “an animal, a mythical entity, an inanimate ob-
ject, a machine, a corpse, a sperm, an omniscient first-person narrator, 
or a collection of disparate voices that refuse to coalesce into a single 
narrating presence”? (Alber, Nielsen, and Richardson 2013, 2).
Of course, as most binaries, this terminologically simple opposition 
between “natural” and “unnatural” is not as clear-cut as it might first 
seem. Even though most cognitive narratologists retain realistic skepti-
cism toward our possibilities of escaping beyond human minds’ inherent 
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limits and inclinations, many also share unnatural narratologists’ be-
lief that art can challenge, sharpen, and expand our accustomed pat-
terns of perception, thought, and imagination (Bernaerts et al. 2014). 
In fact, (transmedial) “narrative engagements with nonhuman phenom-
enology” has been named one of the focal areas for cognitive narratol-
ogy by  David Herman (2013). Furthermore, the “second generation” 
of cognitive literary studies also participates in “the affective turn” of 
the humanities (Koivunen 2010) by directing more and more attention 
toward the material and bodily affects and effects of literature, art, and 
media. This investigation of bodily responses and embodied thought 
complicates and complements the centrality of “the mind” established 
by liberal humanism (see Vermeulen 2014), and is likely to highlight pre-
viously ignored continuities between the human, the nonhuman, and the 
posthuman. All in all, narratives, cultures, and their constituents can be 
used as “instruments of mind”, which can help us humans to construct 
more nuanced and ethical relationships not only with each other but also 
with  nonhumans – especially if the mind is understood in an embodied, 
post-Cartesian sense (Herman 2011, 2012, 2018; Varis 2019).
From Storytelling to Co-agency and Unnarratable Matter
Although some critical tools and frameworks for analyzing the complex 
material, social, and textual ways in which humans and nonhumans 
entangle in the production and reception of art, media, and technology 
have begun to emerge, their methodological ramifications and ties to 
the current global troubles are still quite vague. The chapters in this 
book create new gripping surfaces between art, theory, and the world 
by conducting concrete case studies of various contemporary art works 
and cultural phenomena, and by contextualizing them in the Anthropo-
cene or the Chthulucene, in a way that reconfigures artistic representa-
tions into something more than artistic representations. These studies 
and their target texts reach their tentacles (cf. Haraway 2016) across 
the growing masses of environmental humanities, multiple and multidis-
ciplinary posthumanist theorizations, material ecocriticism, cognitive 
narratology, new materialism, and other emerging lines of thought, in 
order to scrutinize what culture and literature, and multifarious aca-
demic approaches to them, bring to the academic and the Anthropocenic 
or Chthulucenic worlds. Literary and cultural studies can thus realize 
and elaborate on Haraway’s claims about systems, stories, and figures by 
demonstrating how these semiotic constructions fit in the ever-changing 
constellations of human and nonhuman entities and environments.
Zooming in to more limited contexts, the theoretical, methodological, 
conceptual, and analytical work done in this anthology could also be 
characterized as inter- or transmedial: theories and methods of literary 
studies are here juxtaposed with and applied to the study of other arts, 
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media, and technology, and vice versa. “Reading” the multimodality 
of other media potentially opens up new ways of viewing language and 
literary texts, while an avid reader or literary scholar might – sometimes 
helpfully and sometimes not – structure the world through the same 
logics and sensibilities they structure texts.
In terms of methodology, many of the chapters in this anthology still 
represent, or at least intersect with, the traditions of literature and lit-
erary studies. Literature and its various institutions have contributed 
heavily to the human-centered cultural legacy, and they have also been 
central agents in implementing and immortalizing the ideas of human-
ism. This does not mean, however, that literature and narrative theory 
have not or could not also be turned around to examine nonhumans – or 
the often simplified and hegemonic conceptions and portrayals of them – 
as well. Many of the chapters in this book are driven by the need to 
inquire what the research of literature can or cannot do, when faced 
with the profound familiarity and incomprehensibility of human and 
 nonhuman others. This meta-disciplinary streak running through the 
entire book ponders on the methodological challenges and possibilities 
literary studies must come to terms with as they enter the interdisciplin-
ary arena, where the burning issues of human–nonhuman entanglements 
are discussed, and where research materials often defy the traditional 
definitions of representation and textuality. Could the methods of liter-
ary research, and the wider cultural studies, grasp material meanings, 
or the materiality of meaning – the ways in which physical bodies, lan-
guageless organisms, nonverbal materials, and encounters signify – and 
if so, how? These questions take the texts, writers, and readers of this 
anthology to the very edges of literary study, and beyond. Many chapters 
grapple with phenomena that are so vast, fleeting, private, emergent, or 
otherwise slippery they are difficult, or even impossible, to verbalize or 
narrativize. Some contributors have thereby opted for discussing multi-
modal forms of art and media that challenge the linguistic and literary 
frameworks, prompting the researchers to hybridize different disciplines 
and approaches.
In short, different media suggest different research questions, research 
methods, and concepts for studying the nonhuman. In addressing liter-
ary, textual, visual, and ludic portrayals of nonhumans, this anthology 
opens up a wide medial field, where the human and the nonhuman can 
be reconfigured from as many perspectives, and with as many textual 
and analytical tools as possible. The first aim of this book, in other 
words, is to connect posthumanist concerns to the entire range of con-
temporary culture and, in doing so, test the transmedial (and trans- 
species) usefulness of the current theories and methods of literary and 
cultural research. The second aim is to analyze the ways in which lit-
erary texts, texts’ “literariness”, and literary theory could rethink or 
reopen ethical and political questions about the human, the nonhuman, 
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and the posthuman in varying communicative and aesthetic contexts. 
On the one hand, literature, in its classic meaning, always exceeds in-
terpretation both on the semantic and the affective level. On the other 
hand, literature and art already incorporate, embody, and detangle such 
unexpected kinships and issues of difference and otherness that the dis-
courses of humanist research, natural sciences, and politics are yet to 
even recognize.
The question remains: what paths could literature and the increasingly 
interdisciplinary research of texts and narratives take in the posthuman 
future? How deep across disciplinary boundaries could posthumanist 
literary study go, and which of its methods and concepts could – and 
should – be exported into other fields, even outside verbality and lan-
guage? The present anthology is meant to ask, rather than to answer, 
these questions, and it does so by offering sample analyses of a wide 
range of research materials. These analyses propose novel, more com-
prehensive, and less anthropocentric ways of reading, interpreting, and 
experiencing various human and nonhuman minds and worlds through 
diverse stories, images, texts, and practices. The multiplicity of nonhu-
man existence and phenomena is, in its various forms, constantly (re)
presented, (re)imagined, and even (re)made across the stories and figures 
of contemporary culture, and humans coming into contact with these 
stories and figures must themselves become reconfigured through the 
processes of interpretation and engagement.
The book is divided into five sections, all of which approach the ten-
sions between literature, culture, narration, meaning-making, and the 
nonhuman slightly differently. The first section focuses on theoretical 
and methodological questions, and its opening chapter, composed by 
Carole Guesse, simply asks if literature can truly be posthuman. First, 
Guesse aims to settle some recurrent confusions around the theories 
of posthumanism and the concept of posthuman. Then, she turns to 
discussing the concept of literature and the posthuman(ist) potentiali-
ties of each of its components and participants: the author, the reader, 
the text, the context, language, medium, and their various aspects. 
Finally, the chapter concludes with a case study on Michel Houellebecq’s 
The Possibility of an Island (2005), a novel that could be considered 
an example of both posthuman and posthumanist literatures, due to 
its genetically engineered clone-narrators – which may furthermore be 
addressing clone-narratees. In the light of Roman Jakobson’s commu-
nication model, these part-human part-nonhuman characters affect the 
narrative and its meanings in various ways. Overall, the chapter partic-
ipates in the timely discussion concerning the possible functions post-
humanism and the posthuman could serve in literary research: are they 
efficient or meaningful tools of literary analysis – and conversely, can 
literary analysis provide new, relevant understanding of posthumanism 
or the posthuman?
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The second chapter, by Karoliina Lummaa, traces the trope of spec-
trality in posthumanist thinking and suggests a new way of reading 
contemporary poetry as a summoning of nonhuman powers. The 
chapter begins with a review of posthumanist readings performed by 
Stefan Herbrechter, Ivan Callus, Neil Badmington, and Tom Cohen, 
all of whom have attempted to deconstruct the ambiguous boundaries 
and differences between human, nonhuman, and inhuman through 
such fictional figures as cyborgs, mutants, and monsters. Drawing on 
the works of N. Katherine Hayles, Aaron M. Moe, Lambros Mala-
fouris, and others, Lummaa amends these previous analyses with a 
new affirmative approach that focuses on nonhuman influence and po-
etic agencies. For the purposes of demonstration, Lummaa goes on to 
apply this new posthumanist way of reading to contemporary Finnish 
digital, visual and sound poetry, including the works of Dan Waber 
and Marko Niemi (2008), Jouni Tossavainen (2007), and Jukka-Pekka 
Kervinen (2008).
The theory-oriented section concludes with Kaisa Kortekallio’s chap-
ter, “Becoming-instrument: Thinking with Jeff VanderMeer’s Annihila-
tion and Timothy Morton’s Hyperobjects”, which considers first-person 
narration and empathic enactment of fictional experience from posthu-
manist and enactivist perspectives. It introduces a new methodological 
device called “becoming-instrument”, which opens the reader’s experi-
ence to nonhuman influences. Building on Marco Caracciolo’s claims 
about empathic engagement with first-person  narratives and Merja 
Polvinen’s notion of self-aware readerly engagement, Kortekallio argues 
that engagement with estranging first- person narratives, such as Anni-
hilation (2014) and Hyperobjects (2013), can work toward dissolving 
the certainty of the human subject and develop in its stead a model 
of subjectivity as “multiple and always-in- progress” (Vint 2005). She 
also maintains that affective experientiality and awareness of fictional-
ity can intertwine in the readerly experience, and that the combination 
of affectivity and self-referentiality is characteristic of the “dark” or 
“weird” ecology VanderMeer and Morton advance in their texts.
The second section, “Imagining Aliens and Monsters”, presents 
three analyses on how nonhuman characters and nonhumans’ lived 
experiences have been, and can be, imagined, reimagined, and simu-
lated in multimodal fictions. In his classic essay, Nagel (1974) argues 
that we are fundamentally unable to imagine what it is like to be a 
bat, because our senses and cognition are structured in a way that is 
uniquely human – whereas bats’ senses and cognition have a uniquely 
bat-like configuration. In spite of this, popular genres from chil-
dren’s literature and fantasy to science-fiction have routinely strived 
to imagine and show what it could be like to be something other 
than  human – and different media have used vastly different means 
to achieve this effect.
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The fourth chapter, “Alien Overtures: Speculating about Nonhuman 
Experiences with Comic Book Characters”, continues the experiential 
line of inquiry introduced in the previous chapter but recombines it with 
the multimodal storytelling of comics and the tricky, anthropomorphiz-
ing concept of the fictional character. More specifically, the article penned 
by Essi Varis explores – first theoretically and then through a cognitive 
analysis of Neil Gaiman and J. H. Williams III’s fantastical graphic 
novel The Sandman: Overture (2015) – whether markedly nonhuman 
comic book characters are able to convey, or at least gesture toward, 
nonhuman experiences. On the one hand, cognitive narrative theory has 
repeatedly underlined that the ways in which we think and speak about 
narratives in general – and characters in particular – are highly subjective 
and, thus, heavy with human bias. On the other hand, the interactions 
between reading minds and experimental or imaginative texts can make 
these limits of our human subjectivity more  visible, and even counteract 
our automatic human-centric assumptions through different techniques 
of defamiliarization and speculation. The  verbal- pictorial hybridity of 
comics, which enables displaying countless different amalgamations of 
human and nonhuman traits and viewpoints, is an especially flexible 
tool for such explorations.
In the fifth chapter, Jonne Arjoranta continues the investigation into 
different medium-specific imaginations by examining how video games 
portray the nonhuman, what kind of assumptions they make about be-
ing nonhuman, and what kind of tools and techniques they use to con-
vey the (imagined) experience of nonhumanness. The analysis focuses 
on Aliens vs. Predator (2010, Rebellion Developments), which features 
three different but intertwined campaigns that allow the player to play 
as a human, an alien, and a predator. The game thereby evokes two 
playing experiences that are supposedly nonhuman, and enables direct 
comparison between them and the “normal” experience of playing as 
human. Like the authors of the previous two chapters, Arjoranta draws 
theoretical support for this discussion from the notion of embodied 
cognition.
In the final chapter of the second section, Marleena Mustola and 
Sanna Karkulehto demonstrate through analyses of Maurice  Sendak’s 
Where the Wild Things Are (1963), Shaun Tan’s “Stick Figures” (in 
Tales of Outer Suburbia, 2009), and Tuutikki Tolonen’s Monster 
Nanny (2017) how monsters in children’s literature embody contempo-
rary  (human) anxieties. In all of these narratives, the fear of difference 
agitates the  human characters to mistreat the characters that represent 
the disempowered other: monsters – and even the monstrous charac-
teristics lurking inside the humans themselves – are squeezed into tight 
closets, creatures evoking existential questions are beaten down to si-
lence, and opportunistic quests are undertaken to tame anything wild 
and unruly. Children and monsters share a similar position in the world 
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dominated by human adults: they are something to be either tamed, pro-
tected, or abused, because they are constructed as different and “other” 
from the hegemonic standard that is the full-grown, healthy (and typi-
cally white) human. Children’s literature thus opens a space where the 
ethical relationships between humans and nonhumans can be radically 
reconfigured.
The third section, “Becoming With Animals”, comprises three chapters 
that discuss humans’ relationships with nonhuman animals – the seman-
tic and material, messy and fleshy becomings, in which we, as fauna, are 
constantly entangled. The section opens with Mikko Keskinen’s chapter, 
which probes the narrational peculiarities of posthumous tales told by 
dogs. The primary target of Keskinen’s analysis is Charles Siebert’s novel 
Angus (2000), a first-person memoir of a dying Jack  Russell terrier. The 
novel presents its canine protagonist Angus as having an outstanding 
command of the English language, whereby it is no surprise that his lin-
eage turns out to be particularly literary. Yet, there are curious idiosyn-
crasies in his parlance, which appear to suggest a uniquely cynomorphic 
language and worldview. Since Angus the dog resides on the border zone 
between human and nonhuman spheres of communication and knowl-
edge, he is a hybrid creature: domesticated, yet wildly unfamiliar. A sim-
ilar hybridity marks Angus the novel: backward narration may appear a 
“natural” analogy to canines’ ability to trail lingering scents, but it also 
results in unnatural and counterfactual effects and storylines.
The eighth chapter, by Brad Bolman, traces the ethically complex 
shared history of humans and pigs, which has encompassed every-
thing from didactic dissections and culinary consumption to artistic 
co- creation. One of the most prominent early anatomy textbooks, the 
Anatomia porci, has puzzled scholars for a long time: why were pigs se-
lected as the main objects of dissection at the dawn of anatomical study? 
Moreover, how could the knowledge of early Roman pig dissection have 
survived the collapse of the Roman Empire, to reappear centuries later 
in Salerno, Italy? Inter-species anatomical knowledge has traveled with 
and through the bodies of hogs between the Greco-Roman and Islam-
icate worlds for centuries. At first, this circulation emphasized the role 
of edibility, until it turned into more philosophical debates concerning 
human– animal difference, as in the writings of Gilles Deleuze and Félix 
Guattari, Donna Haraway, and Charles Foster. After reviewing these 
lengthy and intersecting lines of scholarly discussion on pigs,  Bolman 
concludes his chapter with an analysis of contemporary artist Miru 
Kim’s work, which explores the fleshy similarities between humans and 
hogs through extended nude performances.
Next, Hana Porkertová’s chapter, “Reconfiguring Human and Non-
human Animals in a Guiding Assemblage: Toward Posthumanist Con-
ception of Disability”, examines how the relationships between human 
and nonhuman animals can affect the experience and the notion of 
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disability. The chapter is based on ethnographic observations of and in-
terviews with a visually impaired woman called Eva and her guide dog 
Nessie, whose experiences are discussed within the framework of the 
Deleuzo-Guattarian theory of assemblage. In the traditional humanist 
paradigm, conceptualizations of nonhumanity and disability are built 
on assumptions of human superiority as well as on negative dialectics of 
identity, opposition, analogy, and resemblance. These conceptual con-
structs are challenged by the assemblage formed by Eva and  Nessie, since 
an assemblage is always created through dynamic, mutual  processes, 
which have no beginning and no end, no leaders nor followers. In other 
words, the “guide team” is effective only when the humanist perspec-
tive, and its dichotomic view on the relationships between human and 
nonhuman animals, is disrupted. Employing the notion of assemblage in 
conceptual thinking thus entails the subversion of the modern concept 
of borders as well as of such related concepts as body, autonomy, and 
independence.
The fourth section, “Technological (Co-)Agencies”, seeks to describe 
different (possible) relations between us humans and our own mechani-
cal creations. Cléo Collomb and Samuel Goyet’s “Meeting the Machine 
Halfway: Toward Non-Anthropocentric Semiotics” highlights the nar-
row conceptions of machines that we circulate in our daily lives, and 
proposes a reconfiguration to this relationship. The chapter opens with 
a semiotic analysis of one page of Google Search results, the purpose of 
which is to demonstrate how habitually and reductively machines are 
viewed as simple tools whose functioning is represented in terms that 
serve humans specifically. The second part of the chapter endeavors to 
describe the agency of machines in their own terms, as a specific mode 
of action. This computational agency can be made visible, for example, 
by analyzing the ways in which we think of writing: machines allow hu-
mans to write, but they are also capable of writing themselves – even if 
their writing is computational, rather than verbal, and thus unreadable 
to (most) humans. If one wishes to uncover the marks of computers’ 
agency, one should target the semiotic characteristics of “computa-
tional writing”, such as bugs or glitches, rather than the human-friendly, 
human- designed interfaces.
Marleena Huuhka’s chapter, “Journeys in Intensity: Human and 
Nonhuman Co-Agency, Neuropower, and Counterplay in Minecraft”, 
revisits Chapter 9’s idea that the relations between humans and non-
humans could be viewed as a type of Deleuzo-Guattarian assemblage, 
and explores the human–machine cooperation conducted in the digital 
environments of Minecraft from this perspective. Playing video games is 
thus described as an activity that combines various agents, materialities, 
and species into operations that produce pleasure, but which – at the 
same time – also enable oppressive, colonialist, and violent practices in-
side as well as outside of the fictional worlds of the games. The chapter’s 
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argumentation draws especially on the concept of counterplay, which 
refers to the type of gameplay that somehow obstructs the rules or goals 
of the game being played. The concept has been previously discussed by 
Thomas Apperley as well as by Hanna Wirman and Rika Nakamura, but 
here, Huuhka identifies two entirely new practices of counterplay that 
allow, or even aim at, deconstructing the inherent logics of videogames.
The twelfth chapter, authored by Patricia Flanagan and Raune 
Frankjær, explores how the evolution of wearable technology blurs the 
boundaries of the body. The writers propose that emergent wearable 
technologies, which augment human perception and sensual capacity, 
may come to expand or alter our understanding of what it truly means 
to be human, and thus foster new, interconnected ways of understand-
ing our place within the Neganthropocene. Building on the writings 
of Rosi Braidotti, Karen Barad, Donna Haraway, Bernard Stiegler, 
 Peter-Paul Verbeek, and Bruno Latour, the chapter arrives at a theory 
of  “cyborganic wearables”, where the concept of “cyborganic” describes 
a fictional posthuman entity, a hybrid of human, nature, and machine. 
Such a figure, through its relation to cyborganic mutation and creativity, 
calls for a reconfiguration of humanness itself – a new conceptualiza-
tion that would lay a more sustainable foundation for humanity’s self- 
understanding in the future.
Finally, in the concluding chapter of the volume, Juha Raipola en-
quires how we – as humans and as literary or cultural scholars – could 
make sense of the emergent, self-organizing capacities of the nonhuman 
material world. The chapter returns to the insights of cognitive narra-
tology introduced in Chapters 3–5, and uses them to reassess material 
ecocriticism’s notion of “storied matter”. Contrary to the recent claims 
that nonhuman matter has narrative agency, Raipola asserts that matter 
consists of countless emergent processes, which can never be reduced to 
their narrative representations. When the more-than-human world is in-
terpreted through a narrative lens, one must always remain wary of the 
basic human tendency to reduce complex emergent behavior into sim-
plified anthropocentric storylines. Instead of joining in celebrating the 
endless “narrative” agency of matter, the chapter thus concludes that it 
might often prove more fruitful to analyze the numerous ways in which 
different nonhuman material entities escape and defy our human desire 
for narrative logics and descriptions.
“If we want to respect the creativity of matter in its own terms, we 
have to acknowledge that its numerous agencies are not performing sto-
ries for the human audience, but exist and act of their own accord”, 
Raipola writes. “No matter how hard we try to fit this world into our 
cultural landscape of narrative sense-making, a major part of its behav-
ior always remains unreachable”. Each reader of this anthology is, of 
course, free to interpret this (lack of) closure as either resignation or a 
challenge.
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After a 2015 conference speech entitled “Posthumanist Literature?” 
Stefan Herbrechter, author of several articles and monographs on post-
humanism and the posthuman, was asked to name a novel that was, 
according to him, posthuman. He answered that he had not found any 
posthumanist literature yet, that “it would be literature written by stones 
[…] or based on animal traces”. This answer epitomizes some of the main 
issues regarding the scholarship on posthumanism and the posthuman: 
on the one hand, “posthumanism” and the “posthuman” are sometimes 
confused and used interchangeably;1 on the other hand, such understand-
ing of the posthuman as a biological other (stones, animals) is incom-
plete. In their Post- and Transhumansim: An Introduction,  Ranisch and 
Sorgner (2014, 8) indeed insist upon the plurality of this figure: “there 
is no commonly shared conception of what posthumans are, and visions 
range from the posthuman as a new biological species, a cybernetic 
organism, or even a digital, disembodied entity”. Acknowledging this 
plurality is the only way to cope with the variety of (sometimes contra-
dictory) writings dedicated to posthumanism and the posthuman.
Clearly, the issue of posthuman and posthumanist literatures remains 
debatable. This chapter reassesses the possibility of such literatures with, 
on the one hand, a clarification of the concepts of posthumanism and the 
posthuman, and, on the other hand, a methodology based upon literary 
and communication theories. Precisely, this study dissects the concept 
of “literature” basing itself on Paul Ricœur’s understanding of Roman 
Jakobson’s communication theory and then discusses the possibility for 
these various aspects of literature to be posthuman or posthumanist. As 
an illustration, it also uses The Possibility of an Island (2005) by Michel 
Houellebecq, a novel in which genetically enhanced clones live secluded 
lives, spend their time reading and commenting on their ancestors’ au-
tobiography, and sometimes, consequently, tell a bit of their own story. 
By contemplating the possibility of posthuman and posthumanist litera-
tures, this chapter considers whether posthumanism and the posthuman 
can serve as efficient and meaningful analytical tools for literary anal-
ysis, and vice versa: namely, whether a literary perspective can provide 
new insights on posthumanism and the posthuman.





Intuitively, the posthuman is a figure born from the concerns over what 
might happen to humankind now that technology provides ways of 
modifying, enhancing, or even wiping out humans. Economic, social, 
environmental, and technological upheavals have given humans reasons 
to anticipate – whether hopefully or fearfully – times when humankind 
would no longer be what it used to be. While the possibility of modifying 
and enhancing the human body has been conceivable since the advent 
of genetics in the early twentieth century, the launch of the first atomic 
bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945 forced most thinkers to con-
template the possible destruction of humankind. The posthuman epito-
mizes those hopes and fears, and has prompted several discourses over 
the last few decades that are optimistic, pessimistic, or critical toward 
the use of technology on the human body.
Transhumanists are a group of scholars and scientists who adopt an 
optimistic attitude toward technology since “[t]ranshumanism affirms 
the use of techniques to increase the likelihood of bringing about the 
posthuman” (Sorgner 2014, 30).2 The technophobics (or “techno- 
conservatives”), for their part, do not form a group as established as the 
transhumanists, although Francis Fukuyama is often considered one of 
their most famous representatives, with his book defending the human 
nature (Our Posthuman Future: Consequences of the Biotechnology 
Revolution 2002) and his article defining “Transhumanism” (2004) as 
one of the world’s most dangerous ideas. Lastly, between these two ideo-
logically opposed discourses stands posthumanism, a critical movement 
as plural as the posthuman itself.
In the fields of philosophy and cultural theory, posthuman characters 
have often leaned toward the abstract and the metaphorical, such as 
in Donna Haraway’s 1984 “A Cyborg Manifesto”, in which she uses a 
posthuman character – the “cyborg” – partly to discuss women’s con-
dition in the late twentieth century. Many scholars consider Haraway’s 
writings to be the cradle of the sociological and philosophical trend la-
beled “posthumanism”,3 especially with the following quotation: “Late- 
twentieth-century machines have made thoroughly ambiguous the 
difference between natural and artificial, mind and body, self- developing 
and externally designed, and many other distinctions that used to apply 
to organisms and machines” (Haraway 2004, 11). This overcoming of 
traditional distinctions is precisely the focus of Stefan Lorenz Sorgner 
(2014, 32) when he defines posthumanism:
Posthumanism represents the attempt to get rid of categorical du-
alities within any type of judgment, as it is being regarded as most 
plausible that thereby the complexity of the world is grasped best 
within propositional form.
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Posthumanists therefore have a different understanding of “posthu-
man”, especially since Katherine Hayles’s (1999, 291) famous “we’ve 
always been posthuman”, which Sorgner (2014, 33) reformulates as 
“we have always been dependent on technologies and there is no clear 
cut categorical distinction between nature and culture, genetic and 
environmental influences or nature and technology”. This chapter, 
however, considers that the posthuman is primarily and more gener-
ally a figure, a character whose interpretation changes according to 
the discourses (transhumanism and posthumanism, amongst others) 
that use it.
Simultaneously, other scholars, including Rosi Braidotti, situate the 
origin of posthumanism in the French anti-humanism of the 1960s, pro-
moted by Michel Foucault and his “Death of Man”, which was the-
orized in The Order of Things (1966). Braidotti (2013, 23) explains 
that anti-humanists reject “the implicit Humanism of Marxism, more 
specifically the humanistic arrogance of continuing to place Man at 
the centre of world history”. To posthumanists, the outdated concept 
is  humanism and anthropocentrism, that is to say humankind’s excep-
tionalism and central position in a system of values that is criticized for 
being exclusively Western rather than universal. According to Braidotti, 
posthumanist theory can develop in two directions: posthumanism and 
post-anthropocentrism. These currents undermine the supremacy of 
Man, respectively, as “white, urbanized, speaking a standard language, 
heterosexually inscribed in a reproductive unit and a full citizen of a 
recognized polity” and as a “hierarchical, hegemonic and generally vi-
olent species”. This supremacy is held, in the first case, against “sexual-
ized and racialized others”, that is, women and non-whites, and in the 
second, “naturalized others”, such as “animals, insects, plants and the 
environment” (Ibid. 65–66).
However, the overwhelming majority of posthumanist writings actually 
discuss issues related to Braidotti’s so-called “post- anthropocentrism”, 
which somehow questions the relevance of her categorization. More-
over, as Ranisch and Sorgner (2014, 8) explain, such attitude of decon-
struction was already part of postmodernism; posthumanism indeed 
perpetuates this critical movement, yet with “a specific focus on (emerg-
ing) technologies”. This chapter retains this emphasis on technology 
for posthumanism as well as the posthuman; a posthuman can there-
fore be a (bio)technologically enhanced being but not an actual organic 
nonhuman species such as animals and plants. One must acknowledge, 
however, that the posthuman is not necessarily a futuristic speculative 
figure such as a cyborg, a mutant, or a robot. Many thinkers indeed con-
sider that some of the already-existing (bio)technologies – for example, 
surgical transplants, prostheses, neuropharmacology, or the ubiquitous 
devices connecting us to the Internet – are already turning humans into 
posthumans.
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Literature and Its Constituents
Such a terminological clarification is the first step in this investigation 
on the possibility of posthuman/ist literature(s). The next step is the 
 definition – and in this case the dissection – of the concept of “litera-
ture” itself, which has never ceased to prompt interrogations and theo-
ries since the Antiquity, resulting in an unfathomable amount of writing 
to cover, should one aim for exhaustiveness. For the sake of conciseness, 
this chapter bases its reflection on Jakobson’s “constitutive factors in any 
speech event, in any act of verbal communication” (1960, 353), which 
were schematized as follows (Figure 1.1).
Paul Ricœur has noted that this model could not fully apply to litera-
ture since it is an indirect mode of communication (Vultur 2011, 247). 
The “addresser” and the “addressee” are not in physical contact and thus 
do not share the same socio-historical context, which results in the dupli-
cation of contexts, the author’s and the reader’s, which creates a discrep-
ancy in the understanding of the “message”. Moreover, literature features 
“various possible enunciative agents”: the “addresser” is not only the em-
pirical author but also the narrator, who can be the implied author, an 
omniscient narrator, or a character. Similarly, the “addressee” is not only 
the empirical reader but also the narratee, who can be an implied reader 
or a character (Hébert 2011).4 The “message” is, in this literary context, 
the narrative but also the story that this narrative features,5 while the 
“code” is traditionally written language, even though many works fea-
ture other “codes” – for example, images or, in the case of digital litera-
ture, videos. Similarly, the “contact” is likely to be a book, but not in all 
cases, as demonstrated below. While Jakobson used his model to explore 
the relationship between the “message” and each of the six categories, 
this study uses its literary version to explore the validity of each factor 
when modified with the adjectives “posthuman” or “posthumanist”.
In “Posthumanist Literature?” Herbrechter considers modalities to 
the realization of posthumanist literature: on the one hand, it should go 
beyond the limits of language, “a primary constituent of human nature” 
(Garber qtd. in Herbrechter 2015, 2), which makes literature deprived 
of human language and human agency quite unlikely. On the other 
Figure 1.1  Jakobson’s “constitutive factors” in speech events and any acts of 
verbal communication (Jakobson 1960, 353).
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hand, literature is declining in favor of a “new media and virtual reality 
technology and might therefore be no longer at the forefront of cultural 
change and innovation” which renders “the phrase ‘posthumanist litera-
ture’” contradictory (Herbrechter 2015, 5–6). While Herbrechter (2015, 
8) considers posthuman literature as purely thematic – the posthuman 
only being able to influence, according to the framework developed 
earlier, the factor of the story – he apprehends posthumanist literature 
according to several factors – language, context, and book – but even-
tually acknowledges the impossibility for the concept to exist. His un-
derstanding of posthumanism implies that the human cannot play any 
part in the process of creating posthumanist literature, which turns this 
concept into a theoretical dead-end based on an apparently unsolvable 
contradiction. The purpose of this chapter is to overcome this dead-end 
by reconsidering posthumanist and posthuman literatures based upon a 
clearer and stronger theoretical and literary background.
Production and Reception Contexts
As mentioned, literature is an indirect mode of communication; this in-
directness implies that the context of writing and the context of read-
ing differ in terms of both time and place. The Possibility of an Island 
creates a mise en abyme of this indirectness: Daniel, a late-twentieth or 
early twenty-first-century stand-up comedian, writes his autobiography, 
each chapter of which is followed by a comment from Daniel’s clone 
(first Daniel24, then, when the latter dies, Daniel25), who reads this 
autobiography centuries later. The discrepancy between Daniel’s context 
and that of his clones – a post-cataclysmic future where humankind is 
on the verge of extinction – is, of course, central to the plot: Daniel was 
asked to write his autobiography in order to pass his memories on to his 
successive clones, but the 24th and 25th clones’ context of reading is so 
different from Daniel’s that they hardly understand and sympathize with 
their ancestor. The remaining humans have indeed returned to a primi-
tive, inarticulate, and tribal state of life, thus preventing understanding 
between them and the clones, who almost regard them as animals:
I simply consider them to be slightly more intelligent monkeys, and, 
for this reason, more dangerous. There are times when I unlock the 
fence to rescue a rabbit, or a stray dog; but never to bring help to a 
human.
(Houellebecq 2005, 17)
Moreover, the clones live alone and secluded in their homes, with the 
Internet as their only means of communication with other clones, which 
makes this 2005 novel rather visionary in the way it echoes the current 
importance of social networks. Houellebecq’s context of writing was 
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already highly technological – he was himself a computer engineer – and 
the role of technology in life and society is only likely to increase over 
the next decades. As mentioned, technology and its achievements are 
precisely the focus of the theories on posthumanism, and even more so 
those on the posthuman. Whether the author or the reader of a literary 
work is situated in a posthuman context depends on how enthusiastic 
and optimistic one is about current technologies. Some may indeed con-
sider that the current ubiquity of technology is a sign that we nowadays 
live in a posthuman context. In parallel, given the increasing questioning 
of human exceptionalism that the last three decades have featured, there 
is no doubt that they can be qualified as posthumanist.
Speculating about posthuman and posthumanist contexts of literary 
production and reception is hardly possible without alluding to the peo-
ple living in this context: a posthuman or posthumanist context of writ-
ing would be a context in which writers are, respectively, posthuman 
or posthumanist. Similarly, the possibility of such a context of reading 
entails discussing the possibility of a posthuman or posthumanist reader 
altogether.
Readers and their Readings
In “What is a Posthumanist Reading?” (2008), Herbrechter and Callus 
put forward the following characteristics:
[A] posthumanist reading […] focuses on the ambiguities around 
the human […][,] can strategically exploit the ambiguity of the term 
posthumanism […] [,] can evaluate examples of posthuman repre-
sentation in terms of their potential for a critical post-humanism […] 
[,] may be critical of both representations of the posthuman and of 
humanism, and instead envisages the human as something or some-
one that remains to arrive, as a potential that remains to be defined 
or realised […] [,] can nevertheless resist technological determin-
ism and posthuman teleology, and contemplate a “posthumanism 
without technology” (Herbrechter and Callus 2008 passim.) […] [,] 
may identify oppositions between the human and the nonhuman at 
work in a text or practice and demonstrate how the vital difference 
between the two has to be strategically breached in order to trouble 
protection of the “essential” purity of the category.
(Herbrechter and Callus 2008, 96–97)
Such characteristics allow the production of a posthumanist read-
ing of almost any text, and not only those written in the speculative 
mode. In other words, works that do not necessarily feature posthu-
man characters or issues might still provoke posthumanist readings. 
Such a tendency is displayed in Wallace’s DH Lawrence, Science and 
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the Posthuman  (2005); Herbrechter and Callus’s Cy-Borges: Memo-
ries of the Posthuman in the Work of Jorge Luis Borges (2009); Her-
brechter’s Posthumanist Shakespeares (2012); and Clarke and Rossini’s 
Cambridge Companion to Literature and the Posthuman (2017), which 
contains chapters on medieval, early modern, and romantic literatures. 
Even if a posthumanist reading does not necessarily require a posthu-
man character, the presence of a posthuman character in a novel is very 
likely to engender a posthumanist reading of the novel. Such is the case 
of The Possibility of an Island, which has been the object of various 
posthumanist readings since its publishing, mainly because of the inclu-
sion of bioengineered clones in its plot.6
However, at the beginning of their article, the authors address the 
following question:
how is it possible to read as if one were not human, or at least from 
a position of analytical detachment in relation to the humanity – 
whether “essential” or “constructed” – that informs and determines 
the very position from which it is read? What would be the nature of 
such an “unnatural” reading?
(Herbrechter and Callus 2008, 95)
While in the rest of their article, they use “reading” as “a particular 
interpretation of something”, this question rather insists on “reading” 
as “the act of reading” (s.v. “Reading”, Merriam-Webster), which em-
phasizes the presence of an agent, the reader. Through this question, 
the concept that they are actually investigating is not a “posthumanist 
reading” but a posthuman reader, a reader who should be able to pre-
tend that it is not human, which leads them to the same dead-end that 
Herbrechter faced in his 2015 presentation.
The 2008 article, which thus uses the phrase “posthumanist reading” 
to allude to both the posthumanist interpretation and the posthuman 
reader, exemplifies, again, the importance of differentiating between 
“posthumanist” as a discourse and “posthuman” as a figure. A post-
humanist reader is a reader who is familiar with the issues of posthu-
manism, which allows them to produce posthumanist interpretations of 
many literary works. A posthuman reader is a reader who is a posthu-
man, that is to say a (bio)technologically enhanced human, such as the 
clones in The Possibility of an Island, who are the readers of their ances-
tor’s autobiography as well as other theoretical, philosophical, and sci-
entific human works. Of course, being posthuman influences the reading 
they might produce of these human writings. Similarly, one could also 
speculate about posthuman readers in real life: in “The Posthuman 
Reader in Postprint Literature: Between Page and Screen”, Jessica Press-
man (2015, 55) explains that digital literature is forcing us to be post-
human readers because “reading [Between Page and Screen] requires a 
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sophisticated digital apparatus: an Internet connection, a webcam, the 
right flash-based software upgrades, and, of course, the book containing 
the Qr codes”. The digitality of the work does not transform readers into 
posthumans but instead makes them realize that they had been posthu-
man all along, even before the reading.
Posthumanist and Posthuman Authors
Just as a reader can be posthumanist as long as they are familiar with 
posthumanist theories, an author can self-consciously write a posthu-
manist work. One could argue that some contemporary writers have 
been influenced by the omnipresence of posthumanism in recent theory 
and might have developed their narratives in order to make a posthu-
manist statement or even contribute to this theoretical trend, although 
this assumption is often hard to prove when the authors have not de-
clared so themselves.
The Possibility of an Island was written in 2005, an era of increasing 
awareness of the possibilities of (bio)technology to modify humankind, 
which has been reflected in the increasing number of publications on 
posthumanism and the posthuman.7 Carole Sweeney (2013, 157) notes 
that Houellebecq’s 1998 novel Atomised was already written at a time 
when “there was much intellectual interest in posthumanism”. Houel-
lebecq must have been influenced by both the constant technological 
progress and the philosophical and critical discourse inspired by this 
progress. Yet one cannot state with certainty that the posthumanist 
trend, which questions human supremacy and exceptionality as well as 
categorical ontological dualisms, has directly influenced him.
Posthumanist authors are very much human, but the perspective of a 
posthuman author still belongs, according to many, to fiction. Yet our 
current reality might in fact feature instances of posthuman authors. 
Some AI technologies can indeed imitate human communication as long 
as they have been programmed to do so – which still involves a form 
of human agency. Many researchers in computer science and narratol-
ogy have been combining their knowledge to create “story generators”, 
which are programs that can create a story, sometimes according to the 
rules of a certain genre (epic, romance, thriller, to name only a few), by 
simply following a previously established pattern. Gervás and his co- 
authors note that finding this pattern has precisely been the core issue for 
these researchers. Some of them have used Vladimir Propp’s 1968 nar-
rative morphological models, established through the study of Russian 
folktales. Others have used Joseph Campbell’s 1968 structure of myths 
or Chatman’s 1978 adaptation of Campbell to literature and films. Some 
scientists also used Robert McKee’s 1997 narrative model. All of these 
models inspired the creation of AIs capable of writing stories (Gervás 
et  al. 2006). One could consider these AIs to be posthuman writers, 
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even though Gervás et al. (2006) established that none of the existing 
programs had managed to cope with the necessary ambiguities that add 
aesthetic value to a random narrative. Nevertheless, this does not totally 
deprive these nonhuman writers from their authorial status; many novels 
might just as well not display any aesthetic value and, according to some, 
do not qualify as “Literature” (with emphasis on the capital “L”), al-
though others (publishers and booksellers, for example) may label these 
allegedly low-brow novels as “literature”. The possibility of a posthuman 
author therefore depends on one’s own understanding of the nature of 
literature. Moreover, since this 2006 article, computer engineers have 
made substantial progress on AIs: in Japan, in 2016, a novel written by 
an AI passed the first round of a literary contest (Lewis 2016) and one 
of Google’s AIs has been writing poetry of relative quality (Gibbs 2016).
Signifiers Keeping Up: Language, Books, and Narrative
Literature and language seem to be inseparable concepts, especially in the 
perspective of Jakobson’s theory of communication: a common “code” 
between the “addresser” and the “addressee” guarantees the circulation 
of the “message”. Language is “a primary constituent of human nature” 
(Garber 2003, 264, qtd. in Herbrechter 2015, 2), but a posthumanist 
gesture would consist in bypassing such statement by considering the 
possibility of posthuman language. For example, computer code might 
be regarded as the language of the technological posthuman. Computers 
are, however, man-made machines, and so is the language they use to 
communicate, not only with each other but also with humans. Kather-
ine Hayles (1999, 15) confirms that the “addressees of code […] include 
intelligent machines as well as humans”. Posthumanists – and transhu-
manists, for that matter – do consider the possibility of machines break-
ing free from their human creators and starting to use a language of 
their own, impenetrable by humans. This would be a symptom of the 
long predicted – and feared – singularity: that moment when “the ordi-
nary human is […] overtaken by artificially intelligent machines or by 
cognitively enhanced biological intelligence and unable to keep pace” 
(Shanahan 2015, xvi). The narrator of The Possibility of an Island seems 
to be aware of the ambiguity regarding human agency in technology: 
“This book is intended for the edification of the Future Ones. Men, they 
will tell themselves, were able to produce this. It is not nothing; it is not 
everything; we are dealing with an intermediary production” (Houelle-
becq 2005, 7). This sentence acknowledges both the role of humans in 
creating “The Future Ones” and the incompleteness of their work.
A post-anthropocentric perspective (which may be confused with 
posthumanism) on language can also provide interesting conclusions 
on the possibility of, if not posthuman, at least nonhuman literature. 
It might seem grotesque to state that animals, plants, minerals, or the 
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environment can actually produce literature. A humanist or anthropo-
centric perspective would provide the aforementioned explanation that 
language, and thus literature, are primarily human: a “message” com-
municated by a nonhuman “addresser” in a nonhuman code will not be 
understood by a human “addressee” and cannot qualify as literature. A 
post-anthropocentric perspective would, on the contrary, acknowledge 
humankind’s inability to ever know whether animals, plants, microor-
ganisms, or minerals send “messages” that lay emphasis on themselves – 
such as suggested by Jakobson with the “poetic function of language”, 
the predominance of which guarantees the work’s aestheticism, hence 
legitimacy as Literature. These messages may simply not be formulated 
in a language humans can understand – let alone print in a book.
Many posthumanists indeed regard printing as the emblematic insti-
tution of humanism that is bound to disappear in the digital era. The 
digitalization of publishing processes, and, more precisely, the rise of 
the e-book, might indeed threaten the materiality of the paper book but, 
despite its digitality and disembodiment, the e-book provokes the same 
reading habits as the printed book: one still reads linearly (from the first 
to the last page), in a range of places and situations. In this perspec-
tive, the e-book is but a mere modernization, not a true questioning of 
the printed book. Other undertakings do question the materiality of the 
book and its consequences on the reading experience and interpretation 
in a more profound way. The hypertext, for instance, is not a simple 
digitalization of a pre-existing paper novel, but a kind of literature that 
has been exclusively created for computers. In Shelley Jackson’s notable 
Patchwork Girl (1995), the reader is presented with windows display-
ing a text full of hyperlinks that lead to other texts with other links.8 
Hypertexts allow various reading paths, making each reading practi-
cally unique and enhancing the role of the reader in the production of 
meaning. In some cases, the computer can also generate random reading 
patterns, which implies that meaning production can be co-dependent 
on the reader and the machine, a nonhuman entity. This could be a step 
further toward both posthuman and posthumanist literature.
As far as its publishing process and its format are concerned, The Pos-
sibility of an Island is a very traditional novel. Published in French by 
Fayard in the collection Livre de Poche, a large mainstream collection 
that has no particular ties to any literary genre, The Possibility of an 
Island does not bear any idiosyncrasy compared to other printed books. 
One could argue, however, that its structure, which alternates between 
chapters narrated by Daniel and chapters narrated by his clones, in-
vites readers to change their reading paths, by choosing to read only 
the clones’ chapters and skip the rest, or inversely. Susannah Ellis ar-
gues further that the multiplication of narrators (Daniel, Daniel24, and 
Daniel25)9 echoes the repetitions in the novel as well as that of Houel-
lebecq’s other novel, Atomised. Cloning as a thematic motif turns into 
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a narrative, diegetic, and even intertextual motif; The Possibility of an 
Island might be a clone of Atomised (Ellis 2014, 148–149), which might 
itself be a clone of Houellebecq’s previous novel Whatever (1994).
Speculative Fiction
As this chapter exemplifies, critics and theoreticians rarely manage to 
keep speculation at bay when considering issues as futuristic as the post-
human. Novelists, for their part, can happily indulge in such an activity, 
for the worlds they choose to depict abide by their own laws. If reader, 
author, language, book, and context refer to entities belonging to our 
empirical universe, narratee, narrator, characters are entities of the uni-
verse of reference,10 a fictional universe in which the story takes place.
In adapting Jakobson’s “addressee” and “addresser”, the reader and 
author must be completed with their fictional versions, the narratee and 
the narrator, who, unlike their factual counterparts, can be posthuman 
(clones, robots, AIs, mutants, etc.) as long as the universe of reference 
allows it. The posthuman narrator and narratee help the readers accept 
the unnatural laws of a fictional universe by inviting them to see things 
through their posthuman perspective.
As already suggested, many stories can be read from a posthumanist 
perspective, whether this story challenges the categories and borders of 
the human in an obvious way (as in speculative fiction) or more discreetly. 
This implies that these stories – especially the oldest, non- speculative 
ones – are not always intrinsically posthumanist; they only become 
posthumanist, thanks to a contemporary posthumanist interpretation. 
Speculative stories, on the contrary, can be intrinsically posthuman-
ist since they are more likely to feature tropes and characters – actual 
 posthumans – that question or dilute the borders between the human 
and the nonhuman. In such speculative works, a posthumanist interpre-
tation might seem almost inescapable – almost. Many speculative stories, 
especially the most popular ones,11 actually do not invoke a posthuman-
ist discourse but, on the contrary, reinforce a dominant, humanist, and 
anthropocentric argument. Herbrechter and Callus (2008, 98) write:
There are what might be called “posthuman moments” in science 
fiction. They more or less deliberately threaten the integrity of a 
given “human essence” and are fetishistically indulged in, but all too 
often they are in the end closed off by the reaffirmation and recon-
firmation of the human on a different plane.
In other words, the presence of a posthuman initially questions the es-
sentiality of humanity, which it might end up reaffirming. A story featur-
ing posthuman characters, or at least the possibility of posthuman life, 
can either be posthumanist or humanist or even both at the same time.
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If the posthumanist potential of a story is connected to the presence of 
posthuman characters, one wonders about the influence of such charac-
ters on the story and the narrative. The most obvious impact is thematic; 
dealing with posthumans implies the recurrence of certain topics such as 
the essence of humanity, human dignity, alterity, ethics, and technology. 
A posthuman character might also have a formal impact on the narra-
tive when, for example, the narrator of a novel is a posthuman, as in 
The Possibility of an Island:
The first time I met Marie22 was on a cheap Spanish server; the 
connection times were appallingly long.
The weariness brought on
By the old dead Dutchman
Is not something attested
Well before the master’s return.
2711, 325104, 13375317, 452626. At the address indicated I was 
shown an image of her pussy—jerky, pixelated, but strangely real. 
Was she alive, dead or an intermediary? Most likely an intermedi-
ary, I think; but it was something you did not talk about.
(Houellebecq 2005, 4)
In this extract, narrated by a clone, Houellebecq seems to be using lines 
of numbers to imitate computer language, and more precisely the server 
connection process. It has been suggested earlier that such an attempt 
at imitating computer code is not entirely a posthumanist gesture, since 
computer code is a language invented by humans to guarantee successful 
communication with the machine and amongst the machine themselves.
The lines in this passage, which is around the beginning of the novel, 
seem to emulate more than a connection between the clone narrator 
and other clones on the Internet; it may also express the attempted con-
nection between the narrator and his readers, who seem to be explicitly 
addressed a few pages later: “I do not want to keep you outside this 
book; living or dead, you are readers. Reading is done outside of me; 
and I want it to be done—in this way, in silence” (Houellebecq 2005, 7). 
Since, in that post-apocalyptic future, the human species has returned 
to a primitive way of life, clones are the only species that is still able to 
process writing, able to be readers. Yet real-life readers do not know that 
the characters are posthuman at that point of the novel, which is why 
the use of the word “readers” creates an ambiguity that invites actual 
readers to take on the role of the narratees and therefore tricks them into 
identifying with the actual posthuman narratees.
This extract also epitomizes several of the oppositions that post-
humanism interrogates. Computer code contrasts with the poem, 
which corresponds to a more traditional and ancient form of writing. 
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The presence of the machine contrasts with the depiction of organic, 
even carnal, elements (“pussy”, “jerky”), which is accompanied by an 
opposition between the disembodied digital (“pixelated”) and the em-
bodied “real”. The question “Was she alive, dead or an intermediary?” 
(Houellebecq 2005, 4) adds the dead/alive dualism as another layer of 
opposition. The narrative thus associates, on the one hand, organic, em-
bodied, and alive, and, on the other hand, mechanic, disembodied, and 
dead but seems to imply that clones are in-between (“an intermediary”). 
This could echo a posthumanist discourse were it not for the presence of 
“alive” and “dead”, whose respective positive and negative connotations 
affect the other terms. The lack of neutrality and the praise, although 
discreet, of the organic and embodied maintain a reactionary and an-
thropocentric discourse. This uncertainty about whether this novel 
fosters a posthumanist discourse continues until its very ending, where 
Daniel25 follows Maries23’s footsteps and leaves his home with his dog 
in order to search for a neohuman community where he could reconnect 
with a more human lifestyle. Throughout his journey, Daniel25 encoun-
ters primitive human beings and does not hide his contempt for them. 
These humans kill his dog, which leads him to experience sorrow for the 
first time, making him realize the nature of love. Following this trauma-
tizing event, Daniel25 decides to lie down on the sand:
I had perhaps sixty years left to live; more than twenty thousand 
days that would be identical. I would avoid thought in the same way 
I would avoid suffering. The pitfalls of life were far behind me; I had 
now entered a peaceful space from which only the lethal process 
would separate me.
I bathed for a long time under the sun and the starlight, and I felt 
nothing other than a slightly obscure and nutritive sensation. Hap-
piness was not a possible horizon. The world had betrayed. My body 
belonged to me for only a brief lapse of time; I would never reach 
the goal I had been set. The future was empty; it was the mountain. 
My dreams were populated with emotional presences. I was, I was 
no longer. Life was real.
(Houellebecq 2005, 423)
According to Posthumus and Sinclair (2011, 352–353), Daniel25 left 
looking for a more emotional existence and eventually finds it through 
experiencing sadness for the first time. In the end, he reaches a state 
of continual ecstasy; he is himself and everything revolves around him. 
His search for a more human lifestyle and an emotional existence con-
veys the anthropocentric idea that emotions are the essence of human-
ity, which reinforces the idea of human exceptionality. He eventually 
never finds a community but seems to accept the isolation of what re-
mains of his existence. He seems paradoxically relieved of, on the one 
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hand, leaving his ascetic home to experience love and pain (“My dreams 
were populated with emotional presences”), and, on the other, knowing 
that he will not have to experience them ever again, that “the future 
[is] empty”. His journey stops there; he settles for an existence of pure 
sensation instead of seeking further for companionship. In parallel, the 
novel conveys a constant critique of humanity and the praise for dogs – 
“Goodness, compassion, fidelity and altruism therefore remain for us 
impenetrable mysteries, contained, however, within the limited space of 
the corporeal exterior of a dog” (Houellebecq 2005, 63), which seems, if 
not really posthumanist, at least misanthropic.
The novel therefore appears to be generally torn between posthuman-
ism and anthropocentrism, as the following extract attests: “Marie22, if 
she exists, is a woman to the same extent that I am a man; to a limited, 
refutable extend. I too am approaching the end of my journey” (Houel-
lebecq 2005, 7). This primarily implies that the biotechnologically mod-
ified clones that are Marie22 and the narrator are not part of the human 
race (again, a human essentialist discourse), but, as suggested earlier, 
the reader does not know about the nature of these two characters at 
this point of the novel. Again, it tricks readers into identifying with the 
narrator and, thus, question their own identity as humans as well as the 
permanence of their race, which actually situates the novel in the wake 
of posthumanist thinkers.
***
On the one hand, The Possibility of an Island can be part of a group of 
fictions that would be called “posthuman literature” because its story 
not only features posthuman characters (narrators and narratees) and 
tropes (a post-cataclysmic world, genetic engineering, etc.) but also at-
tempts at imitating a posthuman language. On the other hand, such 
posthuman elements inevitably prompt posthumanist interpretations of 
Houellebecq’s novel, which could therefore be considered an instance of 
posthumanist literature, especially in the way it stimulates a question-
ing about the essence of humanity and blurs the lines between various 
ontological dualisms (human/nonhuman, organic/mechanic, embodied/
virtual, alive/dead, amongst others) as well as narratological dualisms 
(reader/author, reader/character, etc.).
The main issue when considering the possibility of posthuman and 
posthumanist literatures is that “posthuman”, “posthumanism”, and 
“literature” remain ungraspable concepts. Those who wish to study 
them must first delineate the extent of their meanings and, consequently, 
leave some elements out. Choosing technology as a determining con-
stituent element of posthumanism and the posthuman – which might 
not suit the representatives of more natural, organic, or environmental 
understandings of these concepts – represents a committed stance that 
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is necessary to elaborate stable definitions of these concepts. Similarly, 
contemplating literature through its dissection is an even more radical 
but well-needed stance in order to establish a viable methodology. There 
may surely be other ways to address such an issue, and it must therefore 
be acknowledged that this study is more of an experiment than a final 
statement on posthuman and posthumanist literatures.
The study of literature sparks off enriching considerations about post-
humanism and the posthuman. The distinction between the factual and 
fictional constituents of literature allows for apprehending these concepts 
in a different way. On the one hand, the factual constituents – context, 
reader, author, book, and language – force the scholar to differentiate be-
tween the discourse that is posthumanism and the figure that is the post-
human simply because the existence of the former is objective – there is 
a discourse called “posthumanism” – while the existence of the latter is 
subjective; it depends on where one sets the limit beyond which humans 
become posthumans, somehow making it difficult to take the posthu-
man out of the realm of speculation completely. On the other hand, the 
fictional constituents – narratee, narrator, and story – tolerate such spec-
ulation, and making a clear-cut distinction between posthumanism and 
the posthuman in this perspective becomes irrelevant: the presence of 
a posthuman character in a novel evokes, if not always a posthumanist 
discourse, at least a posthumanist interpretation. This is the reason why 
the “s” in “posthuman/ist literature(s)” is between parentheses in the 
title of this chapter: posthuman literature and posthumanist literature 
are not always two categorically different types of literature.
Reciprocally, posthumanism and the posthuman may contribute to 
the study of literature. Acknowledging that the posthuman is a figure 
that has emphasized the importance of fictional characters as well as of 
agents in the production and reception of literature, which echoes and 
somehow legitimates several trends in literary theory, from the positivist 
interest in the author (which has recently been reactivated by the sociol-
ogy of literature) to the focus on reception by reader-response criticism. 
Considering the implications of posthuman authors and readers has also 
prompted several interrogations on the future of literature, and particu-
larly the changes literature may undergo in a more and more technologi-
cal era. Similarly, the way posthumanism undermines traditional dualist 
categories can be applied to literary categories such as the author and 
the reader, or writing and reading. Moreover, a posthumanist perspec-
tive on literature provides new interpretation grids for readers as well as 
new themes for authors and constitutes a fertile ground for experimental 
and digital literature. Lastly, while “[c]lassic literature […] does have a 
great deal to teach us about what it means to be human and to live in 
this world” (Steinberg 2013, 1), a posthumanist perspective uncovers 




 1 Contrary to what his answer implies, Herbrechter (2015, 3) actually differ-
entiates posthumanism, which is a discourse, from the posthuman, which is 
the object of this discourse. Moreover, a large part of the confusion around 
posthumanism and the posthuman is due to the fact that some critics claim 
to be writing about the posthuman when their work rather belongs to the 
posthumanist trend. A significant example of this issue is Rosi Braidotti’s 
The Posthuman (2013).
 2 In a few writings – most notably Are you a Transhuman? by FM-2030 and 
the collective Transhuman Manifesto – one might come across the derivative 
yet less recurrent term “transhuman”. It is likely to appear in transhuman-
ist works to qualify the being that results from technological enhancement 
( Ranisch and Sorgner 2014, 10–11), or it can be presented in contrast with 
the posthuman, the transhuman thus being an intermediary step on the way 
to posthumanity (Ibid. 8). The nature of the frontier between the trans-
human and the posthuman is unsurprisingly subjective and unlikely to be 
productive, which is why this chapter does not expand upon it.
 3 Herbrechter (2015, 2) also claims the existence of another category: “critical 
posthumanism”, “a posthumanism that is not unduly excited about cyborgs, 
AI, or indeed animals, plants and minerals, technologies, the media and 
their convergences, but which takes the time to remember, to reread and 
reconnect, in short which is ‘critical’”. Given that posthumanism has tended 
to question humanist principles, it is intrinsically critical, which is why this 
chapter will not expand on the so-called “critical posthumanism” nor use it 
as an analytical concept.
 4 This chapter does not discuss the distinction between empirical and implied 
authors and readers because such distinction does not provide significant 
nuances as far as posthuman and posthumanist literatures are concerned.
 5 “Story” and “narrative” refer to Gérard Genette’s (1972, 72) typology that 
distinguishes between story, narrative, and narration: “Je propose […] de 
nommer histoire le signifié ou contenu narratif […],récit proprement dit le 
signifiant, énoncé, discours ou texte narratif lui-même, et narration l’acte 
narratif producteur”.
 6 Cf. Snyman, E. 2008. “The Possibility of an Island; or, the Double Bind of 
Houellebecq’s Apocalypse: When the End is not the End”. Literator 29 (2): 
25–45; Moraru, Christian. 2008. “The Genomic Imperative: Michel Houl-
lebecq’s The Possibility of an Island”. Utopian Studies 19 (2):  265–283; 
Koleva, Neli. 2011. “‘Le Meilleur des Mondes’: Kitsch and Humanity in 
 Michel Houellebecq’s La Possibilité d’une île”. Modern Horizons 1–8; 
Posthumus, Stéphanie and Stéfan Sinclair. 2011. “L’Inscription de la nature 
et de la technologie dans La Possibilité d’une île de Michel Houellebecq”. 
Contemporary French and Francophone Studies 15 (3): 349–356; Morrey, 
Douglas. 2013. Michel Houellebecq: Humanity and Its Aftermath. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press.
 7 This information is derived from my own unpublished study on the statis-
tics of publications on posthumanism, the posthuman, and other related 
concepts.
 8 For more information, see Regnauld (2014).
 9 Ellis (2014, 149) nonetheless notices that this attempt at a polyphony that 
might carry the cloning motif further fails due to the monotony of the vari-
ous narrators.
 10 The “universe of reference” is part of François Rastier’s interpretive seman-
tics and must be understood as “the universe whose units are evaluated 
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according to the absolute truth of the text” (Hébert 2006). Its laws can 
therefore differ from the author’s and reader’s universe, and therefore allow 
the existence of posthumans.
 11 Herbrechter and Callus (2008, 99) allude to Hollywood science-fiction 
blockbusters.
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In his introductory chapter of Posthumanism. A Critical Analysis (2013), 
titled “Towards a Critical Posthumanism”, Stefan Herbrechter argues 
that posthumanist thinking is first and foremost post-anthropocentric 
thinking. To leave the human behind, however, only causes it to return 
in spectral forms to haunt our philosophy, popular cultures, and the arts. 
Herbrechter writes: “The moment the human ‘disappears’ its repressed 
‘mirror images’ of identity return to haunt it and the entire history of 
anthropocentrism has to be rewritten: the ‘object’ world, the ‘animal’ 
world, the entire ‘cosmos’” (Herbrechter 2013, 29). Thus, posthuman-
ism means “to acknowledge all those ghosts, all those human others that 
have been repressed during the process of humanization: animals, gods, 
demons, monsters of all kinds” (Herbrechter 2013, 9). Lists like these, 
lists of “monsters”, are of course an elemental part of the posthumanities, 
both in its critical and popular forms. There are numerous cyborgs, ro-
bots, mutants, chimeras, and hybrids to be met among the more organic 
fauna, flora, and funghi that we can think with. For posthumanist liter-
ary scholarship, these real and fictional nonhumans, humans, and not-
quite-humans have functioned as powerful conceptual tools for category 
work, whether in epistemological, essential, or aesthetical terms. Meth-
odologically, the focus has been on characters and the narrative form.
As fiction plays an important part in the formation of identities and 
ideologies, a scrutiny of fictional characters on the verge of humanness is 
naturally insightful and important. However, to question anthropocen-
trism will, of course, demand a critical view on reading and writing as 
well. How is the inhuman, the nonhuman, or the posthuman present in 
these practices, deemed species-specific to the extent that they mark the 
difference between Man and Animal? With reference to the monstrous, 
spectral figures of the posthuman, it is interesting to note that writing 
and reading are sometimes considered to be haunted, as well. From the 
antihumanist tradition, we have learned to doubt the equivalence of sig-
nifiers to their signifieds – we have even learned to suspect our access to 
the signifieds themselves.
Our understanding of the linguistic sign, and of reading and writing, 







two. Ecocritical, new-materialist, and other related approaches to litera-
ture show that there are actually manifold nonhuman agencies involved 
in the creation of literary texts. The recognition of nonhuman literary or 
poetic agency calls for a re-evaluation of reading as well. These theoret-
ical reconsiderations can be understood in the context of Herbrechter’s 
notion of rewriting “the ‘object’ world”, and even “the ‘animal’ world”: 
these worlds consist of powerful agencies that influence even the most 
human(ist) practices or reading and writing.
In this chapter, I approach posthumanist reading as a dual practice 
of critical analysis and affirmative awareness of nonhuman agencies. 
First, I discuss the critical analysis by reviewing the influential writings 
of Stefan Herbrechter, Ivan Callus, Neil Badmington, Tom Cohen, and 
N. Katherine Hayles. Second, I sketch an additional, affirmative method 
of posthumanist reading by briefly analyzing three examples of Finnish 
contemporary poetry, “a niinkuin koira” [a as a dog], by Dan Waber 
and Marko Niemi (2008), “kadonneen äänen lyhyt haastattelu” [a short 
interview with a lost voice] by Jouni Tossavainen (2007), and “damage” 
by Jukka-Pekka Kervinen (2008). Conceptually, I utilize the posthuman-
ist imagery of spectrality and will thus experiment with the ideas of wit-
nessing ghosts and summoning (evoking, conjuring) nonhuman powers 
to highlight the different attitudes toward and ideas of the nonhuman.
Critical Reading
Stefan Herbrechter and Ivan Callus begin their essay “What Is a Posthu-
manist Reading?” with the following definition:
The claim we are making is very simple. It is possible to read ‘texts’, 
in the widest sense attributed to this word by poststructuralism, 
through the way they set up a catalogue of assumptions and values 
about ‘what it means to be human.’
(Herbrechter and Callus 2008, 95)
Although poststructuralism is here mentioned with reference to its wide 
understanding of texts, poststructuralism naturally also contributes 
philosophically to our current ideas about the human. When scholars 
and philosophers like Jacques Derrida, Roland Barthes, Michel  Foucault, 
Jacques Lacan, or Louis Althusser conceptualized diverse cultural and 
social phenomena with an emphasis on the structures and power rela-
tions beneath these phenomena, the idea of human sovereignty became 
highly contestable. In this line of thinking, humans are not sovereign sub-
jects that are in control of themselves and their social and cultural sur-
roundings, but rather, human subjectivity is formed under the preceding 
contexts and conditions of psychological, linguistic, social, and cultural 
structures and power relations. Therefore, the human is not an essen-
tial category but a historical construction. For posthumanities, then, 
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the task is to observe and re-conceptualize the constant re- formation of 
this construction (Herbrechter and Callus 2008; see also Badmington 
2000a, 7–10).
The claim for a possibility of posthumanist reading is at the same 
time affirmed and questioned by Herbrechter and Callus themselves. It 
is simply impossible to read as if we were not human. Rather, posthu-
man reading acknowledges the ambiguity of humanness and thus focuses 
on the ways cultural texts communicate (or hide) this ambiguity. Here, 
Herbrechter and Callus are of course following post-structuralist ideas 
about the self-deconstructive nature of texts, systems, and concepts. With 
reference to Roland Barthes’s demythologization of the human, they 
claim: “Humanism’s ‘work’, however, is never done because the other-
ness constructed and projected into the world […] comes back to haunt 
and threaten the borderlines of difference drawn around the human as its 
protection” (Herbrechter and Callus 2008, 101). In his introduction to 
the Posthumanism reader, Neil Badmington (2000a, 9) makes a similar 
claim, in the context of Jacques Derrida’s philosophy: “Humanism never 
manages to constitute itself; it forever rewrites itself as posthumanism. 
This movement is always happening: humanism cannot escape its ‘post-’”.
Stefan Herbrechter returns to the idea of the haunting other, or “ghostly 
ontology”, in his book Posthumanism. A Critical Analysis (2013). The 
ghost is a metaphor for the “other” or the “outside” of what in any given 
situation counts as human: the position of outside is necessary for the for-
mation of an inside – human essentiality or human identity – but at the 
same time, it poses a constant threat (Herbrechter 2013, 86, 90). As we 
have already seen, in fiction and film, these ghosts appear in the concrete 
(or not-so-concrete) forms of aliens, cyborgs, robots, and genetically al-
tered organic creatures. For a posthumanist critic, these characters offer 
possibilities of witnessing the ghosts: of deconstructive readings of the 
ambiguous formations of differences between human and nonhuman (or 
inhuman). Indeed, for Herbrechter and Callus (2008, 105), “[a]nimaliza-
tion, cyborgisation, biotechnology, robotics and cybernetics bring about 
an accentuated ‘hauntology’ of the spectralised human”.
Often the ghosts are high-tech mechanical beings. This is of course re-
lated to the challenges new media and new technologies, such as digital 
media, virtualization, and bio-, info-, and nanotechnology, pose on the 
human (Herbrechter and Callus 2008, 96–97). Many of these real- life 
promises (or threats) are embodied in the figure of the cyborg, writ-
ten into the posthumanist canon of theory and fiction already in the 
1980s. Theoretically, the cyborg gains its status in the classic “Cyborg 
Manifesto” by Donna Haraway. In his article about Donna Haraway’s 
manifesto and Marge Piercy’s Body of Glass, Neil Badmington (2000b, 
85–86) states the importance of the cyborg figure: “The cyborg seems 
to be the answer, the messiah who will lead ‘us’ to a promised land 
where humanism is a thing of the past”. For Badmington, the cyborg 
is “a promising monster” only when it aids us in the deconstruction of 
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humanism. He ends his essay in words that resonate with Herbrech-
ter’s ghostly visions of the human: “Man breathes ‘himself’ to death, 
raises himself to ruins. Humanism forever rewrites itself as posthuman-
ism”(Badmington 2000b, 97).
As the characters and events in science fiction typically challenge the 
essentiality of humanity, and hence human essentialism, science fic-
tion movies and fiction are the most favored objects of posthumanist 
 analysis – up to a point where, as Herbrechter and Callus (2008, 104; 
see also 98) claim, “reading […] merely needs to ‘force’ the narrative a 
little to arrive at a ‘meta-fictional’ level”. Whether the interest lies in 
the bodily materialities or mind-altering communication technologies, 
or machinic enhancements or reproductive enterprises, science fiction 
delivers tools for re-imagining and re-conceptualizing the human. One 
popular character in this sense is the anamorphic killer machine T-2000 
from the movie Terminator 2: The Judgment Day (1991, co-written, 
produced, and directed by James Cameron). Its first appearance in the 
context of posthumanist reading is in Tom Cohen’s Anti-mimesis (1994), 
which contains a coda called “Post-human reading”. Cohen focuses his 
critical attention on the liquid-like mechanical post-robot T-2000 and 
asks, “why is that which burns through all representations including the 
commodity form of humans, evil?” (Cohen 1994, 260, original italics). 
Rather than focusing on the characters themselves, however, Cohen in-
terprets the fight against T-2000 as a fight against “anti-representational 
and post-humanist logic” (Cohen 1994, 260, original italics). Here, a 
posthuman character is given an allegorical meaning, whereby it chal-
lenges not the human as such but the ideologies supporting humanism 
and the human. After Cohen’s influential coda, “Post-human reading”, 
T-2000 reappears in Herbrechter and Callus’s “What Is a Posthumanist 
Reading?” (2008, 98–100), where its death by a complete melt-down is 
interpreted again as the re-establishing of the human(ist) order.
For Stefan Herbrechter, Ivan Callus, and Neil Badmington, posthu-
manist reading is essentially post-anthropocentric (Badmington 2000a; 
Herbrechter and Callus 2008; Herbrechter 2013, 3, 7, 10). Rather than 
actively attacking humanist values and conceptualizations represented 
in cultural texts, they believe in the self-deconstructive nature of the 
human and of humanism that will occur in critical reading. The criti-
cal stance toward anthropocentrism is, of course, widely shared among 
scholars associated with posthumanism (e.g. Barad 2003; Haraway 
2008, 9–27; Wolfe 2010, xiv–xxvi). As an ethics (or a variety of ethics), 
posthumanism is indeed able to question the uniqueness and the hierar-
chical position of humans among other beings, organic or artificial.
There is, however, one issue about centering on anthropocentrism that 
I would like to raise. With anthropocentrism often comes anthropomor-
phism, in other words, the tendency (whether conscious or intentional, 
or not) to think about the world, its beings, and its processes by likening 
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or juxtaposing them with humans. Hence, we fear or admire the cyborg, 
the robot, and the computer because we have created them and feel a cer-
tain affinity with them: they reason, they may even have a consciousness. 
Often, they also have a body, that is, they are entities where matter and 
mind are combined. The latter also applies to nonhuman animals. How-
ever, we are often prone to concentrate on animals with which we can 
relate to; animals of “high” intellectual competence (on our standards), 
or animals who are familiar to us. Accordingly, we are able to recognize 
the agency and capacities of those things that we perceive as being simi-
lar to us. Often, we think about them in the singular: T-2000 the robot, 
Dolly the sheep, Theseus the electronic rat (see Callus, Herbrechter, and 
Rossini 2014, 108–109). To explore the borders and boundaries of the 
human quite obviously happens by the logic of similarity: we feel most 
threatened and most intrigued by the things and modes of existence that 
are closest to us. This is our disposition and desire (critically and other-
wise): to witness ghosts.
To question anthropomorphism calls for the recognition of those 
agencies that are more remote, plural, or immaterial too. When Stefan 
 Herbrechter and Ivan Callus (2008, 95) claim, that “[i]t is possible to 
read ‘texts’ […] through the way they set up a catalogue of assumptions 
and values about ‘what it means to be human’”, we can understand this 
not only in terms of thematics. “What it means to be human” can also be 
a question about the reading practice itself; moreover, it can be a ques-
tion about the material-semiotic emergence of texts and of language. The 
powers working here are more anamorphic than  anthropomorphic  – 
they might not have a form at all. To witness them, like the ghosts, they 
need to be summoned.
Nonhuman Powers
In the Finnish poetry online website Nokturno.fi there is a curious digi-
tal poem called “a niinkuin koira” [a as a dog] by Dan Waber and Marko 
Niemi, first published in 2008. The flickering group of alphabets is actu-
ally an interactive zoo of signs. On the website, it is shortly introduced 
as “Partly a homage, partly a parody, an ongoing ultra- minimalist col-
lection of animated letter animals” (transl. K. L.). The word “homage” 
functions as a link to the website which presents Roberto de Vicq de 
Cumptich’s children’s book Bembo’s Zoo: An Animal ABC Book (2000) 
in a flash format. When you click on individual letters, an animal’s name 
beginning with that letters appears, and the letters soon multiple and 
reorganize to form a picture of that particular animal. The letter-bodied 
animals move, and the flash poems are further enlivened by electronic 
sounds. The letter zoo of Waber and Niemi is, as its name implies, mini-
malist: when you click on a letter, only that one particular letter becomes 
“alive”. The name of the poem offers a hint on the animal identity of the 
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letter “a”: when you click on it, a tiny letter “a” appears against an empty 
background, and it starts to wag its tail and wiggle its snout.
The connection between a letter and an animal appears to be completely 
random in the poem by Waber and Niemi. By scrolling down the page, it 
is possible to find identification for all of the letters, but the reader may 
also choose to watch the letters moving about without this information. 
Read in this way, the poem works as an identification game: “g” is flipped 
90° clockwise, and because of the font, it seems to have a giant head (or 
body) and a tail. As the tail is shaking and series of dots are squirting 
from the head, “g” seems to “be” a whale. The letter “f” rapidly extends 
its upper curvy part, and with this move, it hits to a dot right next to 
it, causing the dot to disappear. Thus, “f” can be seen as a chameleon 
catching flies with its tongue. In the poem, however, “f” is identified as an 
anteater. Other letters are trickier. The letter “o” is a pulsating little circle 
which has two dots inside. The first impression, a pig’s trunk, soon turns 
problematic, as the circle flattens to a square. The poem insists it is a pig, 
however. Some of the letters move around, while other seem to focus on 
shape- shifting: “t” is “climbing up” by moving its upper part, and “w” 
just keeps widening and contracting horizontally. By clicking the letters, 
the reader may begin to question her or his desire to see the letters as 
recognizable animals. It is, after all, possible to imagine animated life that 
escapes the bodily trajectories of animals that are known to us humans. 
The desire to recognize the letters as specific species of animals is further 
diminished by the random relations between the animal names and letters, 
and even between the letters and animals themselves. Further, a couple of 
letters actually refer to humans: “z” is the sound of sleep and appears in a 
hand-drawn picture of “eero-eno” [uncle eero] sleeping on a couch!
How to approach Waber and Niemi’s minimalist zoo of animated 
signs from a posthumanist perspective? As a flash poem, “a niin kuin 
koira” is an obvious example of “flickering signs”, introduced by 
N.  Katherine Hayles in her seminal work How We Became Posthuman 
(1999). Hayles bases her idea of flickering signs on structuralist and 
post- structuralist accounts on the arbitrariness of signs. According to 
Ferdinand de Saussure, the relation between signifier and signified is 
arbitrary, and signification is a conventional relation based on differ-
ences among signifiers. For Jacques Lacan, signifiers are “floating” on 
an inaccessible strain of signifieds, and signification is based on a double 
absence: signifieds are absent as things-in-themselves, and absent are 
also stable correspondences between signifiers (Hayles 1999, 25–30). 
In the (post)structuralist framework, signifiers are still understood as 
markers – with computational information-processing, a drastic change 
happens: signification processes are based on codes:
In informatics, the signifier can no longer be understood as a single 
marker, for example an ink mark on a page. Rather it exists as a 
flexible chain of markers bound together by the arbitrary relations 
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specified by the relevant codes. As I write these words on my com-
puter, I see the lights on the video screen, but for the computer, 
the relevant signifiers are electronic polarities on disks. Intervening 
between what I see and what the computer reads are the machine 
code that correlates alphanumeric symbols with binary digits, the 
compiler language that correlates these symbols with higher-level in-
structions determining how the symbols are to be manipulated, the 
processing program that mediates between these instructions and 
the commands I give the computer, and so forth.
(Hayles 1999, 31)
The existence and movement of the animated letter animals created by 
Dan Waber and Marko Niemi are materially and semiotically based on 
the informatics described by Hayles above. There are a number of pro-
grams and codes working to bring “life” to signs and sustain them on 
an electronic environment unrepresentable on a printed page. As Hayles 
notes, the flickering signifiers are no longer functioning on the logic of 
presence and absence (where signifier might be considered to be present 
and the signified absent), but on the logic of pattern and randomness, 
where pattern actually always requires randomness to establish itself 
(Hayles 1999, 32–35). For the reader, then, the zoo of letters is con-
stantly open, but any one of the letters can be watched for only about 
ten seconds. In other words, reading is controlled by informational tech-
nologies and their dependency on patterns and codes – the play of signs 
is no longer solely for the human reader to engage with.
What other powers are to be summoned in reading “a niin kuin koira”, 
besides the powers of information technologies and hardware? Implicitly 
present in Hayles’s flickering signifiers is of course electricity, which for a 
long time was understood in vitalist and spectral terms (e.g. Morus 2011). 
Electricity forms the energetic basis of the posthuman condition, and it is 
also literally the life force of all flickering signifiers we are depending on in 
our everyday lives. In his book Earth Sound Earth Signal (2013), Douglas 
Kahn has rightly noted that questions of life forms and materiality have 
dominated over questions of energy in cultural theories and scholarship 
about the physical conditions of culture and art (Kahn 2013, 17). Indeed, 
animality seems far easier to grasp than electricity in “a niinkuin koira”.
When reading Waber and Niemi’s poem as animated letter animals, as 
we have seen, the letters are read in the contexts of real animals: their bodily 
shapes, trajectories, and movements – even their diets. One important fac-
tor problematizes the animality of the letters, however: almost all of them 
are devoid of any environment. One exception is the “r”, a fish that jumps 
up and then disappears under the water surface. That we are seeking re-
semblance to animal life highlights in any case the presence of nonhuman 
animals in the process of reading. In contrast to Stefan Herbrechter’s and 
Ivan Callus’s critical remarks on animals as the spectral Others, excluded 
outside humanity and returning to haunt us, the presence of animals in 
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“a niin kuin koira” takes the form of power and agency. Different species 
of animals have bodies and forms of life that influence writing and poetry, 
as well. To understand the effects of this nonhuman poetic agency means 
to summon its power in posthumanist reading.
Until recently, the presence of nonhuman animals in poetry has been 
understood in terms of cultural representation: poets write about an-
imals in specific cultural contexts and thus poetically re-present them 
in texts – the animals themselves are only objects for observation and 
representation and therefore left outside the realm of culture. Within 
material ecocriticism and related fields of theory and scholarship, how-
ever, some scholars have suggested that the role of animals in art can be 
understood in more active terms.
The discussions on animal agency are connected to the more gen-
eral ideas about nonhuman agency that have been proposed by Bruno 
Latour, Nick Law, and Michel Callon in their Actor-Network-Theory 
(ANT). According to ANT, any social process always involves human 
and nonhuman actors, whose agencies should be observed and de-
scribed on the same level. The idea of nonhuman agency has been fur-
ther developed among posthumanist and new-materialist thinking and 
critical animal studies: for example, in the works of Donna Haraway, 
Cary Wolfe, Jane Bennett, and others. For ecocriticism, then, ideas of 
nonhuman agency have been important in re-negotiating the role of 
nonhumans, particularly animals, in the production of poetic texts and 
even in language itself. Thus, the bodily features, movements, displays, 
and vocalizations of different species of animals are seen to actively 
influence the linguistic, typographical, and other material- semiotic 
choices made in writing (Mason 2013, xi–xix; Moe 2014, 5–28; Tüür 
2017, 55–79, 226–255). It has also been suggested that language itself 
is infested with nonhuman elements or currents, thereby making non-
human agency an inevitable part of poetry (Abram 2011, 183–200; 
Lummaa 2017, 129–151).
The extending, trembling, bouncing, and other vivid movements and 
actions of the letter animals have correspondences in real animal life. 
Just as poetic texts can evoke a sense of a surrounding environment or a 
presence of nonhuman being (a group of letters swarming like bees, bird 
vocalizations transcribed in letters and written in undulating verses), 
animations in flash poems evoke nonhuman presences with suggestive 
movements (see Morton 2009, 32–78). These movements are often suffi-
ciently recognizable, thus mediating the features and trajectories of spe-
cific animals. The poem by Waber and Niemi absorbs and transforms 
these nonhuman powers into electrically transmitted movements that 
still remain curiously animal-like. Sometimes the movements are mini-
mal, and this minimalism may not only relate to poetic minimalism: the 
gestures and movements of nonhuman animals may be “minimal” in 
the sense that they are not easily observable and sensible to us humans. 
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There is a lot we cannot see, even if we are actively looking, and this of 
course challenges the act of summoning nonhuman powers.
In opposition to minimalism, the presence of words or signs alluding 
to nonhumans may also be excessive. Consider the following excerpt 
from the poem “kadonneen äänen lyhyt haastattelu” [a short interview 
with a lost voice] by Jouni Tossavainen, from his collection Kerro [Tell], 
published in 2008 (Figure 2.1).
Tossavainen’s text is actually a sound poem which contains auditory 
elements from many different living and nonliving sources. As it mainly 
contains nonsensical, verbally, or auditorily motivated wordplays that 
follow each other quite randomly, it is impossible to translate. Here is an 
English interpretation of the excerpt, created by translators Emily Jere-
miah and Fleur Jeremiah (first published in Lummaa 2017):
a short interview with a lost voice
upupa said apupupu
i’m like a pelican in wild woods said the ostrich
rain rain said the brain  bird teach-er teach-er teach-er teach-er 
chink chink chink chink so said the great tit
tia tia said the c-cassette pulled out from the innards of a black box
no sa nosa say sona sa sa say so noya soya and dna said 
offon
 kiva vika pomo mopo said ropoporo isnt tis nist nits 
said a certain ex-starling
some ham said homebird home home said copse home pal pal 
many migrants in the air said pigeon in ballandia
a-honk  brot brot  rat rat  rot-rot-rot  knag-ang-ang  rrot rroak  ga-
ga-ga  kjo-jo-jo  kajajak  klik-klik-kli kjik-jek  kuju ku  ju jy said the 
goose sparrow’s a sparrow said pygmy owl
[…]
Figure 2.1  Excerpt from the poem “kadonneen äänen lyhyt haastattelu” by 
Jouni Tossavainen.
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As the translation shows, there are many birds involved in Tossavainen’s 
poem. Some of the avian vocalizations are wordplays with diverse, allu-
sive meanings or no meaning at all, while others are actual call or song 
transcriptions recognizable from field guides: “a-honk brot brot rat rat 
rot-rot-rot knag-ang-ang rrot rroak ga-ga-ga kjo-jo-jo kajajak klik-klik-
kli kjik-jek kuju ku” are Finnish transcriptions of the calls of different 
species of gulls and geese. Also, man-made objects make sounds that are 
notably birdlike: the c-cassette says “tia tia”, and, later in the poem, the 
fuses say “tzirp tzirp”.
Whereas Niemi and Waber’s flash poem introduces nonhuman elements 
through movement, Tossavainen evokes nonhuman presence through au-
ditory and visual noise. In a posthumanist reading, the verbally rendered 
bird vocalizations can be summoned by recognizing their avian origins 
and resistance to human (and obviously also avian) interpretation. In 
addition to Tossavainen’s chaotic and playful sound poetics, an avian 
poetic agency is involved in the creation of the poem. Ecocritic Aaron 
Moe has conceptualized this as zoopoetics, whereby the gestures and 
sounds of nonhuman animals are translated into or imitated in poetry. 
Moe writes about such poetry as “rich borderlands of energy exchanges 
between poet and animal, animal and poem, poem and reader, animal 
and reader, and many more interactions” (Moe 2014, 23–24).
A posthumanist reading might thus focus on summoning the nonhu-
man gestural, vocal, and bodily powers and artistic agencies that are 
involved in the creation of a text. As the poetic bird vocalizations are for 
the most part incomprehensible to humans and birds alike, they are not 
proper animal signs, approachable in a zoosemiotic frame of reference 
(see Tüür 2017, 64–79). Rather, they are verbal noise born of human and 
nonhuman origin, or “energy exchanges between poet and animal, an-
imal and poem” to use Moe’s expression. Indeed, the existence and the 
affective and semiosic effects of noise are important to acknowledge in 
posthumanist reading. In N. Katherine Hayles’s (1999, 32–33) account 
on reading the flickering signifiers, noise refers to the necessary interplay 
between pattern and randomness in the electric-digital transformation 
of information. In printed texts (as in music), noise is semiotically and 
materially present to interfere with the process of reading. Noise ques-
tions human intelligibility and humans as the producers and recipients of 
signs and meanings (see Goddard, Halligan, and Hegarty 2012).
In his theory of art noise, artist and arts scholar Joseph Nechvatal 
(2011) approaches noise as a productive phenomenon. Noise created in 
art, or art noise, challenges human senses and consciousness and brings 
forth new ways of perceiving, experiencing, and thinking. Art noise even 
has political and ideological potential as it disrupts the un- problematized, 
almost un-conscious gluttonous consumption of entertainment (which, 
according to Nechvatal, is often linked to material over-consumption) 
(Nechvatal 2011, 9–11). Noise also forces us to question the origins and 
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agencies of the messages we consider to be art, as it challenges the prior-
ity and superiority of human intelligibility (Nechvatal 2011, 218–227). 
Indeed, noise (visual, auditory, information-related) is definitely one of 
the powers to be summoned in a posthumanist reading. Now, what is 
common to all nonhuman powers that have textual or poetic agency, as 
well as noise, is that in texts they are transmitted materially by signs. 
Therefore, a posthumanist reading has to stay sensitive to the semiotic 
and material powers of signs.
the Agency of Signs
Due to their manifold essence, the function – and powers – of signs can 
be approached in many different ways. As has been mentioned earlier, 
the post-structuralist accounts on the divide between signifier and sig-
nified have greatly inspired posthumanist thinking. If all signification 
and all communication are based on the arbitrary relation between the 
signifier and the signified, and on the resulting referral of meaning, this 
means that humans are subjugated by the altering and distorting pow-
ers of language. Throughout his philosophical works, Jacques Derrida 
has highlighted differences and deferrals of meaning – the play of signs 
happens always somewhere else, in the distance, beyond human reach. 
Another account on the autonomous play of signs has been proposed by 
Ian Bogost, a game theorist and proponent of object-oriented ontology 
in his book Alien Phenomenology. Or, What It’s Like to Be a Thing 
(2012). Bogost expands his theory of objects (or units, as he calls them) 
to account for linguistics as well, although he only discusses them very 
briefly in the context of the games “Scribblenaut” and “Pickle” as well 
as different sorts of word lists. His idea of words as operating units helps 
to further understand the nonhuman powers at play in posthumanist 
reading:
Words do not just denote, they also operate. We can understand 
signs themselves to have experiences of one another that remain 
comprehensible only by tracing their own relations to our engage-
ment with them as signifiers.
(Bogost 2012, 56)
Bogost here seems to limit human conception of the unit operations 
of signs (or “the strange graspings of stuffs linguistic”) to their status 
as signifiers tied to specific signifieds in a somewhat constant manner 
(Bogost 2012, 56). In other words, from a human perspective, words 
operate according to the objects they signify. But what happens in a 
poem like Tossavainen’s “kadonneen äänen lyhyt haastattelu”, where we 
hear high “stii stii tips tii tii” from the Great tit (Parus major), delicate 
“tia tia” from the c-cassette, and sharp electric “tzirp tzirp” from fuses? 
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These vocally similar words of organic and mechanical origin seem to 
resonate with each other auditorily: they “have experiences of one an-
other” (Bogost 2012, 56) and operate on a material basis, and through 
sensual similarities, they make new strange semantic bonds between 
noise-making objects: birds, c-cassettes, fuses.
To summon the powers of signs requires sensitivity to their materi-
ality, which always introduces the possibility of interference and noise. 
The visual poem “damage” (2008) by Jukka-Pekka Kervinen, published 
in Nokturno website, opens up a seemingly three-dimensional space of 
partly effaced words on a gray background (Figure 2.2).
The impression of three-dimensionality is created partly by the chang-
ing font size and partly by the different colors: words with smallest 
font size printed in white and different shades of gray appear to linger 
in the background and fading to it, while words with bigger font size 
dominate “the foreground” with brighter colors of blue and magenta. 
The crowd of words creates an impression of plenitude and hence noise, 
but at the same time, the letters seem effaced, or damaged as the title 
of the poem implies. N. Katherine Hayles’s (1999, 30–32) remarks on 
the changing experience of reading text from the screen is particularly 
important here, as Kervinen’s poem literally changes when the angle 
of the computer’s screen is changed. By moving the screen, the reader 
is thus able to manipulate the color contrasts and thus the material 
makeup of the poem.
Figure 2.2  Jukka-Pekka Kervinen: “damage” (2008).
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Generally, we are accustomed to read poetry in order to make sense 
of it. In visual poems, we concentrate on letters and reading even though 
other sensual or even visual features might be more noticeable. Thus, in 
Kervinen’s poem, we might concentrate on recognizing individual words: 
they are definitely in English, but what specific words are there? The bro-
ken forms of the words make it difficult to identify them: maybe “slept”, 
“cat”, “damage”, “whereas”, and “colors”? But there are dozens of other, 
unrecognizable ones. Noise (visual or auditory) does not have to be loud 
or irritating – it can be subtle, but it always challenges interpretation and 
understanding. Kervinen’s “damage” plays with the effacement of words 
and their patterned distribution in the visual field, as if to suggest that 
the patterns or colors of the words might convey a message after all.
The poem “damage” is created with a computer program written by 
Kervinen himself, based on an initial idea of how the poem should look 
like. Chosen words and colors and the overall patterning and structure 
of the poem are generated by a program based on stochastic/cybernetic 
algorithms. In “damage”, the words appearing as partly erased have 
 actually new layers of text written on them with the same color that 
 appears in the background. This visual impression is computer-generated 
but designed and thus intended by the poet. To achieve a desired image 
requires several runs of the program.
The visual arrangements and formations of letters and other signs are 
an important aspect of the aesthetics of visual poetry. Denotation is not 
the primal function of signs; instead of (metaphorically) looking through 
the signs, the reader ends up looking at them. This is exactly what hap-
pens in the poems by Marko Niemi and Dan Waber, and by Jouni Tos-
savainen and Jukka-Pekka Kervinen: the multiple nonhuman agencies 
and powers of animals, electricity, hardware and software, and other 
objects, systems, and processes uncommon to any classical humanist 
notion of poetry require the attention of the reader. They challenge the 
reader to account for their strange, influential materialities.
To think this further, it might be helpful to turn to the material en-
gagement theory proposed for archaeology by Lambros Malafouris. In 
his book How Things Shape the Mind (2013), Malafouris composes a 
materialist theory of human prehistory by examining and conceptualiz-
ing the role of things, objects and materials in the development of human 
cognitive skills (counting, writing, conceptual thinking). Malafouris’s 
focus is thus on the long-term change of human thinking, which for 
Malafouris (2013, 77) “is, first and above all, thinking through, with 
and about things, bodies, and others.” One of the crucial things with 
which humans have thought is “the material sign”: a carving, a painted 
mark, a molded figure or another sign object with an expressive (and 
thus not completely describable or definable) meaning. Material signs do 
not function as abstract symbols but rather participate in the signifying 
process through their particular makeup.
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The relation between the (material) sign and the mind (or social uni-
verse) is reversed in this line of thinking, since material signs physically 
shape the human mind and world – they do not represent anything that 
already exists in the mind or in the social world (Malafouris 2013, 97).
Malafouris’s argument is grounded in ideas about nonhuman agency 
and associations of humans and nonhumans proposed by, for example, 
Bruno Latour. Malafouris focuses on the (pre)historical development of 
human thinking through material practices, relations, and engagement. 
What I am suggesting is that the concept of material sign describes in-
structively the entangled agencies of signs in contemporary poetry, 
whether printed or electronic, as both these platforms are material in 
their own specific ways. Further, as the signs in poetry are influenced 
and partly formed by nonhuman powers and agencies, their significa-
tion is always partly alien and thus expressive and engaging rather than 
symbolic and controllable.
Sorcerers
To conclude, I would like to return to Stefan Herbrechter’s (2013, 29) 
prediction about the posthumanist task of “rewriting the entire history 
of anthropocentrism”. Above, I have suggested that posthumanist read-
ing involves the critical reading of human’s others as well as an acknowl-
edgment and an analysis of the diverse nonhuman powers involved. In 
more concrete terms, posthumanist reading as a summoning of nonhu-
man powers pays attention to the plural material-semiotic makeup of 
texts: the materialities of text production (whether in print or in elec-
tronic platforms), possible movements, and other changes in the makeup 
of electronic texts, visual and auditory textual features of nonhuman 
origin, and so on. In the context of Herbrechter’s task of rewriting the 
history of anthropocentrism, I want to ask; aren’t these nonhuman agen-
cies or powers themselves partly rewriting the history of anthropocen-
trism through changing our understanding of language, writing, and 
reading? Accordingly, aren’t these powers also helping (or forcing) us to 
re-address the question “what it means to be human”?
With terminology adapted from occultist traditions – summoning, 
evocation – I have elaborated on the spectral rhetorics of posthumanism 
with a specific purpose in mind: to bring forth associations with the old 
traditions of negotiating, interacting with and commanding forces and 
entities below, above, and beyond humans. These associations highlight 
the prevailing centrality and unquestionable authority of humans in the 
midst of the posthumanist turn. We are the ones to question the exclu-
sive tradition of humanism, and we are the ones to initiate any alterna-
tive epistemologies, ethics, and ontologies. With regard to art, literature, 




The author wishes to thank warmly the poet Jouni Tossavainen for the 
permit to reprint a part of the poem “kadonneen äänen lyhyt haastat-
telu” in this chapter.
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When I finally picked up my husband’s journal and started to read, the 
brightness washed over me in unending waves and connected me to the 
earth, the water, the trees, the air, as I opened up and kept on opening.
(VanderMeer 2014, 160)
Annihilation (2014), a novel by American writer Jeff VanderMeer, pres-
ents the reader with a strange area where nonhuman life flourishes and 
humans change into something else. All that is left from the researchers 
sent to investigate the area are their journals – the novel being presented 
as a journal too. These textual traces entice readers into feeling with the 
focalizing characters, but they also guide the readers’ attention toward 
the recognition of artificiality: the characters are there to interact with, 
and yet they are not people.
Hyperobjects: Philosophy and Ecology after the End of the World 
(2013), a philosophical monograph by American writer Timothy Mor-
ton, presents the reader with strange, imperceptible objects that have the 
power to change humans into something else. A first-person narrator 
invites readers to feel the visceral force of global capital and the burn of 
climate change on one’s body. Yet the text also guides the reader’s atten-
tion toward the artifice of this experientiality: the narrator is there, his 
name is printed on the cover, and yet he is not a person.
This chapter concerns the experience of reconfiguration – and espe-
cially the experience of being opened up to nonhuman influences through 
self-aware engagement with estranging first-person narratives such as the 
ones introduced above. The question is simple, really: how can literature 
change its readers? And in particular, how can literature open readers up 
to environmental change? As a way of approaching an answer, I try out 
a mode of engagement I call becoming-instrument. “Becoming”, over-
used in post-structuralist and posthumanist discussions to the point of 
turning into a dead metaphor, has been used to denote “a continued 
sense of the subject as multiple and always-in- progress, a becoming 
rather than being” (Vint 2005, 288). This basic notion is at the heart of 
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my approach, too. “Instrument” connotes both musical instruments and 
scientific instruments: something that is manufactured, calibrated, and 
played for a specific creative purpose. I suggest that a first-person reader/
writer construct can function as an instrument for making sense of both 
personal and environmental change. My approach loops back to one of 
the primary texts I think with, that is, Timothy Morton’s Hyperobjects:
The thinking style (and thus the writing style) that this turn of events 
necessitates is one in which the normal certainties are inverted, or 
even dissolved. No longer are my intimate impressions “personal” in 
the sense that they are “merely mine” or “subjective only”: they are 
footprints of hyperobjects, distorted as they always must be by the 
entity in which they make their mark – that is, me. I become (and so 
do you) a litmus test of the time of hyperobjects.
(Morton 2013, 5)
Morton evokes the physical connotations of “impression”, turning the 
scholarly body into a material indicator by which the traces and effects 
of environmental change become available for research. In this chap-
ter, the self-instrument is tuned and tweaked in order to become more 
impressionable: that is, more receptible to the various effects of textual 
ecologies.1
Enactive theory Meets Posthumanist Practice
I think with posthumanist thinkers, but the thinking also links to an-
other conversation: the enactive approach to literature, developed in re-
cent years in the cognitive humanities (Kukkonen and Caracciolo 2014). 
The view of reading that often arises in enactive approaches to literature 
involves distributed agency and co-constitution: both the text and the 
reader bring something into the reading event, and the reader is to some 
extent “played” by the text (see Polvinen 2012). Scholars adopting the 
enactive approach to cognition often also promote a holistic understand-
ing of the cognizing subject: they consider the subject of perception to 
be “the whole animal, actively exploring its environment” rather than 
a disembodied mind or a body-independent brain (Noë 2004, 30; see 
also Varela, Thompson, and Rosch 1992; Thompson 2007). Moreover, 
the emergence of such a mind involves skillful activity. Philosopher Alva 
Noë would claim, for example, that perceiving “isn’t something that 
happens in us, it is something we do” (Noë 2004, 216, see also O’Regan 
and Noë 2001).
Enactive approaches to literature trace the skillful activity of this 
“whole animal” in the dynamics of reading. It is, however, still rare for 
enactive scholars to methodically employ the model of co- constitutive, 
holistic reading. In the common rhetoric, the role of “the embodied 
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reader”, the one who engages with the texts emotionally and experiences 
bodily sensations, still tends to be reserved for lay people. One excep-
tion to this trend is Emily Troscianko (2014), who has applied her par-
ticular experiential background of eating disorder to her interpretative 
work. Troscianko’s phenomenological account of starvation is thick and 
detailed, but from a posthumanist perspective, it is problematic in an-
other respect: it mentions the particular experiential background of the 
scholar as a basis of interpretation, but does not discuss the dynamic and 
material constitution of that experientiality. Rethinking the condition of 
embodiment as a more-than-human process would require practices that 
foreground the embodied activity of becoming-with nonhumans.
Enactive approaches do provide tools for considering the nonhuman 
actors that contribute to literary engagement – both textual devices 
themselves, and environmental forces and entities that work through 
text. Merja Polvinen (2012), for example, thinks “of readers as the au-
dience of a magician, being tricked even as they are aware of the trick, 
and of readers as instruments, producing music specifically by allowing 
themselves to be played by the text” (Polvinen 2012, 108). Polvinen’s 
metaphors are tied to a specific understanding of mimesis as poiesis: 
in this understanding, fictions act upon the actual world rather than 
merely imitate it. Polvinen, along with other enactive scholars, such 
as Alva Noë (2015), Karin Kukkonen, and Marco Caracciolo (2014), 
considers fictions as suggestive artifacts and the reading event as ac-
tive bodily engagement with those artifacts. Enactive approaches also 
acknowledge that texts and reading are constituted in material rela-
tions with biological, social, and cultural ecologies (for an overview, see 
Caracciolo 2014a).
In the following, I want to connect enactive ideas about environmental 
and literary engagement to certain posthumanist reading practices – in 
which even the professional reader is allowed to enter into embodied 
and emotional engagement with textual ecologies. The strong natural- 
scientific influence in the tradition of cognitive literary studies guides 
scholars to employ detached, rationalized methodologies that posit the 
text as an object of inquiry rather than an actor to think with. As the 
very brief review of enactive approaches to literature above demonstrates, 
enactive theory is where this tradition is being challenged. This is where 
the new cognitive approaches could, in my opinion, gain from cross- 
breeding with critical posthumanisms, which are informed by natural 
sciences but methodically problematize their epistemological attitudes.
Posthumanist approaches, especially in the strands employing femi-
nist methods, have produced first-person research exploring the entan-
gled aspects of more-than-human engagements. Often this research is 
labeled as “thinking-with”: Donna Haraway thinks with dogs, Astrida 
Neimanis thinks with bodies of water, Stacy Alaimo thinks with tox-
ins. Feminist posthumanists tend to emphasize the material processes in 
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which selves and others are constituted, and yet move away from natu-
ralized conceptions of identity2 – a predilection that also often charac-
terizes enactivist approaches to cognition, even if the style of research 
is remarkably different. In the posthuman phenomenology of Astrida 
Neimanis, for example, “the understanding of ‘body’ that we inherit 
from a dominant Western metaphysical tradition (a bounded materiality 
and individual subjectivity)” is bracketed, and the scholarly body is re-
configured as a more-than-human collective constituted by various flows 
of metabolism, memory, and attention (Neimanis 2017, 41). In this prac-
tice, the more-than-human aspects of experience are brought to focus 
and amplified (Neimanis 2017, 5).
I propose that the posthumanist feminist method of thinking with 
literature (rather than about it) can enrich enactive approaches to lit-
erature by way of “practicing what you preach” – that is, applying an 
enactive conception of cognition to one’s personal process of scholarly 
interpretation. In this chapter, I focus on mobilizing and testing a par-
ticular theoretical claim. Marco Caracciolo suggests that the literary 
techniques of first-person narration can “take readers’ empathic involve-
ment with a fictional character to a higher level than would be likely in 
real life” (Caracciolo 2014b, 32). He argues that reading first-person 
narratives differs remarkably from both the empathic involvement with 
second- or third-person focalizers and the empathic involvement with 
actual people, which tends to follow the second- and third-person pat-
terns of relating. The evocative force of first-person narratives lies, on 
one hand, in their ability to produce simulated experiences in the mind 
of the reader and, on the other hand, in the performative power whereby 
a certain kind of narrator can validate some fictional states of affairs 
as true within the fiction, called “authentication” by Lubomír Doležel 
(Doležel 1998; Caracciolo 2014b).
The concept of empathy has been criticized in the posthumanist dis-
cussion for its dependency on the recognition of sameness (e.g. Ahmed 
2004; Braidotti 2013; Gomel 2014). It is thus important to note that 
Caracciolo’s definition of empathy necessarily contains an imaginative 
aspect – he uses the term to denote not just “the capacity to experi-
ence another person’s mental states in a first-person way” (Caracciolo 
2014b, 32) but as interchangeably with “mental simulation” (ibid. 32, 
38). Empathy, construed in this way, does not imply a hermeneutic un-
derstanding of the experiences of the other, but rather the imaginative 
reconstruction or enaction of such experiences. In the imaginative pro-
cess of reading a first-person narrative, the simulated experience emerges 
as the collaboration of textual cues and readerly imagination. In the pro-
cess, the textual cues activate the readers’ “experiential backgrounds” 
– in all their variation – and in that respect, the imaginative reconstruc-
tion of fictional experience is based on recognition of familiar elements 
(Caracciolo 2014c, 24–26). However, through his analysis of strange 
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and “unnatural” narrators,3 Caracciolo suggests that the reading pro-
cess can also stretch the readers’ capacities into imagining experiences 
remarkably different from their own (Caracciolo 2014b, 2016).4
Deliberately integrating this idea about the evocative force of first- 
person narration into an actual interpretative process means opening up 
to the reconfigurative potential of first-person narratives and becoming 
vulnerable to change. I suggest that this kind of self-aware first-person 
engagement – called becoming-instrument in this chapter – can work to-
ward dissolving the certainty of the human subject and develop instead 
a model of subjectivity as “multiple and always-in-progress” (as phrased 
by Sherryl Vint). In this regard, the engagement could resemble certain 
mindfulness-based contemplative practices, such as Zen Buddhist medi-
tation, that guide the practitioner’s attention toward the illusionary and 
contingent features of personal experience. Echoing Fransisco Varela’s 
(1996; see also Thompson 2009) wish of bridging the gap between stud-
ies of mind-as-object and mind-as-experience, I suggest that combining 
enactive theory with posthumanist methodology can – with a labyrinth 
of caveats to be negotiated5 – give rise to new insights into our original 
question: how can literature change its readers?
To map out the potential of this combined approach, I think with 
two primary texts that evoke and thematize reconfiguration: Jeff 
 VanderMeer’s Annihilation (2014) and Timothy Morton’s Hyperobjects 
(2013).6 In this reading, I align with the narrators, letting their experi-
ence inform mine. Unlike readings emphasizing identification or immer-
sion, this reading strategy maintains an awareness of fictionality: this is 
engagement with fictional minds as “a bundle of effects stories can have 
on their recipients” (Caracciolo 2014b, 32) rather than fictional minds 
as potential persons. To steer away from the ambiguity of the term “em-
pathic engagement”, this form of engagement will from now on be called 
enactment of fictional experience.
Annihilation: Promise of Self-Immolating Ecstasy
One of the most remarkable similarities between Annihilation and 
 Hyperobjects is their complex take on first-person writing. Both of them 
employ a distinct first-person narrator: in Annihilation, the narrator is 
called “the biologist”, in Hyperobjects, “Tim Morton”. However, both 
works are also committed to decentralizing the human subject “within a 
universe that clearly sees us as simple atoms like everything else” (Van-
derMeer 2015), developing instead a mode of ecological existence that 
has been called “dark ecology” (Morton 2013, 2016) or “weird ecology” 
(Tompkins 2014). I suggest that both of these first-person perspectives 
invite readers to engage with them in ways that draw on their experi-
ential background, and yet, through defamiliarizing techniques, fore-
ground the fictional aspects of that engagement. Moreover, I suggest that 
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this twofold move of intimate engagement and cognitive estrangement 
serves to encourage an environment-oriented sense-making process.7
The novel Annihilation is written in the form of a field journal, nar-
rated by a secretive biologist who shies away from stable identities, 
becoming part of the ecosystems she studies rather than keeping an ob-
servational distance. The biologist is part of an expedition group sent to 
study a post-catastrophical site referred to as “Area X”: a place some-
where on the coast of the Gulf of Mexico, a place where traces of human 
life have been almost obliterated by an unknown event. The journal is 
part of her assignment: all members of the group are instructed to keep 
one, private from the eyes of others. Her mission is to report her obser-
vations about Area X and about the group. From the observations, it 
becomes apparent that the flora and fauna of the area are not your usual 
stable objects of scientific description, and the biologist is not your usual 
scientist-focalizer:
At one point, [a pair of otters] glanced up and I had a strange sen-
sation that they could see me watching them. It was a feeling I often 
had when out in the wilderness: that things were not quite what they 
seemed, and I had to fight against the sensation because it could 
overwhelm my scientific objectivity. There was also something else, 
moving ponderously through the reeds, but it was closer to the light-
house and in deep cover.
(VanderMeer 2014, 30)
Tuning into the perspective of the biologist, I am guided into noticing 
the nonhuman environment rather than the human: the text describes 
marshland ecotopes in detail, making note of the color of reeds and 
the eerie sounds of the forest at night, always leaving room for the un-
known. It does not provide me with the names of the other group mem-
bers, nor does it narrate their history. They are deemed insignificant – by 
the narrative, and by my reading. I make note of the color of the reeds, 
and I wait for something to emerge from the dark forest.
Soon into the expedition, the biologist is exposed to a transforming 
event. There is a tower under the ground, and the inner walls of the 
tower are filled with writing made of fungal growth. She leans in to read 
the text: by then, she is already contaminated by the emanating spores. 
This is a moment familiar to me from earlier reading of science-fictional 
and Weird texts – from J. G. Ballard, William S. Burroughs, Stanislav 
Lem, and H. P. Lovecraft. After this, everything will be made psyche-
delic, or perhaps psychotic: the individual mind will soon be flooded 
by the inhuman forces, and a horrific ecstasy will wipe away all ra-
tional subjectivity. I will give into that ecstasy too, I will let the text 
fill me and carry me, and I will be annihilated. This is, according to 
Burroughs, the dynamic of panic: I realize that everything surrounding 
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me is undoubtedly and uncontrollably alive, and as a consequence lose 
the sense of being the center of my world (Burroughs 1985). Philosopher 
Val Plumwood (1996) describes a similar loss of subjectivity in her essay 
“Being Prey”, in which she accounts for her experience of being attacked 
by a crocodile.
And so it happens in Annihilation. Except it does not. Many things are 
made psychedelic: the walls are alive, the biologist feels a “brightness” 
in her body – a brightness that sculpts her into becoming something else 
 entirely – and she becomes impervious to the hypnotic inductions prac-
ticed by the group’s leader. She cannot help but perceive differently. But 
she is as stubborn as she is scientifically trained: she refuses to give in to 
transformation. She does not trust the hypersensitivity that makes walk-
ing in the forest feel like listening to “an intense and expressive aria”, and 
as a result, she remains a consistent subject even in the face of annihilation.
In the tradition of science-fictional “forbidden zone” narratives such 
as Lem’s Solaris (1961) or Ballard’s The Drowned World (1962), the 
deciding moment of transformative estrangement is soon followed by 
the disintegration of the knowing subject. Annihilation stretches the mo-
ment of estrangement, making the biologist’s resistant practices more 
like a deliberate inquiry than an inevitable slide into asubjectivity. This 
is also apparent in the style of the novel: even when reporting moments 
of utter panic, the narration does not turn into the more sensational type 
of horror-writing that would break the sentence structure or the borders 
between subject and environment. Neither is there any sentimentality. 
Even the confessional passages such as the one below, in which the nar-
rator reveals previously hidden information about the brightness, retain 
a tense formality in the name of “scientific objectivity”.
It may be clear now that I am not always good at telling people 
things they feel they have a right to know, and in this account thus 
far I have neglected to mention some details about the brightness. 
My reason for this is, again, the hope that any reader’s initial opinion 
in judging my objectivity might not be influenced by these details.
(VanderMeer 2014, 150)
In the novel, several processes of transformation overlap and intersect: 
the ecosystemic change of the geographical area that is Area X and the 
resulting loss of an anthropocentric worldview; the progressing bright-
ness that transforms the biologist’s body; and, perhaps most obscured of 
them all, a psychological process of grieving the death of her  husband – 
who took part in the previous expedition to Area X. Even though the end 
of the novel provides a resolution to some of the psychological tension, 
the conflict between the distanced tone and the transformative subject 
matter holds.8 The tone can be understood in the context of the biol-
ogist’s resistance to emotional and ecological transformation: in order 
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to retain her humanity under the onslaught of nonhuman forces, she 
practices techniques that affirm her as a consistent, discrete self: repeat-
edly wounding her body, and compartmentalizing her thoughts through 
research and writing. Distancing thus becomes a technique for affirming 
the boundaries of the subject, and for keeping the self- annihilating ec-
stasy of the brightness at bay.
My side burned, but I could tell that too-quick repair was taking 
place, enough for me to move about […]. I knew not to trust this 
feeling of well-being, that it could simply be the interregnum before 
another stage. […] To keep the brightness in check, I would have to 
continue to become wounded, to be injured. To shock my system.
(VanderMeer 2014, 151)
As the narrative accounts for the events, readers are invited to enact 
the fictional experience of the character in all its sensory texture and 
complex emotionality. At the same time, the report-like tone of the ac-
count asserts a distance between the readers and the fictional mind of 
the biologist: the reader is repeatedly reminded of the artifice of writ-
ing that mediates the biologist’s experience – and, perhaps, also of the 
fictionality of the novel itself. In other words, this may not be the kind 
of first-person narrative that Caracciolo (2014b) intends to draw out in 
his article, as it does not provide an unhindered illusion of first-person 
access to a fictional mind. However, the experientiality of reading is not 
annulled by the awareness of fictionality. Rather, the distancing style 
activates those parts of one’s experiential background that are salient to 
the cognitive tasks of analysis and resistance. In enacting this particular 
fictional experience, a certain fearful tension builds in the body, and 
the experiential contrast between scientific objectivity and more-than- 
human entanglement is enhanced. Becoming-instrument involves be-
coming aware of the ways in which this contrast is produced in reading. 
Timothy Morton’s work on the impressive forces of nonhuman objects 
can enrich this awareness.
Hyperobjects: Ecological thought as  
Becoming Impressed
The dark ecology of literary scholar Timothy Morton, particularly the 
book Hyperobjects, also narrates bodily transformations stemming from 
environmental transformations: the effects of climate change, globaliza-
tion, and ubiquitous oil in the body of a scholar. In doing so, it calls for 
an engagement with its first-person narrator. As Stephen Muecke has 
noted in his review of Hyperobjects, the correct category for this book is 
not any particular scholarly discipline but the cross-intellectual practice 
of “theory” – and “you don’t read theory to advance the discipline you 
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might belong to – you read it for stimulation” (Muecke 2014). I claim 
that Morton’s writing thematizes this very function, making the act of 
being stimulated a requirement for ecological thought.
In dark ecology, first-person experience is presented as constituting of 
encounters with other objects. The “object-oriented” approach  Morton 
promotes is committed to revealing the activity, unknowability, and 
strangeness of material things. For an object-oriented ontologist, human 
subjectivity inhabits no special ontological category – “the being of a 
paper cup is as profound as mine” (Morton 2013, 17). By turning the 
reader’s attention to nonhuman objects, and the material relations of 
 humans-as-objects and other objects, Morton foregrounds the limita-
tions of human cognition. Like the writers of Weird tales such as Annihi-
lation, Morton insists that the real is permeated by weird and awesome 
processes. He also uses similar literary techniques to evoke estranging, 
grotesque, and sublime effects: the evocation of material monsters, vis-
ceral imagery, first-person narration, and a reversal of subject-object re-
lations (see VanderMeer 2011 for the Weird).9
The monstrous concept of hyperobject is a particularly effective tool in 
the project of reconfiguration. A hyperobject is defined as “a thing that 
is massively distributed in time and space relative to humans” (Morton 
2013, 1) – a system or a process that escapes human sensory perception 
and cognitive capabilities, but still has the power to transform human 
existence. Global warming, radioactive materials, and ubiquitous plastic 
can be considered hyperobjects, but so can the processes of evolution and 
extinction, and so can things like the English language and money. A hy-
perobject is both pervasive and viscous: in the idiom of Cara Daggett, it
penetrates you to the cellular level and yet sticks to you and every-
thing you know on Earth and everywhere: it is something like a 
wasp drowning in a jar of honey – the more you panic and resist it, 
the more stuck you become.
(Daggett 2014)
Morton presents this as an inescapably personal experience:
I do not access hyperobjects across a distance, through some trans-
parent medium. Hyperobjects are here, right here in my social and 
experiential space. Like faces pressed against the window, they leer 
at me menacingly: their very nearness is what menaces. From the 
center of the galaxy, a supermassive black hole impinges on my 
awareness, as if it were sitting in the car next to me at the traffic 
lights. Every day, global warming burns the skin on the back of my 
neck, making me itch with physical discomfort and inner anxiety. 
Evolution unfolds in my genome as my cells divide and mutate, as 
my body clones itself, as one of my sperm cells mixes it up with an 
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egg. As I reach for the iPhone charger plugged into the dashboard, 
I reach into evolution, into the extended phenotype that doesn’t stop 
at the edge of my skin but continues into all the spaces my human-
ness has colonized.
(Morton 2013, 27)
Morton connects the invasive qualities of hyperobjects to the practice of 
writing. For him, accounting his personal impressions is a technique for 
studying hyperobjects. His approach to environmental thinking requires 
an openness to nonhuman objects – including art objects. Openness is a 
counter-move to the kind of distanced observation usually considered as 
the proper scientific attitude (the same attitude Annihilation’s biologist 
fails at), which Morton considers “a psychic and ideological construct 
designed to protect me from the nearness of things” (Morton 2013, 27; 
see also Morton 2010, 8). The “things” that call for attention in the time 
of radical environmental change are not merely near, but in crushingly 
invasive contact with human bodies. This invasion is also at the heart of 
VanderMeer’s Area X, in the transformation of the ecotopes, and in the 
contamination of the biologist. What unites Morton and VanderMeer, 
and sets them apart from most environmental writers, is their call for 
opening up to the strangeness of environmental transformations rather 
than preserving nonhuman Nature as a harmonious and stable setting for 
human activity. First-person engagement plays a great part in this project: 
one’s personal impressions become “litmus tests in the time of hyperob-
jects” (Morton 2013, 5; see quote in the introduction to this chapter).
According to Morton, the existence of hyperobjects forces thinking 
into acknowledging a paradox: that there are real, material things that 
exist and act independently of human perception – and that there is no 
metaposition from which to approach these things. It becomes impos-
sible to write from a position “outside” hyperobjects. Rather, the self 
is always impressed by hyperobjects, and to some extent constituted by 
them. By following the “footprints”, the traces of hyperobjects in indi-
vidual bodies, one can make hyperobjects perceptible. The human body 
thus becomes a measuring device, and the rhetorical self becomes a phe-
nomenological instrument – an affordance, a handle by which you can 
grasp a hyperobject and communicate the feel of it.
The rhetorical self Morton frequently uses is quite effective in evoking 
embodied experientiality. Consider, for example, the kinetic and physi-
cal way in which he evokes the experience of listening to a musical track 
by the group My Bloody Valentine:
When I listen to My Bloody Valentine, I do not reach out toward the 
sound – instead, I am assaulted from the inside by a pulsation that is 
also sound, a physical force that almost lifts me off the floor. Kevin 
Shields’s guitar sears into me like an x-ray, scanning me, strafing me. 
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The chords lurch around one another sickeningly, gliding in and out of 
tune, amassing towers of harmonics through dissonance. Distortion 
pulps and fragments the sound into a welter of gravel and thick oil.
(Morton 2013, 29)
The strategic purpose of the passage is to support the notion of the viscos-
ity of hyperobjects – that is, the impossibility of distancing oneself from 
them, either intellectually or aesthetically. In Morton’s line of thought, 
aesthetic experience in general is not “attunement” of a subject to an 
art object (in the Kantian sense) – instead, the art object “tunes to me, 
pursuing my innards, searching out the resonant frequencies of my stom-
ach, my intestines, the pockets of gristle in my face” (Morton 2013, 30). 
This relationship between objects, termed interobjectivity by Morton, 
can be considered a visceral form of Polvinen’s (2012) “being played” 
and an extreme form of becoming-instrument. Interobjectivity differs 
remarkably from the general understanding of empathic engagement, 
which is considered to be an intersubjective phenomenon that requires 
participants capable of experiencing mental states. Morton, however, 
sees intersubjectivity as “a particular instance of interobjectivity with 
which humans are familiar […] ‘intersubjectivity’ is really human inter-
objectivity with lines drawn around it to exclude nonhumans” (Morton 
2013, 81–82).10
Reading the above passages from Hyperobjects through the con-
ception of interobjectivity, one can acknowledge the text as an aes-
thetic object that evokes embodied experientiality and draws its power 
both from the material affectivity of nonhuman objects and from the 
specific practices of interhuman affectivity – such as first-person nar-
ration. Both Doležel’s (1978) authentication and Neimanis’s (2017) 
amplification are helpful here. In the passages, a first-person narra-
tor authenticates the physical effects and bodily feelings of interob-
jective relations as true within the theoretical construction presented 
in Hyperobjects: they are true as experiences. The overt stylization 
of the passages (metaphors and similes; repetition of structures such 
as “as I”; rhythm; synesthetic expressions) marks them as distinctly 
literary, as already saturated with skill, learning, and culture. Instead 
of seeking an objective stance outside hyperobjects, Morton’s approach 
embraces personal impressions as means of inquiry. As such, this is a 
performative mode of writing, one that develops an understanding of 
the impressive and invasive qualities of hyperobjects by amplifying the 
experiential feel of them.
Enactment of Fictional Experience as a Mode of Inquiry
Returning to the reading of Annihilation further demonstrates how this 
kind of deliberate engagement applies to engaging with a literary object. 
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As mentioned above, Annihilation is presented as an expedition journal. 
Over the course of transformational events, the process of analytical 
writing is presented as a tool for making sense of the experience. It is an 
insufficient tool – there seems to be no way of getting to the truth about 
Area X – but it is presented as necessary for psychological purposes. In 
accounting for the oppressive vitality of Area X and the brightness that 
works its way in her body, the narrator makes a note of the impossibility 
of thinking about Area X without writing.
[T]here is a limit to thinking about even a small piece of something 
monumental. You still see the shadow of the whole rearing up be-
hind you, and you become lost in your thoughts in part from the 
panic of realizing the size of the imagined leviathan. I had to leave it 
there, compartmentalized, until I could write it all down, and seeing 
it on the page, begin to divine the true meaning.
(VanderMeer 2014, 93, italics in the original)
The most apparent mental strategy applied by the biologist, compart-
mentalization, protects the mind from shattering from the impact of 
the hyperobject that is Area X. As the biologist walks the marsh trail 
toward an abandoned lighthouse, she thinks of the strange biology of 
the tower/tunnel. Instead of trying to consider the whole truth, “a vast 
biological entity that might or might not be terrestrial”, she focuses on 
analyzing specific details of her observations. In her mind, “contemplat-
ing the sheer enormity of that idea on a macro level would have broken 
my mood like an avalanche crashing into my body” (VanderMeer 2014, 
90). Her focus on detail is later echoed in the journals left behind by 
members of earlier expeditions. One particularly provocative journal 
focuses solely on the thistles that grow in the area, giving lengthy and 
detailed descriptions of them. This single focus is presented as “a way 
of coping” with the horror of there being a “terrible presence hovering 
in the background of these entries” (ibid. 114). The compartmentalizing 
approach is also considered as “guerrilla warfare” against the invasive 
agency of Area X – a way to fight an enemy you cannot directly con-
front, physically or mentally.
The biologist keeps on analyzing, and so do I. I read the novel several 
times, making note of the cues and tones provided by the text, tuning 
into the resistant attitude of the biologist. As she is oppressed by the 
vividness of her impressions, so am I: there seems to be no proper way 
of talking about this book in an academic context. I can dissect it and 
categorize all my findings, but I am always left with a feeling that I have 
been misled – that my analytical training, like the scientific training of 
the biologist, has failed to prepare me for the encounter with this strange 
text. Accounting for the reconfigurative potential of the novel requires 
surrendering to subjective experience: the enactment of theoretical 
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reader models, rather than a mere critical assessment of them. Only af-
ter repeated exposure to the novel, as well as to the theory introduced 
above, do I find release from the analytical tension.
In the novel, the journals of the expedition members become repre-
sentatives for their writers. Every member is instructed to keep one, and 
is encouraged to keep them private. Finding a decaying mound of dis-
carded journals inside the abandoned lighthouse, the biologist feels as 
if she has encountered a “pile of ghosts”. From this pile, she finds the 
ghost of her husband, the journal “stuck to the back of another journal 
by dried blood or some other substance… written in the confident, bold 
hand-writing I knew from birthday cards, notes on the refrigerator, and 
shopping lists” (VanderMeer 2014, 118). The material description of the 
journals makes them seem like dead bodies, a rotting mound that docu-
ments a history of unnamed expeditions gone awry. The journal of the 
biologist’s husband carries the traces of his actual, familiar body: the 
blood and the handwriting.
Finding the journal of her husband, the biologist also finds a connec-
tion to him that was not realized when he was still alive. She carries the 
journal with her for some time without daring to open it, and when she 
finally does, the experience becomes a resolution of a long-accumulated 
tension.
When I finally picked up my husband’s journal and started to read, 
the brightness washed over me in unending waves and connected me 
to the earth, the water, the trees, the air, as I opened up and kept on 
opening.
(VanderMeer 2014, 160)
The biologist’s reading dramatizes the issue of enactive engagement with 
first-person narratives. Reading the journal enables an experience of in-
timacy that the accumulated years of shared living could not release.
My husband had had an inner life that went beyond his gregarious 
exterior, and if I had known enough to let him inside my guard, 
I might have understood this fact. Except I hadn’t, of course. I had 
let tidal pools and fungi that could devour plastic inside my guard, 
but not him.
(VanderMeer 2014, 167)
There is more to this revelation than interhuman relationships: the 
“opening up” serves as a model for ecological subjectivity. During the 
story, the biologist repeatedly reports her observations of the biological 
life of Area X. In these passages, the emotional and aesthetic aspects 
of an environmental orientation emerge most clearly, evoking a sense 
of an experiencing subject who appreciates life in a profound way. The 
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contrast between this observational sensitivity and the report-like man-
ner of accounting for interpersonal relationships contributes to the mod-
eling of the character as psychologically complex but unsociable. As a 
reader, I am invited to feel a closeness to someone who feels more com-
fortable in desolate marshlands than in crowded restaurants. I am also 
invited to observe the biologist in different habitats, to mark the changes 
in the tone of her narration. Toward the end of the novel, these tones and 
preferences emerge as expressions of her environments.
[F]un for me was sneaking off to peer into a tidal pool to grasp the 
intricacies of the creatures that lived there. Sustenance for me was 
tied to ecosystem and habitat, orgasm the sudden realization of the 
interconnectivity of living things. Observation had always meant 
more to me than interaction. He knew all of this, I think. But I never 
could express myself that well to him, although I did try, and he did 
listen. And yet, I was nothing but expression in other ways. My sole 
gift or talent, I believe now, was that places could impress them-
selves upon me, and I could become part of them with ease.
(VanderMeer 2014, 110, italics in the original)
The way to understand the biologist on her own terms, then, would be 
to observe her as a living creature, an organism in an ecosystem. By 
being impressed by her environments, she becomes their expression. 
In that way, she has been open for interpretation all the time she has 
seemed closed due to the lack of verbal expression of emotions. Being 
a fictional creature, she can only be tracked by the textual traces she 
leaves: the fictional journal text of Annihilation. But she is there, as 
real a thing as any narrator of a letter – and she can be engaged with. 
The sense of engagement may well be an illusion. That does not make 
it less true.
As mentioned in the introduction, Marco Caracciolo argues that the 
literary techniques of first-person narration can “take readers’ empathic 
involvement with a fictional character to a higher level than would be 
likely in real life”. For him, first-person internal focalization provides 
an intimate access to the fictional experience of a character – an access 
the kind of which is not possible with actual persons (Caracciolo 2014b, 
32). In reading Hyperobjects and Annihilation, I have chosen to accept 
this hypothesis as a methodical starting point: I have become impres-
sionable, and found a way to enact the experiential states evoked by 
first-person narration. Furthermore, this reading has led me to suggest 
that the dynamic of enactment also applies to narratives that are not 
explicitly fictional but rhetorical devices in non-fiction texts, enabling a 
mode of enactive engagement with textual constructs usually conflated 
with actual persons – such as the rhetorical I in Hyperobjects, and, to 
the extent you find plausible, the rhetorical I of this chapter.
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Conclusion: Becoming-Instrument and Reconfiguration
Science fiction and fantasy stories are full of narratives about (often 
horrifying) assimilations with and incorporations into other entities. 
What sets Annihilation apart is that the biologist successfully resists the 
incorporation into the strange entity of Area X. Although boundaries 
between the biologist’s body and other entities in the novel are porous 
and mutable at times, a distinct separation remains between the narra-
tive I and the experiential environment. Neither the acknowledgment 
of nonhuman agency nor the realization of the constructedness of one’s 
experiential self leads to a total annihilation of human subjectivity or to 
complete abandonment of rationality. At the end of the novel, the biol-
ogist leaves her journal and proceeds deeper into Area X, anticipating a 
“cataclysmic molting” of the area and the final transformation of herself 
into something nonhuman.
I will not be here when the thirteenth expedition reaches base camp. 
(Have they seen me yet, or are they about to? Will I melt into this 
landscape, or look up from a stand of reeds or the waters of the 
canal to see some other explorer staring down in disbelief? Will I be 
aware that anything is wrong or out of place?)
(VanderMeer 2014, 194)
What is annihilated here is not subjectivity as such, but the conception 
of the human subject as the sovereign master of a passive environment. 
In Annihilation, epistemic control over one’s environment is a necessary 
but limited tool, as the “interconnectivity of living things” both trans-
forms and transgresses human subjectivity.
In Annihilation and Hyperobjects, the characters of the biologist and 
Tim Morton are presented as objects for hyperobjects: their fictional 
bodies are affected by strange imperceptible forces, and they are trans-
formed in the process. These modeled transformations, conveyed to 
readers in the first-person singular, can train the readers’ abilities for 
imagining and enacting experiential change – for deliberately remod-
eling their experiential worlds to include nonhuman agency. If art and 
literature are considered as practices that reorganize the naturalized 
conventions of experience (see Caracciolo 2014a; Noë 2015), literary 
transformations like this reorganize a specific aspect of experience: per-
sonal change as part of environmental change.
My persistent hope is that first-person involvement, such as the mode 
of reading presented here as becoming-instrument, can add both inten-
sity and detail to processes of reconfiguration. I have posited a reading 
self as a heuristic instrument that, in engagement with literature, pro-
duces knowledge of the biocultural mesh it is embedded in. The instru-
ment might be inadequate – it is calibrated in the pressures of several 
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disciplines with partly contradicting methodologies and agendas, and as 
such it is an experimental hunting dog, purposefully bred yet potentially 
hazardous. It might be mad science, and it might be witchcraft. Yet this 
mongrel approach can help us reconsider the importance of personal in-
volvement and aesthetic experience in understanding both literature and 
environmental phenomena. Therefore, it is worth exploring.
Notes
 1 I make no empirical claims on the effect of Annihilation and Hyperobjects 
on other readers than myself. The reception of both works indicates that 
they can indeed be read in countlessly varied ways. Rather, I focus on the 
evocative potential in VanderMeer’s and Morton’s literary techniques, spe-
cifically first-person narration, and explore what happens if one intention-
ally inhabits the subject position these texts supposedly offer their readers.
 2 By “naturalized conceptions of identity”, I refer both to the notion of human 
subjects as sovereign individuals, as developed in modern Western philoso-
phy, and to the reductive notion of identity as a stable end result of biological 
and evolutionary processes, as proposed in popular versions of evolutionary 
psychology.
 3 Caracciolo has worked with estranging narratives by, for example, William 
S. Burroughs, Julio Cortazar, Marie Darrieussecq, Bret Easton Ellis, and 
Mark Haddon.
 4 Caracciolo’s work on readerly experience rests on the notion of experien-
tiality. The term was introduced by Monika Fludernik (1996) to designate 
narrative’s “quasi-mimetic evocation of real-life experience” (1996, 12). In 
contrast to Fludernik’s definition that construes experientiality as primarily 
a property of narrative, Caracciolo’s use of the term focuses on the phenom-
enology of the event of text-reader interaction. He argues that
even if engaging with narrative does involve mental representations of 
some sort, its experientiality cannot be understood in representational, 
object-based terms. Instead, we should think of experientiality as a kind 
of network that involves, minimally, the recipient of a narrative, his or 
her experiential background, and the expressive strategies adopted by 
the author. At the root of experientiality is, then, the tension between the 
textual design and the recipient’s experiential background.
(Caracciolo 2014c, 30)
  This is also the sense in which the term is used in this chapter.
 5 One of the more crucial caveats is that the two approaches employ different 
epistemological interests: posthumanist thought strives to actively trans-
form research practices, whereas cognitive approaches, due to their natural- 
science genealogies, tend to maintain a carefully apolitical stance. In this 
question, I side with the posthumanist ethical and political project.
 6 In this chapter, I read Hyperobjects more for its literary qualities than 
for its philosophical implications. Therefore, I do not take up the task 
of considering Morton’s thinking in light of the many traditions it draws 
from, but focus instead on the techniques he uses to affect his readers. 
I also acknowledge the critique of one of those traditions, namely, object- 
oriented ontologies or OOOs, given by many feminist new materialist 
scholars – the most frequent critique being that OOOs do not properly 
consider the world-constituting role of power-relations in their ontological 
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model – but I steer away from the debate for the time being. I trust that 
inquiries combining feminist and object-oriented perspectives can provide 
important insights even if there is no consensus on the ontological aspects 
of knowledge- formation. (See Åsberg, Thiele, and van der Tuin 2015 for an 
overview of the critiques.)
 7 Cognitive estrangement is one of the grounding concepts in science fiction 
research. Coined by the Marxist theorist Darko Suvin in 1972, cognitive 
estrangement has traditionally been considered as the primary effect that 
distinguishes science fiction proper from related genres such as horror and 
folkloric fantasy. In short, Suvin’s theory defines science fiction as the sort 
of fiction that systematically presents “an imaginative framework alterna-
tive to the author’s empirical environment” (Suvin 1979, 4). This systematic 
construction necessitates a novel element that sets the entire fictional world 
apart from the empirical reality of authors and readers, and enables the nor-
mative world-model of the reader to be transformed. (Suvin 1979, 63–64) 
While Suvin’s theory focuses on the traditionally cognitive, that is, rational 
aspects of literary engagement, and veers away from bodily experientiality, 
it can give a general idea of the transformative dynamic at play in reading 
strange fiction such as Annihilation.
 8 The issue is taken up again in the third part of the trilogy, Acceptance, with 
a significant change in the narrative voice of the biologist. This change will 
be discussed at length in my doctoral dissertation (forthcoming in 2019).
 9 Object-oriented ontologists (or “speculative realists”, a term that marks a 
slightly different but overlapping group of thinkers) have been known to 
affiliate themselves with Weird literature – according to philosopher David 
Roden, this might even be considered as the main uniting feature in the 
“otherwise fissiparous movement” (Roden 2016).
 10 Similar ideas about the force of nonhuman matter have been developed by 
New Materialist and material-ecocritical thinkers (e.g. Barad 2007; Iovino 
and Oppermann 2012).
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Part 2
Imagining Aliens and 
Monsters

When you leaf through the very first pages of the collected edition of 
The Sandman: Overture (2015), your eyes are filled, spread after spread, 
with swirls of bright colors. Bleeding pricks of blinding white intermin-
gle with nebulous, translucent shapes that appear to be clouds, mist, or 
perhaps stardust – until, on the page preceding the author Neil Gaiman’s 
foreword, an Earth-like planet is shown from a distance. Colorist Dave 
Stewart’s paratextual efforts thus highlight the tone and the themes of 
this strange graphic novel even before the story begins: by flinging you 
directly into fantastical space-scapes, the opening pages prime you into 
leaving your Earthly, anthropocentric presuppositions behind. Even the 
lone, inviting planet in the midst of the fanciful color explosions pro-
vides less of a reference point than you might initially think because, 
rather than our Earth, it is revealed to be a home to hairy humanoids and 
dreaming flowers – a world that is both familiar and strange (#1, [1]).1
The Sandman: Overture, an acclaimed mini-series published by DC 
Comics’ Vertigo imprint, first appeared in six issues from 2013 to 2015, 
constituting a retrospective prequel to Gaiman’s 76-issue dark fantasy 
comic The Sandman, which has enjoyed enduring cult fame ever since 
its publication in 1989–1996. Both the original series and the new pre-
quel revolve around the moody but responsible Morpheus, or Dream, 
who – the series asks us to imagine – is a personified distillation of sto-
ries and dreaming. The comic explores the functions, similarities, and 
idiosyncrasies of human and nonhuman minds more generally as well, 
by experimenting with varying visual styles, and by constructing agen-
tial creatures that defy the very definitions of ‘character’ – especially 
the term’s anthropomorphic connotations. The original series gained 
its visual richness from switching between more than twenty different 
pencilers, and in regard to characters, it introduced the Endless: Dream 
and his family of personified abstract concepts. In addition, numerous 
minor characters turned out to be places, nightmares, or one and many 
individuals at the same time. Although Overture is only a limited series 
and penciled by just one artist – J. H. Williams III – it continues these 
traditions by constantly switching up its visual styles and color palettes, 
and by telling its story without involving a single human character.
4 Alien Overtures
Speculating about Nonhuman 




Then again, most of the characters posed as aliens or abstractions in 
The Sandman: Overture appear to have extremely human-like minds 
and physical features, which makes one wonder how the comic actu-
ally constructs its characters as nonhuman and, in doing so, evokes the 
illusion of mediating nonhuman experience. The question is not only 
tangled in the previous discussions about narrating nonhuman or “un-
natural” minds but also in the logics of fictional characters and in the 
expressive arsenal of comics storytelling. Thus, this chapter will start 
by summarizing how different branches of cognitive narrative studies 
have approached the possibilities of portraying nonhumans in fiction so 
far. Although these ponderings have not yielded much consensus, defi-
nite answers, or even optimism for interspecies understanding, they have 
at least begun to explain why engaging with fictional aliens may be a 
worthwhile enterprise, rather than just an exercise in escapism. The sec-
ond subchapter will go on to consider what new perspectives character 
theory and comics analysis might bring to this already crowded but ex-
ceedingly important debate. Finally, the third subchapter will catalogue 
the main strategies The Sandman: Overture employs in constructing 
odd but relatable characters, and in marking the boundaries between 
human understanding and nonhuman realities more generally.
Narrating the Nonhuman: From Species-Specific 
Solipsism to Celebration of Speculation
Should one ask a crowd of humanist scholars if works of fiction can help 
their audiences to understand nonhuman experience, some philosophers 
of mind would immediately stand up, waving Thomas Nagel’s semi-
nal essay “What Is it Like to Be a Bat?” (1974) and yelling no. Several 
proponents of cognitive and natural narratology (cf. Fludernik 1996; 
Zunshine 2008; Vermeule 2010) would likely nod in acceptance to this 
demonstration of restraint and realism. “Is this really what we should be 
discussing? Narratives and the cognitive capacities we use to interpret 
them are designed to extract social information about human identi-
ties and human interactions”, they would say. “Perhaps”, other cogni-
tive narratologists (cf. Herman 2011; Bernaerts et al. 2014; Caracciolo 
2014a, 2016) might retort, “but that does not mean different imagined 
scenarios could not challenge our pre-existing cognitive frames and thus 
affect our preconceptions of nonhumans”. By this point, unnatural nar-
ratologists (cf. Alber 2009) or practitioners of genre fiction (cf. Gaiman 
2016) would likely interject: “Maybe we should start with these specu-
lative and postmodern works you put aside here in the corner? Strange 
narrators and nonhuman creatures a-plenty – and, in case you haven’t 
noticed, they make up almost half the library!”
From this point on, the disagreements and digressions would only 
grow even more substantial and complicated, as the question cuts across 
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two extremely current, multifaceted, and cross-disciplinary areas of in-
quiry: “research on the nexus of mind and narrative” (Herman 2013) 
and research on human–nonhuman entanglements. What is more, the 
key concept tying them together – experience – is not an easy target for 
research, due to its dynamic, multisensory, situated, and uniquely sub-
jective character (Nagel 1974, 437; Caracciolo 2014b, 6, 14). However, 
as Thomas Nagel (1974, 438, 449) has famously argued, we humans 
do not necessarily lack the vocabulary to describe and the methods to 
approach nonhuman experiences because such tools are categorically 
unattainable but because we have been looking for them in the wrong 
places – in the framework of natural sciences, which systematically dis-
misses subjective experientiality. Since an experience is “fully compre-
hensible only from one point of view” – that of the experiencer – “then 
any shift to greater objectivity” – which the physicalist sciences always 
strive for – “does not take us nearer to the real nature of the phenom-
enon” but “farther away from it” (Nagel 1974, 444–445). Narratives, 
by contrast, are “ tailor-made for gauging the felt quality of lived expe-
riences”, as David Herman (2013) suggests, since they tend to unfold 
specific circumstances from the specific point of view of a specific char-
acter, sometimes in a way that even invites the reader to simulate the 
characters’ experiences “in a first person way” (Caracciolo 2014a, 29).
There are obvious epistemological limitations to this narrative media-
tion of subjectivities, however. Since we can only receive experiential input 
through our human senses and bodies, and since we can only process them 
with our evolved species-specific cognitive faculties, the output of our imag-
inations must be determined by patterns of perception and thought that 
are central, or even unique, to human experience (Nagel 1974,  238–441). 
Moreover, for most people, much of the input derives from social interac-
tions with other humans, and much of the output is targeted at yet more 
fellow humans, which means that most of our everyday thinking is filtered 
through several layers of assumptions about what matters to this specific 
species. In other words, humans tend to write fiction about humans for 
human readers, because all these human readers are likely interested in the 
ways other humans experience their human condition.
Accordingly, Monika Fludernik’s (1996, 9, 26) natural narratology 
equated narrativity with “mediated human experientiality”. The base ar-
gument for many subsequent cognitive theories has, likewise, been that 
the readers’ mental representations of fictional worlds, characters, and 
scenarios draw on the cognitive structures and “encyclopedic knowl-
edge” they have accumulated through their continued engagement with 
the real world, real people, and real-life situations (see e.g.  Schneider 
2001; Eder, Jannidis, and Schneider 2010; Herman 2013; Jannidis 2013; 
Caracciolo 2014b, 58–59). As Nagel (1974, 439) formulates: “Our own 
experience provides the basic material for our imagination, whose range 
is therefore limited”.
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Although the reasoning behind these claims is difficult to deny – one 
cannot create anything from nothing – they hardly reflect the scope of 
characters and subjectivities that narrative arts and media have actu-
ally attempted to (re)produce. Instead of being limited to scenarios that 
mimic “natural”, spontaneous storytelling situations, fiction – especially 
postmodernist (cf. Alber 2009) and contemporary (cf. Caracciolo 2016) 
fiction – is awash with stories in which “[t]he narrator may be an animal, 
a mythical entity, an inanimate object, a machine, a corpse, a sperm, 
an omniscient first-person narrator or a collection of disparate voices” 
( Alber, Skov Nielsen, and Richardson 2013, 2). Thus, adopting a moni-
ker that is explicitly antithetical to Fludernik’s project, unnatural narra-
tologists like Jan Alber (2009, 80) have experimented with applying the 
same cognitive reasoning to works that “radically deconstruct the an-
thropomorphic narrator, the traditional human character, or real-world 
notions of time and space”.
Yet this strife to expand the canon outside of the “mimetic bias” – which 
has reigned over narrative studies for the past century (Alber 2009, 79; 
Fehrle 2011, 240) – has usually stopped short of challenging the “an-
thropomorphic bias” framed by Fludernik (1996, 9). Alber (2009, 82, 
94) has only reasserted that “even the strangest text is about humans 
or human concerns”, because “nobody would be interested in such 
narratives” that do not “say something about us and the world we live 
in”. Of course, naming a movement that focuses on strange narrators 
as “unnatural” already implies that mimetic, human-like characters 
are the only “natural” subject of storytelling. Moreover, employing the 
rhetoric of natural versus unnatural, rather than human versus nonhu-
man, connotes that unnatural narratologists’ inquiry is mostly focused 
on the ways in which narratives can deviate from mimetic norms and 
conventions, not on the ways in which they could suggest nonhuman 
experience, as embodied by characters that represent types of actual 
nonhumans. By keeping their claims largely to formal, metafictional, 
and meta-disciplinary levels, unnatural narratologists have thus been 
able to bypass the solipsistic concerns voiced by Nagel but they have also 
resigned from placing much ethical weight or consequence on their own 
work or on the fictions they research.
More recently, other cognitive theorists have been inclined to see non-
human fictional characters as potential sites of negotiation and explo-
ration, as artistic and didactic thought experiments that can actually 
“destabilize anthropocentric ideologies” by underlining the continu-
ities and downplaying the differences between human and nonhuman 
experience (Bernaerts et  al. 2014, 74–75). For Herman (2011, 166, 
2012, 97–101), the first step for establishing such continuities is craft-
ing more “fine-grained representations” of nonhumans as genuinely 
 nonhuman – not “emptying” them out and making them vessels for alle-
gorical meanings and “experiences imported from the human domain”. 
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Indeed, even if one cannot truly know what and how nonhuman animals 
feel or think, it is always possible to depict them accurately from a be-
havioristic viewpoint, that is, to produce mimetic representations based 
on the knowledge gained by observing real nonhuman animals “from 
the outside”.
According to current philosophy of mind, these “Cartesian geogra-
phies” that situate the mind on the “inside”, as if separate from out-
ward behavior, should be discarded, however, because cognitions can 
only arise from the “sensorimotor coupling between agent and world”. 
Hence, the mind should be reconceptualized as “situated, embodied and 
extended” – and since this “basic structure” of an enactive conscious-
ness is likely to apply to other-than-human minds as well, readers can, 
indeed, fumble for some approximate sense of animals’ lived experience 
by engaging with carefully constructed (multimodal) animal narratives. 
(Herman 2012, 97) Inspired by the philosophy of Jakob von Uexküll, 
Herman (2011, 167, 178; 2012, 99) names such narratives “Umwelt ex-
plorations”, and concludes that “increasingly detailed engagement with 
the lived texture of nonhuman experiences does not necessarily result in 
a diminishment of narrativity”, as Fludernik and Alber have assumed. 
This is because animal comics and most other nonhuman stories still 
retain the most fundamental ingredient of narrative: an experiencing 
subject, to whom the reader can attribute at least some mental states – 
based on how it interacts with its environment.
Two disclaimers are in order here. First, because human readers are 
fine-tuned by the evolution to infer mental states of other humans spe-
cifically (Zunshine 2008, 58), it seems very likely that their attributions 
of mental states to nonhuman characters are unavoidably anthropo-
morphizing and inaccurate. The narratives can, however, purposefully 
work against this, by anticipating and undermining some of the readerly 
assumptions that would aim for overstated humanization, coherence, 
and illusion of mutual understanding, as the analysis of The Sandman: 
Overture will demonstrate. Second, making the representations more 
“fine-grained” still does not make them verifiable or factual. No matter 
how expertly mimetic and resistant of cognitive biases narrative fictions 
might be, they can never provide the readers with reliable information 
on how actual bats actually experience their batness, because that is 
simply not the purpose of fiction. As noted above, narratives excel at 
subjectivity rather than objectivity, at providing alternative perspectives 
rather than “alternative facts”.
This is not to say, however, that fictional nonhumans would be com-
pletely inconsequential – or that narratives reaching toward non-existent 
worlds and creatures would be purely escapistic. On the contrary, cog-
nitive narratologists have repeatedly emphasized that the connection be-
tween real-life cognitive frames and fictional constructions is a two-way 
street (e.g. Herman 2013); that narratives can have a “feedback effect” 
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on the selfsame knowledge structures the reader employs to make sense 
of them (Caracciolo 2016, 50–51). Even more crucially, the accuracy, 
mimesis, and truthfulness of the fictional constructions in question may 
not be very important variables in this equation. If anything, Marco 
Caracciolo (2016, 47–49) argues that engaging with “strange” charac-
ters and foreign worldviews can result in especially extensive – even if 
only subtle and temporary – cognitive readjustments. In other words, 
nonhuman or otherwise unconventional narrators often induce cogni-
tive dissonance, which the reader has to resolve in one way or another, 
by employing interpretive strategies that require reflecting and review-
ing the assumptions the reader holds about himself or herself, about 
mental functioning, and about the world in general (Caracciolo 2016, 
12–14, 34–37). Similarly, Alber (2009, 80–93) believes that unnatural, 
or “physically or logically impossible”, scenarios cannot always be nat-
uralized as hallucinations or allegories; sometimes, they “challenge the 
mind’s fundamental sense-making capabilities” and, as a result, “blend” 
or “enrich” the readers’ pre-existing cognitive frameworks.
Of course, disjointing or expanding the readers’ cognitive frame-
works in this way has always been the main goal of all the different 
 subgenres of speculative fiction (cf. Stockwell 2008, 518). Science fiction, 
fantasy, and horror typically ask the readers to concern themselves with 
worlds, entities, and experiences that are clearly not knowable, verifiable, 
real, or perhaps even possible. The very fact that these entire “unnatu-
ral” genres exist and continue to remain popular defies the reasoning of 
both natural and unnatural narratologists: it seems reductive to assume 
that authors would create fantastical scenarios only to explore different 
ways of diverting from natural, mimetic frameworks and conventions, 
or that the readers would only engage with them in order to glean “Ma-
chiavellian” social knowledge from odd creatures they ultimately see as 
cleverly disguised fellow-humans (Vermeule 2010, 30–33). Rather, genre 
fiction typically treats speculation and counterfactual thinking as goals 
in themselves. Neil Gaiman (2016, 15), the author of The Sandman, for 
instance, sees “what-if” thinking as the most important prerequisite for 
ever changing anything in the world or in oneself: “Political movements, 
personal movements, all begin with imagining another way of existing”.
Sometimes, this “imagining another way of existing” means trying 
to imagine what it is like to be a bat. Even if such an attempt is doomed 
to fail objectively speaking, it can still influence one’s understanding of 
bats, for better or for worse. Other times, “imagining another way of 
existing” means making up aliens and speculating how they might expe-
rience the world through their unique “sensory-motor couplings” with 
their imagined environments. In a way, this is an even better, safer form 
of speculation, because it does not pose the risk of misunderstanding 
or misrepresenting any actual nonhumans. Imagining aliens has abso-
lutely no consequences for bats but, again, it can still be consequential 
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for the reader, whose ideas of humanness, nonhumanness, and expe-
rience become foregrounded, and perhaps even reconfigured, at least 
for the duration of the imagining. Indeed, when faced with something 
 unknowable – such as the subjective textures of nonhuman experiences – 
 imagining is the only option for getting any purchase on the matter.
Hybrid Humanity: Possibilities of  
Multimodal Fictional Characters
On a more practical level, these theoretical strands intertwine in non-
human fictional characters – a strange concept in itself as characters 
are, of course, never truly human. Instead, they are constructions that 
are meant to be mistaken for humans, much like the living scarecrow 
Mervyn, who serves as the janitor in Morpheus’ dream kingdom in The 
Sandman series. Although he pointedly describes himself in very material 
terms – as “a moist wet pumpkin with the seeds scooped out, carved into 
the shape of a face and rammed onto a hard, rough, rampant wooden 
stick” (#1, [19]) – his physical form and verbal self- expression are so 
analogous to those of regular humans that the reader is, nevertheless, 
likely tempted to anthropomorphize him into an agential  individual – 
with the mind to mock Freudian interpretations of dreams. The juxta-
position between this anthropomorphic “feel” of the character and the 
passing foregrounding of his artifactual materiality are likely to cause 
a jolt of defamiliarization, however, and remind the reader that agency 
and sentience are more fundamental to the concept of characterness 
than anthropomorphism is. In this section, I will argue that the inherent 
nonhumanness of characters is always ranged against the humanness of 
the reader, and that comics’ capacity to evoke characters’ subjectivities 
with monosensory yet multimodal narrative means can highlight these 
tensions in unique ways.
As James Phelan’s (1989, 4) rhetorical character theory sums, all char-
acters are artificial constructions – but they are constructed in such a 
way that conjures forth a mimetic illusion of personhood. Many liter-
ary theorists (e.g. Eder et al. 2010; Jannidis 2013) have since concurred 
that characters are born when textual cues are read through cognitive 
frames of humanness. This supposedly involves both “top-down” and 
“bottom-up” processing, meaning that the reader can either instantly 
recognize the character as belonging to a certain category – such as the 
category of character or the category of humanity – or extrapolate such 
categories by collecting specific textual cues (Schneider 2001, 619–626). 
Cues like a proper name or a speech balloon imply agency, sentience, 
and individuality, and thus invite the reader to place the entities asso-
ciated with these cues into the category of character – and, most likely, 
into the category of humanity as well. Thus, to summarize Phelan’s 
theory in another way, the category of characterness binds agential 
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narrative functions and illusory humanity together, so that the readers 
are compelled to humanize agential textual constructions as well as to 
expect narrative agency from such textual constructions that manifest 
human-like traits. Furthermore, it would seem that placing a different 
amount of interest and emphasis on these two aspects – the synthetic 
and the mimetic aspects of character (Phelan 1989) – forms the main 
fault-line between natural and unnatural narratology’s approaches to 
nonhuman minds.
Arguably, Fludernik’s natural narratology and the cognitive narra-
tology formed in its wake have mainly concentrated on explaining the 
formation and functions of the mimetic aspect. That is to say, they have 
largely equated the human readers’ ability to understand, animate, and 
flesh out fictional characters with human species’ evolved “ability to 
interpret other people’s behavior in terms of underlying mental states” 
(e.g. Zunshine 2008, 58; Vermeule 2010, 34–37) – the so-called theory 
of mind. Some have further inferred that the opportunity to safely use 
and train this ability must be the main “point” and pleasure of reading 
fiction (Alber 2009, 94; Vermeule 2010, 246). Thus, while the exact 
chains of argumentation vary, many theorists drawing on this frame-
work have essentially reformulated Fludernik’s (1996, 28) claim that 
narrativity “centers on experientiality of an anthropomorphic nature”. 
Narrativization is consequently bound up with anthropomorphization, 
and the blame for this bias rests on the human readers: because readers 
use human-centric cognitive capabilities to make mimetic sense of nar-
ratives and their characters, they are inclined to read about humans even 
when they are not reading about humans. In other words, even overtly 
nonhuman fictional characters are seen merely as “proxies for traits of 
human difference or otherness” (Keen 2011, 147) or as “strategic and 
parodic” “mask[s] or costume[s]” for the human, “whose universality is 
reaffirmed and reified in the process” (Chaney 2011, 130, 135).
The agenda of unnatural narratologists, by contrast, implies that 
characters’ synthetic aspect is not subservient to mimetic interpretations 
but vice versa: the illusion of personhood is only one of the effects the 
textual cues can be used to produce. Indeed, since characters are always 
ontologically nonhuman, all one needs to do in order to create an “un-
natural” character is to allow this nonhumanity to seep onto the repre-
sentational level. Many unnatural narratologists have therefore analyzed 
such postmodern works that flaunt the artificiality of their characters. 
The very fact that such characters typically have a jarring, disruptive, 
“unnatural” effect actually ends up being a testament to characters’ sup-
posed anthropomorphism, however. Following Lisa Zunshine (2008, 
63–75), portraying a character simultaneously as a person and as an 
artifact upsets essentialist assumptions that are fundamental to human 
minds’ ontological reasoning. Since readers are unlikely to ever truly for-
get that characters are non-existent constructions created by the author, 
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the dissonance evoked by openly artificial characters must rise instead 
from the readers’ inability to ignore the expectations of humanness they 
associate with characterness.
Then again, whether or not fictional characters themselves are hu-
man is less pertinent to the present research problem than whether or 
not they can be used as a tool for approaching other, actual or imag-
inary, nonhuman creatures. Some theorists claim that tampering with 
the synthetic level of characters’ textual construction can produce other 
defamiliarizing effects on the interpretational layer as well – effects 
that can read as nonhuman in a more general sense, not only in the 
sense of postmodern artificiality (cf. Bernaerts et al. 2014). This relates 
to the blending of cognitive frames discussed in the previous section. 
When something presented in a text does not fit the readers’ existing, 
anthropomorphically biased cognitive frames, they tend to react both 
cognitively and affectively. Together, the epistemological conflict and the 
accompanying feeling of strangeness constitute what Viktor Shklovsky 
named “defamiliarization”: the reader becomes aware of the newness – 
or the alienness – of what he or she perceives and is thus prompted to 
reflect on it, to discard automatized heuristics, and to find new pathways 
for thinking and perceiving it (Caracciolo 2016, 35, 48–49). If this is 
caused by or coupled with two other narrative devices or experiences – a 
character posed as nonhuman and an empathetic stance toward him or 
her – defamiliarization could arguably give the reader the sensation that 
they are glimpsing a nonhuman subjectivity.
As Bernaerts et  al. (2014, 71, 75) argue, creating characters that 
appear both relatable and nonhuman requires striking a delicate bal-
ance between the two “poles” corresponding to natural and unnatu-
ral narratologists’ main interests: the texts’ deliberate, “anti-mimetic” 
strangeness, and the reader’s “natural” projection of “assumptions and 
expectations about human life and consciousness”. That is, a text can 
season a character with textual cues evoking the dissonant cognitive 
categories of “animal”, “plant”, “artifact”, or “substance” (Zunshine 
2008, 56–65), but the character still has to remain anthropomorphic 
enough to be recognized as a character. Also, the defamiliarizing ef-
fects of nonhuman subjectivities can only truly be experienced through 
 empathy – or the imaginative, first-person adoption of the “the per-
ceptual, emotional, or axiological perspective of a fictional character” 
(Bernaerts et al. 2014, 73). However, the empathetic simulation of the 
nonhuman character’s mind requires projecting partial memories of the 
reader’s own past, embodied experiences onto the nonhuman character 
(Caracciolo 2014b, 123–132), which both presumes and results in some 
degree of anthropomorphization. In other words, although characters 
are always nonhuman, even the representationally nonhuman charac-
ters can be classified as characters only by the virtue of their illusory 
anthropomorphic qualities, and the reader must paradoxically relate 
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nonhuman characters to his or her own human experiences in order to 
bear witness to their nonhumanness. Thus, nonhuman narrators always 
manifest “the conceptual integration of human and nonhuman traits”; 
impossibly, they blend “similarity and otherness” and “empathy and de-
familiarization”, the category of human and the many possible catego-
ries of nonhuman (Bernaerts et al. 2014, 71, 72–74).
Suzanne Keen (2011) and David Herman (2011) have come to similar 
conclusions: they both note that comics especially can hybridize human 
and animal traits in different proportions for different effects. Animal 
features can be superimposed on human characters – for instance, in 
order to establish a distancing allegory (Herman 2011, 169) – or animal 
characters can be made more understandable and sympathetic by an-
thropomorphizing them to some degree (Keen 2011, 142, 148). There is 
no way off the continuum, however. Keeping in line with the “natural” 
argument that characters always have a mimetic aspect and that the 
mimetic aspect is based on the cognitive application of anthropocen-
tric folk psychology, Herman and Keen imply that nonhuman characters 
unavoidably incorporate some human features. At the same time, they 
point toward a medium that can juxtapose these dissonant streams of 
character information with particular ease: the medium of comics.
On the one hand, comics have traditionally fostered an exceptionally 
high “tolerance”, or even a preference, for the fantastic and the unnatural 
(Fehrle 2011, 211). Not only are the institutions and fandoms of specu-
lative fiction and comics historically linked – for example, Neil Gaiman 
is known as both a fantasy author and a comics writer – but cartoon-
ish and expressive graphic styles presuppose story content that does not 
necessarily follow the laws and conventions of realism. That is, because 
comics are rarely photorealistic, they might activate the cognitive frames 
and memories readers have of fantastical fictions, rather than of real life 
or realistic fictions, inviting them to actually expect such “unnatural-
ities” as altered laws of physics or nonhuman characters (Fehrle 2011, 
215). On the other hand, contemporary comics show an increasing inter-
est toward the inner worlds of characters (Groensteen 2013, 129). This 
inward turn is likely related to the recent surge of critically acclaimed 
autobiographical comics, from Art Spiegelman’s Maus (1991) and 
David B’s ’Lascension du haut mal (1996) to Marjane Satrapi’s Perse-
polis (2000) and Alison Bechdel’s Fun Home (2006). Meanwhile, in ac-
ademia, cognitively informed scholars have started to notice how the 
multimodality of comics allows depicting “minds in action” – that is, 
evoking fictional minds through repeated visual bodies embedded in 
“physical contexts” (Mikkonen 2008, 303, 316; Herman 2011; Kuk-
konen 2013, 154). Where these two tendencies – fantastical speculation 
and innovative depiction of embodied minds – collide, comics and com-
ics research can contribute to the speculative exploration of nonhuman 
experiences.
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What is more, colliding or paralleling different discourses is what 
comics do best. This is because a page of a graphic narrative is always 
a composite of several, more or less independent elements: pages are di-
vided into panels, and panels consist of foregrounded and backgrounded 
elements belonging to “two distinguishable semiotic tracks”, the verbal 
and the pictorial (cf. Kukkonen 2013, 136). All of these parts and tracks 
can stand in vastly different relations to one another: transitions from 
panel to panel typically introduce some changes in time, location, per-
spective, or even graphic style (McCloud 1993, 70–79); a single page or 
panel can parallel several simultaneous events (Kukkonen 2013, 136); 
and the words and images can either complement or contradict each 
other (e.g. Fehrle 2011, 221). As Keen and Herman’s analyses already 
testify, this modularity of comics’ expressive arsenal provides plenty of 
options for such human–nonhuman hybridization Bernaerts and his col-
leagues assume that nonhuman narration necessitates.
Unlike film – to which it is often unfavorably compared – comics is 
also “a monosensory medium” (Groensteen 2013, 122), meaning it must 
pack all the information and expression on the static, two-dimensional 
space of a page. As a result, things belonging to different sensory do-
mains and different levels of mimesis become forcibly juxtaposed. The 
most prevalent example of this is the speech bubble, “a desperation de-
vice” (Eisner 2008, 24) that allows auditory and abstract information to 
intrude the visual, physical reality of the storyworld. For regular comics 
readers this device has, of course, become naturalized (Groensteen 2013, 
122) – no one really imagines the characters walking around with white 
balloons on which they write their thoughts – but translating thoughts 
into images can take other, more elaborate or defamiliarizing situational 
forms as well. Since the 1920s, cartoonists have remixed objective and 
subjective perspectives both within and between panels, devoting spe-
cific story elements or entire passages to flashbacks, daydreams, and 
other character-focalized outlooks on the storyworld (Groensteen 2013, 
130). Bill Watterson’s Calvin and Hobbes, for instance, constantly 
demonstrates how imaginatively and vividly Calvin experiences his toy 
tiger and everyday situations: in his mind, teachers become dinosaurs, 
girls appear as disgusting aliens, and Hobbes is alive (cf. Groensteen 
2013, 129; Varis 2013, 60, 120). Although these changes from more ob-
jective to more subjective and private perspectives are typically signaled 
by changes in the graphic expression, they can still leave quite a bit of 
room for ambiguity and interpretation. That is, the reader may be left 
hesitating between what is real and what is imagined, and for which 
characters (Groensteen 2013, 124, 131).
Of course, this kind of oscillation between interpretations, be-
tween empathetic and more external stances, is also closely related to 
 character-centric defamiliarization (Caracciolo 2016, 47, 55). As noted 
above, the concept of defamiliarization is an important ingredient 
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in the discussion about nonhuman narration as its emotive component 
marks the textual source of the defamiliarization as new or alien, while 
the cognitive dissonance prompts the reader to blend and reconcile his 
or her pre-existing cognitive structures in relation to this alien, possi-
bly nonhuman domain. In the context of comics, however, this hesita-
tion may also target the “Cartesian geographies” and the subjectivity of 
mind and experience, heightening the readers’ awareness not only of the 
presence of something Other but also of the ways and extent in which its 
subjectivity can be known and shared.
To sum, the necessity to express both the storyworlds and the char-
acters’ subjective experiences solely through the “visual channel” 
causes them to blend with and through different semiotic devices and 
graphic qualities, so that the dichotomies between the “inside” and the 
 “outside”, the mental and the fleshly, the subjective and the objective 
become deconstructed. Indeed, although the minds of the characters 
can be revealed by direct, verbal means in speech and thought balloons 
 (Mikkonen 2008, 306–307; Groensteen 2013, 122), the imaginary sub-
jectivities rarely remain confined in them. Instead, anything from colors 
and graphic qualities of the lines to the shifting perspectives and appear-
ances of the characters can convey (aspectual) character- focalization 
(cf.  Thon 2014). Such visual devices allow evoking subjective experi-
ences without verbalizing them, which is especially important when 
aiming for mimetic depiction of the experiences of creatures that do not 
think or communicate in written or spoken language. Then again, tradi-
tional, “behaviorist”, third-person graphic narratives, which provide no 
direct access to their characters’ minds at all, also depict their characters 
as visually embodied and embedded in social, spatial, and temporal sit-
uations (Mikkonen 2008, 303). Thus, the reader can draw on much of 
the same cues they would take note of when observing sentient creatures 
in real life. Facial expressions and bodily postures, for instance, can be 
observed directly from the visual track, which, according to Suzanne 
Keen (2011, 135, 146), allows comics to tap into the readers’ immediate 
affective responses: the characters’ core emotions are recognized before 
the neocortex has time to judge whether the character in question is one 
of “us” or one of “them”, a human or a nonhuman.
Of course, one crucial difference between reading comics and observ-
ing real life is that the visual perspectives of comics’ panels do not only 
situate and embed the characters in the storyspace, but they also situate 
the reader in some relation to the characters: near or close, opposite or 
over the shoulder, outside or as-if inside (Mikkonen 2008, 309–312). 
This is likely to have some effect on the empathetic perspective- taking, 
which, as noted above, is a logical prerequisite for engaging with the 
nonhuman characters’ experiences. As the page designs keep leading the 
reader from panel to panel, through the different perspectives and trajec-
tories, “the representational and experiential dimensions of the fictional 
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mind” are often brought together (Kukkonen 2013, 154). In other words, 
the overlap between the visual storytelling and character focalization 
can force some degree of aspectual overlap between the narrated, specu-
latively nonhuman experience of the character and the real viewing ex-
perience of the reader (cf. Caracciolo 2014b, 123). As a result, it becomes 
more difficult to view the character only as a static, alien object, whose 
unfamiliar way of seeing the world can forever remain completely out-
side of the reader’s considerations. The next chapter will demonstrate, 
among other things, how the page designs can manipulate the reading 
experience in this way, and how they can thus underline what the reader 
can and cannot assume to know about the nonhuman characters’ minds 
and perceptions.
Fables and Reflections: A Brief Experiential  
Analysis of The Sandman Overture
When discussing the fictional experiences of nonhuman characters as 
well as the readers’ experiencing of those characters, it seems neces-
sary to employ a method that also leaves some room for experience. 
Therefore, this section presents not only an analysis of The Sandman: 
 Overture but also an analysis of my personal process of (re-)reading it. 
Of course, this process involved the kind of subjective layers, inaccu-
racies, and irrelevancies that academic research typically rejects, but it 
is only against this experiential backdrop that I have been able to ask 
the questions the present chapter seeks to answer: how does this un-
usual comic and its nonhuman characters make the reader think and feel 
about the borders of humanity and nonhumanity? It seems to me that 
all researchers engaging in close reading must implicitly go through this 
same step; we build our appropriately distanced analyses on more ho-
listic, embodied, and immersive interpretive experiences (cf. Kukkonen 
2014). The only novelty of my approach is that I have endeavored to 
make this preliminary experiential juncture of my reading slightly more 
visible and systematic. In practice, this means that as I read The Sand-
man: Overture for the third time, I recorded, by hand, spread by spread, 
as many of my observations and associations as possible. I do not claim 
that this method captured more than a fraction of my entire experi-
ence or that the presence of a pen, a notepad, and a specific interpretive 
agenda did not affect the experience itself. Despite these inadequacies in 
comprehensiveness and authenticity, the method did yield some merit, 
however: it revealed which elements on each page potentially draw the 
reader’s attention, highlighted the metatextual layers and trajectories 
implied by the page designs, made it more obvious which pages and 
panels might make one stop or misread, and generally added nuance to 
my understanding of the work – as well as to my understanding of my 
understanding of it. The findings of this initial, subjective, and visually 
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oriented raw analysis are here grouped, contextualized, and refined fur-
ther, into a more objective and less digressive, fairly traditional discus-
sion. Nevertheless, whenever I am referring to “the reader”, I am still 
primarily referring to myself.
Without further ado, let us dive into the space-scapes evoked in the 
beginning: The Sandman: Overture’s plot unfolds nonlinearly, and at a 
cosmic scale, but underneath all the formal experiments and stretches 
of imagination, it actually follows the familiar formula of an apoca-
lypse and a messianic intervention. Long ago, in a fit of compassion, 
 Morpheus – a god-like personification of dreaming and stories – refused 
to kill a star, who had gone mad from seeing into other creatures’ sleep-
ing minds. This madness has since spread through the “four hundred 
billion galaxies in the universe —, like a cancer” spreading through 
the “four hundred billion cells in the human brain”, which means that 
“soon enough, the mind that is the universe will cease to think and all 
things will cease to be” (#2, [17–18]). After Morpheus learns that he 
is the one responsible for this apocalyptic domino effect, he sets on an 
intergalactic, interdimensional journey to stop it. He succeeds – after a 
fashion – with a little help from the rest of his family of metaphysical 
concepts: Father Time, Mother Night, and his siblings Destiny, Death, 
Destruction, Desire, Despair, and Delirium.
The scenario Overture sets up is thus the one scenario that positions all 
imaginable life forms and existents on an equal footing: the destruction 
of the entire universe affects everything in the universe in the same way, 
from monocellular organisms to star systems. The impending erasure of 
such fundamental common denominators as dimensional space effec-
tively nullifies the more refined dichotomies we normally use to classify 
different entities: organic or inorganic, sentient or non-sentient, human 
or nonhuman. Combined with a protagonist like Morpheus, whose abil-
ity to understand, traverse, create, and destroy different worlds exceeds 
even those of regular gods, this premise invites the reader to stretch their 
imagination far beyond the scope of human reality. Author Neil Gaiman 
is well aware that this is a tall order, and explains in his introductory 
chapter-by-chapter notes how he wanted to intersperse the “spectacle” 
and “futuristic spatter” with “something contained and very human”, in 
order to make “people care” (“The Accompaniments”,2 [40]). The dual 
strategies of nonhuman narration (Bernaerts et al. 2014) are thus very 
much present throughout the work: the near-systematic, multimodal 
induction of defamiliarization alternates with invitations to more an-
thropocentric, more empathetic perspective-taking, which covertly pre-
supposes a human reader.
Before pointing out its inevitable limitations, let us first consider the 
ways in which the comic does manage to evoke cognitive and emo-
tive strangeness through its character designs. The very first character 
whose inner world the reader of Overture glimpses is clearly situated 
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on a foreign “small planet” and belongs to a “race of huge carnivo-
rous plants, with limited mobility, but beautiful minds” (#1, [1]). Subse-
quently, each issue keeps introducing ever more fantastical alien species: 
“there are ships that live and warriors who are worlds” (#3, [1]); there 
is a “a cluster of metallic beetles”, who “have come to participate in the 
destruction and to make art from the wreckage” (#3, [3]); and there is 
“a bacteria complex”, who is “one of the universe’s greatest mathema-
ticians, yet immediately lethal to the majority of life-forms it encoun-
ters” (#6, [1]). While the diversity of these nonhuman characters seems 
striking at the first glance, they are all made concurrently comprehensi-
ble and strange by the same, simple strategy: by cross-attributing traits 
from several, normally irreconcilable “ontological categories” to one 
single character (Zunshine 2008, 63–64). A “carnivorous plant” al-
ready defies prototypic thinking, as meat-eating is much more common 
for the existents in the “animal” category than for the existents in the 
“plant” category. As such creatures exist in the actual world, however, 
they are not that defamiliarizing or difficult to imagine. What pushes 
such a creature outside the known reality is complementing it with 
a mind that “dreams”, because – while this trait may still be weakly 
commensurate with the carnivorous category of “animal” – it is rarely 
associated with the barely sentient category of “plant”. The following 
page heightens the dissonance even further by connecting the plant 
creature with speech bubbles, which imply a cognitive ability associated 
exclusively with personhood: language. Still, this talking plant pales in 
comparison to the increasingly simple organisms – beetles and bacteria 
complexes – who in the later issues are claimed to be capable of even 
more sophisticated human feats, of making art, and of understanding 
high-level mathematics.
All in all, The Sandman: Overture makes use of a much wider se-
lection of ontological categories than the usual talking animals, which 
some theorists consider to have already become naturalized (Alber 2009, 
94). That is, anthropomorphic animals, or zoomorphic people, are so 
familiar from fables and comics, they no longer require cognitive adjust-
ments from the readers’ part. In addition, one could claim that the ma-
jority of such characters sit firmly on the allegorical, “coarse-grained” 
end of Herman’s (2011, 165) continuum, meaning that Donald Duck, 
Blacksad, and their ilk mostly convey human experiences, like having a 
job and a family, or fighting against criminals and racism. By contrast, 
they convey very little of their experience of using wings for arms, of 
seeing in the dark, or of being coated in fur or feathers. The Sandman, 
too, teems with so many colorful critters there is hardly any space to 
render the depiction of individual characters’ experiences particularly 
“fine-grained”, but the ontological blends manifested by the crowds of 
Gaiman’s odd figures are so many, extreme, and unusual they can at the 
very least surprise the reader and thus open a door for thinking outside 
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the established cognitive frames. Moreover, many of these nonhuman 
characters are portrayed multimodally, which allows the reader to ex-
perience their strangeness in an even more concrete, multifaceted, and 
defamiliarizing way.
One of the most striking ontological fusions in The Sandman: Over-
ture is achieved completely non-verbally, through a gradual devel-
opment of a disturbing visual motif. Many of the backgrounds and 
landscapes incorporate inappropriately organic features: architectural 
structures of the City of Stars (#4, [11–12]) mesh with red, tree-like 
shapes that could be interpreted as blood vessels, and an abandoned 
dream hospital (#2, [4–5]) appears to be in possession of sensory and 
internal organs – teeth, eyes, and tongues poke out of the windows, and 
the attic is filled with brain tissue. The comic delivers on these back-
ground details in the final issue, where the near-death of the universe 
is signaled by a giant EKG chart running through several blacked-out 
spreads (#6, [18–19; 24–35]): the very space of the universe – and, 
by analogy, the narrative space of the comic – has both veins and a 
heartbeat. This effectively hybridizes the categories of entity and its 
environment, of foreground and background, giving places the kind 
of biological traits that are usually associated with characters, due to 
their anthropomorphism.
As for the verbal narration and dialogue, they constantly attribute 
very human-like, language-mediated minds to very nonhuman-looking 
creatures, which in itself might have a dissonant effect. In addition, the 
verbal track can be used to twist around the more abstract and cultural 
laws and conventions that define human life. For instance, the narra-
tor boxes describe the air on a warring planet as “undrinkable”, while 
the aliens living on that planet discuss their interspecies “fourmarriage” 
(#5, [11]). Even the names of the aliens are made dissonant by picking 
them from unconventional grammatical categories or by making them 
extremely difficult to reproduce with English alphabet or human vocal 
tract: the late “Clearly” (#3, [16]) and “the floating jelly-balloon” called 
Rr’arr’rr’ll (#6, [2]) are unlikely to have any namesakes in the comics’ 
readership.
Along with the pictorial and the verbal tracks, some of the comics- 
specific metatextual elements also add to the defamiliarization and dehu-
manization of the characters. First, and most notably, the page  designs 
of Overture avoid regular, angular grids to an unusual degree,  utilizing 
various organic, nonlinear, and representational shapes instead. As a re-
sult, almost every spread boasts a sense of striking visual novelty, which 
might even leave the reader unsure of the proper reading order. This 
makes the affectual dimension of the reading experience regularly coin-
cide with the confused mental states of the focalizing characters: both the 
reader and the character are often equally unsure about the stability of 
the  spatio-temporal parameters defined by the panel frames and equally 
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amazed at the developments of the story. This experiential overlap reaches 
its crescendo in the fourth issue, where the gradual tilting of the frames 
prompts the reader to turn the entire album upside down for the duration 
of two pages (#4, [17–18]). Williams, the illustrator, specifically explains 
that the trick is “intended for the reader to sort of feel what Morpheus 
is feeling”: disoriented, and possibly frustrated (“The Accompaniments”, 
[6]). Caracciolo (2016, 74–75) has named these parallel and “shared” 
experiences between characters and readers “mirroring effects”.
Second, The Sandman series is extremely well known for its use of 
unconventional-looking speech bubbles. Letterer Todd Klein remem-
bers having created over 50 individualized fonts and bubble styles for 
different characters in the original series (“The Accompaniments”, 
[17]). Variations of bubble styles and fonts are widely used in comics 
for suggesting different qualities of voice and prosody (Eisner 2008, 
24), but in the context of The Sandman, this device has also served as 
an additional marker of nonhumanity (Bender 1999, 74). In Overture, 
too, the more anthropomorphic characters have rather standardized 
black-and-white speech bubbles, whereas the more overtly nonhu-
man figures speak in various colors, or in letterings that are slower 
to decipher – an apt way of simulating cross-species communication 
problems.
In the same vein, some of the characters are doomed to complete 
silence due to their extreme alienness: the reader never hears the 
mathematically gifted bacteria complex speak, and even when the 
artistic metal beetles do speak, they collectively assemble into a very 
 human-looking configuration (#3, [15], see Figure 4.1). By contrast, an 
alien girl called Hope, who appears emphatically human apart from 
her blue skin, is given an extremely central role toward the end of the 
series: her human-like face, human-like body, human name, and re-
ported needs for food, warmth, sleep, and companionship (#3, [13]) 
apparently qualify her for the role of a full-blown character-focalizer. 
The final issue (#6, [1–3]), for instance, opens with her breaking the 
fourth wall, by looking challengingly out of the panel, as if asking 
for attention. After this, her first-person internal monologue and her 
recurring, translucent but very human-like figure guide the reader’s eye 
across several pages of completely opaque, much less anthropomorphic 
aliens in a way that seems to truly illustrate, or even prove, the alleged 
necessity to nest defamiliarizing effects within a more anthropocentric 
narrative discourse.
All in all, no matter how alien or nonhuman ontological categories 
the characters evoke, humanity is always one component in – or at least 
congruent with – the resulting blend. There are no half-animal, half- 
mushroom blends or half-substance, half-AI blends, but the animals al-
ways speak in human language, the machines are always androids, and 
every non-carbon-based creature has a human face. As a result, in this 
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comic of cosmic concerns and zero human characters, there is still a 
clear continuum between the less human-like and the more human-like 
characters (cf. Herman 2011), and this continuum largely dictates the 
hierarchies of saliency and agency: the more human traits a character in-
corporates, the more the reader is shown its inner world and, as a result, 
the more the reader is invited to empathize with it.
The most egregious example of this is that Morpheus the protago-
nist and his six equally god-like siblings are mostly depicted as white, 
able-bodied human adults. They do transgress the borders of ontological 
categories rather radically, of course: as “anthropomorphic personifica-
tions of –– universal forces” (Bender 1999, xii), they give fleshly, individ-
ualistic forms to things that are so abstract and non-sentient they do not 
Figure 4.1  The beetles must assume a human-shaped formation in order to 
speak, while Dream’s face momentarily reflects their insectoid fea-
tures (2015, #3, [15]). The Sandman: Overture © 2013 DC Comics. 
Written by Neil Gaiman and illustrated by J. H. Williams, III.
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normally even qualify as ‘existents’, let alone ‘persons’. Yet how narcis-
sistic is it to portray Death – which should be equal to all living creatures 
– as a perky Goth girl? Similarly, it is quite difficult to think of Dream 
purely as an abstract concept when he so clearly experiences solitude 
(#5, [1]), never calls on his mother (# 5, [6]), eats an occasional bite (#5, 
[7]), and even dresses appropriately for battles and state visits (#1, [20]). 
If anything, the Endless only seem to reinforce the human tendency to 
comprehend and construct even gods in terms of human mental states 
(Vermeule 2010, 145–146). The mythologies of ancient cultures amply 
demonstrate this tendency, of course, and the pantheon of The Sandman 
does bear some resemblance – and, in fact, some blood relation (Bender 
1999, 152) – to Greek deities: the spindly, moody, black-robed young 
man in the midst of the ontological, intergalactic tempests of Overture 
even shares the name with the Greek god of dreams. However, as the 
multimodal storytelling repeatedly underlines, Morpheus is only one 
 aspect – indeed, the anthropomorphic aspect – of the incomprehensibly 
complex entirety of Dream.
One of the most fascinating aspects of The Sandman’s storytelling is 
how it constantly attends – again, both visually and verbally – the ways 
the characters see each other. This allows the more nonhuman characters 
to passingly project their nonhuman minds on the more anthropomor-
phic characters, momentarily dehumanizing, or at least defamiliarizing 
them. For instance, the aforementioned, human-like but blue-skinned 
alien girl is branded a “meat child” and ultimately “deleted” (#4, [8, 
20]) by a community of stars – who, Overture assures us, are “flaming 
balls of gas in space” but “also alive” (#3, [12]). An even more sustained, 
more multimodal example of this inter-character projection is provided 
by the shifting appearances of Dream and the other Endless. As the rare 
heterodiegetic narrator underlines in the original series, “we perceive 
but aspects of the Endless, as we see the light glinting from one tiny facet 
of some huge and flawlessly cut precious stone” (Gaiman et al. 1992, 
#21, [11]). On every given moment, any and all of their apparent attri-
butes are merely a matter of perspective – and comics are especially deft 
at creating rapid shifts of perspective. The entire gem metaphor is thus 
concretized 15 years later in The Sandman: Overture, when Dream uses 
his ruby necklace to contact another character in another dimension. 
For the duration of their conversation, the page designs resemble giant 
rubies, so that the facets comprise the panels, and in each panel, Dream 
assumes a different physical form – a cyclops, a robot, a bat, and an ice 
creature. Yet the conversation can carry on as normal, underlining that 
all these seemingly different figures share the same godly mind and iden-
tity (#2, [16–18], see Figure 4.2).
The appearances of all the Endless siblings morph to mirror the im-
plicit expectations, worldviews, or self-images of whichever characters 
they are interacting with (Bender 1999, 25) in various other sequences 
Figure 4.2  Dream’s fluid physical form appears to be fractured into various 
possible appearances by the ruby amulet he uses for long-distance 
communication with other god-like characters (2015, #2, [17]). The 
Sandman: Overture © 2013 DC Comics. Written by Neil Gaiman 
and illustrated by J. H. Williams, III.
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as well. In a flashback concerning an ancient world of anthropomor-
phic panther creatures, for instance, all the appearing Endless – Dream, 
Death, and Destruction – look as if they belonged to this same unnamed 
half-human, half-feline species (#4, [13–16]). Similarly, when negotiat-
ing with the metal beetles, Dream’s face becomes decorated with the 
same orange patterning as their elytrons, just for the flash of one panel 
(# 3, [15], see Figure 4.1). Such quickness and fluidity suggest that these 
changes are not really metamorphoses but effects of focalization – a 
way of showing something of an alien mind by projecting it on to some-
thing slightly more palpable and familiar. Meanwhile, the coherence of 
the morphing characters is maintained by contextual clues like contin-
uous action, dialogue, or monologue as well as by stable visual “point-
ers” (Varis 2013, 135). These can be part of the character’s physical 
 appearance – for instance, Death always wears an ankh – or metatex-
tual, like Dream’s black, amoeba-like speech bubbles.
One could thus deduce that the Endless wear their human skins as their 
default mode because of the one onlooker they cannot possibly shed, not 
even for a single panel: the human reader. Even when there are no other 
characters around Dream and his siblings, they are still being watched 
and read by the reader, whose anthropocentric worldview and anthropo-
morphizing cognitive strategies they thereby reflect. Although The Sand-
man comics never address or acknowledge the presence of the real-life 
reader with overt metalepses, especially Overture demonstrates an im-
plicit awareness of the reader. Particularly in the first issue, this awareness 
is realized through the prevalence of reflections as a visual motif.
The first and possibly the most unsettling instance of this motif is the 
spread that resembles a giant gaping mouth: each bared tooth frames one 
panel, giving the impression that scenes of the storyworld are actually 
reflected on their enamel surfaces. The effect is further heightened by the 
fact that some of the panels are clearly depicted from a first-person per-
spective, and even incorporate the rims and dark tint of sun-glasses. The 
fans of the series are likely to instantly associate these visual signs – the 
mouth and the glasses – with the Corinthian, a murderous nightmare who 
looks like a normal, white-haired man but has two extra mouths where 
his eyes ought to be. The spread thus situates the reader into two equally 
disturbing but dissonant positions, which concretize the concurrent “in-
sideness” and “outsideness” of (defamiliarizing) character engagement. 
On the one hand, the first-person panels place the reader behind the 
glasses of this horrific serial killer, forcing empathetic perspective-taking 
on the level of visual perception. On the other hand, the page is not, in 
fact, a gaping jaw but an extreme, metaleptic close-up of the Corinthi-
an’s eye, staring back at the reader (#1, [6–7], see  Figure 4.3). Indeed, in 
creating Corinthian, Morpheus says he “wished only to build something 
that would reflect humanity –– would show it itself, show it everything 
about itself it did not want to acknowledge” (#1, [14]).
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The reader is again challenged to a similar metaleptical staring contest 
only a few page-turns later, on a page whose composition resembles a 
lithograph of old-fashioned window panes (Figure 4.4). The visual style 
of this sequence deviates greatly from the rest of the series, and may 
allude to the works of M. C. Escher, who was famous for creating the 
kind of visual illusions this scene aims to deliver. First of all, the single 
squares of the window constitute the panels, but in a way that plays with 
medium-specific illusions of transparency: squares containing text are 
completely opaque and thus function as narration boxes – they tell of 
abstract things rather than show concrete things – whereas squares that 
only contain images give the impression that the reader can peer through 
them, straight into the storyworld, as if peering through a window. For 
the first few panels, the only character on the other side of the window 
seems unaware of being watched, busying himself with everyday tasks. 
In the fourth panel, however, he turns around, as if to look back toward 
the reader. What makes the effect especially startling and convincing is 
that his face appears to be replaced by a mirror, which reflects the frames 
of the same window, but from the inside. (#1, [11]) The changes of angles 
Figure 4.3  The readers are watching the storyworld as – while also being 
metaleptically watched by – the Corinthian (2015, #1, [6–7]). The 
 Sandman: Overture © 2013 DC Comics. Written by Neil Gaiman 
and illustrated by J. H. Williams, III.
Figure 4.4  This page layout plays with the “opaqueness” of written  language, 
the apparent “transparency” of pictorial presentation, and the book’s 
overarching motif of reflections (2015, #1, [11]). The  Sandman: 
Overture © 2013 DC Comics. Written by Neil Gaiman and illus-
trated by J. H. Williams, III.
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on the next page reveal that the character’s face is not, in fact, a mirror, 
but permanently shaped like a portcullis – as per the character’s name, 
George Portcullis (#1, [12]). Yet the illusion that the reader is separated 
from the storyworld only by a thin, transparent surface has already been 
formed – momentarily but memorably. Put in the larger context, the 
scene seems to imply that while the page is “transparent”, the characters 
are not; they are mirrors at least as much as they are windows.
The same theme is once again evoked on the final page of the issue, 
which shows three interlocking, circular panels, all focusing on Mor-
pheus from the straight-on, eye-level angle. In the uppermost panel, he 
is wearing his bone helmet, which makes his head appear elongated, 
insect-like, and alien. A myriad of his nonhuman aspects – whom he 
has just encountered – is reflected, small and distorted, on its lenses. 
In the second panel, the helmet disappears, so that the final panel can 
clearly display Morpheus’ familiar human face, expressing a familiar 
human emotion – which, again, is likely to reflect the readers’ confu-
sion about what has just happened. This simple, fairly static three-
panel sequence containing only one word – “What?” – thus states quite 
clearly what the comic and its protagonist can and cannot convey. The 
human Morpheus is emotive, vocal, and clear, but the parts of him that 
reflect the nonhuman world – only partially and imperfectly – remain 
unreadable and incomprehensible, hidden behind the helmet. (#1, [24], 
see Figure 4.5)
All in all, the framing of the panels throughout Overture gives the 
reader a very palpable sense that something is always left outside the 
frame. Scenes where different aspects of Dream and different alien 
species gather together are given plenty of space: an entire spread (#6, 
[2–3]) and even a rare double-wide fold-out spread (#1, [22–23]) show 
all types of creatures, which gain added diversity from the fact that 
some are drawn with digital, some with analogue techniques (“The 
 Accompaniments”, [16]). Yet the framing and the composition empha-
size that only a small part of the crowd is shown. Only the feet of one 
creature and an arm of another have been fitted in the frame, suggesting 
that the nonhuman multitudes extend beyond the page – and beyond 
imagination.
To summarize, The Sandman: Overture seizes an ambitious scenario 
that requires adopting a universal perspective and, accordingly, triggers 
constant defamiliarization by blending human and nonhuman traits in 
all of its characters, often multimodally. Yet, before long, the story runs 
into the insurmountable wall of subjectivity outlined by Nagel, and gets 
tangled up in the human experientiality implied in the very act of narra-
tion. Although The Sandman series has always been an unabashed cele-
bration of stories and their power – one of Dream’s sobriquets is “Prince 
of Stories” – an oddly familial encounter between Morpheus and his 
mother Night indicates that in Overture, the triumphant narrativity 
Figure 4.5  Some aspects of Dream are irrevocably hidden and unrepresent-
able, whereas his familiar human form results from, and appeals 
to, the human readers’ perspectives (2015, #1, [24]). The Sandman: 
 Overture © 2013 DC Comics. Written by Neil Gaiman and illus-
trated by J. H. Williams, III.
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finally reaches its limits. “It’s one of your stories, isn’t it?” Night mocks 
as she realizes that Dream is trying to stage a conventional happy ending 
for entropy itself: “In the reunion of Time and Night the mad stars will 
become sane, and peace and wisdom and joy and beauty will reign for 
ever and aye…”. Being less tied to entities and subjectivities than her 
son, Night understands that only certain aspects of universes can be 
contained, controlled, and understood by the narrative logics employed 
by Dream, the human reader, and the comic that brings them together.
Thus, The Sandman: Overture attempts to stay aware of its creators’ 
and readers’ human perspective while it avoids totalizing it. The more 
nonhuman the character, the more consistently the illusion of “transpar-
ent minds” – and the over-projection of anthropomorphic experience it 
entails – is avoided. Instead, nonhuman creatures are often approached 
with wonderment and curiosity. For instance, as Hope, the human-like 
alien girl, weaves between the less human, more opaque aliens, she pon-
ders how they might experience the refugee situation they are presently 
sharing: “But we are all here. I wonder what they see. I wonder how they 
talk” (#6, [3]). Similarly, the reader can attend the perspectives and the 
emotions of the characters quite closely and concretely “from the outside”: 
Morpheus especially is often depicted either straight-on – which reveals 
his emotional state – or so that the reader looks over his shoulder –  seeing 
an approximation of what he sees (see e.g. #3, [24], which gives both 
views simultaneously). This encourages empathetic perspective-taking 
and alignment with the character without any need or pretense of convey-
ing his private, lived experience. The abundance of extreme close-ups of 
eyes may be symptomatic of this same epistemological stance: the reader 
can look into the characters’ eyes and wonder what would be going on 
behind them if characters truly were minded beings – what they would 
see if they could see – but as with real life, there are no thought bubbles to 
explain away any of it. In this way, the comic encourages “non-intrusive” 
ways of approaching and empathizing with nonhuman characters – ways 
that circumvent at least some of the anthropocentrism inherent in verbal-
ized subjectivities and spelled-out folk psychology.
Conclusions
In conclusion, The Sandman: Overture mostly evokes nonhuman expe-
rience by not really depicting it at all but by gesturing – vigorously – to 
its general direction. For this, the comic has two overarching strate-
gies. First, it does not even pretend to represent any actual nonhuman 
creatures but invents instead an array of aliens that blend human and 
nonhuman features in imaginative ways. The nonhuman traits tease the 
readers’ imagination with little, counterfactual alternatives, which the 
reader can grasp in an embodied way due to the intertwined human 
traits: we know how humans dream, but how would plants dream; or 
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how would my life change if I had mouths for eyes? The tension between 
the familiar and the unfamiliar – the defamiliarization – thus provides a 
manageable, but potentially consequential challenge to the reader’s cog-
nitive capabilities. Second, the reflection motif constantly confronts the 
reader with his or her own humanity and the epistemological limits it 
entails. The comic seems to imply that it narrates the tale that it is nar-
rating from the point of view it is narrating it from because that is what 
the human reader is ready, willing, and able to receive. Various vast non-
human domains always lie beyond the panels, but depicting them, either 
in words or images, is either difficult or impossible. All The Sandman: 
Overture can do is to remind the reader that they are there. Like the 
sun, nonhuman experience cannot be looked at directly, but speculative 
fiction and the multimodal storytelling of comics are quite competent at 
dancing around it and making the reader wonder about it.
Unfortunately, discussing nonhuman experiences is not any easier to 
a researcher than it is to a comics creator. It seems clear that discussing 
the possibility of understanding nonhuman minds through narratives 
requires considering several layers of discourse, representation, and 
cognition, but the texts, worlds, and minds are so tangled together, it 
is often difficult to discern where they truly intersect and when they 
are collapsed together more or less needlessly. The concept of charac-
ter is an excellent case in point: in spite of actually being nonhuman 
constructions, they are, in practice, burdened by very anthropomorphic 
connotations. It may thus be worth considering whether detangling mi-
metic personhood and narrative agency would actually be possible, and 
whether the resulting agential concept would allow narrativizing nonhu-
man experiences in a less anthropomorphizing manner.
One could also ask to which extent these entanglements between 
characters’ mimetic aspect and the readers’ anthropomorphizing as-
sumptions depend on specific medial contexts and their affordances. For 
instance, comics clearly draw very non-Cartesian cartographies, where 
the mind and the physical world cannot be separated any more than the 
verbal and the pictorial elements can, without losing something crucial 
of the characters’ imagined experience. The constant presence of visual 
bodies makes it awkward to even refer to the characters as “minds”, 
which is perhaps a signal for the slowly transmedializing narratology 
to start theorizing characters more holistically. Indeed, in the face of 
the mimetic, anthropomorphic, and literary biases of current narratol-
ogy, considering speculative, nonhuman comic book characters poses an 
aptly defamiliarizing challenge.
Notes
 1 Because the collected hard-back edition of The Sandman: Overture lacks 
page numbers, all the references are made to specific issues or chapters, 
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whose pages have been counted manually: “#” designates the number of 
issue, and the unmarked page numbers are specified in the square brackets.
 2 “The Accompaniments” is a collection of interviews and other extra materi-
als included in this specific hardback edition of the comic. The page numbers 
are, again, based on manual counting, as they have not been marked on the 
original documents.
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What is it like to play a nonhuman? In a classic philosophical article, 
Thomas Nagel (1974) argues that we are fundamentally unable to imag-
ine what it is like to be a bat. Because our senses and cognition are 
structured in a certain way, imagining what it would be like to be other 
is difficult, if not impossible (cf. Barsalou 2008). Yet, in media genres 
from fantasy to science-fiction, we are routinely shown what it is like to 
be something else or asked to imagine it. Different media do this with 
different tools, from descriptions in text to moving images on the screen. 
Some of the portrayals of aliens may be similar, but different media also 
have different tools at their disposal.
This chapter examines how videogames portray the nonhuman, what 
kind of assumptions they make about being nonhuman, and what kind 
of tools they use to convey the experience of nonhumanness. I focus on 
Aliens vs. Predator (Rebellion Developments 2010), because it has three 
 different but intertwined campaigns, where you play as a human, an alien, 
and a predator. Therefore, it depicts two nonhuman  experiences that can 
be compared to the human experience. This analysis is  complemented 
with examples from other games that represent playing nonhuman 
 characters. The discussion here draws from the theory – or a loose fam-
ily of theories – of embodied cognition to better explain the nonhuman 
 experiences discussed.
(Non)Human Cognition
The idea that cognition is a neutral, withdrawn observer with an objec-
tive view of the world is an idea created largely during the Enlighten-
ment. The rational, withdrawn cognition is the classic view of reason 
propagated by the philosopher René Descartes, who established his ideas 
on the foundation of a mind-body dualism. This view considers the mind 
to be separate from the body, and identifies personality, cognition, and 
identity with the mind. Bodies are seen as little more than containers for 
the minds within. This creates philosophical problems, like explaining 
the relation of the immaterial mind to the material body – a problem 
famously solved by Descartes by suggesting that the pineal gland acts as 
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a conduit between the two. The relation between the mind and the body 
was seen as two-way, with the rational mind sometimes compromised by 
the passions of the body.
In comparison, embodied, situated (Anderson 2003), or grounded 
 cognition (Barsalou 2008) relies on the notion that action, context, 
and the body are central to cognition.1 In opposition to Descartes, this 
 tradition of thinking is more in line with philosophers like Maurice 
 Merleau-Ponty (2002), who emphasize how humans are not simply 
minds put into the containers of bodies, but how being in the world – 
bodies and all – is necessary for being human. The idea of  embodied 
cognition is complex and multifaceted, but these six typical ideas 
 associated with it offer a brief overview (Wilson 2002):
1  Cognition is situated.
2  Cognition is time pressured.
3  We off-load cognitive work onto the environment.
4  The environment is part of the cognitive system.
5  Cognition is for action.
6  Off-line cognition is body based.
What these six things mean for the present discussion is that bodies mat-
ter for thinking. The difference between a human body and different alien 
bodies is therefore meaningful when discussing cognition and experience 
in videogames. However, it should be noted that not all of these ideas are 
equally rooted in research. For example, Wilson (2002) shows that the 
fourth idea (the environment is part of the cognitive system) does not have 
strong evidence in research (for a general critical overview of claims often 
associated with embodied cognition, see Adams 2010).
Videogames are largely based on the false assumption that human 
bodies are uniform. It is an assumption shared by the game examples 
discussed here: the human perspective detailed later in this chapter is 
that of a capable soldier. The analysis conducted here examines this 
normative assumption of what humans are like. While it would be out-
side the scope of this chapter to deconstruct the ableist assumptions 
presented, it is shown that even the normative bodies represented here 
can be weak and lacking.
Nonhuman Perspectives in Games
Games, both digital and analogue, use multiple media to convey ideas 
and experiences of human and nonhuman alike. I’ve played characters 
ranging from cyborgs to aliens, vampires and elves, all embedded in 
physical, social, and experiential surroundings that reflect what it is like 
to be them (Lankoski 2011) or what their perspective on the world is 
(Allison 2015).
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Games can give us the possibility of experiencing things we normally 
cannot experience, and which would be hard to portray in other media. 
For example, Gualeni (2015) details how the game Hærfest (Technically 
Finished 2009) can provide at least a glimpse of bat phenomenology.2 
One of the most common ways of representing nonhumanity in games is 
to include characters that have senses different from humans. A few of 
the typical ways of doing this are using synesthetic design, visual indica-
tors, and color filters.
Although there are exceptions, many – if not most – games aim for a 
naturalistic portrayal of human experience.3 This means that things like 
visual representation aim to convey a relatively “normal” look to the 
player. Often, this includes some stylistic flair, and genre conventions 
shape how things are portrayed, but the overall effect is more or less 
recognizable as human experience. Changing the visual representation is 
one of the easiest ways of portraying alien experiences – perhaps  because 
vision is such a central sense to most able-bodied humans. Games 
 deviate from the standard representation of human visual experience in 
a few ways. Using different color filters is one of the typical ways games 
 portray alternative ways of perceiving the world. The way humans usu-
ally  perceive the world falls within a small range of variation, even when 
accounting for the stylistic filters and alterations videogames use. Large 
differences from the naturalistic norm are easy to notice and generally 
change the feel of the visual experience significantly.
Games could use other methods than the visual to portray nonhuman 
experiences, for example, by using sounds. When playing nonhuman 
characters, it is common to have them grunt, hiss, gurgle, or otherwise 
make sounds not typical to humans. For example, the playable zombies 
in Left 4 Dead 2 (2009) make a variety of unpleasant sounds. However, 
these noises sound identical whether one plays a zombie or a human, so 
the experience of hearing seems identical for the zombies.
Before moving on to analyze Aliens vs. Predator in more detail, I will 
introduce the concept of synesthetic design. I use synesthesia to refer to 
game design where one sense is expressed through another sense. One 
of the typical forms of synesthetic design used in games is portraying 
hearing through sight. For example, in Mark of the Ninja (Klei Enter-
tainment 2012), the interface provides several types of clues on what 
the player should be focusing on. Yellow circles represent areas of inter-
est, while blue circles serve as warnings of how far sound can be heard. 
This is constantly telegraphed to the player, as any loud sound will be 
accompanied by a blue circle. Because Mark of the Ninja is a stealth 
game where keeping quiet is important, the player has to be aware of 
the noise they are making. However, actual sounds in the game are not 
accurate enough to convey information to the player, so the location 
of sounds needs to be conveyed through another sense. By looking at 
the blue circles, the player can accurately gauge how far noise travels 
(Figure 5.1).
Playing the Nonhuman 111
Similar techniques are used to communicate information in cases 
where the player character is not human. For understanding nonhuman 
experience, it is useful to look at how bats are portrayed in games. Bats 
are interesting examples because they are prototypically different in the 
sense Nagel (1974) discussed, but still evolutionally close to humans. 
Bats have also been represented in videogames. Thus, there are some 
common techniques for portraying what it is like to be a bat.
For example, in Hærfest, one can see the environment only by activat-
ing a pulse-like sense that washes over the surrounding area and reveals 
everything briefly in striking purple. Otherwise the world is covered in 
darkness and only visible when it is very close. Presumably, this is the 
developer’s impression of what it is like to be a bat, or at least what it is 
like to sense like one. However, because humans lack the actual sensory 
organs for perceiving the world like a bat, the experience is simulated 
through vision (Figure 5.2).
Several games from the Global Game Jam 2014 tried to portray the 
experience of playing a bat, for example Breaking Bat (2014) and Echo 
(2014). These games use techniques similar to the earlier Hærfest, with 
light being used as metaphor for the bat’s ability to sense its surround-
ings. All three of these games use synesthetic design, mapping one sense 
(echolocation) to another sense (sight).
Global Game Jam 2014 included another game, confusingly also 
named Echo (2014), that tried to portray the experience of being a 
bat without synesthetic design. Playing it requires (at least) two 
players: one referred to as “the bat” and another called “the eyes”. 
The bat is blindfolded and given headphones that the eyes can send 
Figure 5.1  A hiding ninja in Mark of the Ninja (Klei Entertainment 2012). The 
dim circle marks the range of sound produced by the dog.
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Figure 5.2  Sensing the surroundings in Hærfest (Technically Finished 2009; 
image via Mobygames).
 audio messages to. The goal of the game is for the eyes to navigate 
the bat through a physical maze using a computer to send audio mes-
sages to the bat. This approach does not use synesthetic design, instead 
 letting the second player to act as the bat’s sense of space. Because that 
information is conveyed through hearing, the bat player has to use 
their hearing to navigate a space – not an easy task for someone not 
used to that kind of navigation.
Aliens vs. Predator
Aliens vs. Predator (Rebellion Developments 2010) is a perfect example 
for examining how videogames portray alien experiences: it features 
gameplay with three protagonists, two of which are alien. All three have 
a unique storyline, shown from their perspective.
The three storylines are intertwined, all relating to the planet BG 386. 
The Weyland-Yutani corporation is breeding aliens in a laboratory that 
is located next to an ancient predator temple. While examining the tem-
ple, the Weyland-Yutani accidentally activates a predator device. The 
device temporarily deactivates their systems, thus freeing the aliens the 
 Weyland-Yutani was breeding from their captivity. The device also sends 
a distress signal to the predators’ home planet. The predators send a party 
of young predators to investigate, while a group of marines is also sent to 
combat the aliens freed from the Weyland-Yutani breeding facility.
The first group of predators sent to the planet is killed, which prompts 
the predators to send in a more experienced hunter. When it arrives, it 
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destroys the marine ship orbiting the planet. Some of the marines survive 
the destruction of their ship on a smaller space vessel. The predator also 
lands, trying to make sure that humans do not tamper with the bodies of 
the dead predators from the first group. The human protagonist is one of 
the surviving marines. The second playable character is the more experi-
enced predator sent to the planet to make sure humans do not desecrate 
the bodies of the first group sent there. The last player character is one 
of the aliens that is freed during the power-out caused by the activation 
of the predator device.
Afraid of the Dark: Playing as a Human
Playing the human protagonist – called simply Rookie by the other 
characters in the game – presents a fairly standard view of human per-
ception. The view is first-person, meaning that the world is portrayed 
through Rookie’s eyes. Most of the areas are dark, so the world is expe-
rienced with the help of the shoulder-mounted flashlight. Only a small 
area is in the visual focus, with most of the world covered in darkness. 
Rookie can also throw flares, providing stationary light in a small area. 
Perhaps the most important tool for getting information about the sur-
roundings is the motion sensor, which produces constant sound while 
scanning the surroundings and emits a beep whenever it detects move-
ment. Movement is also shown on the small indicator on the lower left 
side of the screen. The motion sensor seems to be a part of a heads-up 
display, worn by Rookie, meaning it is supposed to indicate things also 
visible to him. The heads-up display shows an objective marker, a small 
arrow on top of the motion tracker, to show the direction of the next 
objective (Figure 5.3).
Figure 5.3  A dark room, seen in the light of a gun-mounted flashlight.
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The combination of darkness, small areas of light, and the beeping of 
the motion sensor combine to create a claustrophobic, tense atmosphere. 
The motion sensor is an iconic part of the Aliens vs. Predator franchise, 
a technological tool to enhance the limited senses humans naturally pos-
sess. It is also a constant source of dread: a beep might mean deadly crea-
tures in the dark – or not, as it is also prone to false positives.
The only refuge against the enemies in the dark is the arsenal of weap-
ons at Rookie’s disposal. He starts the game with only a pistol, but 
can later find an assault rifle, a shotgun, a flame-thrower, and an auto-
matically aiming smartgun. If wounded by the aliens or other threats, 
Rookie can heal himself with stims, medical syringes that he sticks to his 
wrist. There is a limited supply of these, but Rookie is also easily killed, 
so there is a big incentive to use them as often as possible. He can also 
access areas off-limits to most other personnel on the planet because he 
carries a hacking device capable of opening locked doors. Through using 
these technological apparatuses, Rookie is able to survive in the hostile 
environment, despite being the weakest type of organism around.
Playing Rookie is an experience of uncertainty. Human senses are lim-
ited, and the darkness can only be made to make sense with the help of 
technology. The flashlight is the main source of light, but the motion sensor 
is almost as important, as it warns about the approaching aliens. Humans 
in Aliens vs. Predator are frail and slow and lack the sensory capabilities 
of the other species. It is only with technology – especially weapons – they 
are able to match, and best, the natural abilities of their enemies.
“A Structurally Perfect Organism”: Playing as an Alien
In comparison to Rookie, the alien – known as Specimen 6 by the 
Weyland-Yutani – is much more capable. It can see in almost complete 
darkness and can use its other senses to track prey – meaning humans – 
without any light sources. It is fast, heals quickly, and can rip humans to 
pieces with its claws and sharp tail.
These abilities are presented to the player in a short tutorial, which is 
framed as a testing of Specimen 6’s abilities by the Weyland-Yutani sci-
entists. Victims of increasing dangerousness are sent into a room with it, 
allowing the player to learn the abilities Specimen 6 possesses: walking 
on walls, seeing in the dark, sensing its prey through walls, moving and 
attacking quickly and ferociously.4
Specimen 6’s ability to see in the dark is easily achieved by making 
the environment slightly less dark for the player. The world is still dark, 
but navigation is easier than it was for Rookie because the world is not 
focused on a small area of light. Specimen 6 is also able to sense the pres-
ence of humans. A tutorial text states that “The smell of a human be-
trays its nature”. In practice, this means that different types of humans 
have outlines of different colors, with civilians differing from hostile 
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prey. The tutorial continues by stating that “the stronger their scent, the 
greater the danger they pose” (Figure 5.4).
The text seems to imply that it is the alien’s sense of smell that it uses 
in detecting humans. This information is conveyed to the player through 
a visual outline around human characters, seen even through walls (see 
previous figure). This is an example of synesthetic design, converting 
olfactory stimuli into visual representations. It is unclear how, exactly, 
the alien sense of smell works as it can smell even humans in enclosed 
spaces but has no information on how the characters have moved around 
or how many of them have been present in a space; humans may have a 
scent, but it is not present in the spaces they have occupied. The repre-
sentation of scent seems to be simplified into a singular visual outline.5
Easily the most disorienting part of playing Specimen 6 is its ability 
to walk on any surface. This differs greatly from human everyday ex-
periences of how humans relate to gravity, verticality, and surfaces. It 
takes even the most experienced human climbers a great deal of effort 
to climb vertical surfaces, and the speed is much slower than what they 
can accomplish on horizontal surfaces. In comparison, Specimen 6 can 
move on any surface much faster than a human can run, and switch be-
tween surfaces of different orientations with dizzying speed. This means 
that all surfaces are affordances for movement, whether they are upside 
down, vertical. or horizontal.
An indicator in the middle of the screen always points toward the floor 
to make it easier for the player to get their bearings after running around 
the walls and ceiling (see previous figure). This crosshair is also used 
to aim jumps and attacks, but it is probably not appropriate to read it 
Figure 5.4  Specimen 6 stalking human prey through the wall.
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literally as part of Specimen 6’s visual field (cf. Jørgensen 2013). Instead, 
it is another example of synesthetic design, conveying to the player what 
humans usually experience with the help of their inner ear and through 
their whole body: the effect of gravity, a sense of up and down. The 
game cannot convey the feeling of your body being pulled toward the 
ground, so instead, it relays this experience with a visual indicator. A 
comprehensively bodily sense is translated into a visual representation.
The indicator serves another purpose by changing color: it tells you 
whether Specimen 6 is covered by darkness or not. The indicator is com-
pletely light yellow when Specimen 6 is in direct light and turns smaller 
when it moves toward darkness, turning black in the middle when the 
alien is completely covered in darkness. There are few possible ways of 
reading this: it is possible that the indicator simply corresponds to how 
much light is hitting Specimen 6’s visual organs, and is just another way 
for the player to evaluate the surroundings – they could also just look 
around and see how much light there is in the surroundings. It is also 
possible that this indicator is supposed to suggest that the alien possesses 
another sense, an ability to sense how much light it is in. This could be 
likened to a human sensing sunlight touching their skin. The tutorial 
simply states that “In the shadows, you are almost invisible”.
However, the alien’s relation to darkness is never explained. Clearly, 
they are accustomed to using darkness against their prey, which seems 
to imply that they are used to being more perceptive and adapted to 
darkness than their prey.
The experience of playing Specimen 6 is alien. It moves quickly on all 
surfaces, interacts with its surroundings mostly by killing, and stays hid-
den until it is ready to strike at its prey. It is very much like a predatory 
animal, preying on the humans wandering in its territory.
“Those Creatures You Hunt”: Playing as a Predator
The last of the player characters is the predator, who is never named 
in the single player game, but is identified as Dark in the multiplayer 
part of the game. He starts the game with a demonstration of superi-
ority, first killing aliens in close combat and then stalking and killing 
humans.6 His abilities are a combination of physical qualities and ad-
vanced technology.
Dark is able to use the technology in his mask to choose three different 
modes of seeing, two of which are available at the beginning of the game. 
Two of these modes are specialized in seeing particular prey (humans 
and aliens), while the third one is closer to the human visual experience, 
with any unnatural parts explained by the heads-up display of the helmet 
Dark is wearing. The two modes specialized in hunting particular prey 
use strong color filters to achieve a strong contrast, with enemies marked 
by clear, bright colors. The vision mode for hunting humans uses a visual 
look often associated with thermal vision7 (Figure 5.5).
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The game is played from Dark’s perspective, with the mask covering 
his face, so it is difficult to separate what is his unaugmented experience 
and what is part of the mask’s technology. However, there is one part of 
the game that clarifies this. Dark encounters a tomb of an ancient pred-
ator and recovers his mask. Dark removes his own mask and replaces 
it with the one he found. The sequence is shown from a first-person 
perspective, and when Dark removes his mask, the visual experience is 
equivalent to human vision. Therefore, it seems likely then that the pred-
ator’s visual experience of the world is similar to the human experience8 
(Figure 5.6).
Figure 5.5  The predator stalking human prey with thermal vision.
Figure 5.6  The predator sight without filters.
118 Jonne Arjoranta
The way the predator moves around is close to human movement. 
It walks and runs, but because it is much stronger, it can also jump to 
places not available to humans. The player can aim the jumps using a 
special indicator that appears when aiming them, making it clear where 
and how far the jump will take Dark. The game would work without the 
indicator as well, forcing the player to learn by trial-and-error how far 
Dark can jump. However, this would change the experience of playing 
Dark considerably. Now the jumping is deliberate as the player knows 
exactly where the jump will end – unless they aim the jump in haste. The 
indicator could be read as a representation of Dark’s ability to evalu-
ate the aim and length of his jumps. It is implicit, embodied knowledge 
made explicit for the player through a visual indicator.
His great strength means that Dark can also take on both humans 
and aliens in close combat. In fact, aliens are much less a threat to the 
predator than they are to humans, and even a large group of aliens can 
be killed with the predator’s many weapons. Humans are even less of a 
threat. If close by, Dark can simply grab them and tear them apart. Only 
human technology – guns, turrets, combat androids – is a real threat to 
the predator.
Dark’s natural abilities are enhanced by advanced technology. In ad-
dition to the vision-enhancing mask, Dark has the ability to turn trans-
parent, almost invisible, with a technology called Cloak. When hidden 
in this manner, humans are unable to see him, unless he is very close to 
them. Dark can heal himself with a device that consists of two sets of nee-
dles that he sticks into himself, apparently hurting him because he roars 
in pain. The mask he wears is also able to mimic human voices, enabling 
him to lure unsuspecting humans away from their allies and toward 
their deaths. Predators are not without their own weapons technology, 
which combines archaic weapons with advanced energy weapons. Dark 
uses sharp blades worn on the wrists, a retractable spear, a self-guiding, 
thrown disc, mines, and a plasma weapon worn on the shoulder.
Although in some senses Dark is closer to humans than aliens, with 
his advanced technology and culture, the experience of playing him is 
probably closer to the alien. He stalks human prey, carefully waiting for 
opportunities to tear them apart in close combat. However, when this 
fails, he can fall back to using his technology. Dark is powerful, in many 
senses of the word. With his great physical power, he is able to jump 
around to areas that would be unreachable to humans. From atop high 
vantage points, he can survey as the humans nervously huddle together 
and try to guard themselves against their superior enemies.
Alien Experience, Human technology
This chapter has highlighted the practice of synesthetic design in por-
traying nonhuman experiences in videogames. Humans have limited 
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sensory capabilities, so things that would be hard to experience or 
conceptualize are instead translated into forms that are more easily 
grasped. Often this happens by turning other senses into visual indica-
tors, since vision is usually so dominant in making sense of the world 
for humans. This might also be due to conventions within the medium – 
even the name “videogame” refers to an experience of looking at mov-
ing pictures.
Some of the experiences that are represented visually would be hard 
to represent otherwise. For example, the experience of feeling what is up 
and what is down that is indicated by an arrow when playing Specimen 
6 is hard to convey with other means. However, it seems that the game 
takes the easy way out in other cases. It seems, for example, that both 
Dark and Specimen 6 hear sounds in very similar manner than humans, 
even though their auditory systems are presumably very different from 
humans. They do make nonhuman sounds, screeching, gurgling, and 
clicking while hunting their way through the levels, but both their own 
sounds and the noises made by other beings sound the same as when 
playing Rookie. There is no reason the sounds experienced while playing 
the two alien creatures in the game had to correspond to the ones heard 
while playing Rookie.
While experiencing the different bodily representations of Dark and 
Rookie is one way Aliens vs. Predator creates the alienness of playing 
something nonhuman, it also requires the player to take on a very par-
ticular perspective on humans. Killing other humans in videogames is 
not uncommon, but hunting your own species is rarer. The antagonism 
between the species cannot be described as a fair fight: it is often easy to 
avoid the humans encountered during the game, especially when playing 
as Dark. The choice to kill humans is more akin to sport than to fight. 
This is fitting, since the predators treat it like a mixture between sport 
and a rite of passage.
When playing as Specimen 6, the relation is even more alien. In addi-
tion to being prey to an alien hunter, humans are also a way to procre-
ate. If Specimen 6 grabs a non-combatant human from behind, it can 
hold the human in place while a small alien facehugger appears from 
somewhere off-screen and plants itself on the human’s face. The human 
collapses helplessly, while the facehugger uses it as a host for breeding 
more aliens. Humans are not treated by Specimen 6 only as prey, but 
also as unwilling hosts.
While humans are reduced to the roles of prey and host, there is one 
factor that seems to give them a fighting chance against the physically 
superior aliens: technology. Using different technological apparatuses, 
humans are able to match the other species. Rookie is not able to phys-
ically best aliens or predators, but using his gun he can kill dozens of 
them during the campaign. He is almost blind in the dark, but using 
his flashlight, he can see. The motion sensor is also an example of this, 
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allowing Rookie to sense threats around him. The motion sensor also 
highlights how technology becomes embodied, turning into just another 
way of sensing the surroundings.
Even the predators that are technologically more advanced than hu-
mans in many ways still have to be wary of human technology. Right 
from the beginning of the game, the autonomous turrets humans 
use are a threat to Dark, even when the humans themselves are not. 
Later in the game, Dark encounters even more advanced technological 
threats as Weyland-Yutani military androids try to stop him. These 
are human-shaped, but much more dangerous than the human enemies 
encountered before.
The game seems to imply that humans have an ambivalent relation to 
technology. Technology is what makes humans capable of meeting the 
other species on an even level, even when the capabilities given by nature 
make them weaker. But humans are also very reliant on that technology, 
unable to survive without it. The weapons Dark uses seem like tools for 
sport and ritual, and he is able to fight his enemies even without them. 
One of the defining weapons he uses is the set of blades attached to his 
forearm. Rookie, on the other hand, needs his flashlight, motion sensor, 
and weapons in order to have a fighting chance of surviving.
Creating Alien Experiences
It seems that while there are differences in playing the different characters 
in Aliens vs. Predator, there is also a lot of common ground, from the 
similar goal-structure to the constant fighting of similar enemies. What 
would a game that took into account all the embodied differences look 
like? Making such a game might not be easy, but at least it would pay 
attention to the following things:
1  The game would focus on different things when playing different 
characters: different things are important for bats or aliens than 
for humans. For example, much of Aliens vs. Predator is focused 
on proceeding through areas that are shut off by electronic locks. 
Rookie hacks these locks, while Dark and Specimen 6 bash the 
control panels to gain access. This is a remarkably similar way to 
proceed in the game despite the differences between the charac-
ters. This feels particularly artificial in Specimen 6’s case: it is able 
to walk on walls and could presumably bypass most (but not all) 
obstacles by finding an alternative route.
2  Different things would be appealing or repulsive, based on the em-
bodied experiences with these things. For example, the aliens secrete 
a thick resin that they use to build nests and cocoon prey. This seems 
repulsive to humans, but would be perfectly normal to the aliens 
in question. Aliens vs. Predator does use this to a great effect by 
Playing the Nonhuman 121
making Rookie proceed through areas enveloped by alien cocoons, 
which highlights the alienness of these areas. However, that is the 
easiest way of using this aspect of embodiment, because it draws on 
our embodied experiences as humans.
3  Different things would seem dangerous, based on what kinds of 
things endanger the creatures. For example, the predators discussed 
in this chapter routinely hunt aliens, meaning that they have a very 
different attitude toward them than humans. The aliens are usually 
portrayed as afraid of fire, but this does not seem to play a large 
role in Aliens vs. Predator. Some of the marines encountered use 
flamethrowers, but they are not a particularly serious threat. Por-
traying emotional reactions can be difficult, since they are partially 
dependent on the player. However, other games deal with similar 
situations by, for example, making characters that are afraid less 
effective in combat.
4  The game would focus less on visual input in cases where other 
senses are more important. However, these experiences can be hard 
to translate to humans, which is why most games seem to translate 
other senses to visual indicators. This applies to senses not possessed 
by humans: for example, the alien light-sense in Aliens vs. Predator.
Combining these approaches would enable one to design a game that 
would take embodiment into account more comprehensively. However, 
it is possible that a game focused on conveying the embodied experience 
of something completely alien would not be particularly playable, since 
many of the compromises made in the examples discussed in this chapter 
are due to design choices made to allow better gameplay experiences. The 
fact that the examples discussed are games and not simulations intended 
for the purpose of simulating embodiment is important. Nonhuman ex-
periences are, by definition, alien, which might explain why games tend 
to use the human experience as the norm. Alien experiences are then 
portrayed by slight changes in that default approach. Another reason for 
adopting this approach is probably related to the economics of creating 
entertainment products. For example, it is more cost-effective to create 
one set of sound effects and use them in all of the three campaigns instead 
of creating unique sound effects for each Dark, Specimen 6, and Rookie.
The relation of this discussion to technology merits a mention. While 
the alien relies on its physical abilities, both the human and predator 
protagonists lean heavily on their technologies. Technology enhances 
their senses and allows them to recover from harm and fight against 
enemies that would be impossible to best without their tools. This is de-
spite the predator being physically the most powerful of all three of the 
characters – it would seem to need technology less than the alien.
However, it is not that straightforward to tell apart the experience of 
embodiment with and without technology. Technology tends to become 
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normalized and embodied: eyeglasses tend to become the norm for seeing 
after wearing them for a while, while lacking them runs counter to every-
day experiences of always having them on (cf. Hirose 2002; Merleau-Ponty 
2002). In games where technology plays an important role, using that 
 technology becomes as natural as any other form of interacting with the 
surrounding. For example, Batman in Batman: Arkham Asylum (2009) 
may scale a wall and use his Detective Mode and punch enemies, with all 
of the modes of interaction feeling as essential to being Batman. This is as 
true for playing Rookie and Dark, as many of their essential abilities are 
based on the technologies they are using.
As the comparison to Batman shows, there is no one way of being 
human. Both Rookie and Batman rely on technology to solve problems 
and survive, but being Rookie and being Batman are very different kinds 
of experiences. The comparison to the other ways of being in Aliens 
vs. Predator highlights certain types of being human, which would be 
absent if those other ways of being were absent. The game produces 
a certain way of being human: uncertain, afraid, and weak, but ulti-
mately triumphant due to technological tools – and some luck. Every 
danger and adversity can be overcome with perseverance. Ultimately, 
the game seems to carry the same kind of anthropocentrism typical to 
most science fiction narratives. Human may be weak and hunted, but 
their experiences are what matter.
Notes
 1 Embodied, situated, and grounded cognition each deal with slightly different 
things, but for the purposes of this chapter, they are closely related. In cog-
nitive literary studies, similar approaches are sometimes grouped together 
as “e-approaches”, because they concern with the “enactive, embedded, em-
bodied and extended qualities of the mind” (Kukkonen and Caracciolo 2014, 
261). The rest of this chapter focuses on the idea of embodied cognition.
 2 There is also a separate category of play where you play objects or things, 
like I am Bread (Bossa Studios 2015). I will here mostly focus on playing 
things that are nonhuman, but still easily recognized as intentional beings: 
animals, aliens, and fantasy creatures.
 3 Some games intentionally aim for unnatural visual look while still portray-
ing human experiences, usually for aesthetic reasons. For example, dys4ia 
(2012) uses simplified pixel-graphics and abstract shapes to illustrate the 
experience of going through hormone replacement therapy.
 4 Another game in the franchise, Alien: Isolation (Creative Assembly 2014), 
also portrays aliens as deadly, perceptive, and dangerous, but this is often 
invalidated by events in the game where an alien fails to notice the protag-
onist if she is even slightly hidden. The aliens are still the most deadly thing 
present in the game.
 5 This seems to differ from how the alien senses are represented in other me-
dia, like the movie franchise or the multiple comic books published. These 
media do not mention sophisticated olfactory senses, while the aliens are 
mentioned as being able to sense heat and have specialized hearing. I will 
here focus only on the Alien vs. Predator game and how it portrays things.
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 6 The gender of the predator is never made explicit, but other media in the 
franchise portray the predator society as very sexist, with limited roles 
reserved for female predators. It is likely that the predator played is male.
 7 Humans in other videogames regularly use similar technology to enhance 
their vision. For example, in Batman: Arkham Asylum (2009), Batman can 
use Detective Mode to see things humans normally cannot see. His senses 
are also enhanced by technological means, and it is portrayed in the game in 
a manner similar to how the predator’s visual overlays work. Other games 
that use a mechanic similar to Batman’s Detective mode include games like 
Assassin’s Creed (Ubisoft Montreal 2007), Dishonored (Arkane Studios 
2012), and Hitman: Absolution (IO Interactive 2012). In some of these 
games, the mechanic represents specialized training or mystical ability, not 
technological apparatuses.
 8 There are different versions of the predator species in different media of 
the franchise, and how their senses are portrayed is not always consistent. 
The canonical version seems to be that the infrared vision is the preda-
tors’ natural vision, but this does not seem to be true in the game being 
examined.
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It is no coincidence that monsters abound in children’s literature. Ac-
cording to a simplistic explanation, the purpose of these raging, mon-
strous creatures is to help children cope with their fears and anxieties. It 
is worth noting, however, that the seemingly innocent children and the 
openly untamable, threatening monsters of children’s fiction have some-
thing axiomatic in common: they are both creations of adults and, as 
such, different from and “other” to them. Childhood itself may be con-
sidered a social construction (e.g. Ariès 1996; Cook 2009), as adults need 
to see and construct children as pure, cute, and innocent (e.g.  Jenkins 
1998) and monsters as their polar opposites, in order to control their 
own ambivalent emotions toward their offspring. Likewise, the mech-
anism that aims to reject otherness by “taming the supposed out-of- 
control”, which is an oft-used theme in children’s literature, may justify 
both othering and separating the self from the difference, and abjection 
and abuse of these others (cf. Hellstrand et al. 2018).  Children  – the 
main target audience of child-friendly, adult-created cultural artifacts, 
such as toys and “children’s” books – are always positioned as “oth-
ers” in a world where the adult perspective is the perpetual default. 
This inevitably brings them closer to other “others”, such as monsters 
(cf.  Kincheloe 1998).
Even if adults have mostly been reluctant to address the undeniable 
monstrosity and vulgarity associated with and expressed by children, 
there is also some thematic affinity between monsters and children. 
Gary Cross (2004, 12–13) and Marina Warner (1994) note that “in-
nocence” is not a self-evident characteristic of children but, rather, the 
romantic creation of adults, which entails a covert demand for children 
to live innocent lives on behalf of those who are no longer children them-
selves. Even though infants in our own era are virtual objects of worship 
because they represent some kind of primordial innocence, for most of 
Western history, babies have actually represented the fall from grace. 
Today’s unwillingness to recognize children’s unpleasant or repellent 
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qualities, which has been perceived to be manifested in, for example, 
an increasing eagerness to diagnose children’s behavioral or emotional 
disorders and treat them with tranquilizers (e.g. Breggin 2014), leaves 
them adrift in adult fantasies, without a road map for maturing. This 
has led to the invention of the image of the “cool kid”, the rebellious 
child who works against adult myths and fashions their own identity 
(Warner 1994; Cross 2004, 5–7, 124–125). Cool children and monsters, 
thus, share the position of independent but inescapably inferior beings 
that are alien to the dominant adult-centered culture.
The cultural category of monstrosity and the figure of the monster can 
be approached from various angles. They can be regarded, for example, 
as projections of the repressed facets of the self; as the unthinkable and 
the unnameable; as various representations and embodiments of dif-
ference; as political symbols of otherness; as metaphors of chaos and 
threat; and as manifestations of wildness or humans who have abdicated 
their humanity, such as aggressive criminals (Cohen 1996; Gilmore 
2003; Asma 2009; Beville 2014). Maria Nikolajeva (2002, 38–39) sees 
monster characters in children’s literature as alienating, because they 
enact the subversion of identity that is typical of postmodern aesthet-
ics1 (cf. Butler 1990). Maria Beville (2014, xii), for her part, describes 
nonhuman monsters in literature and film as unnameable and slippery, 
as  impossible to fully explain, and thus as figures that offer humans 
valuable experiences of the unknown or unexpected, and difference and 
otherness (see also Hellstrand et al. 2018). Donna McCormack’s (2018, 
155) account goes on to make an important amendment to that of Bev-
ille: usually this otherness “comes to signify inferiority in opposition 
to the imagined superiority of the ‘rational, autonomous, [human] sub-
ject’” (see also Shildrick 2002, 121). In the analysis that follows, we try 
to figure out the messy meaning-making processes that the representa-
tions of nonhuman monsters in children’s literature offer. How do they, 
first, represent and embody contemporary (human) anxieties and deal 
with the unknown or unexpected that we humans face in our everyday 
lives? How may they even justify both othering, and abjection and abuse 
of others? Keeping all this in mind, we ask, second, if the monsters could 
also offer ways in which to explore and reconfigure the ethical relation-
ships between humans and nonhumans.
To elaborate, this chapter examines how monsters have been used to 
represent inferior otherness in children’s literature, and how they could 
be interpreted in the context of posthumanities. The otherness, wild-
ness, and anthropomorphism of monsters allow readers to draw paral-
lels between them and human children, which reveals the fact that both 
of these groups are subjected to adults’ control and both are viewed 
as inferior to adult subjects, the self-declared representatives of human 
superiority, rationality, and agency. Not only will we consider how the 
narrative representations of the embodied similarity of monsters and 
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children signify inferiority, but we will also investigate how these in-
form us about the apparently unethical validation of othering. Narrative 
fictions can open such doors by their virtue of analyzing the many un-
known and unpredictable variations of otherness, including the varia-
tions of monstrosity lurking in humans themselves. Children’s literature 
does not shy away from asking how “the monstrous is already of the self, 
ontologically integral to the human” – a question that implicitly calls for 
an ethical reconfiguration, or perhaps even the creation of new forms of 
ethics (McCormack 2018, 155, 157, 162).
These complicated interrelations of nonhuman monstrosity, child-
hood, and adulthood are central to the three children’s books discussed 
in this chapter: Maurice Sendak’s picture book Where the Wild Things 
Are (2013/1963), which was also made into a film in 2009 (directed 
by Spike Jonze), Shaun Tan’s short story “Stick Figures” (in Tales of 
Outer Suburbia, 2009), and Tuutikki Tolonen’s novel Monster Nanny 
(2017). This inquiry does not cover all types of monsters or all types 
of children’s literature containing monsters; however, the three ana-
lyzed works include monsters that both represent diverse aspects of 
human and nonhuman monstrosity and share crucial similarities with 
frequent portrayals of monstrosity in children’s literature. These books 
are popular also outside their native countries and have aimed at global 
coverage: Where the Wild Things Are originates from the USA, “Stick 
Figures” is an Australian story, and Monster Nanny was first published 
in Finland.2
Where the Wild Things Are (2013/1963) by Maurice Sendak was 
first published in 1963 and has since established itself as a classic. The 
story, delivered in a traditional picture book format, is about a child 
called Max who, due to his aggressive behavior, is sent to bed with-
out supper. Max then imagines an entire inner journey, during which 
he confronts and tames his inner monsters, that is, his feelings and 
emotions, until in his imagination, he returns to his room where his 
supper is now waiting for him. As the title suggests, Shaun Tan’s “Stick 
Figures” (in Tales of Outer Suburbia, 2009)3 is a short story about 
mysterious stick figure creatures who have always been a part of the 
suburban landscape depicted in the story. Children play with them, 
but also beat them, and nobody knows the reason for their existence. 
The origin of monsters remains a mystery also in Tuutikki Tolonen’s 
Monster Nanny (2017), in which the children protagonists’ parents are 
sent away for a holiday and replaced with a peculiar monster nanny. 
Siblings Halley, Koby, and Mimi start to investigate their hairy nanny 
Grah, who takes care of them and lives in the closet of their entrance 
hall. The mysteries of the monsters are not fully resolved in the novel, 
but the children are ultimately able to help them find their way back 
home and escape the evil witches exploiting monsters and using them 
as forced childcare labor.
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Monsters as Others
When a big, hairy creature, smelling like a musty cellar, appears behind 
the front door of Halley, Koby, and Mimi’s house at the beginning of 
Monster Nanny, the children are not sure what it is. Even after they get 
to know their monster nanny personally, they are generally unsure of 
how to make sense of it or how to interpret its communication correctly. 
As it grunts and murrs, the children ponder: “Was it happy murring or 
dangerous human-eating murring? How could one tell?” (Tolonen 2017, 
51). The monster nanny is – like so many other monsters – unfamiliar, 
strange, and alien, which is why the children resort to a science book 
to acquire more information about monsters. A scientist Runar Kalli, 
who “found a monster in the forest behind his house, coaxed it into his 
home, and studied it for almost two years”, wrote the book 80 years ago 
and the children borrow it from the library (Tolonen 2017, 33). Reading 
a book written in human language by a human scientist is probably 
the most anthropocentric way to approach a nonhuman creature, which 
makes the difference between humans and monsters particularly visible 
in the book.
In some ways, the monster nanny resembles humans and other mam-
mals considerably, and, according to the science book, it is even classi-
fiable as half-human: it has anthropomorphic nails, four fingers, and 
typical herbivore teeth. Furthermore, the children assume, for example, 
that mosquitos must also suck the blood of the monsters – or “what-
ever it is that flows in the monsters’ veins” (Tolonen 2017, 153). Even 
though there is something recognizable about them, the monsters are 
obviously strangers, and some of their features seem to originate from a 
whole different reality. When Grah first arrives in the Hellman house-
hold, for instance, it sheds some weird substance that spreads into the 
whole apartment. It is described almost as some kind of “mist in the air” 
or “darkness stuck to the walls” (Tolonen 2017, 21), but it is clearly not 
any kind of a substance that the children would have come in contact 
with before.
Tan’s monsters share the category confusion with Tolonen’s. Tan’s 
monstrous creatures are stick figures who have bodies and limbs made 
out of sticks, and heads that resemble grass tufts. They move around, 
“slowly as clouds” (Tan 2009, 65). It is a total mystery how anthropo-
morphic they really are or if they belong to flora or fauna. The embodied 
difference of these creatures thus likens them to such unworthy things as 
garbage or dead animals in the story: “If they are standing in the middle 
of the street, it’s easy enough to drive around them, as you would a piece 
of cardboard or a dead cat” (Tan 2009, 65). Tan’s depiction implies that 
no matter how confusing the monsters are, they are no different from 
dead animals left on the side of the road, or cardboard – other objects 
and beings that humans might not see, recognize, or even want to know 
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anything about. Since the stick figures represent yet another species that 
humans dissociate themselves from, Tan’s short story quite indisputably 
designates the cultural and societal status of nonhuman otherness as 
something worthless (cf. Beville 2014, xi).
In contrast to Tan’s story, Tolonen’s monster nannies are treated 
differently: even if strange and mysterious, they still are half-humans, 
whereas Tan’s stick figures are impossible even to categorize. Moreover, 
the human characters of Monster Nanny are sincere in their attempts 
to interpret and understand the monsters to the best of their abilities 
and to fabricate at least some kind of a meaning for their existence. 
The children discover that the monsters have been brought to the neigh-
borhood homes as slave labor, apparently by three witchy-looking la-
dies. According to the ladies, they are merely executing a “secret special 
experiment in which [they] are researching new options for child care 
work” (Tolonen 2017, 6), but the children seem to know better: the mon-
sters are kept in human habitations against their own will. In their role 
as researchers and experimenters, the witches are positioned as Fran-
kensteinian  characters – as unethical superiors exploiting a nonhuman 
species. It is not completely certain whether the witches belong to the 
category of human beings either, which associates the inhumane and 
exploitative treatment of otherness with other nonhuman characters. 
That being said, the same Frankensteinian interest has clearly motivated 
Runar Kalli, the scientist who has examined a monster in his house for 
two years, and it is worth asking if the end justifies the means or only 
questions human experiments with nonhumans, such as nonhuman an-
imals, in the first place. The question is only highlighted, while Grah 
the monster obediently prepares breakfast and uses a washing machine, 
despite the science book’s statement that “regular human work would be 
alien to [the monster’s] free, wild nature” (Tolonen 2017, 207).
In Tan’s “Stick Figures”, the monsters are generally ignored by hu-
mans. The adults either do not notice them or try to keep them away from 
the yard by turning on the sprinklers and playing loud music. Children 
are more curious, however: they sometimes dress the stick figures in old 
clothes and hats, as if playing with dolls or decorating scarecrows. The 
adults reproach the children and prohibit such behavior but, crucially, 
give no reason for this rule: “‘Just don’t,’ they say sternly” (Tan 2009, 
65). The reader is positioned asymmetrically with respect to the fictional 
adults who leave both the fictional children and the actual readers to 
wonder at the reasons behind the compulsion. The adult authorities may 
guide the children because they want them to behave ethically – to give 
stick figures some personal space – but they may as well instruct them 
just to bypass and neglect the wooden creatures as well as the entire en-
vironment they evidently are all part of.
The otherness of the monsters also frightens some of the human char-
acters, and sometimes this fear escalates into violence and aggression. 
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In Tolonen’s book, Bathrobe, another nonhuman character who only 
comes alive in the company of select children, explains this by saying 
that humans are afraid of monsters, and, because of their fear, “peo-
ple usually start to tease and bully anybody who is different” (Tolonen 
2017, 201). Perhaps there is a reason for Tolonen’s monster nanny to live 
in a closet and a Bathrobe, one of the most intimate pieces of human 
garment, to explain about the human fear of difference. Even if the idea 
of the monster, a justifiable allegory of difference and otherness, and 
“a figure who signifies selves and ways of living the world cannot ‘bear 
to see’” (Holman Jones and Harris 2016; cf. Butler 2014, 41), thus hid-
ing in the closet, may have but little to do with sexual difference – or 
queerness – in children’s literature, the significance of closets in Monster 
Nanny is well worth a thought. Resonances between monstrosity, oth-
erness, sexual difference, and queerness have been more or less axiom-
atic in the history of Western or Eurocentric culture (e.g. Halberstam 
1995; Benshoff 1997; Holman Jones and Harris 2016; Precup 2017), 
and undoubtedly the restraints of heteronormativity are at play in chil-
dren’s lives in the contemporary culture as well. According to Henry Jen-
kins (1998), it is the very myth of childhood innocence that naturalizes 
heteronormativity, and according to a classic thought of Eve Kosofsky 
Sedgwick (1990), heteronormativity relies on the “epistemology of the 
closet”, meaning that gender and sexual difference are often suppressed 
by culturally dominant acts of control, denial, and concealment, all of 
which can be considered forms of symbolic, gendering violence in cul-
ture and society (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992, 170; Weininger 2005, 
138; Butler 2015, 34, 59). This Sedgwickian context raises a question 
then of how we should read and interpret a monster character of a chil-
dren’s book who stays in a closet:
The monster squeezed into the closet. The closet was quite narrow. 
To fit in it, the monster had to stand straight with its arms tightly at 
its sides, but it didn’t seem bothered by the lack of room. The mon-
ster growled contentedly.
(Tolonen 2017, 13)
We suggest that if the monster squeezed in the closet could be examined in 
the light of monster theory, it could also be scrutinized in the framework 
of queer theory. Both theories, or rather methodologies, engage critically 
with discourses on the strange, the weird, and the “other” and aim at
thinking otherwise about the interconnections between the production 
of knowledge, the disciplining and creation of bodies and subjectivi-
ties, and the lives that are at stake whenever one attempts to draw a 
distinguishing line between the inside and the outside, self and other.
(Hellstrand et al. 2018; Karkulehto 2010; 2012)
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This interrelatedness reveals, first, that not only the disciplining of mon-
strosity or queerness – that is, everything that does not “stand straight” 
(Tolonen 2017, 13) – but also of all kinds of marks or signs of differences 
and otherness are, even if inherent in all humans, often disciplined or 
controlled, or even in a prohibited or closeted form. Second, the novel 
shows how the monster has to “stand straight” in order to fit into the 
closet, having no room around him/her for any natural movement. Yet 
Grah accepts this controlling cultural demand for confinement and 
“straightness” “contentedly”. This image of a monster growling com-
placently in its tight closet space invokes the forced cultural assimilation 
that many minority groups – not only gender and sexual but also ethnic 
and religious minorities and, for example, indigenous people – have been 
subjected to, solely because of the differences they embody. Associations 
with the tragic, violent human history of colonialism and its severe con-
sequences are difficult to avoid: imagining the monster purring in its 
little cell is eerily reminiscent of the imaginary figure of a “happy slave” 
and phenomena like the “Uncle Tom syndrome”. However, no matter 
how tightly the monster is squeezed into the closet, there is still, undeni-
ably, a monster in the closet; no matter how much symbolic denial and 
concealment we practice, the closets of human history are still packed 
with violence against otherness, all caused by the fear of difference.
An analogous fear of difference leads to physical violence in Tan’s 
story. Boys beat the stick figures with “baseball bats, golf clubs, or what-
ever they have at hand, sometimes including the victim’s own, snapped-
off limb[s]” (Tan 2009, 66). Initially, the boys find this activity fun, and 
it goes on for hours, until it finally ceases to be entertaining: “It becomes 
boring, somehow enraging, the way they just stand there and take it. 
What are they? Why are they here? What do they want? Whack! Whack! 
Whack!” (Tan 2009, 67). This unprovoked violence toward the stick 
figures, who do not even defend themselves in any way but just take the 
beating, exemplifies the processes of the fear of difference, the dehuman-
ization of otherness, and the consequent violence, which together expose 
the hidden monstrosity of humans themselves. As wooden creatures, 
the stick figures are also closely associated with nature, which reminds 
about the monstrous human abuse of nonhuman natural environments.
The constructed binaries that divide humans from the “other” po-
sition monsters at the margins reserved for the repressed, the abject, 
and the uncanny (Beville 2014, 1). The vulnerable position the monsters 
have is only partly shared by the children in these fictional works. The 
minors are, like monsters, dependent on the adult humans’ authority 
and arbitrariness, and they are at risk of being bypassed or neglected 
by their parents. The Hellman kids are left alone for days in Monster 
Nanny because their mother simply decides to leave for a special holiday 
she has won and their father’s return flight is late from a business trip. 
In Where the Wild Things Are, Max is instructed to stay in his room 
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without supper, and the kids in the suburban neighborhood are told to 
behave as the adults command. Nevertheless, the fictional children, at 
least in these books, evidently have a more secure position compared 
to that of monsters, since they can mainly rely on adults’ care and as-
sistance. However, even if they are not violently beaten, used as free 
labor, or stuck in the dusty closet like the monsters, the adults seem to 
have ambivalent feelings toward their children: they are tired and angry 
with them, and from time to time, they find them a burden rather than, 
for example, symbols of innocence. This pushes the children to act in-
dependently and develop emotionally and intellectually on their own 
(cf. Warner 1994; Cross 2004, 5–7, 124–125), which, in a way, tears 
them more apart from their parents and brings them closer to the mon-
sters and the alien otherness they represent.
It has been argued that the acknowledged independence and otherness 
of children and childhood grants children at least some weight and visi-
bility in various political and ethical spheres, and this acknowledgment 
helps us to consider otherness a meaningful ethical construction (Jones 
2008, 197). According to Owain Jones (2008, 197), otherness is not 
only healthy for children and for child-adult relationships but essential 
to what children are. By the same token, this otherness is also essential 
to what adults are, and even essential to what humans are, in relation to 
the nonhuman others – and monsters or, what we regard as monstrous – 
in particular. In this way, the monster narratives in children’s literature 
may persuade us to rethink or even reconfigure what it means to live 
with otherness, difference, and monstrosity (cf. McCormack 2018, 161), 
and how to perceive and manage the otherness, difference, and mon-
strosity in ourselves.
Wild, Animalized, Nonhuman Monsters
“Let the wild rumpus start”, Max declares once he has learned how to 
control the monsters that represent his own unruly emotions in Sendak’s 
Where the Wild Things Are (2013, 22). Even though the monsters are 
essentially wild, he can confront them and even romp with them safely 
after he has tamed and understood them. The wildness of monsters con-
nects them to wild nature and untamed nonhuman animals, while differ-
entiating them from the “civilized” human culture. This dualistic divide 
between nature and culture, where the latter covers humans and human 
artifacts, and the former all the other external environments and beings 
(Haila 2000, 155; Åsberg and Braidotti 2018), is one of the most cen-
tral conceptual human constructions that posthumanist thinking aims 
to challenge. In her seminal “Cyborg Manifesto” (2000),4 Donna Har-
away addresses this leaky distinction by imagining a cyborg: an ironic 
political myth, a feminist figure, and a critter that is not unequivocally a 
human, an animal, or a machine but a tangled combination of them all.
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This binary nature-culture divide is visually played with in Where the 
Wild Things Are: the monsters look like hybrids; one has a head of an 
eagle, a body of a chicken, and legs of a bear; another has a head of a 
bull, a body of a wolf, and legs of a human. All of them have sharp teeth 
and claws. The hybridity of these figures indicates that the separation 
between different species, such as humans and other animals, should 
not be taken as fundamentally as it might appear in the humanist dis-
courses of the book’s time of publication. In Tolonen’s Monster Nanny 
(2017, 47, 73, 76, 102–103, 132), the monsters are reported to look “like 
a pig”, “like a moth, “like a hairy caterpillar”, or “like a giant teddy 
bear”, and they roar “like a lion”, murr “like a large cat”, or roll their 
eyes “like goldfish in a glass bowl”. In the science book that the children 
study, a monster is characterized as a “peaceful humanoid animal, if not 
half-human” ( Tolonen 2017, 102). Thus, even though the monsters are 
explicitly animalized and animal-like, they are also hybrid humans or 
even machine-like, which suggests that the nature-culture divide cannot 
be maintained or credibly justified.
In Tan’s short story, the monsters incorporate features of humans, 
animals, and plants. Nonetheless, “they are not a problem, just another 
part of the suburban landscape” (Tan 2009, 65). The violence that the 
human characters direct against the stick figures brings forth the dev-
astating actions humans direct against many kinds of others, including 
nonhuman animals and other aspects of the natural environment. This 
kind of violence that indiscriminately targets anything and everything 
nonhuman has a long history but has been forcefully articulated in lit-
erature since the notion of the turn to the era of the Anthropocene. As 
Adam Trexler (2015, 223) points out, before the turn of the millennium, 
climate change was considered mainly a sensational topic for science 
fiction, apocalyptic narratives, ecological thrillers, and dystopias. Only 
now that the scientific consensus concerning the destructive impact of 
human actions on the Earth system has grown stronger, other literary 
approaches have become possible as well (ibid.).
These new approaches include starkly realistic or dystopian portray-
als of the destruction that humans cause to other entities and beings, 
and Tan’s short story, with its quietly suffering stick figures, could be 
counted among them. Their lithe, vulnerable bodies remain “passively 
upright until smashed to splinters between heels and asphalt”, and the 
only response to such human violence is “the sound of the dead branches 
falling from old trees on windless evenings, and random holes appearing 
in front lawns, dark sockets where clods of earth have been removed 
during the night” (Tan 2009, 66, 68). The narration in these passages 
is mysterious and oddly threatening, as if some bigger retaliation or ret-
ribution would wait just around the corner. Alternatively, perhaps the 
ominous tone is only meant to help the reader to grasp, in an affective 
way, the inequality caused by human behavior and their cruelty against 
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nonhuman otherness. At the same time, the violence and cruelty are di-
rected to hybrid figures representing humans themselves, which portrays 
a disturbing image of humans’ fundamental self-destruction.
Humans’ wounding of nature and nonhuman animals is also criti-
cized in Tolonen’s Monster Nanny. The aforementioned science book 
that the children constantly rely on in their quest to know more about 
the monsters speculates:
Would it be possible for us humans to live peaceful and mutually 
respectful lives alongside monsters? Or would we attempt to harness 
these gentle, strong beings as mere work animals to do our heaviest 
jobs? Regrettably often, human nature is far from humane.
(Tolonen 2017, 106)
Later, Koby reads more about monsters’ anthropomorphic habits and 
finds out that “[they] would hardly choose to coexist with humans. 
The disparity between the two species is too great. An equal environ-
ment would not be possible” (Tolonen 2017, 207). This extract epito-
mizes, and admits, the exploitative history of the human species: we 
have  always exploited each other, tortured, killed, and eaten others, as 
well as destroyed and enslaved anything and everything. Why would it 
be any different with the monsters? Tolonen’s novel thus emphasizes, 
in an honest but child-friendly way, that the idea of human supremacy 
is deeply problematic, as it creates a constraining distinction between 
humans and the others, while simultaneously justifying human cruelty 
against others by depicting humans as more “valuable” than others.
Since monstrosity is also closely intertwined with wildness, one may 
be tempted to ask whether monsters could or should be tamed somehow, 
and how ethical such an approach would be. Furthermore, in the con-
text of children’s literature, this evokes the parallel question, whether 
children could or should be tamed as well, seeing that childhood is also 
regarded as a “wild” and “natural” state. After all, it is only through 
prolonged socialization and education that children are assumedly culti-
vated into full members of the “civilized” human culture and adulthood 
(Jenkins 1998). Where the Wild Things Are thematizes this cultivation 
process through Max’s relation to and eventual mastery of his inner 
monsters. At the beginning of the story, his mom calls him a “[w]ild 
thing” (Sendak 2013, 5), but Max evolves as the story progresses, and 
toward the end, he acts in a distinctly more civilized manner, being in 
control of his turbulent emotions. Moreover, this civilizational and ed-
ucational “progress” is visually intertwined with nonhuman animality: 
on the first page, Max is wearing his wolf costume, and on the last 
pages, he removes it. He is no longer a wild animal with inner monsters 
but a well-behaved, “proper” human subject.
The beasts of Monster Nanny represent more complex cases, as when 
the story begins, the monster nannies have already been tamed, enslaved, 
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and assimilated into human habitats. Similarly, the children of Tolonen’s 
book have already been tamed, as they are obviously well-educated and 
good-mannered little creatures. Halley, Koby, and Mimi seem to be very 
happy about their own status and position as (tamed) children, although 
this happiness suffers a crack when they learn – thanks to their ability 
to read, seek, and critically evaluate information – that monsters are 
miserable when being used as unpaid labor under human discipline and 
control. The children discover that the monsters’ natural habitat is the 
forest, and that without their natural diet of rotten leaves, monsters’ fur 
will grow thinner and their lives become joyless. This prompts the chil-
dren to take their monster nanny Grah to the nearby forest, where it rolls 
and trashes around in rotten leaves, noticeably happily, and not only 
“contentedly”. Afterward, the monster looks “magnificent and power-
ful”, “as if it had grown in height and girth” (Tolonen 2017, 62). The 
monsters of Monster Nanny most likely need to be in touch with their 
animality, wildness, and natural habitat, or otherwise they will suffer.
This question about the taming of (inner) monsters seems to be inter-
connected with the question of whether or not humans themselves are 
happier when they tame and repress their own animality and wildness. 
Is the civilization that humans have created for themselves truly their 
natural habitat, and, if not, can any civilized human really claim to be 
more than merely contented? John Weaver (2015, 186–187) theorizes 
that civilization and culture are two different kinds of forces: civiliza-
tion seeks morality and rationality, while culture is tasked with finding 
limits in order to create something novel and different. He also implodes 
the distinction between human culture and animality by stating that 
human animality is human culture. Human memory has simultaneously 
created civilization and forgotten about humans’ creative animality, but 
“through human memory and animal forgetfulness, our cultivation be-
gins” (Weaver 2015, 186). However, since the institutions that produce 
civilization, especially the educational system, aspire to create obedient 
citizens, they are in danger of the “fetishizing of ‘becoming human’” 
(Pedersen 2015, 57).
While humans try to tame their offspring and other species in their sur-
roundings, in order to cultivate them and to enhance life on planet Earth 
with diverse and often contradictory actions, the binary  constructions – 
nonhuman and human, nature and culture, child and adult – act as justi-
fying mindsets, for better or worse. Our everyday lives are crowded with 
children and other others, such as pets, who constantly fail to fulfill hu-
man adults’ expectations to abandon their wildness and become tame. 
At the same time, children’s literature is crowded with child protagonists 
who choose to rebel against these oppressive expectations: J. M. Barrie’s 
Peter Pan, Rudyard Kipling’s Mowgli, and Astrid Lindgren’s Pippi Long-
stocking are all examples of fictional characters5 who “reveal the depth 
of adult investment in a utopian childhood state” ( Warner 1994). Real 
children, like fictional ones, have the power to subvert cultural norms, 
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especially those associated with the myth of innocent childhood ( Jenkins 
1998), simply by being normal children who cannot fulfill adults’ un-
realistic expectations. As Marina Warner (1994) puts it, “our children 
can’t be better than we are”.6
Inner Monsters
Despite their wild and animalized features, the monsters in the three 
books studied in this chapter, and beyond, are also anthropomorphic. 
Sometimes their monstrosity is clearly positioned as a part of humanity. 
Where the Wild Things Are, for instance, is built around an idea of 
 children’s inner monsters, which corresponds well to the traditional as-
sumption that children’s literature ought to offer resources for their read-
ers’ psychological development. According to Bruno Bettelheim (1979, 
145, 191), fairy tales do not even attempt to describe the outer (physical) 
reality; instead, they aim to offer children a better understanding of their 
inner lives and help them resolve their psychological difficulties. This ar-
gument is made especially concrete by the otherness of the monster char-
acter called the Groke, who appears in Tove Jansson’s famed Moomin 
stories. The Groke may exude a certain amount of existential horror, 
but her inclusion in the stories serves a psychological and an educational 
purpose, as her character presents the reader with poignant, relatable 
themes of loneliness and alienation (Ylönen 2014, 228, 233). Similarly, 
the monster nanny in Tolonen’s Monster Nanny may be a horrific other, 
but its half-humanity can be read as a metaphor for humans’ monstrous 
qualities and inner battles. As a result, the monster nanny also becomes 
a symbol for “the changing relationships between the human and non-
human, culture and nature, technology and the body, and Other and 
Self” (Åsberg and Braidotti 2018, 11). In other words, it embodies the 
Harawayan “processes of becoming with all that is other-than-human” 
(Koistinen and Karkulehto 2018).
As humans empathize with monsters or identify with them, even in 
the context of fictional narratives, the boundaries between the two cat-
egories are momentarily shaken. In Monster Nanny, the youngest child, 
Mimi, is especially good at understanding their beastly, hairy caretaker. 
While her siblings are terrified of the huge “hairy cigar” that appears at 
their front door, Mimi simply observes: “It’s not dangerous. […] Look 
at its eyes. It wants to stay here” (Tolonen 2017, 12–13). The six-year-
old Mimi as the character that understands the monster the best is an 
easy choice, as smaller children typically have to rely more on nonver-
bal communication than spoken, “civilized” human language. When 
Mimi’s father wants to know how Mimi is able to understand Grah, 
she gives him a surprised look and says: “Just normally. […] In the same 
way as one understands anybody. Just like I understand you” (Tolonen 
2017, 256). The response suggests that the perpetual binaries and the 
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stark pragmatic and conceptual separation of different beings are actu-
ally learned, man-made constructions of adults. Children, by contrast, 
are represented as the ones who are more in touch with the natural, plain 
mutuality, and the feeling of togetherness that encompasses all creatures, 
which resonates well with the myth of innocent childhood.
In summary, the anthropomorphism of the storybook monsters as 
well as the monstrosity of the human characters in these narratives can 
lead the readers to question the deep-ingrained human/other distinc-
tion and encourage them to face their own inner monstrosity. In Mon-
ster Nanny, the human characters make a crucial discovery: “now that 
the monster was in sight again, it was much more difficult to forget it” 
( Tolonen 2017, 29). The increased visibility of humans’ inner conflicts 
and an insistent feeling of otherness leave no other choice but to face 
them with courage or to repress them – to squeeze them in the closet. 
The narrative representations of monsters thus serve the same general 
function as the fictional monsters in Tolonen’s novel do: they lure us 
into seeing them and facing them. In Where the Wild Things Are, Max 
boldly confronts his inner challenges, and his process of gaining control 
over his feelings is described in a way that really emphasizes the pluck it 
takes to examine oneself realistically and without fear:
And when [Max] came to the place where the wild things are they 
roared their terrible roars and gnashed their terrible teeth / and 
rolled their terrible eyes and showed their terrible claws / till Max 
said ‘BE STILL!’ and tamed them with the magic trick / of staring 
into all their yellow eyes without blinking once and they were fright-
ened and called him the most wild thing of all / and made him king 
of all wild things.
(Sendak 2013, 17–21)
There is, however, a mystery at the heart of this citation that seems to 
also be at the heart of all humans’ inner battles: the emotion-monsters 
may be successfully tamed, but only with the help of a “magic trick”. 
This gives the readers little applicable advice on how to actually cope 
with difficult emotions.
Even as the nonhuman monsters are construed as others, they are also 
(inner) companions, and their human “hosts” may have grown quite 
attached to or even fond of them. For instance, once Max starts to miss 
his mom and feel homesick, he decides to leave the place where the wild 
things are but faces some unexpected resistance: “But the wild things 
cried, ‘Oh please don’t go – we’ll eat you up – we love you so!” (Sendak 
2013, 31). The monsters’ reaction to the abandonment is quite forceful, 
and it reflects the paradoxicality of human emotions: the distinction be-
tween love and hate is vague and flickering. Moreover, the monsters’ 
words echo Max’s own words from the beginning of the book, where he 
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cites the same angry threat – “I’ll eat you up” (Sendak 2013, 5) – to his 
mother, even though he clearly loves her. In Tolonen’s novel, the children 
feel affection toward their familial monster, as evidenced by the sorrow 
they feel after they have managed to help Grah and the other monster 
nannies to finally get back home: “Halley felt tears rolling down her 
cheeks. She felt lost with the monsters gone. Like something essential 
had disappeared” (Tolonen 2017, 298). Others are not always others, 
after all; they may just as well be fundamental, although unrecognized, 
parts of our lives, or even parts of ourselves.
This internalization of the monstrous can make it especially frighten-
ing, although also especially powerful in other ways. Monsters do not 
simply signify oppositional others that are safely fenced off within their 
own boundaries. Instead, they act as the harbingers of the otherness of 
possible worlds or of possible, if as yet unrealized, versions of ourselves 
(Shildrick 2002, 129, 2018). As such, they force us to look at others 
and otherness from a different angle but also invite us to reconfigure 
 ourselves – to tune into the alien and the strange within us. The stick 
figure monsters in Tan’s short story, for example, prompt the people 
around them to guess at or create meanings for their existence, which 
eventually leads them to ask questions about themselves:
if you stop and stare at them for a long time, you can imagine that 
they too might be searching for answers, for some kind of meaning. 
It’s as if they take all our questions and offer them straight back: 
Who are you? Why are you here? What do you want?
(Tan 2009, 69)
This existential questioning triggered by an encounter with non human 
 otherness can easily spread to the readers as well, guiding them to 
 reconsider the essence and meaning of humans and nonhumans. These 
questions, in turn, evoke further questions about how we could  reconfigure 
the current world, which has already entered the era of the Anthropo-
cene, so that it reflects true humanity as well as includes  nonhuman 
 others in the sphere of ethical consideration and – cohabitation.
As Zoe Jaques (2015, 5) remarks, children’s fiction can make sophis-
ticated, albeit often overlooked, interventions into the ongoing debates 
on being human and nonhuman, and maybe even posthuman. Indeed, 
children’s literature features interesting discussions about the ethical 
qualities and the cultural signification processes permeating humans’ 
relationships with other creatures. All in all, this genre offers wads of 
intriguing, underutilized material for examining the construction of 
nonhuman otherness and its complex interconnectedness with the oth-
ered groups that have been established inside humanity itself, including 
children. Sendak’s, Tan’s, and Tolonen’s works show how the distinc-
tions between humans and nonhumans are, on the one hand, artificially 
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produced, and how they could thus, on the other hand, be purposefully 
reconfigured. In the end, monsters seem to exist anywhere: outside of us, 
inside of us, and everywhere in between.
Notes
 1 In traditional fiction, child and adult readers are usually expected to identify 
and empathize with at least one character, while in postmodern aesthet-
ics, the reader might be detached from characters by making them repul-
sive: physically unattractive, morally depraved, or alien (Nikolajeva 2002, 
38–39).
 2 Even though Sendak’s and Tan’s works rely heavily on pictures, we will fo-
cus mainly on their textual elements in our analysis.
 3 Despite the fact that most of Tan’s award-winning stories feature child or 
monster protagonists, some critics have debated whether his works should 
be categorized as children’s literature at all (see Banerjee 2013), whereas oth-
ers consider him to be one of the world’s most important children’s authors 
who has transformed the entire genre with his works (see Kite 2016).
 4 “A Manifesto for cyborgs: Science, technology, and socialist feminism in the 
1980s” was originally published in Socialist Review 80 (1985), 65–108.
 5 Not all of these characters are rebels in the same way. For instance, Peter 
Pan rebels against growing up, while Pippi Longstocking rebels against the 
expectation of being a vulnerable, dependent girl. Peter and Mowgli act as 
affirmation of the utopian state of childhood, while Pippi fights against it.
 6 Keeping this in mind, it should be mentioned, however, that the idea of the 
adults giving up in their aspirations and fetishizing wild, untamed children 
and animals also seems quite irresponsible and destructive.
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Talking, and narrating, dogs run more or less cynically through Western 
literature, from Lucian via Miguel de Cervantes to Franz Kafka,  Virginia 
Woolf, and Thomas Pynchon. The talking canine forms a veritable 
literary tradition, thus familiarizing the seeming strangeness of this 
wildly unnatural phenomenon by making it a nearly domesticated 
 literary trope. There is, however, a more extreme subset in the long 
line of  loquacious canines: the supernatural case of the talking dead 
dog. This chapter probes the narrational peculiarities of posthumous 
canines’ tales by reading Charles Siebert’s novel Angus (2000). A 
talking dead dog doubly violates the usual state of affairs; unlike ac-
tual humans, dogs never really possess the ability to speak or nar-
rate, and unlike  human characters, dead dogs rarely make posthumous 
(ghostly or zombie)  appearances in literature. In Siebert, the situation 
is even more preposterous, for Angus – the narrating dog – occupies, 
like the proverbial Schrödinger’s cat, an ambiguous space between life 
and death.1
If we are to believe our ears, dogs do talk. A YouTube search on 
“talking dogs” yields some 9,590,000 videos featuring loquacious or at 
least noisy man’s best friends engaging in what is commonly regarded as 
a distinctively human ability. If we doubt our ears or the auditory reli-
ability of pet lovers’ cute footage, we can turn to the abundant  literature 
on the spoken or linguistic skills of dogs, ranging from zoosemiotics 
to popular pet guides, to assure faith in canid communication. Titles 
such as Tail Talk: Understanding the Secret Language of Dogs (2007), 
Dog Language (1997), If Dogs Could Talk: Exploring the Canine 
Mind (2005), The Rosetta Bone: The Key to Communication between 
 Humans and Canines (2004), and Tales from the Dog Listener (2006) 
are by no means uncommon on the market.2
As most of these titles indicate, dog talk and talking dogs hinge on 
the metaphor of human speech or, more generally, on the anthropomor-
phization of speechless animals. But dogs are by no means silent, as any 
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insomniac will testify. Spectrographic evidence shows that  canids have 
eight basic sound types (Fox and Cohen 1977). The vocal apparatus of a 
canine can produce “whines (including shorter yips and yelps, and lon-
ger, softer whimpers), screams, barks, growls, coos, howls, mews, and 
grunts” (Fox and Cohen 1977, 735), but communication also  happens “by 
means of more ‘mechanical’ sounds such as clicking and  tooth- snapping” 
(Fox and Cohen 1977, 738). The capability of  producing these sounds, 
of course, does not imply an ability to speak, but it does make anthropo-
morphization easier than is the case in famously reticent fish, snakes, or 
pet spiders, not to mention insects.
We may never know the truth about dogs’ actual mental or  linguistic 
abilities, unless it lies in the very anthropomorphism. Friedrich 
 Nietzsche’s famous 1873 dictum on that trope states: “What is truth? 
A mobile army of metaphors, metonymies, anthropomorphisms […]” 
(Nietzsche 1989, 250).3 It is perhaps in keeping with Nietzsche’s point 
that we could easily imagine this statement emitting from a schnau-
zer’s snout, especially if we bear in mind the similar looks of the 
 philosopher and the dog in question. The Nietzsche quotation derives 
from “On Truth and Lying in an Extra-moral Sense” (1873), which 
speculates, among other things, what it would be like to be a gnat, a 
century before Thomas Nagel posed the same question about a bat.4 
Nietzsche writes:
if we could communicate with the gnat, we would learn that it 
too swims through the air with this same pathos and feels within 
itself the flying center of this world. Nothing in nature is so 
 contemptible and insignificant that it would not immediately be 
swollen up like a balloon by the slightest touch of that power of 
knowledge […].
(Nietzsche 1989, 246)5
How does Nietzsche know the thoughts and feelings of a speechless in-
sect? Probably he does not, but projects his personal views to the external 
world and to its creatures. Although Nietzsche states, in the next sen-
tence, that “the philosopher […] believes he sees the eyes of the universe 
focused telescopically from all directions upon his actions and thoughts”, 
it could rather be that he presumes, or imagines, the universe to act or, 
more precisely, exist according to his conception of it.
The human and nonhuman mingle in Nietzsche’s rhetoric in telling 
ways. His answer to the question about the truth, for instance,  vacillates 
between the two realms. The German Heer means both “army” and 
“herd” or “host” (a group of animals, for instance, or cloud of gnats or 
other insects). Although the movable army is the most felicitous transla-
tion in this connection, the nonhuman option naggingly resonates there 
as well.
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Speaking Animals and the Posthuman
As Margo DeMello states, the long-standing tradition of “animal speaking 
and writing” surfaces on different levels of oral and literary culture, and 
ranges from everyday pet talk and myths to poetry and written narra-
tives (DeMello 2013, 1). The human/nonhuman animal communication 
of this kind can be conceived of as ventriloquism (people voicing non-
human animal minds) or mediation (nonhuman animals used as relays 
between human minds) (DeMello 2013, 1, 4; Morstad 2013, 200). In 
Karla Armbruster’s view, talking animal stories, and their readers, 
 almost invariably show a longing for a genuine understanding of the 
otherness of nonhuman animals (Armbruster 2013, 19). She asks how 
the literary criticism tapping from combinations of animal studies and 
literary/cultural studies could sustain that longing or desire, especially in 
connection with the literary representations of nonhuman animal voices 
and minds (Armbruster 2013, 19). Armbruster is the only literary critic 
to have published a scholarly article on Angus to date and is therefore 
an important dialogist in my reading, both theoretically and interpreta-
tively.6 She takes cue of Cary Wolfe’s 2009 notion that the introduction 
of posthumanism to animal studies has often resulted in applications 
that still cling to the humanist subject and, consequently, anthropocen-
trism. Wolfe problematizes, following the tracks of Jacques Derrida, the 
first-person plural as simultaneously including and excluding:
“we” are always radically other, already in- or ahuman in our very 
being – not just in the evolutionary, biological, and zoological fact 
of our physical vulnerability and mortality, which we share, as an-
imals, with animals, but also in our subjection to and constitution 
in the materiality and technicality of a language that is always on 
the scene before we are, as a radically a human precondition for our 
subjectivity, for what makes us human.
(Wolfe 2009, 571)
What could this reconfiguration of the human/nonhuman divide mean 
to literary criticism? Quite devastating changes, if Susan McHugh’s no-
tion of literary studies is correct: “a systematic approach to reading 
animals involves coming to terms with a discipline that in many ways 
appears organized by the studied avoidance of just such questioning” 
(McHugh 2009, 487). The re-examination of disciplinary practices as 
prompted by the new configuration would radically reframe literature’s 
place “in a larger universe of communication, response, and exchange, 
which now includes manifold other species” (Wolfe 2009, 571). Arm-
bruster locates the listening to “the animal voices in literature” as a 
beginning of that reframing (Armbruster 2013, 20). I would like to 
add another mode of reception to this posthuman constellation: the 
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reading of human noises in nonhuman animal discourses as well. In my 
reading of Siebert’s Angus, I will trace not only the presumed voicing 
of a dog’s cognition, as Armbruster does, but also the human, cultural 
interferences in it.
Narratives of Speaking Dogs
Literary imagination, especially in the form of narrative fiction, does 
testify to the speaking abilities of dogs. There is indeed a long  tradition 
of talking, philosophizing, and narrating dogs in Western literature. 
One might initially think of such loquacious canines as the one in 
 Kafka’s late story “Investigations of a Dog” (1922). Kafka’s deeply 
troubled animal attempts to tackle a series of metaphysical questions, 
starting from the ultimate one about the source and origin of (dog) 
food. However, the tradition of loquacious dogs runs quite a bit further 
than the first decades of the twentieth century, in fact to antiquity and 
hence the beginning of Western philosophy and literature.7
Dogs in literature are conventionally eager to talk to one another, 
but Kafka’s canine is alienated from his community and has no one 
of his species to talk to. Still, we, as readers, witness his soliloquy or 
investigative monologue. This puts us in the position of the “grazed 
witness who understands – or thinks that s/he understands – the lan-
guage of the dog” (Ziolkowski 1983, 114). This is what happens also 
in Angus, but with an extra twist of interpretive challenge: we are to 
believe that we understand the language of a canine who is dead or on 
the verge of dying.
What constitutes language, speech, and reading in connection with 
dogs mobilizes a Nietzschean army, host, or herd of metaphors, me-
tonymies, and anthropomorphisms. Language is to be acquired from 
the dog herself, but not solely from her mouth. Not only a nonhuman 
animal’s body language but also her whole lived and experienced real-
ity, inner sensibility included, forms what can be labeled as “language” 
(Kate Soper as quoted in Armbruster 2013, 24).
The thriving of nonhuman narrators in fiction has, predictably, caught 
narratologists’ attention. In their useful analysis of the phenomenon of 
nonhuman storytelling, Lars Bernaerts, Marco Caracciolo, Luc  Herman, 
and Bart Vervaeck note “the paradoxical idea that readers are invited to 
reflect upon aspects of human life when reading the  fictional life stories of 
nonhuman narrators” and that “these  narratives  highlight or even chal-
lenge our conception of the human” (Bernaerts et al. 2014, 68–69). Pre-
vious literary critical and narratological accounts of  nonhuman narration 
have had recourse to concepts such as estrangement, defamiliarization, 
and the unnatural (Shklovsky 1965; Richardson 2006; Alber et al. 2010). 
Bernaerts and his co-writers, however, understand this phenomenon as 
“the result of a double dialectic of empathy and defamiliarization, human 
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and nonhuman experientiality” (Bernaerts et al. 2014, 69; emphasis in 
original). This means that
[n]on-human narrators project human experience onto creature and 
objects that are not conventionally expected to have that kind of 
mental perspective (in other words, readers “empathize” and “nat-
uralize”): at the same time, readers have to acknowledge the oth-
erness of nonhuman narrators, who may question (defamiliarize) 
some of the readers’ assumptions and expectations about human 
life and consciousness.
(Bernaerts et al. 2014, 69)
Literature is capable of creating an illusion of an experience from a non-
human animal’s or a dead being’s perspective (Bernaerts et al. 2014, 
76–77). What this means for human readers is, according to the writers, 
that they may recognize the simultaneous similarity and otherness of 
nonhumans (dogness and humanness of dogs, as well as dogness and 
other nonhuman animalness of humans), and consequently, anthropo-
centric ideologies can be destabilized (Bernaerts et al. 2014, 74). These 
ideologies are perhaps shaken or tilted but not seriously reorganized in 
the very theory of nonhuman narrators as presented by Bernaerts and 
his group. While it is true that the last sentence in their article boldly 
states that “[h]uman and nonhuman experientiality are always caught 
up in a dialectic, so that their boundaries are constantly renegotiated as 
a result of complex historical and cultural dynamics” (Bernaerts et al. 
2014, 89), the penultimate sentence shows definite human bias and thus 
reduces the destabilizing potential of nonhuman narration:
nonhuman narration may push back the limits of human 
experientiality – the audience’s repertoire of beliefs and values – 
by inviting them to engage with characters and experiences that 
they construe as strange and “unnatural”, but which are in fact 
the products of the human creativity of their authors – and of 
readers’ own imaginings and interpretations.
(Bernaerts et al. 2014, 89)
Angus’s Language and Literary Lineage
Siebert’s Angus is a first-person memoir of a Jack Russell terrier, narrated 
not on his deathbed but out in the woods where he is awaiting death 
after having been attacked by a coyote. He eloquently spins his tale for 
150 pages, while he feels his body and mind disintegrating.  Although in 
pain, he manages to narrate his life story, starting from his puppy months 
and ending in the present of his final hours. Like Kafka’s investigating 
dog, Angus is cut off from his canine community, but he does have an 
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outstanding command of the English language. He knows the English 
names for the constellations in the sky and the British and American typ-
onyms, and he proficiently uses such words and expressions as “atom”, 
“absorbing disquiet”, and “disassemblage” placed in ornate syntax:
And then I went into the unfurnished, the room’s forgotten, quadrants, 
the spaces orphaned by your designs, sniffing out wraiths, absorbing 
disquiet, knowing no hierarchy of air, no best place in the room to be; 
knowing in my bones that nothing is what it appears, that objects, 
too, ache, the way that all atom-arrangements do, for disassemblage.
(Siebert 2000, 51)
He also provides etymological explanations of terrier (of terra, “of the 
earth”) (ibid., 38), and quotes a long passage from a book on the origins 
of his own breed, Jack Russell terrier (ibid., 54–55). His syntax and 
style vary dynamically, with the linguistic register ranging from the so-
phisticated to the cuddly. For instance, perhaps for sentimental reasons, 
he uses pet names for his guardians, Huge-Head and Sweet-Voice. His 
narration is aimed at a human narratee, Sweet-Voice, not at another dog 
as is customary in the classic cases of talking dogs.
Angus is not, hence, a dead dog talking in the literal sense of the 
expression. Rather, he is like a dead man walking – in the idiomatic, 
metaphorical sense of the phrase. A dead man walking is an inmate on 
death row awaiting his execution; he is still alive but certain to be killed 
and therefore seen as already dead. In the sense of inevitable mortality, 
the expression applies to all living persons, who will eventually die and, 
analogously, to all talking dogs, who will become (talking) dead dogs. 
Hence, the awkward or preposterous term preposthumous.8
Besides being between life and death, Angus is also, at least nomi-
nally, another kind of hybrid. He is a Jack Russell. The breed carries 
the name of its 1819 pedigree developer, the Reverend Jack Russell; the 
canine is, thus, the namesake of a long-dead human being (ibid., 54). His 
first name, Angus, points to two directions. First, he can be interpreted 
as being a dog in the anagrammatic disguise of a Latin sheep (agnus), 
or perhaps a strange amalgamation of the two. Second, his guardians 
jokingly dub him an angel (ibid., 75), an intermediary being between 
humans and gods, earth and heaven, and, significantly, between the liv-
ing and the deceased. Christopher Merrill even connects Angus’s angelic 
aspects to the elegiacally mystical spheres of Rainer Maria Rilke:
Angus is a sort of Rilkean angel, wiser than humankind deserves; 
and although he inhabited our “sphere of worry” for only a short 
while, he left behind a profound meditation of last things – a sharp-
toothed message from the edge of the field in which, sooner or later, 
we all find ourselves.
(Merrill 2000, [2])
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Merrill’s reading is permeated with other literary heredity as well:
What if The Death of Ivan Ilyich had been written from a dog’s 
point of view? In Angus, Leo Tolstoy meets Jack London, and the 
result is a contemporary call of the wild, which is by turns heart-
breaking and hilarious.
(Merrill 2000, [2])
If Josef K., in the end of The Trial, dies “like a dog” (Kafka 1999, 229), 
Angus passes away over the course of his narrative, like a man or, more 
particularly, a man of letters.
There is certainly more to the literary pedigree of Siebert’s little novel 
and its protagonist. The third chapter of miniature-sized Angus starts 
with a line reminiscent of the veritable whale of an American novel, 
Moby-Dick: “Angus. They call me Angus” (Siebert 2000, 19). Just as 
Ishmael’s true name and identity remain secrets, so are Angus’s actual 
designation (if there is such a nominal system among dogs) and self un-
disclosed. Both Moby-Dick and Angus are about calling, language’s at-
tempt to name, describe, control, or hide the world and the entities in 
it. He asks himself: “What is Angus? What am I without that two-beat 
tug on my heart?” (Ibid., 52). And then he urges himself, curiously with 
the second-person address: “Go back now, Angus, toward your own 
namelessness, to the time before they arrived […] and brought you here 
[…]” (ibid., 52). Name seems to be of utmost importance for Angus, even 
when the period before it was given to him is being recollected.
The Adamic project of naming the objects of the storyworld is given 
an animal twist in Angus’s first-person narration. He is aware of the 
imposed, arbitrary, and conventional quality of name-giving, even to 
the degree that he chooses to disobey language’s functional power when 
he pleases: “I go by and, when it suits me, come to, Angus” (ibid., 19). 
He was given that name at the age of two months, nine months prior 
to his fatal accident, but that nameless period of his life is by no means 
devoid of language. The name came along with the puppy’s new owner 
couple, “they”, and with it the supposedly submissive position in the 
pack of two humans and a canine.
A first-person autodiegetic narrator, Angus is free to articulate what 
and how he senses, but remains firmly tied to the flexible leash of the 
English language. In the narrative universe of his own making, Angus 
executes his self-imposed right of naming. He does not call his male 
and female guardians by their human names but systematically dubs 
them Huge-Head and Sweet-Voice, respectively (28 and onward). This is 
clearly a marking strategy. The misnaming does not derive from a lack of 
knowledge or understanding because he invariably provides place names 
in their accurate forms: for instance, “a few drinks at the Star Inn, in 
St. Just, the little Cornish village at the far western tip of England where 
we lived last fall and winter before flying home to this side of the earth 
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[…]” (ibid., 29). The difference between the canine and human naming 
seems to relate to emotions, to “puppy love” for his guardians, which is 
articulated with nicknames of endearment, whereas the neutral names 
are given in their standard forms.
Angus’s idiolect features some mild deviations from standard English, 
as if to give an impression of a nonhuman language and, with it, of a 
nonhuman worldview. Karla Armbruster acutely notices Angus’s un-
conventional use of language, including sensory images for fundamental 
memories and the term “tug” for a dog’s name (implying the bond tug-
ging the animal toward the caller) (Armbruster 2013, 28). The tug also 
 functions as a metalinguistic concept for the morphological structure of 
name. Thus, Angus is a “[t]wo- beat tug” (Siebert 2000, 57), and he also 
tears, in true terrier style, a number of other dog names into  syllables (ibid., 
58, 104). There are also other, more striking idiosyncrasies in  Angus’s 
parlance. He seems to treat pronoun and verb forms liberally, but there 
is a cynomorphic logic guiding the infelicities. For Angus, “me” signifies 
dog as a species. Hence, dog in the plural is “me’s” (ibid., 25, 104, 123). 
By extension, “me” sometimes includes Huge-Head and Sweet-Voice, the 
humans he bonds with: “He is here. Is me. I am Angus” (ibid., 57).
On the basis of his whole narration, Angus’s language skills seem 
exceptionally developed. He clearly understands the language spoken 
in the human world around him, as well as reports characters’ speech 
and gives place names accurately. During his first months of existence, 
 however, human speech sounds cartoon-like in his puppy ears: “Blab, 
blab, blab” (ibid., 28, 71, 76). In his retrospective autobiographical 
narrative,  different layers of time and development are simultaneously 
 present and therefore make his linguistic abilities seem oddly asymmetri-
cal or selective. For instance, the last “blab, blab” section (ibid., 76) sur-
faces in the linguistic universe of Sweet-Voice listening to the radio and 
commenting on its science interview, with each of the three voices cor-
rectly reported by Angus – or perhaps not quite. If the “blab, blab” layer 
represents Angus the pup’s limited understanding of human language, 
returning to that scene with an adult dog’s mind does not rescue the 
signification of the spoken utterances. The linguistic reconstruction of 
the incident is therefore a fictional dramatization or re-enactment rather 
than an actual account of what really was said. What Angus crystallizes 
at the end of the scene and chapter, applies to him as well: “So many 
layers and tones it has, your world” (ibid., 77).
The radio interview that Sweet-Voice happens to listen to deals with 
the possibility of building a machine capable of translating barks into 
words.9 When the inventor is about to demonstrate his miraculous appa-
ratus, the broadcast technology fails, leaving the listeners in a quandary 
about what dogs really want: “a deep, warbly, metallic voice sounded: ‘I 
want to…,’ then broke into shards of static” (ibid., 77). This is reminis-
cent of science fiction movies in which translation devices customarily 
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turn alien voices into tinny but comprehensible American English. At the 
beginning of the following three chapters, the dying Angus returns to 
the possibility of a translation machine and the question of dog’s needs 
(ibid., 79, 81, 91) as well as elsewhere in the novel (ibid., 129). The trans-
latability or, more generally, communicability of animal and human sen-
sibilities and minds seems to be a pivotal question in the whole novel.
Interspecies communication or mindreading does not require a ma-
chine or software to function. Angus’s Theory of Mind is of the second 
degree when he momentarily feels that Sweet-Voice knows what he is 
thinking, although “she is too impatient to hunt for the words” to ex-
press it (ibid., 105). Mindreading thus runs both ways. I suggest that this 
two-way traffic in Angus also applies to the realm which is, to continue 
and emulate Angus’s metaphor, the veritable hunting ground or pasture 
of words: literature.
Angus’s lineage is literary. The Reverend Jack Russell, who discovered 
and named the terrier breed in the May of 1819, did not walk empty- 
handed around Magdalen Meadow toward Marston, Oxfordshire. He 
had, according to a lengthy quotation from a dog book, “Horace in 
hand” – and literature of antiquity in his mind, as the similes describing 
the encounter with the Ur-terrier Trump suggest:
[the Reverend Russell] halted, as Acton might have done when he 
caught sight of Diana desporting in her bath; but unlike that ill-fated 
hunter, he never budged from the spot till he had won the prize and 
secured it for his own. She was called Trump, and became the pro-
genitress of that famous race of terriers […].
(Ibid., 54–55)10
As a partly negated allusion to the transformation of Acteon into a stag 
in Ovid’s Metamorphoses, the scene nevertheless describes the encoun-
ter in terms of hunting. Acteon, the hunter, became prey; Russell, the 
nonchalant stroller, became a hunter who caught a canid alive. Not sur-
prisingly, Angus’s guardians feel a need to purchase books about Jack 
Russells “in order to learn how best to handle the likes of [that] storied 
breed” (ibid., 46). Those terriers are both multilayered and consist of 
many narratives, as the breed’s premodifier suggests.
Angus’s metaphoric language, too, bears traces of Jack Russells’ liter-
ary lineage. Referring to dogs’ sensibilities, Angus states: “Every day is 
an open book of devotion to a me” (ibid., 92). In the novel’s epilogue, the 
book metaphor is picked up by the writer of Cabin Journal in connection 
with the atomic “matter of existence”: “It’s something like words before 
they’re set down on a page. It’s the blankness of the page, inspiration 
without expression, pure urge […]” (ibid., 172).
As a whole, Angus shows that fiction itself is a translation machine 
of sorts. It is capable of conveying meanings across species or at least 
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of giving an illusion of such an ability. As in actual translation, some 
nuances are lost in the process and some meanings even become unintel-
ligible. What is always conveyed is, however, the effort itself, complete 
with the semantic and cognitive friction, hiatuses, and overall static in-
volved in the very phenomenon of translation. It should be remembered, 
however, that language is just “one among many different mediated rela-
tionships with reality that structure life, both human and nonhuman, at 
all levels” (Calarco 2014, 621). For Angus, there is no radical difference 
between verbal and body language: pause for effect equals paws for ef-
fect, so to speak.
A hybrid of human and nonhuman spheres of communication and 
knowledge, Angus is an outlandish creature. He is domesticated but 
wildly unfamiliar, easily recognizable but utterly strange. The same can 
be said of Angus the novel, and the effects that its narration brings about.
the Strange and Familiar World of Human Animals
Angus’s superb command of the English language, complete with its 
Latinate lexical stratum and other foreign words, and his astonishing 
knowledge of physics make him a curious canine. However, his well- 
educated human-like understanding of the world around him is not quite 
 systematic, which allows for the emergence of some typical fable motifs 
and stock features, such as defamiliarization or estrangement. In  Angus, 
encounters with technology particularly tend to trigger instances of 
 making the familiar strange via a dog’s eyes and mind.
Angus gives the following account of Huge-Head’s and Sweet-Voice’s 
mysterious activities:
each of them working in their own rooms, sitting upright, motion-
less, only their hands clacking in front of lit glass boxes where rows 
of tiny black birds keep alighting and flying off and then settling 
back down again.
(Siebert 2000, 53)
This tinkering obviously refers to writing on laptops. Nevertheless, the 
estranged or defamiliarized depiction of writerly activity is in itself a 
peculiar mixture of different realms of knowledge. Angus does not fully 
describe the scene in natural or animal terms, but conceives of it as (hu-
man) “work” done with non-natural tools (“glass boxes”). The letters 
on the screen, however, are apprehended as an extended avian metaphor. 
Angus’s dog-minded view of the human world around him is not simply 
reducible to systematic defamiliarization. The inconsistencies or slips in 
the system of understanding his surroundings could justifiably be read as 
lapses in the representation of an animal mind. I would rather interpret 
the cognitive infidelities as poetic decisions. Angus acts like a creative 
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writer, first setting a realistic frame of reference and then transposing the 
familiar scenario to a metaphoric sphere.
Another extended description of the incomprehensible takes place in a 
building, “in a section of town I think they call Soho”:
First, a glass door opened from the street, letting us into what seemed 
a very nice room as rooms go, but my masters seemed to know right 
off that it wasn’t ours. This room gave away to a tiny one, not much 
bigger than a feed trough, the door to which slid open and closed by 
itself, and the whole of which – I know I didn’t dream this – moved.
(Siebert 2000, 94)
This elevator ride is a nicely executed defamiliarization of an everyday ur-
ban activity as understood from a puppy’s viewpoint. However, the frame 
of reference changes radically when the ride is over, and when Angus and 
his “masters” or guardians start walking down the corridor of their floor, 
navigating toward their new apartment. Angus produces the following 
simile as they are proceeding: “It was like we were peeling away the lay-
ers of the wild onions I used to dig up around Pollard’s Combe, trying 
to get, at last, to the juicy core” (ibid., 94). This is a curious turn from 
the customarily canine to the popularly literary. Dogs, Jack Russell terri-
ers included, are not usually known to have a craving for onions, which 
are in fact lethal for canids, even in small amounts. Here, Angus (or, 
rather, the author Siebert ventriloquizing him) is mapping the literary and 
canid domains a bit too forcedly, perhaps producing an unintentionally 
bland blend. In the human context, the metaphor of peeling an onion, 
which derives from antiquity but is probably best known from Ibsen’s 
Peer Gynt, commonly refers to the layers of mind, personality, memory, 
truth, or such, with the core being the ultimate goal to be discovered after 
shedding the surrounding strata. Finding the right room after discarding 
false options may fit in this constellation, albeit not without some stylis-
tic uneasiness, not to mention the unlikely idea of a dog participating in 
peeling tightly structured vegetables. This case of defamiliarization thus 
tends, not as much toward a maverick mongrel of styles, as toward bad 
human writing.
Other objects of built environment – such as cars, rooms, farms, dog 
crates, and airplanes – are also delivered in the form of more or less 
canid-human hybrid expressions. This utterance manages to both defa-
miliarize and refamiliarize footwear within the course of one sentence: 
“I learned to chew to pieces those thick, stinky shadows of traitorous 
human feet known as shoes” (ibid., 73). The airplane cargo hold is 
dubbed “the belly of the metal bird” (ibid., 95), and the airplane “the 
metal bird” (ibid., 53, 118, 119), reminiscent perhaps of the tribal nam-
ing of Western aircraft or, more specifically, of the so-called cargo cults. 
Linguistically, the underdog or pidginized position is shared by canids 
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and natives alike in the portrayal of unfamiliar, human-made artifacts. 
Both could be interpreted as being seen from a subaltern viewpoint, yet 
rendered from a condescending position, which makes the lack of under-
standing of the real state of affairs cute and charming, as if mimicking 
the perspective of a human toddler.
Sniffing Backward and Sideways: Reversed and 
Counterfactual Narration
Dog’s short-term memory span is notoriously brief, ranging from around 
thirty seconds to a few minutes. The long-term or associative memory of 
dogs can last for years, even for life. Instead of images and memories per 
se, dogs have imprints of occurrences, positive or negative associations 
attached to happenings of the past (Horowitz 2010, 223–228). A dog’s 
sense of smell is, by contrast, famously accurate, and the canine mainly 
relies on it when interpreting the surrounding world (Horowitz 2010, 
67–85). Angus’s narration goes back and forth in his eleven-month life. 
The narrative structure and logic of the novel is at least partly  motivated 
by the dog’s limited capacity to remember and its well-developed 
 olfactory ability.
In the novel’s second chapter, Angus is laying in the woods after the 
deadly coyote attack and, although he has “never been one to look back” 
(Siebert 2000, 15), now reports:
I’m beginning to see everything now, but backward, in recollection, 
as though my last flash forwards into this forest is illuminating a 
final flashback: the things that I wasn’t thinking when I charged out 
tonight; the steady train of events, from my life’s very beginning, 
that lead, inevitably, here, to these dark woods […].
(Ibid., 17)
At the near end of his existence, Angus perceives his life-story in a 
reversed order. Although the retention of “the steady train of events” 
resembles more human than canine both in its depiction of mind’s 
working and its use of a transportation metaphor, the logic of returning 
to the past backward is believably dog-like. Contrary to dog’s dominant 
sense of smell, the passage is permeated with visual perception (see, 
illuminating, dark), metaphoric or literal. I interpret the human traits 
of memory and perception in this and many other passages of Angus 
as products of dog/human translation. What is lost in translation is the 
surface layer of expression, the idiomatic articulation of discourse, and 
what remains stable is the basic structure of narrative.
Angus’s going back in story time (and place) in a reversed order does 
not follow the train but the trail of events, starting from the most recent 
one, and he surveys the track with his nose down, sniffing. What is an 
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unusual or unnatural form of human discourse (Richardson 2002, 49), 
could be imagined to be the most natural one in canine narration. Nar-
rating backward follows the principle of tracking the chronology of odor 
traces. Angus does not engage in sustained backward narration, which 
entails consistent reversal of each event, but in the episodic variant in 
which the episodes follow in a reverse order but the “events of each 
episode move forward” as in simple flashbacks (Chatman 2009, 33). 
 Episodic flashback narration is not systematic in Angus, but telling tends 
to oscillate between the past events and the present time of the dying 
narrator. Nevertheless, the trail of odor traces forms the narrative line 
along which Angus, in his mind, moves to and fro.
Angus’s oscillating movement also connects separate and even extreme 
events along the narrative line or trail. There is an olfactory bloodline 
between birth and death, Angus notices, when recalling the perinatal 
and the near-death moment of his life:
Do you recall, did you ever really know it, the full, drowning scent, 
like wet, rusted iron, of your own birth’s blood?
(Siebert 2000, 21)
the trail of my own leaking blood, escaping life now on the very 
same rusty scent that I followed into it.
(Ibid., 22)
The collection of scents in Angus’s memory forms a veritable potpourri 
or rather a historical fragrance, which he describes with the eloquence 
of a perfumer:
My life was an ever-shifting sea of scents […]. There were endless 
air-etched rivulets of scent to travel down: earthworm-moist and 
butterfly-dust; hoof-hollow, paw-pads, and seagull swill; and all of 
these trails subsumed in the end by that wider, base-note scent of 
my life at the Combe: teat, tummy, and straw, lightly baked by a 
day-long, drowsy sun.
(Ibid., 38–39)
Angus’s canine narration is not limited to past events. The trail of scents 
also leads, in his snout, to future, possible, and nonexistent spheres. 
The vicinity of death prompts counterfactual storylines in Angus: “a 
possible future that doesn’t at all resemble any one day […] – hope, in 
other words […]” (ibid., 15–16). The novel’s first words are conditionally 
counterfactual: “If I could lift myself and run again” (ibid., 11). In ad-
dition, there is the predictable speculation on the trail not taken, of not 
going after the coyotes (ibid., 26). The smell of death also forms a “trail 
of scent that leads nowhere” (ibid., 41); it is a “scent both primordial and 
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new” (ibid., 42). Death opens up a posthumous scenario as well. Angus, 
on the verge of drawing his last breath, prophesizes how his guardians 
will recall a recent moment of happiness:
Later, when I’m back among them, they’ll remember how I went up 
to her earlier this afternoon here in the north field, how she had to 
pull me away from her. […] I hopped up onto her lap, knocked off 
her book, went right into those needy hands, and then farther and 
on. I put my head on her shoulder.
(Siebert 2000, 155)
The Epilogue can be interpreted as continuing the sniffing strategy 
of Angus’s narration, although the concluding chapter of the book 
 dramatically opens with the statement “Angus is dead” (ibid., 157). The 
narrator of the Epilogue, the dead dog’s guardian who turns out to be 
very much like Charles Siebert himself, speculates with his wife about 
what happened to Angus, as if tracking the trail of his fatal incidents, 
suggesting a fox, bear, and bobcat as the attacker (ibid., 168).
Dog Gone: the Passing of a Nonhuman Animal
The canine narration of Angus is posthumous, preposthumous, and even 
preposterous. Once the dog is dead and passed to discursive silence at 
the end of the book, what is left of the tale thus voiced? Alice A. Kuzniar 
sums up her appreciation of the novel:
Siebert does not so much anthropomorphize [Angus], imputing ca-
nine similarity with the human mind, as he probes the gaps between 
the two that lie at the foundation of the profoundly melancholic 
desire of one species for another. In so doing, he does not have the 
dog serve merely as the blithe narrator of external events but tries to 
imagine or track the dog’s own form of consciousness.
(Kuzniar 2006, 61)
In Karla Armbruster’s reception,
the novel conveys a sense of a posthuman world, in which voices 
come from all sorts of beings (including not just dogs but atoms) 
[and] the human voice is demoted from its conventional position of 
authority and control to one among many.
(Armbruster 2013, 31)
These qualities of Angus offer “the readers an opportunity to radically 
re-envision their relationship with other animals (and indeed, with the 
entire nonhuman world and material reality in general)” (Armbruster 
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2013, 31). I would like to emphasize some more specific and even prob-
lematic narrational points to counterbalance these rather generalizing 
interpretations.
Performatively, the posthumous canine narration of Angus drama-
tizes the vacillating boundaries between the human and the nonhuman 
(dead or alive), and how they can be figured in narrative. The oscillation 
of Angus and his guardians’ capabilities, cognition, and experientiality 
generate curious effects. Angus is a very human nonhuman animal, and 
his guardians verge on being nonhuman human animals. Especially the 
counterfactual and backward narration by both Angus and his guard-
ians points to the dogness of humans, not only to the humanness of 
canids. Instead of multiple voices, I would call this intertwinement of 
characteristics and porousness of articulations and capabilities with the 
term “noise”, with or without the attribute “cultural”. That noise can 
awaken the reader, who might be comfortably accustomed to the meta-
physical notion of discrete species and their separate minds, from her 
dogmatic – or should I say dog-matic? – slumber. As David Herman 
states, “fiction provides a domain for staging the dissolution and re-
construction of self-narratives, and for exploring the ontologies in the 
context of which selves are recognized as such” (Herman 2014, 141).11 
The transspecies relationships imagined and performed in Angus are as 
ambiguous and problematic as in “real life” – but with a literary twist, 
further complicating the ecology of agents.
Purely formally, there seems to be two ways of interpreting Angus’s 
eloquent monologue or soliloquy. Either it uncynically tends toward sen-
timentality or, in a more dog-like vein, duplicitously parodies extended 
death scenes in sentimental narratives (cf. Stewart 1984). In the posthu-
man context, neither alternative is accurate. Angus reads, not quite an 
allegorical or a fable-like figure, but more like a quasi-human character, 
and the styles and reference points of Angus and Siebert merge to a 
degree of undifferentiability. This hybrid produces, depending on the 
reader’s point of emphasis, either uncontrolled and uneven writing or a 
serious attempt to account for the reconfiguring of the nonhuman.
In memoriam Foxwarren Sally (1993–2002)
Notes
 1 The Art of Racing in the Dark (2008) by Garth Stein is also narrated by a 
dying dog capable of speaking (albeit in a manner poorly understood by hu-
mans). Mikhail Bulgakov’s novella A Dog’s Heart (1925) is a more remotely 
analogous case. The body of Bulgakov’s mongrel, Sharik, hosts implanted 
glands from a dead criminal, and the dog himself virtually dies during the 
operation. What all this seems to point to is that Bulgakov’s dog unequiv-
ocally speaks posthumously only. When he is alive in the beginning of the 
novella, his speech may be merely metaphorical. When he virtually dies 
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during the operation, he is blessed with the ability to talk. Sharik’s voice 
emits from a hybrid which, in effect, is constituted of two dead bodies, the 
dog’s and the criminal’s (for the dog ceases to exist as a dog, when its vital 
organs are replaced).
 2 By Sophie Collins; Roger Abrantes, Alice Rasmussen & Sarah Whitehead; 
Vilmos Csanyi & Richard E. Quandt; Cheryl S. Smith; and Jan Fennell & 
Monty Roberts respectively.
 3 “Was ist also Wahrheit? Ein bewegliches Heer von Metaphern, Metonymien, 
Anthropomorphismen […]” (Nietzsche 2009).
 4 Unlike the boldly speculating philosopher of the insect world, Nagel chose 
“bats instead of wasps or flounders because if one travels too far down the 
phylogenetic tree, people gradually shed their faith that there is experience 
there at all” (Nagel 1974, 438).
 5 “Könnten wir uns aber mit der Mücke verständigen, so würden wir verneh-
men, dass auch sie mit diesem Pathos durch die Luft schwimmt und in sich das 
fliegende Centrum dieser Welt fühlt. Es ist nichts so verwerflich und gering in 
der Natur, was nicht durch einen kleinen Anhauch jener Kraft des Erkennens 
sofort wie ein Schlauch aufgeschwellt würde […]” (Nietzsche 2009).
 6 Alice A. Kuzniar provides a brief reading of Angus in her Melancholia’s 
Dog: Reflections on Our Animal Kinship (2006, 57–61).
 7 I will not go into the literary history of talking canines in detail here. For 
those interested in this tradition, I recommend Theodore Ziolkowski’s stan-
dard work on the subject, “Talking Dogs: The Caninization of Literature”, 
in his Varieties of Literary Thematics (1983). It is unfortunate that the 
articles on talking dogs in Speaking for Animals (2013) do not recognize 
Ziolkowski’s seminal study. See also the two lengthy chapters on talking 
dogs in Ross Chambers’s Loiterature (1999, 157–211).
 8 Or should I say antemortem? Perimortem? My point is that this state pre-
cedes the condition that comes after the moment of death. On the other 
hand, Angus’s tale is told after his death, ventriloquized by his guardian, as 
is apparent on the basis on the Epilogue (see also Armbruster 2013, 28).
 9 Perhaps not surprisingly, there actually exists software capable of classifying 
dog barks and the emotions related to them (see Molnár et al. 2008).
 10 This unattributed quotation derives from A Memoir of the Rev. John Russell 
and His Out-Of-Door Life by E. W. Davies (1878); (see Davies 1902, 52).
 11 In Caracciolo’s wording, the
confrontation with animal consciousness [is] constrained by the bound-
aries of the human imagination and that in literary texts such boundaries 
are renegotiated according to a cultural logic that is inherently and irre-
ducibly anthropocentric. What fiction can do is to call attention to these 
limitations and stage the impossibility of transcending them in ways that 
are highly productive for literary interpretation and may sensitize readers 
to the puzzles of consciousness (both human and animal).
(Caracciolo 2014, 488)
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The pig, we are told, has skin very similar to a human’s. It is a der-
mal affinity attested to by regimes of experimentation in biomedicine 
as well as the work of contemporary artists: Miru Kim, for instance, 
juxtaposes these animal bodies in “The Pig That Therefore I Am”, lying 
down amid the dirt and rough tumble of industrial hog farms, covering 
herself in mud.
In this chapter, I investigate the construction of similar skins, a  process 
that occurs not only within anatomical and physiological  reference 
works but also in a much longer genealogy, connecting early efforts to 
understand humans through analogy to pigs with literary,  philosophical, 
and artistic work that probes the limits of such similarity. To do so, it is 
necessary to draw upon an eclectic body of sources, since similarity is 
produced as much in particular histories of science as it is, and was, in 
intermingled cultures.
I take inspiration from recent work on the global transfer of materi-
als and skills across time, looking at how “artisanal” knowledge moves 
among a diversity of institutions, groups, and places. For instance, fol-
lowing mercury and sulfur as they trade and train hands across Eurasia, 
Pamela H. Smith highlights “the reciprocal processes by which matter 
gives rise to practices and objects, which themselves produce systems of 
belief that in their turn inform specific ideas about materials and prac-
tices” (Smith 2014, 132). Smith argues that focusing on the production 
and dissemination of particular things (in her case, “red” vermilion) 
pushes traditional historical approaches beyond textual interpretation 
to the transfer of material and technique.
Here, I would like to follow Smith’s footsteps to the tracks left behind 
by pigs, specifically Italian pigs who made themselves present as far away 
as the Abbasid Caliphate before returning to jumpstart scientific anatomy 
in Italy. Examining the pigs and their carvers – at times their butchers, 
but certainly not always – allows us to understand not only the very spe-
cific emergence of human anatomy from the bodies of Salernitan hogs, 
but also to trace the construction of ‘similarity’ between human  and 
8 Carnivorous Anatomies
Art and Being Beasts
Brad Bolman1
164 Brad Bolman
nonhuman animals along with the critical role played by carnivorousness 
(Bolman 2015, 2018).
I begin at the founding of the body of knowledge we today call “anat-
omy”, focusing on the work of the Roman anatomist Galen, who de-
serves credit, among a great many other things, for having built his 
science from the flesh of hogs. Here, pigs first entered the spotlight of 
similarity construction. Rather than merely weaving a series of frag-
ments into a conventional origin story, I track the transmission of ana-
tomical knowledge and technique through animals beyond the borders 
of Europe and back again. Employing insights from animal studies the-
orists like Donna Haraway and Charles Foster as well as a speculative 
historical approach that builds narrative out of incomplete sources, 
I seek to draw the attention of scholars of art, literature, philosophy, 
and history to the way knowledge can be stored inside living things, 
such as pigs, just as much as inanimate ones, such as books. I then 
connect this wayward transmission of knowledge about similarity to 
contemporary literary and artistic practices that employ and represent 
hogs in order to demonstrate how unstable the territory of transspecies 
similarity  remains, even today. Throughout, we seek an answer to a 
deceptively simple question: How similar is our skin?
Once More to the Anatomia Porci
One of the more commented-upon mysteries of Medieval medicine is 
the short, orphan text known as the Anatomia porci, attributed often 
to Copho, a Salernitan physician, and so (perhaps mistakenly) called 
also the Anatomia Cophonis, though its true author remains unclear. 
The Anatomia sits, as Ynez Violé O’Neill noted forty years ago, in a 
paradoxical position: “[T]ermed the earliest Western work on anatomy 
in one history of Medieval science, [it] is not mentioned at all in perhaps 
the most widely read history of pre-Harveian anatomy and physiology”, 
Charles Singer’s A Short History of Anatomy and Physiology from the 
Greeks to Harvey (1957) (O’Neill 1971, 115).
The Anatomia consists of a series of dissection directives. It is an 
ur- textbook of anatomy and an original example of didactic medical ped-
agogy. In the text, pig dissection is used to explain the elements of human 
anatomy. Yet this tract is an amalgam of influences, a  perplexing rid-
dle for those seeking to trace the movement of textual knowledge from 
Greece to Rome, from the Arabicate world back to Europe. On the one 
hand, the Anatomia porci incorporates words and phrases that appear 
to come from translations, new at the time, produced by Constantine 
the African, a physician and prolific translator of Arabic texts, which 
suggests that the Anatomia’s creation occurred around the time of his 
death at Monte Cassino (one of few relative certainties concerning Con-
stantine’s life) in 1087 (O’Neill 1971, 116).
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On the other hand, the Anatomia’s first instructions suggest con-
nections to a much older intellectual lineage, particularly the works of 
 Galen (129–c. 200 CE):
Because the entire composition of the interior members of the human 
body was unknown, it pleased the ancients, and especially Galen, to 
make manifest the positions of the interior organs of brute animals by 
means of anatomy. And because among brute animals certain ones, like 
the monkey, are similar to us in their external structures, while others, 
such as the pig, are similar in their internal structures, in regard to the 
position of the internal organs none were found so similar as pigs. And 
so we have determined that dissection will be made upon them.
(Jansen, Drell, and Andrews 2011, 321; emphasis mine)
The distinction between internal and external similarity drawn in rela-
tion to primates and pigs could have been lifted directly from On An-
atomical Procedures, where Galen notes that, for an anatomy of the 
larynx, “It is best if you do this on the body of a pig” (Galen 1962, 85), 
or again, “Leave the apes alone, and turn to these animals [i.e. a pig or a 
goat]” (Galen 1962, 87). That Book XI of Galen’s On Anatomical Pro-
cedures begins, just as the Anatomia does, with an incision into the neck 
suggests some awareness of Galen’s work and, in particular, awareness 
of his work with pigs. O’Neill argues that the order of presentation of 
porcine anatomy also mirrors Celsus’s De medicina (c. Second Century 
CE), an encyclopedia of Greek medical knowledge produced in Rome, 
despite agreement among twentieth-century historians that this text had 
little influence on ninth- and tenth-century medicine in Europe.
O’Neill – echoing the editors of Cambridge’s edition of On Anatom-
ical Procedures – argues that despite Salernitan awareness of Galenic 
teachings, few extant copies of On Anatomical Procedures would have 
been available in Europe – only the first half seemed to exist at all in 
Greek or Latin until late in the twentieth century – and thus, she sug-
gests, these later sections, including the description of pig dissection, 
could not have influenced the physicians of Salerno. So, she concludes, 
“the question [of] how the Galenic concepts found their way into that 
work must for the present remain an open one” (O’Neill 1971, 122).
Historian Roger French resolved the dilemma by suggesting that it 
is not one: Galen’s demonstrations – his famous “proof” of the con-
nection between larynx and voice produced by publicly incising the 
throat of a wailing pig and “muting” it – were in the air waiting to be 
recovered by an eager, loosely organized school of theoretical physi-
cians (French 1999, 15). French argues that the mixture of Arabic and 
Latinate terminologies is evidence of a continuous updating of older 
forms of vernacular knowledge. But he offers little explanation of how 
this process persisted.
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the Persistence of Pigs
There is, nevertheless, something puzzling in the presence of Galen’s 
framework and argumentation without the direct presence of his texts. 
An appropriate answer seems to reside somewhere between O’Neill’s 
open “question” and French’s unreflexive acceptance. Perhaps the puzzle 
only exists insofar as we imagine the movement of knowledge strictly 
through the prism of its textual manifestations, as if knowledge only 
ever traveled via the exchange of books across lands between learned 
men; a powerful medium, clearly, but hardly exhaustive of the transfer 
and translation of knowledge across Italy, Greece, Spain, North Africa, 
and the Middle East.
Applying Smith’s alternative historiographical approach to the problem 
of Galen’s missing texts and the Anatomia porci provides an obvious yet 
under-considered possibility. We could comprehend the Anatomia porci 
by focusing less on the comparison of texts and more on the  transmission 
of two kinds of extra-textual knowledge. First, a cultural- culinary 
knowledge of pigs (a variant of Smith’s “artisanal”  knowledge) emerged 
from the peculiar place of the pig in the culture and diet of both Greeks 
and Romans (and later Medieval Italians), a knowledge stored to some 
degree inside the pig, which offers an initial answer to one  question that 
few commentators have seriously asked of the Anatomia: Why pigs? Sec-
ond, Arabic translators and Salernitan physicians exchanged  information 
without the clear mediation of the written page; in other words, that we 
should not be afraid to speculate, within limits, on the unwritten move-
ment of medicinal thought as well as to grant a more  significant role to 
Islamicate physicians in the development of “European” dissection and 
anatomy. Thus, much of the “paradox” surrounding Galen’s (and Arabic 
physicians’) presence in the Anatomia is the fact that Galen’s text fails 
to surface in Europe until Oxford’s Bodleian Library purchased a copy 
in 1714. But this seems more unfortunate than proof of a lack of Galen’s 
influence on Arabic translators and Salerno. If we wanted to trace the 
movement of unwritten knowledge from Galen to Salerno, we ought to 
start with Galen himself.
Mutable Mobiles
As Charles Gross explains, Galen “conducted extensive experiments on 
the nerves that control breathing”, and as the story goes, during the course 
of one such effort, “accidentally cut the recurrent laryngeal nerves that 
innervate the larynx” (Gross 1998, 218). The pig continued to move, but 
its voice ceased entirely. Boethus, Galen’s patron, offered his famous phy-
sician the opportunity to display this finding publicly. Pigs were acquired, 
the event was publicized, many important political and philosophical 
 figures arrived, and Galen muted his test subjects. Some were impressed, 
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but others remained skeptical. Galen’s retort, as sources carry it, was bit-
ing: “I was mistaken in not realizing that I was coming to meet boorish 
skeptics; otherwise I should not have come” (Gross 1998, 219).
From this demonstration and from others that followed, Galen pro-
duced a since-lost treatise, On the Voice. He would write about and 
use pigs, repeatedly, from his text On the Usefulness of the Parts of the 
Body to On Anatomical Demonstrations. Galen’s “mute pig” demon-
stration remained famous for centuries, supposedly inspiring da Vinci 
to produce a drawing of the laryngeal nerves and Vesalius to experiment 
with hogs in a significant section of De fabrica. Renaissance editions of 
Galen’s work even featured an engraving of the famous “Squealing pig” 
demonstration (Gross 1998, 220).
How, exactly, did news of Galen’s demonstrations echo across the cen-
turies separating their concrete instantiations from reappearances in the 
texts of Vesalius and their symbolic reemergence in work at the school of 
Salerno? The conventional accounts suggest that after a durée of relative 
obscurity, Renaissance humanists rediscovered the first half of Galen’s 
On Anatomical Procedures. Then Vesalius, the “founder” of modern 
anatomy, took a particular interest in reviving his demonstrative peda-
gogical methods. This partly resolves our dilemma, since the surviving 
first half of Galen’s book claims, at numerous points, that dissecting a 
pig is ideal for the purpose of demonstrating the anatomy and operation 
of the voice. But we are left in the dark about the extent to which Galen’s 
demonstrations were reprised in the millennia gap between his work and 
his Renaissance “rediscovery”. What if one crucial medium of transmis-
sion was not his texts, but the pigs themselves?
After all, that Galen himself would choose a pig for this dissection was 
never strictly necessary. His justifications for selecting a pig rather than 
the usual subjects of dissection – macaques2 – centered on the loudness 
of the pig’s voice and the “unpleasing expression” or “hideous” spectacle 
of macaques during vivisection (Galen 1962, 15). These monkeys, noted 
Galen, are indeed more similar to humans than pigs or other creatures, 
but lack some of the performative luster offered by louder and more 
violent hogs.
One unspoken reason, however, that he might have preferred pigs to 
other potentially “similar” animal specimens is that pigs, unlike ma-
caques, were in no short supply in the Roman Empire. It is common 
to cite the variety of Latin words for pig – porcus, aper, sus – as one of 
many indications that pork played a central role in Roman culture and 
diet (MacKinnon 2001, 649). Michael MacKinnon has shown through 
zooarchaeological data and texts from the period that at least two 
 varieties of hog were critical to Roman diets throughout the Empire’s 
 duration. Though Spain and Gaul were principle locations for farming 
hogs, segments of Italy were heavily taxed for pigs and pork, including 
Lucania, in Southern Italy, close to Salerno.
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Beyond a clear culinary role, pigs frequently appeared in Roman 
 sacrificial rituals. The “Suovetaurilia”, an agricultural rite that aimed 
to ward of bad fortune, involved sacrificing a pig, sheep, and bull. The 
sacrifice of pigs, sometimes consumed after rites were finished, would 
have been relatively commonplace for Roman citizens, and it requires 
little historical-artistic license to perceive continuity between the pig as 
a religious sacrifice and pig as a medical “sacrifice”, to retroject  today’s 
scientific parlance. Galen’s pig demonstration indeed mirrors very closely 
the slicing-open of hogs by soothsayers to divine omens from the Gods.
The widespread availability of pigs in the Roman Empire suggests 
there was an economic justification for Galen’s decisions to utilize pigs: 
acquiring multiple for a public demonstration would have been dramat-
ically easier and cheaper than acquiring Barbary macaques. Considering 
the widespread nature of Galen’s interests – everything from eating to 
the voice – there is little reason to separate his religious, culinary, and 
anatomical expertise into separate spheres. For Galen, diet was central 
to living well, and thus connected to anatomy. He was well aware of 
Roman pork production along with transformations in its methods, 
 referring to the era when “acorns were formerly forage for pigs” and the 
contemporary situation when pigs are “slaughtered […] at the beginning 
of winter and used […] for food” (Galen 2000, 136). Pork, he notes later 
in the same text, “is the most nutritious” of all foods (Galen 2000, 154). 
Thus, while dissection was a distinct act from butchering a pig for con-
sumption, we might see them as cross-pollinating bases of knowledge.
Yet that he ate pigs is not in itself proof of anything – few Roman chefs 
stand out as scions of anatomical study. But if we remain within the 
realm of Galen’s culinary expertise, we notice something intriguing: he 
seemed to know very little about the taste or quality of animals such as 
the dog. And of the rabbit, that “little animal in Spain [that] looks like a 
hare”, he knew even less (Galen 2000, 156). However, when he discusses 
the pig, he moves part-by-part, differentiating between the taste and tex-
ture of the trotters, the noses and ears. Thus, of the animals that  today 
we might consider ideal for medical dissection or experimentation – 
dogs, rabbits, rats – Galen had given comparatively scant consideration. 
Though it is probable that he did, indeed, dissect cats, dogs, and a selec-
tion of other animals (Mattern 2013, 151), pigs were perhaps the most 
familiar subjects – for dinner as much as for experiment.
Here science and culinary knowledge combined, influencing the con-
duct of experiment on nonhuman animals and, perhaps to a significant 
extent, what kinds of animals Galen had access to and in what numbers. 
There was a kind of feedback loop, in other words, where the culinary 
culture that produced large-scale breeding programs for pigs had also 
contributed to the development of some of Rome’s most famous ana-
tomical demonstrations. When hogs outlasted the Roman Empire, they 
helped to transmit Galen’s experiments to Salerno across darker ages and 
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conquests. Although such a claim might give pigs too much credit for 
a preserving action they could not possibly have intended, it is import-
ant to keep in mind how pigs have functioned across times and places 
as walking storage “banks” of knowledge and credit (Scott and Zeuske 
2002). Pigs were ambulatory bodies of knowledge, and in their relation-
ships with the humans that tended and hunted them, they kept alive 
anatomical- culinary knowledge.
Back to Salerno
As MacKinnon argues, a relatively intensive hog-breeding program took 
place in Southern Italy during Galen’s day, with large numbers near to 
where the Salerno physicians would later practice. And, far from collaps-
ing as the Roman Empire dissolved, pig breeding appeared remarkably 
consistent throughout the Medieval period when pork remained “one of 
the most important sources of meat and fat” throughout Europe (Ad-
amson 2004, 30; Vanpoucke et al. 2007). A wealth of preserved recipes 
from Medieval Europe – “Stuffed Suckling Pig”, for one – suggests that 
while pigs were not quotidian fodder, they were common enough in the 
diets of Medieval Salernitans (Redon, Sabban, and Serventi 1998, 104). 
There are even similarities between the style of preparing a suckling pig 
by incising its throat and allowing it to bleed before working through 
the internal organs and the instructions offered in the Anatomia porci. 
Thus, even if they had read none of Galen’s texts, these practices and 
rituals of consumption could have bled into more “scientific” pursuits.
Therefore, when the Salernitans claimed that the pig should be dis-
sected because Galen had done so before and because the pig, unlike 
the monkey, is the animal most similar to man, one senses culinary fa-
miliarity and ecological proximity playing a more significant role in the 
selection of the dissected animal than the authors care to admit. After 
all, as contemporary accounts of the selection of various kinds of model 
organisms have shown, choices for a given scientific question are not 
always as free from external pressures as practitioners imagine (Kohler 
1994; Rader 2004). The difficulty of acquiring Barbary macaques for 
dissection during the twelfth century, when the Principality of Salerno 
was fraught by wars of succession and invasions from abroad, along with 
all that came from living inside a heavily fragmented Italian  Peninsula, 
cannot be overstated. While trading networks existed, the Salernitan 
physicians would have had to work with what was available. That, it 
seems, was very likely pigs.
Correct Cutting, Subjects of Pigs
If we have seen how the economic availability of and culinary exper-
tise concerning hogs were essential in enabling their use within scientific 
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practice, particularly the earliest forms of anatomical investigation, we 
have done little to explore the significance of the Salernitan anatomies 
for the researchers themselves. If, as I have argued, the Anatomia porci 
included a critical subdivision of transspecies similarity, whereby there 
were external likenesses and internal similarities, it also established 
within the foundations of Eurasian science that cutting apart pigs was a 
proper way to understand the human. This would have a critical impact 
for the centuries to come.
Greek and Roman philosophers had long imagined themselves, to vary-
ing degrees, as transcendent apes – but to explicitly bring the human in 
line with the pig, to suggest that cutting into one offered  radical insights 
into the other, was a relatively novel idea. Even today, efforts to draw hu-
mans and pigs together face resistance: in 2013, a self- proclaimed “ex-
pert on animal hybridization”, Eugene McCarthy,  suggested that  human 
beings might be the offspring of primates and pigs (Gayle 2013). The 
theory, he noted, explains our hairless skin and the ease with which pig 
valves can be implanted in human bodies.  Reprisals against  McCarthy’s 
theory were swift and dismissive, but shares, likes, and the ensuing 
 controversy suggest that many are not altogether  comfortable with the 
similarity of pigs and men even now.
Thus, the kind of anatomy popularized at Salerno, expanded upon 
later by Vesalius, and centralized in modern classroom dissection ped-
agogy, was also a process of self-discovery interlinked with  underlying 
conceptual distinctions between what was human and nonhuman. 
Only humans that could engage in the proper “ana-tomia”, the proper 
cutting up of the natural world. Only humans stood apart enough to 
recognize the necessity of this cutting, and, equally significantly, the 
“human” emerged from the cutting up of the nonhuman. This ana- 
tomia was a kind of ontological investigation, an effort to understand 
and teach what we are and what the other “brute beasts” are as well.
This perspective, one that recognizes the violence inherent in the 
 anatomical enterprise while also acknowledging its formative and 
 generative effects, is key, particularly due to a tendency in animal studies 
to perceive Western scientific rationality as a violent monolith of unthink-
ing anthropocentrism. In contrast, it is valuable to recognize the genuine 
curiosity and ethical complexity at play in animal experimentation of 
all varieties. What, after all, do scientists do when they experiment on 
pigs, when they ask after similarity? Georges Canguilhem offers an el-
oquent answer when, reflecting on Jean Giraudoux’s Elektra, he notes 
“the beggar” character “who stumbles across squashed hedgehogs on the 
road, meditat[ing] on the hedgehog’s original sin that drives him to cross 
roads”. For Canguilhem, the beggar’s reflection is absurd. He writes:
Hedgehogs as such do not cross roads: they explore, in their own 
way, their own hedgehog milieu, on the basis of their alimentary 
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and sexual impulses. On the contrary, it is man-made roads that 
cross the hedgehog’s milieu, his hunting ground and the theater of 
his loves, just as they cross the milieus of the rabbit, the lion, or 
the dragonfly. Now, experimental method […] is also a sort of 
road that the human biologist traces through the world of the 
hedgehog, the frog, the fruit fly, the paramecium, or the strep-
tococcus […]. [W]e will say that the knowledge of life must take 
place through unpredictable conversions, as it strives to grasp a 
becoming whose meaning is never so clearly revealed to our un-
derstanding as when it disconcerts it.
(Canguilhem 2008, 22)
Beyond the literary appeal of seeing biological experimentation as one 
of so many roads carved into the animal world, Canguilhem’s vision of 
biological experimentation as an iterative grasping at a becoming that 
continually disconcerts our understanding resituates experimentation as 
a form of life within a broader world of becoming. Knowledge of life, 
animal or otherwise, emerges through moments of disconcertion, rather 
than a unidirectionally domineering desecration of the natural world. 
Hogs, though hardly equal partners in the strict sense of the term, are 
 active agents in the creation of knowledge concerning “ human” existence.
Keeping in mind the relationship of anatomical knowledge to the on-
tological edifice of “the human”, I would like, now, to jump forward 
to consider the ways contemporary artists have approached the issue of 
human-nonhuman similarity, culinary-cultural knowledge, and sacri-
fice that have motivated this chapter so far. If anatomy and experimental 
method are efforts to grasp a disconcerting becoming, so too are artistic 
interventions that analyze and perform different becomings (becomings- 
with or otherwise). In these artistic and aesthetic engagements, we find 
alternative possibilities for relationships between human and nonhuman 
animals as well as the enduring significance of mute hogs.
the Body of the Pig
At the Lódź Biennale in 2010, the artist Miru Kim staged a performance 
entitled “Mud Bath for Thick Skin”. Kim is known for her adventurous 
photography, appearing nude in city sewers, atop bridges, and even in 
the airy sands of the Sahara. But “Mud Bath for Thick Skin” and its 
precursor pieces, “The Pig That Therefore I Am” and “I Like Pigs and 
Pigs Like Me”, offered something distinct. To understand why, we need 
to examine the pieces in sequence.
In “The Pig That Therefore I Am”, which begins the porcine  series, 
Kim’s unclothed body appears contorted in a sty: at times, her face is 
 hidden behind long hair or turned away from the camera, her body 
crouched down amidst large industrial hogs, sometimes in and sometimes 
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outside of their gated pens. The images draw attention to the paradox-
ical similarity between hogs and humans, particularly in their skin. As 
Kim writes, “Both a pig and I carry our exteriorized memories on our 
cutaneous garment–scars, blemishes, wrinkles, and rashes that manifest 
markings of time, anguish of the soul, wounds of love and war” (Kim 
2010). Her nakedness next to the nakedness of the hogs establishes a 
visual regime of identification, with skin touching skin, bodies draped 
across each other. The resemblances and correspondences between art-
ist and hog is so great that many of the photographs are a transspecific 
Where’s Waldo, as one seeks the artist within a sea of hairy hog bodies, 
standing, lying, or walking around. More than merely concealed by a 
porcine camouflaging, Kim’s body and the bodies of the pigs become in-
terchangeable. In one, her head may seem connected to a hog in front of 
her, while in another her body appears in multiple pens  simultaneously. 
As the photographs progress, Kim becomes dirtied by her environs, and 
the  markings on her flesh, both those that come from the setting and 
the scars and blemishes that hold a longer history, mimic and mirror 
the marked bodies of the hogs, with their own histories of abuse, love, 
and an enclosed vitality. In the shadows of the sty, the clear distinction 
between hog and human is blurred.
The photographs are bisected by a blurred line separating skin from 
skin, but as the question of which bodies we are viewing becomes in-
creasingly confused, folding into each other, the “hog” portion of each 
photo appears less like an opposition and more an alternate view of 
human skin. The artist notes, “Two bodies mingled momentarily, in the 
skin on skin contact. I could no longer reason whether I was feeling 
the pig’s abdomen on my thigh, or the pig was feeling my thigh on her 
abdomen” (Kim 2010). For Kim, the dissolution between what is prop-
erly human and properly porcine demonstrates “two souls mingled on 
the plane of contact”, which she contrasts to the traditionally Western 
notion of Cartesian subjectivity, where body and soul stand apart from 
one another.
At the same time, the images have a way of highlighting the dissim-
ilarity between human and hog. While there is parallel bruising and 
blemish, the skin of hog bellies, for instance, displays cracks and bumps 
that do not mark Kim in the same way. Kim’s long, dark hair acts as 
a clear visual separator, the smoothness of her body distinct from the 
hairy roughness of the pigs. Form and posture also diverge, particu-
larly Kim’s capacity to kneel as well as stand upright, moving fluidly 
in and out of the gates. Like Red Peter, the ape in Kafka’s “A Report 
to an Academy” (1917), the “way out” of confinement in the pens ap-
pears to be a becoming-human – one that remains inaccessible to the 
hogs themselves. There is, then, a melancholy to the “external” photos 
in which Kim looks upon fenced-in hogs that sometimes reach out to 
her with their snouts or retreat so quickly that the photograph captures 
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only spectral traces of escape. There is also a sexual charge to them: not 
so much in the interplay of nudity and eroticism, but in the echoes of an 
old poem by John Wilmot, Earl of Rochester, about the maiden Chloris, 
who lies with her pigs in their pen, inspired by their grunting dreams of 
sexual violence (Rochester 2013, 16–17). The vital bodies lying next to 
each other display a lingering sexual energy that gives way equally to 
nightmare and fantasy.
Naked Responsibility
Kim writes that she first came to recognize the similarity of humans 
and pigs in a dissection during her time as a premedical student: “I 
remember peeling away carefully with forceps, scalpel, and scissors, 
the integument of a fetal pig”. “Layer by layer”, she continues, “I got to 
the abdominal cavity. When it was finally cut open, I saw an elaborate 
cluster of organs arranged in a way almost identical to what I’d seen 
in human anatomy books” (Kim 2010). Through the proper cutting, 
the ana-tomia, she comes to recognize the profound similarity between 
species and cannot continue school. Kim’s turning away from medicine 
because of classroom dissection mirrors the experience of many stu-
dents who find something upsetting about cutting apart beings whose 
insides remain so like our own. PETA, People for the Ethical Treat-
ment of Animals, for instance, describes dissection not as anatomical 
education but as so many “lessons in cruelty” (“Dissection: Lessons in 
Cruelty” n.d.).
Considered from this perspective, Kim’s naked openness to the pigs 
echoes Jacques Derrida’s mute nakedness in front of his cat. Derrida, 
reflecting on feeling “Ashamed of being as naked as a beast”, refers to a 
long philosophical history that sees the nudity of nonhuman animals as 
impossible: the beast cannot be nude because it is already naked, know-
ing nothing of the techne of clothes (Derrida 2008, 4–5). Kim’s work, 
which seeks a nudity without shame, becomes a project of vulnerabil-
ity, an effort to allow what is normally impossible – the body-to-body 
connection of human and hog – to exist, however fleetingly. In these 
moments of contact where Kim’s body grazes and blurs into the pig that 
therefore she is, and as the viewer gazes upon the photographic evidence 
of these precarious encounters, the firm boundary of the subject, her 
“human” skin, dissipates. As Judith Butler argues, vulnerability is pow-
erful precisely because of its capacity to undermine our self-contained 
individuality, because it preconditions ethics of every kind: “[T]he ‘I’ 
becomes undone in its ethical relation to the ‘you,’ which means that 
there is a very specific mode of being dispossessed that makes ethical re-
lationality possible” (Butler 2015, 110). We are defined, in Butler’s con-
ceptualization, by our responsibility to and for those others around us. 
This vulnerability, which is less a choice than a condition of existence, 
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makes ethics possible. As Kim’s work emphasizes, our vulnerability and 
responsibility extend to those hogs that live otherwise invisible lives at 
the outskirts of our cities.
There is, nevertheless, a more pessimistic reading of Kim’s work that 
resonates with what has already been suggested about anatomical ed-
ucation: the inescapable sense that “The Pig That Therefore I Am” 
remains a profoundly human and humanizing way of approaching the 
porcine world. Just as Derrida’s being-seen by the cat can be interpreted 
as merely another moment of philosophical masculinity that under-
plays dominance (Guenther 2009), the photographs might merely rep-
licate the simultaneous external-internality of the anatomist who cuts 
apart the other in order to recognize him- or herself, both because Kim 
often appears included-but-separate and because the camera’s gaze cre-
ates a further layer of mediation. They become, in this view, little more 
than “tourist” photographs (Cherry 2016, 72): the artist might choose 
temporarily to kneel down in tight quarters with large hogs, enduring 
moments of hardship to generate an alternate interpretation of human 
phenomenology, but this openness remains transient and objectifying.
Being and Becoming a Beast
Yet we should emphasize the significance of the transitory opening that 
her work provides: “The Pig That Therefore I Am” offers something 
beyond the “shameful” reflection that Derrida’s cat inspires in him. Less 
an effort to rearticulate a particular phenomenological experience – and 
here, I depart from Kim’s own analysis – her proximity to the pigs, lying 
with them and being dirtied as they are, enclosed and penned in, offers 
a kind of temporary companionship with the animals, a willingness to 
open up the human self to complex animal behaviors, a mutual regard 
that asks after their interests and desires, allowing pigs to be pigs. It 
might be an example of what Donna Haraway has called, rather than the 
Deleuzian and Guattarian notion of “becoming-animal” (Deleuze and 
Guattari 1987), a “becoming-with”, an embodied human engagement 
with specific animal others (Haraway 2008, 28). According to Haraway, 
work with companion animals (in scientific contexts as well as our rela-
tion to pets) is not a unilateral relation of dominance, but a relationship 
of response-ability that transforms all parties, human and non-human. 
In this light, “The Pig That Therefore I Am” can be understood as the 
record of a practice of becoming-with, one that emerges, significantly, 
from the particular subject-crafting functions of anatomy.
Elizabeth Cherry has suggested that Kim’s work “highlights the sym-
bolic boundaries between humans and animals” and offers an example 
of art that contributes directly to mobilization into animal rights ac-
tivism (Cherry 2016). But her conclusion, that “directly” political art 
and projects that are much less obviously so may both produce activist 
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possibilities, seems relatively uncontroversial, failing to do justice to the 
conceptual complexity of “The Pig That Therefore I Am”.
In Becoming a Beast (2016), Charles Foster seeks to articulate an 
 alternative approach to nature-writing and another method of reflecting 
on animality: instead of a distanced theorization of concepts and con-
sciousness, he argues that the truest analyses of human and nonhuman 
capacities will emerge from living with, alongside of, and perhaps even 
as those animals themselves. Following in the tradition of works like J. 
A. Baker’s The Peregrine (2004) or, more recently, Thomas Thwaites’s 
GoatMan (2016), Foster spends time living as a badger, a fox, and a 
swift, each time finding ways to transform and extend his phenomeno-
logical experience through the forms of life of the particular creature 
he studies (Baker 2004; Thwaites 2016). As a badger, for instance, he 
burrows into a hill, eats earthworms, and learns to rely more on smell 
more than vision.
Yet, even as he stretches his capacities, seeking new methods of 
exposure to the vital world, Foster remains aware of the limitations 
of his body, the way it differs from the birds and beasts he tracks and 
impersonates. As he writes:
I’m much less local [than the badgers]. Despite my best efforts, many 
of my molecules come from China and Thailand. I have to work a 
lot harder to get any kind of resonance. Yet there are many things 
that can help: history books; the songs and tunes of dead farmers; 
the stories that cling to the land and to my mind as earth clings to 
the back of a badger. I can slowly learn the mythological language in 
which the land speaks both to me and to the badger, and it suffices 
for some sort of conversation even if the badger and I falter in our 
neuronal dialects.
(Foster 2016, 25)
Echoing Canguilhem’s notion of the experimental method as a tracing 
through the lifeworld of experimental animals, Foster sees “being a 
beast” as a combination of understanding through stories and more di-
rect phenomenological experience. In Kim’s work, too, there is a family 
resemblance to this slow practice of “being a beast”, of allowing oneself 
to practice a becoming-with that pushes beyond archetypical “human” 
experience. As Kim lies among the hogs, even though she can exit their 
pens in a way that the pigs themselves cannot, she both limits and ex-
pands her own experiential possibilities; in Butler’s terms, she embraces 
a vulnerability that tests the bounds of the “human”, one that might 
allow for more ethical engagement with the nonhuman world. While 
these bodies remain closed up, uncut, the contact between skin – the 
movement of living flesh that brushes against others, offers a different 
kind of openness.
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“Mud Bath for Thick Skin” (2010), a multimedia installation that 
followed Kim’s first pig project, shifts the context significantly: now she 
appears in an underground storage room atop a pit of mud which she 
gradually covers herself in over the course of six hours. At her eye level, 
a screen replays video from “The Pig That Therefore I Am”.  Spectators 
may watch her covering herself from afar, as well as see video of her 
 earlier time with the pigs, footage that was not originally centered in 
“The Pig That Therefore I Am”. Beyond the endurance required by 
 covering one’s body in mud for hours inside a cold basement – these 
feats of endurance, of reaching unreachable or hidden places and brav-
ing harsh conditions, are central to Kim’s work – “Mud Bath” also em-
phasizes the hidden challenge of the previous pig photos. Rather than 
the almost meditative calm or peace of the photographs, we see Kim 
knocked around, chewed on by the hogs, fighting to maintain stability 
in the midst of large and unwieldy creatures.
This alternate perspective also echoes a strange but persistent Amer-
ican myth: that more farmers die at the jaws of their pigs than from 
any other comparable workplace danger. The myth is, strictly speak-
ing, false. Nevertheless, this fable, a kind of warning that appears in 
diverse publications and arises out of the very real danger presented 
by enormous farm hogs, reminds us of the oft-occluded violence of 
the natural world that the increasing disconnection of urban dwellers 
from non-domesticated animals enforces (Cronon 1992); of violence 
that is both ours and theirs, a point made beautifully and hauntingly 
in Werner Herzog’s Grizzly Man (2005), where the main character, 
Timothy Treadwell, attempts to live in peaceful coexistence with ani-
mals only to find himself killed by the bears he named, cared for, and 
sought to protect (Bolman 2012). One cannot forget that alongside the 
desire to atone for the violence of the human past lives the irreconcil-
able alterity of the other, the possibility for openness and hospitality 
to be radically rejected.
As Kim is knocked through the mud by large hogs that have been 
reconfigured – aesthetically, genetically – by breeders and factory farms, 
it is important to recognize that the skin she touches is not a pure bar-
rier between bodies, a neutral screen for phenomenological experience 
between living beings on an equal plane, a flimsy wall between self and 
world. Indeed, this skin is not natural at all. Instead, this skin is itself 
a kind of fabrication, transformed for scientific and agricultural needs 
and crafted by centuries of domestication. Thus, where Kim and other 
commentators have focused on the presence of human and animal bod-
ies together, even as I have located the practice of an alternate rela-
tion to animals in her work, it is equally significant that this relation 
cannot escape a multiplied human mediation: between human animals 
and animals that have been constructed by humans, almost from the 
bottom -up, for reasons of cuisine as much as control. “Mud Bath”, then, 
offers a refracted view on the original work, one that emphasizes the 
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presence of constructed “similarity” and fabricated “nature” in factory 
farms and our relationship to the natural world more broadly.
Becoming-pig, Becoming Pigs
To suggest that Kim’s engagement with the pigs is lessened due to the 
crafted nature of the hogs would oversimplify: “Mud Bath” displaces 
the human gaze, as Kim’s lonely performance occurs under the watch-
ful (though pre-recorded) eyes of the pigs as well as the visitors. Kim 
suggests that the title of the work is derived from the “Poet” character 
in August Strindberg’s A Dream Play (1901). Midway through the play, 
the Poet walks onstage “with his eyes raised toward the sky and carry-
ing a pail of mud in one hand” (Strindberg 1913, 61). The Officer, upon 
seeing this strange visitor arrive, quips that a mud bath makes no sense 
for such a man, who “ought to be having light baths and air baths”. 
But a third character responds that it makes perfect sense, for the poet 
“is roaming about the higher regions so much that he gets homesick for 
the mud and wallowing in the mire makes the skin callous like that of 
a pig. Then he cannot feel the stings of the wasps”. The Officer, befud-
dled, notes that they live “in a queer world, full of contradictions”. This 
homesickness, or perhaps nostalgia, is clearly at play in Kim’s work, of 
bathing herself in the mud, making her skin callous.
But the Poet connects his mud bath not simply with a return to na-
ture or a descent from the realms of abstraction, but also with a kind of 
truth-telling. To explain why justice has failed to reach all the residents 
of the region equally, he offers a short allegory:
That much the Caliph, Haroun the Just, came to understand. He was 
sitting on his throne, and from its height he could never make out 
what happened below. At last complaints penetrated to his exalted 
ears. And then, one fine day, he disguised himself and descended 
unobserved among the crowds to find out what kind of justice they 
were getting.
(Strindberg 1913, 63)
The mud bath and Haroun’s descent among the people are linked as 
parallel methods for better understanding and responding to the fail-
ures of justice that exist among humans and their nonhuman others: 
two ways of covering the skin, two encounters with abjection, both 
highlighting differences of experience. In this way, Kim’s bath becomes 
more than a banal, nostalgic departure from the “challenges” of the 
civilized world to some dirtier and more complex universe of feeling: it 
is also a mode of knowledge-gathering and practice that clings to the 
possibility of a justice that has not yet arrived.
When one watches from the perspective I have offered, this slow – 
almost degrading – performance of mud-covering appears as a form 
178 Brad Bolman
of becoming-with that differs from the emergent, crazed movement 
 between worlds and states that the most messianic interpretations of 
“becoming-animal” have occasionally offered (Vint 2005; Goh 2012). 
Instead, we have a cautious, embodied practice that is framed by the 
violence of nature and of creation. Despite the immediate visual per-
ception of two natural beings together in the nudity of their creation, 
the “sameness” that Kim sees in the pigs was never a “wildness” that 
humans and animals share waiting to be discovered, but a similarity 
constructed, noticed, and reinterpreted through the millennia, from 
Salerno’s anatomies to today’s factory farms and medical research. As 
Kim performs pigness for the pigs, despite their lack of regard, seeking 
in a sense to erase her skin in front of the human spectators, she places 
herself uneasily between spaces and forms of life.
Kim’s final effort in the pig series appears more direct and playful 
than the previous pieces, yet confirms the argument offered so far. 
Titled simply, “I Like Pigs and Pigs Like Me”, viewers walk up to a 
small room, walled off by a large piece of transparent glass, inside of 
which Kim lives for 104 hours with two hogs. She moves with the pigs, 
at times protecting herself from their unwanted advances, at times 
 feeding them or trying to steal a narrow slice of space for herself to eat 
unbothered. Whether the artist likes the pigs or they like her is diffi-
cult to answer from an exterior perspective, but they are nevertheless 
becoming-with each other as Kim attempts to build a life for herself 
inside the enclosure as the pigs make sense of her presence within their 
Umwelt. Like the pigs, she has no escape. Like the pigs, she must lie in 
mud, eat the small quantities of food available. Because she is not pos-
ing for photographs but merely subsisting, “I Like Pigs” appears like 
an additional porcine chapter in Foster’s experiments with “becoming 
a beast”. Perhaps animal becomings exist in these moments of cautious 
practice, rather than in strange transitions; in the willingness to commit 
oneself, even temporarily, to another kind of living, to becoming more 
than human by becoming more porcine.
Becoming-with-Hogs
In this chapter, I offered an alternate history of anatomy that emerges 
from the bodies of pigs. I showed how these early moments of pig ex-
perimentation laid foundations for the notion of human-pig similarity 
that has persisted, in numerous forms, to the present. I connected the 
movement of knowledge inside of bodies themselves to the way contem-
porary art and literature have used hog bodies, focusing particularly 
on the practice of contemporary artist Miru Kim, whose photographic, 
video, and performance pieces toy with the boundaries of human and 
hog. I  suggested that her work serves as an example of “becoming- 
with” (Haraway 2008), and emphasized its pace, the slow rhythms of 
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cooperative formation and being together: a philosophical approach to 
becoming that is nevertheless cognizant of the particular interventions 
that humans and pigs have made into each other’s bodies. Just as culi-
nary practices combined with scientific ones to make hogs into exem-
plars of human beings, Kim’s work highlights the anatomical relations 
that haunt engagements (or lack thereof) with often invisible swine.
I want to end with another work of art, another becoming-with and 
intervention into the politics of human-animal bonds: an art installa-
tion by Joseph Beuys titled, “How to Explain Pictures to a Dead Hare” 
(1965). In the piece, Beuys strolls through a locked gallery of paintings, 
holding a dead hare and explaining paintings to it. Beuys’s viewers are 
left uneasily outside, watching him pace the gallery from a large window, 
seeking to understand his peculiar ritual. Beuys covers himself in gold 
and other materials, which Kim playfully inverts with mud in her own 
work. Beuys then walks through the gallery as something other than 
“normally” human, describing paintings to the hare. What could possi-
bly be said to this animal whose skin has been routinely cooked to pro-
duce the glue that has primed stretched canvases since the Renaissance?
In The Jungle (1906), Upton Sinclair looks at the cruel efficiency of 
a Chicago pork plant and wonders: “Who would take this hog into his 
arms and comfort him, reward him for his work well done, and show 
him the meaning of his sacrifice?” (Sinclair 1906). In Beuys’s and Kim’s 
works, in the aimless covering and occlusion of the phenotypical mark-
ers of humanity, human and pig are reconfigured. A faltering attempt is 
made to offer meaning to the hog’s and the hare’s sacrifice. Where Beuys 
might retain a certain nostalgia for lost naturalness, the severing of hu-
mans from an original wholeness, Kim seeks not to save or fully explain 
the hog’s sacrifice but, perhaps more simply and just as powerfully, to 
treat them as they are and take them into her arms.
Notes
 1 I am thankful to attendees of the “Reconfiguring Human and Nonhuman” 
conference in Jyväskylä for comments on an early version of this chapter. 
Original inspiration for the piece came from a course taught by Katharine 
Park and Ahmed Ragab. I am also grateful to Sophia Roosth for advising the 
thesis from which some of this material also originated.
 2 Though there is some debate, it seems his primary experimental subjects 
were Barbary macaques, acquired from the Gibraltar region of Spain or 
North Africa through Roman trading networks, along with a composite of 
other available nonhuman primates.
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Over the last three years, I have engaged in qualitative research with 
six visually impaired people, the boyfriend of one of them, a guide dog, 
workers in an organization providing services for visually impaired 
 persons, and several random people with whom my communication 
partners came into contact. The following chapter is about two of them, 
a thirty-two-year-old woman named Eva1 and her guide dog Nessie, 
whose relationship departs from the humanist logic of the difference 
 between human and nonhuman animals. I show how not only this 
boundary but also the concepts of humanity and animality are reconfig-
ured in a guide team that Eva and Nessie have created.
I draw on ethnographic research, “based on fieldwork using a variety 
of (mainly qualitative) research techniques but including engagement in 
the lives of those being studied over an extended period of time” (Davies 
2002, 4–5). This method allows me to capture the heterogeneity, dynam-
ics, and interconnection of the phenomenon of disability as well as the 
guide team. The relationship between Eva, Nessie, and I has grown into 
a friendship and brought forth great moments spent with both of them. 
The study is thus a combination of different methodological techniques, 
ranging from interviews through e-mail communication connected to 
the research to less formal ethnographic observations and conversations 
about the experience of a visually impaired person. Although the fuzzy 
distinction between research and friendship may be risky, I have allowed 
the relationship to flow naturally.
The methodology used in my research corresponds to “connective 
ethnography”, which has its roots mainly in IT technologies. It can cap-
ture their dynamics (Dirksen, Huizing, and Smit 2010), and it “orients 
towards connection and mobility rather than to pre-defined field sites” 
(Hine 2007, 619). The method lies in “tracing the flows of objects, text, 
and bodies” (Dirksen, Huizing, and Smit 2010, 1046) instead of focus-
ing on static and fixed borders. I draw on the presumption that connec-
tivity and dynamics do not involve only IT technologies but are also 
inherent in disability.
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I analyze Eva and Nessie’s relationship and the phenomenon of dis-
ability through the concept of assemblage (Deleuze and Guattari 2005). 
An assemblage is a construction consisting of heterogeneous connec-
tions and conjunctions, organic and inorganic, linguistic, material, and 
so forth that are being changed and reconfigured, gaining new qualities 
during the process of mutual encounters. A constant dialogue between 
discursive and non-discursive elements occurs, which cannot be reduced 
to one or the other. Connections within an assemblage are often un-
predictable, imperceptible, and uncontrollable, and they enable to do 
something while disabling to do something else. Despite its dynamics 
and fluidity, an assemblage acquires certain articulations and stability in 
particular configurations. Stability does not stop the process but infers 
its predictability and continuity.
An assemblage of a visually impaired human and her guide dog is 
an encounter point where a human, a nonhuman animal, technology, 
and disability meet and acquire new discursive articulations as well as 
otherwise unavailable activities. Both Eva’s and Nessie’s bodies and 
experiences evolve. Further, the concept of disability attains different 
contours and elicits different reactions, for example, varying from the 
typical connection with a white cane. The dog herself is transformed, 
too, since she is not a pet anymore, but a professional assistant with 
access to territories strictly prohibited to “animals”. Emerging conjunc-
tions between these heterogeneous elements blur the mutual boundaries 
in which modern thinking is entrenched – above all, the division between 
nature and society (Latour 2002). They affect distinctions between hu-
mans and nonhuman animals, humans, and technology and nonhuman 
animals and technology (in other words, organic vs. inorganic). The con-
junction between Eva and Nessie is an occasion for rethinking animals 
and humans and reconfiguring their relationship. It cannot be based on 
the humanist conceptualization since it defies the purified distinctions 
grounded in negative difference based on identity, opposition, analogy, 
and resemblance (Deleuze 2004, 38).
A Human-guide Dog Assemblage and the 
territorialization of the Guide team
Rod Michalko (1999), a sociologist who has written an autobiographic 
book about his experience with a guide dog Smokie, says: “We are of-
ten compared to other dog guide teams, and I am compared to other 
blind people, Smokie to other dog guides” (54). However, when the con-
cept of assemblage is introduced, it is not sufficient to analyze “input 
elements” and compare a dog with a dog and a human with a human. 
Assemblage is a “multiplicity”, that is, “the one AND the multiple”, 
sustaining heterogeneity and independence on the one hand, but repre-
senting associations on the other (Deleuze and Guattari 2005, 26–38). 
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Therefore, it is important to analyze a human together with her or his 
guide dog, because their assemblage does not consist of the aggregate of 
their original qualities; it creates new ones depending on their mutual 
conjunctions. My study defines the guidance itself as such a new qual-
ity, without asking the insolvable question of “who guides and who is 
guided”. Lestel, Brunois, and Gaunet (2006) remind us that the analysis 
“cannot be reduced to either the behaviors of the animals with which 
humans interact or the representations humans have of these animals” 
(ibid., 170). We must focus on how they behave together and how they 
create a “human-dog entity” (ibid.).
The dynamic character of an assemblage implies that it is not only 
important to capture the current associations of which it consists, but 
also to analyze what had preceded its current form – precisely, how the 
two parties (in this example) had been preparing themselves for the fu-
ture conjunction. Nessie’s life had been affected by the forthcoming as-
semblage with Eva even before she was born as her parents had been 
deliberately chosen so that their puppies can become guide dogs one 
day. When a puppy is born, genetic tests are run, and a thoroughgoing 
training follows until she is ready to join a visually impaired human. Eva 
got her as a highly trained guide dog, but that does not imply that their 
assemblage had already been established at that moment.
In addition to exploring associations within an assemblage and 
focusing on what they do, one must analyze how the assemblage is 
being territorialized, in other words, how it holds together. Territori-
alization stabilizes the assemblage, gives it form and relative perma-
nency, which “establishes connections between certain multiplicities” 
(Deleuze and Guattari 2005, 23). Simultaneously, there are numer-
ous deterritorializations. They occur when a process of becoming 
is  detached or escapes from its original territory. A new connection 
enters the territory, which results in the reassembling of an assem-
blage. Deterritorialization not only generates possibilities of change 
and rupture but also represents an indispensable part of territorializa-
tion itself (ibid.). Deleuze and Guattari thus reconcile two seemingly 
 contradictory concepts – stability and change – and simultaneously 
problematize the difference between discourse and matter when show-
ing how they territorialize into assemblages.
“[After having received Nessie], we would often walk together to get 
accustomed to each other” (e-mail, December 2, 2015). For the territo-
rializing process, a time element and reiteration of the same or similar 
activities (never with the same outcome, though) are pivotal features re-
ferring to the continual work that makes the assemblage functional. Eva 
and Nessie’s bond must be maintained on many levels, which involves 
not only guiding itself but also time spent together beyond this activ-
ity. The territory has two significant consequences: “a reorganization 
of functions and a regrouping of forces” (Deleuze and Guattari 2005, 
Reconfiguring Human and Nonhuman Animals 185
320). Distinct species – and activities – are specialized, which holds true 
also for a human and her or his guide dog. Getting to know each other 
indicates specializing in tasks and knowing what the other can do; thus, 
the ability to see is just one of the functions necessary for the guiding 
assemblage; other activities require different abilities.
The conjunction of a human with a guide dog and specialization in 
functions within the assemblage contradicts general humanist percep-
tions about “animals”. Taylor (2013), Haslam (2006), and Rasmussen 
(2011) accentuate that the boundary separating humans from nonhu-
man animals lies in “specific” characteristics with which only humans 
are endowed, and which thus confirm human superiority. It is no coinci-
dence that some of the crucial features upon which the modern subject 
is built are rationality and the ability to make decisions. Animals serve 
as the “‘constitutive outside’ or negative example that enables to define 
human subjectivity as disembodied and autonomous” (Rasmussen 2011, 
101). Therefore, a successful territorialization of a guide team depends 
on deterritorialization of a solid boundary between human and nonhu-
man animal and a willingness to admit Nessie’s abilities that belong to 
the “human sphere”.
Lately, she surprised me when I found out I shouldn’t meddle in 
her guiding because she knows best where she’s going. For example, 
when I was at the faculty X, I would tell her where to turn and so 
on, and this February, I finally learned I shouldn’t do that. When I 
navigate her, we always get lost, whereas when I leave everything 
up to her, it never happens. She just knows where she guides me, 
and when I start to panic and navigate her somewhere else, and she 
obeys me after all, it usually doesn’t end up well.
(E-mail, March 19, 2016)
Deterritorialization requires the will to risk and often goes against 
the logic (or rather the rhetoric) of dog’s training, which builds upon 
docility and control. Although veterinary research (Batt et al. 2008; 
Arata et al. 2009) identifies docility and the ability not to be easily 
distracted as important factors for the successful territorialization of 
a guide dog, Eva finds Nessie’s intelligence and the ability to make 
decisions more important. Guiding schools in the Czech Republic also 
count on so-called “intelligent disobedience”, which means that a dog 
must not carry out the order if it puts the owner into a potentially dan-
gerous situation (Pomocné tlapky o.p.s.,2 2009). Eva views absolute 
docility in a negative light.
Nessie doesn’t like observing the rules (or I have spoiled her in this 
respect, and I don’t really mind), which means that she doesn’t stop 
at the edge of a sidewalk, nor does she stop when crossing a road 
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or going up the stairs; she just runs upstairs right away. So, she’s 
definitely not a dog who wins medals at guide dog competitions. 
However, her good memory is her upside. Recently, I had an English 
lesson at the faculty Y, and I had no idea where it was, so my dad ac-
companied me for the first time [along with Nessie]. I had Nessie just 
on the leash; nobody showed her the way. Well, when I went there a 
month later by myself, Nessie perfectly knew her way around the lab-
yrinthine corridors and walked me to where I needed to get. And this 
is much more important for me than stopping where some rule says.
(E-mail, March 13, 2015)
Michalko (1999, 72) talks about the dichotomy between dominance and 
submission that is not productive for a guide team as dominance and 
submission are in constant flux. It is the dog who takes control in some 
situations, and the human being must let her or him make decisions – 
even if they might think they know better what to do than a nonhuman 
animal. The same holds true for Eva and Nessie. Eva ascribes to Nessie 
“extraordinary intelligence”, which brings up the underlying question 
of how to study nonhuman animals and how to approach them when 
human language limits the realm of our thinking. Then again, it is im-
portant to focus on the guide team and explore what these human terms 
do in the assemblage. When Eva ascribes extraordinary intelligence to 
Nessie, the assemblage works in a different way than it would if Eva did 
not do so.
Allowing Nessie to enter the spheres usually associated only with human 
intellect and rationality raises the question of autonomy and independence. 
Gibson, Carnevale, and King (2012) draw on the Deleuzo-Guattarian 
concept of assemblage to contest the conventional perception of autonomy 
by replacing it with the terms “interconnectivity” and “interconnections” 
to discuss means of “doing-in-the-world” (1897) – in other words, finding 
ways to carry out certain activities. An assemblage is defined by which 
connections it can make and what this “interconnectivity” can do. Thus, 
the borders of both mind and body are contested and unclear, and they are 
in constant flux depending on the connections that form the assemblage. 
Subjectivity is not delimited by distinctions from others but in combina-
tion with them.
Instead of interconnectivity, the modern discourse of the autonomous 
and independent subject results in dependency and in-sufficiency and 
contributes to the construction of disability as inferior and the consti-
tutive outside of the modern subject. However, Gibson, Carnevale, and 
King point out that the idea of independence is just an illusion also for 
able-bodied people.
Nondisabled people’s dependencies are not as readily recognized be-
cause they are banal instead of extraordinary, but they still open 
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and close possibilities and actions. Mimi works within the interview 
to establish that her dependencies should also be considered unre-
markable, but this requires resisting pervasive negative discourses 
of disability.
(Ibid.)
For the relationship between Eva and Nessie, the pervasive discourse 
of disability must be contested, along with the delimiting boundary be-
tween human and nonhuman animal. Interconnectivity disagrees with 
the modern subject not only because it challenges the notion of inde-
pendence but also because the bond that holds this assemblage together 
often confronts rationality when emotions (like the love between Eva 
and Nessie) and trust come to the fore.
I have trusted Nessie from the beginning. Basically, I do not have a 
problem with trust in general. Well, what else can I do, right? On 
the contrary, people often wonder how I trust them that they tell me 
in time that stairs are coming, or won’t let me hit something. And 
it is true that Nessie has not brought about any bigger collision yet. 
When she lets me hit a traffic sign or fall off a sidewalk, it is just 
because she is observing other dogs or sniffing some dog’s news.
(E-mail, March 3, 2015)
For Eva, trust does not mean complete predictability and the ability to 
know what Nessie or other people will do (which is necessary for tech-
nology). She counts on situations in which they might do something other 
than the expected: a dog is disturbed by dog-related matters, or a person 
forgets to tell about the stairs that Eva is approaching (which has happened 
to me as well). Magnus (2014) says that trust involves an element of risk 
and the knowledge that the dog is not fully under control. Similar to in-
terconnectivity, trust does not concern only disabled people, but disability 
highlights it. People who wonder that Eva trusts them, trust many other 
interconnections, which are, however, mediocre and therefore invisible.
Not only the mental dimension and mutual experience territorialize an 
assemblage; it is physical aspects as well. Deleuze and Guattari (2005) 
question the nature of a body and perceive it as an assemblage instead of 
conceiving it in terms of unity, wholeness, stability, and predictability. It 
is a “disrupted body” that opposes the idea of the “able-bodied” subject 
(Shildrick 2009), but only because of such disruptions, a body is able 
to create assemblages that allow it to do some things. Both Eva’s and 
Nessie’s bodies evolve, adjusting to each other during their connection. 
They affect each other’s speed and compose “compound bodies” (Shores 
2012, 198). Their composition is maintained in certain ways that ensure 
its functionality. Nessie walks only by Eva’s left side, a bit ahead of her. 
Eva holds the harness in a certain way, which differs substantially from 
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the manner in which she holds my arm when we walk together. The as-
semblage changes its elements – the bodies – which gain new qualities. 
The body walks, flexes its muscles, feels, moves, takes up space differ-
ently with a dog, with another person, or with a cane (or with more 
of these at once). Consequently, for getting to some place, it is vital to 
prepare a route that complies with the whole assemblage and not only 
with its separate parts. It is not only important which way to walk; the 
way is created by the factors with whom and how you walk. During her 
or his training, a guide dog is trained to choose a way that is suitable for 
both a dog and a human – the dog cannot slip under a hurdle or take a 
narrow path. Also, Eva must know what Nessie can or cannot do and 
adjust their way accordingly.
She is scared of escalators. Every guide dog can do it but Nessie. 
I wouldn’t dare to go on an escalator because it would probably be 
a tragedy.
(Field notes, October 15, 2014)
Their co-modification also involves Eva’s willingness to let Nessie sniff 
around, and the latter’s sense of smell is an integral part of the assem-
blage although it sometimes disturbs the guiding process.
Sight and Connective Difference
When Michalko talks about his experience of going blind, he comes to 
define what “sight” actually means:
The relationship I had always assumed between blindness and sight-
edness was quickly losing its cogency. I no longer thought of them as 
opposites, or even, necessarily, as antithetical. I was not sure what 
their relationship was; it was more complicated than I’d thought, but 
its exact nature eluded me.
(Michalko 1999, 15)
One of the outcomes of modernist discourse has been a purification of 
the senses, detaching them from each other, and creating oppositions – 
consequently, blindness/visual impairment is considered to be “non-
sight” (Schillmeier 2010, 45). Oppositions are never lonely and neutral; 
many other negative demarcations follow. The history of sight and non-
sight is therefore also the history of “the good and bad,  abilities and 
disabilities, beauty and ugliness, human and nonhuman, humans and 
technologies, one and many, nature and culture, etc” (ibid., 77), which 
refer to each other and reinforce one another. One pole of these opposi-
tions is embedded in the norm, and the other in otherness constituting 
the borders. “(I)n order to deal with the heterogeneities, differences, 
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uncertainties, and fragilities” (ibid., 43), exclusions and marginalization 
of otherness are practiced.
Deleuze challenges the notion of difference that “is ‘mediated’ to the 
extent that it is subjected to the fourfold root of identity, oppositions, 
analogy, and resemblance. “[It] must leave its cave and cease to be a 
monster” (Deleuze 2004, 38). Such difference is docile and predictable 
(i.e. fully territorialized) and serves as a legitimizing tool that declares 
an asymmetric position between able-bodied and disabled subjects as 
well as their stable contours and identities. Deleuze (1983, 1990, 2004) 
perceives difference as a primary power that creates assemblages – thus, 
it is not dividing but connecting. Besides territorialized contour and ar-
ticulation, we need to analyze deterritorializing connections that are not 
predetermined by a stable logic. The relation between sight and non-
sight (lack of sight) is a difference between assemblages, but Deleuze 
focuses on difference within them. By focusing on associations instead 
of solid entities, it becomes clear why blindness cannot be the opposition 
of sight – it does not create opposite connections. Conceptualizing sight 
in terms of the connections it creates (and at the same time, is a result 
of connections) enables us to analyze its role and character in the Eva- 
Nessie assemblage.
Although Michalko (1999, 46–47) says he chose a dog for a guide 
because he preferred sight for guiding, and the dog’s “sight” is a crucial 
element of a dog guide team, we should not speak about “replacement”. 
Nessie’s sight creates different connections than Eva’s sight would have 
in the assemblage. The idea of loss evokes the idea of substitution. I am 
not to saying that we can never talk about loss when analyzing disability, 
especially in certain cases, but the problem is the incapability of stepping 
out of the logic of loss and substitution. There is a significant difference 
between “replacing” something – which refers to the “original draw-
back” and thus goes backward – and “adding” something – which is 
oriented toward production.
When Latour (1995) analyzes the construction of scientific facts, he 
talks about a series of translations and transformation during which 
some of the old qualities (and information) disappear while new ones 
emerge. The same logic can be used to describe transformations in some-
one’s sight in the assemblage. When there is a human as a guide, their 
sight travels to Eva through connections that are no longer visual. It ap-
plies to situations in which a human guide describes the surroundings – 
there is not a direct relation between “the visible” and “the articulable” 
(Deleuze 2006, 47–69). What is seen is translated into words that Eva 
absorbs and understands in her own way, and since she used to see and 
still has a visual imagination, she consequently imagines a picture of 
the described thing or surrounding in her head. Because of this chain of 
translations, the original picture is not the same as the seen one. There 
is, however, still a correspondence since some information remains, for 
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example, that there is a shop with souvenirs on the left side or stairs 
ahead of her. Sometimes, vision is transformed into physical connection, 
which is primarily the case of a human and her guide dog. Nessie’s sight 
is connected with Eva through a harness.
Thanks to a solid harness in combination with a leash, I can feel 
‘most everything Nessie’s doing. I also feel whether she’s looking to 
the left or the right or sniffing a verge post, which I don’t feel if the 
harness is just loose. So, thanks to the solid harness that transfers 
Nessie’s every move so well, I’m not insecure at all when I walk. 
I don’t feel that I walk into emptiness like I do when I am in a strange 
environment without a dog, someone’s help or a cane.
(E-mail, March 13, 2015)
The guide dog has not replaced Eva’s sight but rather has extended her 
touch, as well as transformed the character of it and changed Eva’s ex-
perience from insecurity to security. We cannot analyze sight as a unity 
but only as a part of other assemblages – Nessie’s sight would be useless 
for Eva unless she was trained to become a guide dog. Nevertheless, 
sight is not a docile function, but changes according to the assemblage 
it enters.
We took part in a guide competition, but we finished second to 
last. […] When we got to the square, my mother was waiting for 
us since she has always helped everybody, so that they don’t have 
any trouble with me. The instructor who was accompanying us told 
her to leave, but as soon as Nessie saw my mom, she wanted to run 
towards her, and from then on, she was distracted and wasn’t guid-
ing because she wanted to go to granny. […] Even if she normally 
behaves in an intelligent manner, she was pulling me and walking 
across the lane.
(Interview, October 15, 2014)
When Deleuze and Guattari (2005) oppose the idea of the organism, they 
criticize its central control and subordination of parts to the wholeness. 
Perceiving the body as an assemblage is a symbiosis between holism, 
since the assemblage is intertwined, and fragmentation, as heterogeneous 
elements sustain their ability to deterritorialize/create new connections 
independently and these deterritorializations of each element impact the 
rest of the assemblage. Hence, sight cannot be fully controlled from the 
center, which is trained to guide Eva. It is a part of a body (of bodies, in 
this case), and, as such, it does something according to the connections 
it creates. While most connections (e.g. with a hurdle or with a path) are 
fruitful for the guiding assemblage, others can lead to its destabilization. 
When Nessie saw (and smelled and heard) Eva’s mother, new connec-
tions were created that caused a rupture in the guide team.
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Changing Disability
Studying connections also brings a perspective into the analysis of dis-
ability that does not focus solely on discursive aspects and articulations. 
Perceiving disability as an assemblage enables us to bridge the distinc-
tion between impairment as a functional limitation of a body, and dis-
ability as a social system of discrimination that has been criticized over 
the last two decades (Corker 1999; Samuels 2002; Tremain 2005; Price 
2007; Goodley 2013; Abrams 2016). At the same time, it allows taking 
not only technology but also animals into consideration and offers a way 
around the “discursive trap”, which often causes the disappearance of 
body and pain, in studies focusing exclusively on language (Vehmas and 
Mäkelä 2009; Shakespeare 2014).
The word disability evokes a lack of ability and skills, and even if this 
meaning corresponds to the asymmetrical relationship between an im-
pairment and a norm, at the same time, it characterizes an assemblage. It 
concerns what this assemblage disables and what it enables. Dis/abilities 
are not constant since an assemblage is not fixed; it changes according to 
the connections it creates. Dis/ability is supposed to work as a relatively 
objectified measure according to which it is possible to say that some-
one is disabled to do something and someone is not. And thanks to the 
removal of barriers, a disability can be alleviated (Barnes 1991). People 
who cannot use their eyes to see cannot create certain connections, but 
they can create others. However, the discourse of the impaired body 
does not imply only dis/abilities to carry out certain activities, but also 
the ways in which they are achieved. People who are “disabled” are also 
able to carry out many of these activities; they simply do them in dif-
ferent ways and through connections different from those of “healthy” 
people.
The concept of assemblage enables us to analyze how disability varies 
according to the ways people utilize to move. One of the negative delim-
iting lines between able-bodied and disabled people is their movement in 
space, which differs for those who can or cannot see. Further differences 
come out in moving dis/abled assemblages: unlike a white cane, a guide 
dog elicits a more positive reaction from others.3 The cane pertains only 
to blind people and therefore represents a foreign element that does not 
belong in a territory of “normality”. On the other hand, a dog is associ-
ated with ordinary people for whom it represents access (that is to say, 
a very popular and familiar one) to an “unknown” environment, which 
disability for many of them is.
As Bohan and James (2015), Worth (2013), and Whitmarsh (2005) 
point out, guide dogs inspire social interactions and the beginnings of 
a conversation. Eva has had the same experience, especially after she 
had moved to the United Kingdom with her boyfriend about two years 
ago, where Nessie facilitates meeting new people and fitting into a new 
environment. Eva describes that nearly every conversation is about 
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Nessie: what is her name and breed, whether she was trained in England 
or the Czech Republic (Field notes, April 20, 2015). People start a con-
versation not only with Eva but also with anybody with whom Nessie 
(wearing her harness) is at the time. When I had visited Eva, Filip, and 
Nessie in the United Kingdom last spring, I often overheard someone 
saying, “What a lovely dog!” People would smile at us, and some of 
them would start a chat. Furthermore, a guide dog often becomes a 
source of welcome entertainment, particularly in spaces forbidden to 
“animals”, such as stores or airports (field notes). However, we must be 
aware that the attention a guide dog draws can eclipse his or her owner 
(Whitmarsh 2005). Moreover, the presence of a guide dog is not always 
so positively welcomed as in the Euro-American context (Bohan and 
James 2015).
Disability as a Post-human Phenomenon
Although humanism involves rigid, narrow, and normative conventions, 
which relate to practices of exclusion and discrimination (Goodley, Law-
thom, and Runswick-Cole 2014, 350), it has had numerous positive con-
sequences for disabled people by inspiring efforts to include them in the 
category of “human” (ibid., 344). Simultaneously, even though uninten-
tionally, such efforts have unleashed processes that subvert some of the 
humanist foundations. On the one hand, disability is a normative concept 
that constructs rigid identities, such as “the disabled”, and is built on 
the division between a given norm and otherness. On the other hand, 
disability is extraordinary and steps out of one of the normative realms, 
little by little disrupting also other realms in which humanist thinking is 
ingrained, such as the division between a human and nonhuman animal. 
Shildrick (2009) and Goodley et al. (2014) talk about disability as space 
that opens up new ways of becoming, which elude normative organiza-
tion. This subversive potential and the inherent ambivalence of disability 
are caused by “letting it” into the humanist conception.
The posthumanist character of disability stands out if we analyze 
not only the construction of disability but also what disability does 
and what it elicits. Human disabilities and illnesses affect animals to 
a great extent, from less-controversial assistance animals, including 
guide dogs, to more controversial animals in medical experiments. If it 
were not for the concept of disability, Nessie would not have come into 
existence. A mere acknowledgment of the fact that disability concerns 
animals would still trap us in humanist thinking; a posthuman per-
spective re-thinks how to approach and analyze them. It is clear from 
the above analysis that the pivotal territorializing bonds for a guide 
dog team are not the human intelligence, superiority, and control that 
divide human and nonhuman animal subjectivities, but cooperation 
and trust.
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What is required is a reconfiguration of humanity and nonhuman 
animality not defined by the characteristics that maintain their asym-
metric relationship. Instead of the One and the Other, the  collectivity – 
 multiplicity – that changes both a human and her or his guide dog comes 
to the fore. Consequently, the analysis cannot draw on an anthropocen-
tric view. It is important to cease perceiving  nonhuman animals as “pas-
sive recipients of care and protection” (Rasmussen 2011, 102), as devoted 
pets (Haraway 2003), or as creatures working for people’s needs or as 
objects given for consumption (DeMello 2012). Such a shift in thinking 
does not imply that we cannot talk about  “protection” or “care” regard-
ing nonhuman animals, or fight their abuse. The  humanistic perspec-
tive, in either its superior or protectionist form, ascribes agency only to 
people, and the animal is dependent on human decisions and kindness, 
which also reflects the discourse of obedience and training. As the exam-
ples from Eva’s and Nessie’s life have shown, their guide team defies such 
a reductive dichotomy  between agentic human and docile dog.
Similarly, Haraway (2003), a social theorist and a biologist, discards 
the conception of a docile dog bred from a wild wolf – substituting na-
ture by culture – and writes about the mutual co-evolution of humans 
and dogs instead. According to her, co-evolution is the rule, rather than 
the exception, and diverse animal species (including humans) develop in 
mutual co-existence. Thus, a posthumanist approach does not lie only 
in taking “nonhuman actors” into consideration but in reconfiguring the 
binarities around which “humanity” and “animality” revolve. Haraway 
reconciles two seemingly exclusive issues, training and a dog’s agency. 
She finds an example in “agility”, a very demanding discipline that 
requires the coordination of people and their dogs aimed at managing an 
assault course as fast as possible:
The major demand on the human is precisely what most of us don’t 
even know we don’t know how to do – to wit, how to see who the dogs 
are and hear what they are telling us, not in bloodless abstraction, but 
in a one-on-one relationship, in otherness-in-connection.
(ibid., 45)
During the training, mutual obedience is necessary to eliminate elements 
that block trust on both sides. The resulting close bond can be called an 
assemblage since its logic is similar to the relationship between Nessie 
and Eva. As Haraway puts it, “Dogs are about the inescapable, contra-
dictory story of relationships – co-constitutive relationships in which 
none of the partners pre-exist the relating, ant the relating is never done 
once and for all” (ibid., 12).
The assemblage between a human and a dog is a process that is never 
established permanently. Correspondingly, the “origin” of a guide dog is 
an assemblage that has no clear beginning or end. The first written notes 
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about dogs accompanying blind people date back to the Middle Ages 
(Oxley 1995). Today, there are stories about dogs guiding other dogs 
that cannot see without anybody training them. Mostly lifestyle web-
sites4 feature such stories; journalists and then readers gush over “animal 
friendship”. The popularity of similar friendships does not eclipse the 
humanist position, but there is a different aspect to these examples – they 
disrupt the picture about a man using a dog for his needs. It is likely that 
the impulse for guiding first came from a dog or it was a mutual collabo-
ration. When I shared these stories with Eva, she responded:
It is likely then, that Nessie has the guiding in herself, somehow. 
I have to tell this to Lenka, so she doesn’t think anymore that guide 
dogs are such poor creatures.
(E-mail, March 21, 2016)
The image of the work and stress that guide dogs sometimes face often 
opposes the idea of a joyful and playful dog, and Eva tries to reconcile 
these two opposites by saying, Nessie has the guiding in herself. Guide 
dogs remind their clients that owning a guide dog is a big responsibility 
and that those dogs also need time for play and rest.
Nessie, the Guide Dog, and the Menace of the Forest
I have spoken about the unclear division between a human and a dog. 
However, there is also another boundary that is challenged by the 
 existence of a guide dog. Nessie is allowed to access places that are oth-
erwise strictly prohibited to “animals”, including hospitals, with their 
uncompromising hygiene standards. The line between a guide dog as an 
institution and a dog as an animal, which exclude one another in many 
ways, is disrupted. However, there are several interconnected ways to 
reconcile this paradox.
First, the dog is subsumed in a human subjectivity – “a dog becomes 
a notional part of your body”, the website Pomocné tlapky o.p.s. (n.d.) 
proclaims. In the concept of an assemblage, what matters is not the sub-
suming but a mutual conjunction in which neither is primary. But it is 
the dualistic Cartesian heritage of a superior mind and an inferior body, 
in which only a human mind is endowed with rationality, autonomy, and 
intelligence, that enables us to consider a dog to be part of a human sub-
ject. Second, under Czech law, a dog is reduced to technology, a “com-
pensatory aid” (Helppes,5 n.d.), and therefore is in the same position 
as a wheelchair or a prosthetic; the animality is erased. The training is 
supposed to secure his or her “technological character”, that is, control 
and predictability. Third, ideas that maintain the principle of a whole 
body and subject, and allow a connection between a human and a guide 
dog, are related to the discourse of “lack”. It is the lack of Eva’s vision 
that is substituted by Nessie’s sight. And it is the lack of Nessie’s rational, 
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autonomous subjectivity that grounds this fusion seemingly only on a 
bodily level, and it is a human mind that controls it.
The guide dog’s “animality” must be sidelined as much as possible 
so that a well-behaved, controlled, and predictable creature can come 
forward. But how can we characterize the relationship between a profes-
sional assistant and a dog? Is it possible to switch between those modes? 
What grounds this difference? At first, it seems quite simple:
The dog is a guide when she’s wearing her harness. When I put the 
harness on her, she is guiding me along the street, but when we come 
home, and I take the harness off, it means a holiday for her, and 
she’s acting like a naughty dog who doesn’t have to work.
(Interview, September 22, 2014)
A conjunction with a harness actualizes a guiding assemblage – Nessie 
becomes a professional who knows what to do and behaves responsibly. 
Taking her harness off turns off this regime, and she can be a dog again.
Nevertheless, it is not that easy; a harness is not a simple button that 
switches between diverse dog modes. Nessie does not wear her harness 
only in situations where she is supposed to guide Eva. In the Czech 
Republic, and largely in the United Kingdom, many public spaces pro-
hibit dogs from entering, such as churches, castles, museums, and in the 
United Kingdom, also public transportation and many restaurants. Eva 
and her boyfriend Filip, who sees and guides her when they are together, 
take Nessie to most events, trips, or walks, and it is the harness that 
allows them to take her with them, even though she is just on the leash 
with no intention of guiding Eva. As I noted earlier, their bond should 
be strong, and time spent together is thus a part of the assemblage of a 
guide team. Besides that, Nessie is their pet, and they just want to enjoy 
time with her. They often do not take off the harness in the city, so that 
they do not have to put it on and take it off all over again based on the 
nature of the spaces they enter. Moreover, Nessie is much calmer and 
does not pull so much when wearing the harness. Even during trips to 
the countryside, Nessie’s harness is always in the car for the occasion 
when dogs are not allowed to enter a restaurant. After the walk, they 
put the harness on her, and from a menace of the forest who loves div-
ing in puddles, Nessie transforms into a well-educated guide dog with 
universal access.
Nessie is Eva’s guide dog and, at the same time, a playful, energic 
animal, and hers and Filip’s pet, a member of the family with whom 
they have a strong emotional bond. Nevertheless, the reactions of other 
people confirm their image of a guide dog.
I don’t feel the difference between “Nessie the guide dog” and “Nessie 
the menace of the forest anymore,” but other people tend to emphasize 
her guiding side and think that she is a nice doggie when she is a guide. 
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Everybody admires her and people always say something like: “She 
has a such a calm nature, right?; These guide dogs are so nice and 
skillful!; She’s such a quiet sweetheart.” And tell those people that she 
ate shit a moment ago and she was hitting my legs with a stick during 
the entire trip.
(E-mail, May 13, 2015)
The reliability of training is a crucial part of the discourse regarding 
guide dogs, and, simultaneously, it is complemented with an image 
about the calm nature of the dog, which allows this training to happen – 
thus, nature is in agreement with “taming”. But Eva shows that docility 
and responsibility do not exclude an energic character, stubbornness, 
and disobedience; they just surface in different situations according to 
an assemblage that the dog creates. This assemblage is changing based 
on the connections it makes, and some deterritorializations can be fatal 
for its viability. For example, sometimes, people do not respect Nessie’s 
working status, and approach her like every other dog and stroke her 
without Eva’s permission or knowledge, which distracts Nessie and dis-
rupts the guiding assemblage.
Conclusion
The way human and nonhuman animals are conceptualized in hu-
manist discourse, that is, their separation and the emphasis on certain 
characteristics that differ for a human and a dog, does not help ex-
plain the workings of a guiding assemblage. Analytical and theoretical 
approaches that are not ingrained in the humanist heritage can better 
detect the reconfiguration, heterogeneity, dynamics, interconnectiv-
ity, and interchangeability of human-animal connections. Among the 
suitable theoretical frameworks are Deleuzo-Guattarian philosophy or 
Bruno Latour’s actor-network theory.
In the humanist perspective, built around bodily competence, a healthy 
subject is an ideal to which everyone else is compared. To approximate 
to this ideal, so-called disabled people are equipped with compensatory 
aids, including guide dogs. The loss has been replaced. But a much more 
heterogeneous process also occurs, which may be imperceptible when 
considering the relationship between a human and her/his guide dog 
merely from a humanist point of view – that is, when replacing a “loss”.
The idea of loss and its replacement is fulfilled only if a human, a dog, 
and their bodies are perceived as separate from each other. Their mutual 
connections reveal fluidity and inner instability, which are stabilized 
only through the process of territorialization of an assemblage. In the 
assemblage that not only Eva and Nessie but also the concepts of disabil-
ity and sight create, the character of these “input elements”, which are 
assemblages themselves, evolves. In short, to be disabled with a human 
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guide, a dog guide, or a cane, implies different experiences, creates other 
connections, and traces different lines. The same goes for being blind, 
which, in a Deleuzian perspective, is not the opposition of being sighted. 
Besides interconnections with other people, disability also necessarily 
produces interdependent connections with nonhuman entities, such as 
technology or animals (Goodley et al. 2014).
The guide dog is being constantly transformed from a pet into an assis-
tant, which goes against stereotypes about animals in many ways. Even 
the humanist thinking that stresses the rationality, independence, auton-
omy, and coherence of the modern subject, in which so-called disabled 
people inevitably fail (Gibson 2006; Shildrick 2009; Tremain 2015), is 
not closed to deterritorializations that question these characteristics and 
expose their paradoxical nature. Shildrick (2009) and Overboe (2007) 
see disability as an opportunity for creating a new body and experience 
and for undermining the norm. The same occurs with a dog.
The concept of assemblage not only stresses mutual associations, 
connective difference, fluidity, and interconnectivity but also opens up 
space for emotions and feelings, which are often invisible in the modern 
concept of subjectivity rooted in rational decisions. My research has 
shown that the feeling of trust is the crucial glue in a human-guide dog 
assemblage, and trust can be one of the ways of approaching otherness. 
Perceiving the experience of so-called disabled people from a human-
ist point of view inevitably leads to comparing them to the so-called 
healthy experience that cannot see beyond its own limits. Trust could 
overcome gaps between these experiences that should be perceived as 
equally valuable – rather than perceiving one as the ideal to which the 
other can only approximate.
Notes
 1 The research was based in the Czech Republic, and the interviews were car-
ried out in Czech. For the purpose of this text, I translated Eva’s quotations 
into English. She has been informed about the ongoing research, including 
this chapter.
 2 “Helpful paws” is a Czech school for guide dogs.
 3 While it is usual that people use both a dog and a white cane while walking, 
Eva takes out the cane only if she needs to be easily recognized as visually 
impaired, so that people help her to find a zebra or get on a bus.
 4 See, for example, three different stories on the websites Boredpanda (2015), 
Gizmodo (2012), and MailOnline (2013).
 5 “Help-dog” is a Czech guiding school.
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Human beings evolve in a world that they share with nonhuman entities. 
Among these nonhuman entities, there are many technical objects that 
are commonly called “digital media”: personal computers, smartphones, 
tablets, and so on. These are all machines that function on the basis of 
binary calculations incorporated into electronic machinery. While the 
term “media” focuses attention on the communicational function of 
these machines, and therefore on the way in which they organize com-
munication between human beings, we prefer to call them “computa-
tional machines” to insist on the fact that they perform calculations and 
have a certain kind of autonomy.
These calculations are made, however, in a way that is fundamentally 
different from the way humans compute (Souchier 1996; Collomb and 
Goyet 2016). Therefore, the term “computational machines” also puts 
light on the otherness of these machines, reframing the problem of the 
relationships that human beings have with them. These relationships 
are constructed not only around the various uses that humans make 
of  machines but also around many texts that build up representations of 
machines: novels, films, photographs, media productions of different 
kinds, and so on. In other words, a range of narratives that are read, 
seen, and heard in daily life builds up the representations that humans 
have of computational machines and the relationships they can have 
with them. Narratives play an important part in the way humans and 
nonhumans interact (Haraway 2003, 2016). In this chapter, we share the 
need for renewed narratives about digital machines (Collomb 2016), and 
we try to do so by grounding our work into semiotics and digital materi-
alism (Dolphijn and van der Tuin 2012; Casemajor 2014; Jahjah 2016). 
This leads to three important ideas that we need to explain in detail: the 
materiality of narratives, a broad definition of what a text is, a focus on 
ordinary texts and the ideology they perform.
First of all, narratives are not ethereal. They have a form of some sort; 
they are produced by certain actors, certain companies and institutions, 
and so on. Narratives are not independent from their material, concrete, 
and meaningful forms (MacKenzie 1991). In other words, they are de-
pendent on a text. A “text” is not only to be understood in the sense of a 
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literary work or a book, for example. There are also “texts that are not 
books” (MacKenzie 1991, 30): these may include a film or a web page, 
for example. We therefore adopt a broad definition of what a text is, and 
we analyze it under the aspect of power. If we follow the reasoning of 
Michel De Certeau, a text can actually be a place of power organized 
by writing (in the broad sense of the term, in other words including 
 pictures, letters, sounds, etc.). When a person writes, s/he produces a 
text that makes a distinction between objects and subjects, between 
those who have a say and those who do not – in a typically modern 
 gesture that reduces the world to a set of objects and mechanical forces 
(De Certeau 1990, 235). In other words, a text – in the sense of De 
Certeau – is a place of power, a place where power relations are organized.
These relations often involve the use of graphic elements. By graphic 
elements, we mean everything that makes a text readable for a human 
being. It goes from typography, layout of the page, color of the text, and 
spacing between paragraphs to the legend of a picture, the collection in 
which a book is published or the software used to read a digital docu-
ment, the screen through which the text is made perceptible for a human 
being. These graphic elements are not neutral. As the form is meaningful 
(MacKenzie 1991), they say something about the text they allow the 
readers to read. They produce a specific kind of utterance: an editorial 
utterance (énonciation éditoriale, Souchier 1998), where every actor of 
the editorial chain (typographer, graphic designer, publisher, software 
designer) has its say, in addition to what is identified as the main author 
of the text. If the form is meaningful, and if the way the text is visually 
organized on a page is an act of utterance, then the geography of the 
page is thus geography of power. For example, placing an element in the 
“margin” is a devaluation which is at once topographical and symbolic.
In this chapter, the text is broadly defined as an organization of signs 
on a material substrate. Web pages, or computer screens, can thus be 
understood as texts that organize power relationships between the en-
tities concerned: humans and machines. The question is then to specify 
the place attributed to the computational machine in those specific types 
of text that are ordinary web pages, and what representations of the 
relationships between humans and machines are thereby constructed on 
these very pages. A semiotic analysis of ordinary web pages, based on 
the French media theory of “written writing screens” (Souchier 1996; 
Jeanneret and Souchier 1999; Souchier and Jeanneret 2005), can thus re-
veal the dominant ideology that circulates therein, and the way in which 
this ideology configures the relationship between humans and computa-
tional nonhumans.
The dominant ideology in the relationship between humans and tech-
nical objects, and found in ordinary interfaces, is anthropocentrism. 
This ideology is expressed in at least two ways. Either the technical ob-
ject is reduced to a purely instrumental role: it is a tool that may be more 
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or less sophisticated but only exists because of its usefulness to humans. 
Or else, in an expression of rampant technical fetishism, it is elevated 
to the rank of a sacred object to which humans delegate their dreams of 
power. Culture, writes Simondon,
thus entails two contradictory attitudes towards technical objects: 
on the one hand, it treats them as mere assemblages of matter, bereft 
of any real meaning, and possessing only a certain utility. On the 
other hand, it assumes that these objects are also robots and that 
they are animated by hostile intentions towards humans, or that 
they embody a permanent danger of aggression towards them, of in-
surrection. Considering that the first characteristic is a good thing, 
culture aims to prevent the manifestation of the second, and talks 
about putting machines to work for mankind, in the belief that re-
ducing them to a status of servitude is a sure means of preventing 
any rebellion.
(Simondon 1958, 11)
These two anthropocentric perspectives on technology can be found in 
the different conceptions people have of computational machines. At 
times, they are considered as tools that serve humans, enabling them to 
calculate at great speed or to have access to virtually unlimited stores of 
knowledge, thus giving humans the impression of having great power. 
At other times, these same machines crystallize the fantasies of human 
beings who project their own dreams onto the machines, for better or 
worse as the case may be. These fantasies can go from transhumanist 
(Bostrom 2008) utopian futures where machines can help humans to 
transcend their mortal selves to dystopian worlds where computers are 
at the service of government surveillance or have taken power over hu-
man condition, for instance. It is these two attitudes toward machines – 
the one that considers them purely as tools and the other that projects 
human fantasies of omnipotence onto them – that we find in ordinary 
interfaces. On the web pages that people consult every day, the machine 
is most often considered in both of these human terms.
The aims of this chapter are to study how this anthropocentric con-
ception of the machine circulates in daily life, to bring out the extent 
to which this conception is constructed, to investigate its propagation, 
and to propose a different way of considering the relationship between 
humans and machines. The first part of the chapter offers a semiotic 
analysis of a page of results obtained via Google Search, in order to 
show, through the example of the calculation time, how the machine is 
relegated to the rank of a simple tool and how its action is represented in 
terms that remain specific to humans. However, and this is the concern 
of the second part of the chapter, if we want to grant machines an agency 
on their own terms, we need to pinpoint and describe their specific mode 
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of action. This mode of action is to put in terms of writing: machines 
allow humans to write, but they also write (Kittler 1995; Hayles 2002). 
This writing is not textual but computational: for a computer, to write 
is to compute, and to compute is to write, since they are rooted into 
formal logic and a specific conception of calculus as a kind of writing 
(Lassègue et Longo 2012). But this writing does not necessarily pro-
duce a human-readable text. In this sense, computational machines are 
objects that to some extent lie outside the category of texts. This is the 
reason why we propose to make a clear distinction between the “textual 
writing” of humans and the “computational writing” of machines (Col-
lomb and Goyet 2016). We then need to uncover the mark of computa-
tional activity in what is most characteristic, through a semiotic analysis 
that focuses on “computational writing”, in objects such as bugs, for 
example.
Ordinary Anthropocentrism of Web Pages: the Case of 
Google Search
We have selected a particularly representative example of the way in 
which relationships between humans and computational machines are 
constructed at the interface level. This example illustrates the everyday 
anthropocentrism through which people interpret the action of the ma-
chine in terms of their own categories. We first perform a semiotic analy-
sis of the interface, in order to bring out this everyday anthropocentrism. 
We then attempt to draw out the consequences that this sort of represen-
tation of machines can have for the relationship between humans and 
machines (Figure 10.1).
This is the results page of a Google Search for “Reindeer”, made on 
September 27, 2015. Three main zones can be identified: the two bars at 
Figure 10.1  Screenshot of a Google Search request for “Reindeer”, carried out 
on September 27, 2015.
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the top, including the search formula and tabs used to specify the type 
of search (images, videos, etc.). Next, the column on the left displaying a 
list of links, each comprising the first lines of the pages to which the links 
refer. This column is usually interpreted as the search “results”. The 
frame on the right shows pictures followed by a descriptive note con-
cerning “Reindeer”, translated in the French screenshot as  “Caribou” 
and apparently taken from Wikipedia.
Google, by means of its interface, assembles a set of documents from 
a variety of different media (newspaper articles, encyclopedia articles, 
photographs, zoology fact sheets, etc.), and presents this set as the 
 response to the search request. Through its use of space (the results con-
sidered most relevant are at the top of the list) and the typeset (some 
characters are larger than others and may be colored), the Google Search 
interface constructs levels of relevance: what is at the top and in the larg-
est print is what we should look at first, because this is where we find 
the content considered most relevant to the request in question. What is 
it that makes the semiotic link between the request and the response? 
It is the inscription in discreet light gray lettering that indicates “About 
32.300.000 results (0,60 seconds)”. This indicates that the list before 
our eyes is only a tiny fraction of over 32 million results. And this is the 
work that Google actually does: it performs an algorithmic action that 
enables it to scan a set of documents, organized as a database, in order to 
calculate the results it selects as most relevant in this context as rapidly 
as possible.
The way Google’s work is signified can be treated on two levels. First, 
on the level of the text image (Souchier 1998), the algorithmic action 
performed by Google occupies a paradoxical position, because it is at 
once minimized and given prominence. It is minimized if we only con-
sider the aspect of the text: in light gray and small characters, the phrase 
is barely noticed. On the other hand, its place in the topography of the 
page is highly symbolic: between the request and the responses, it cor-
responds to the articulation between the two. This sentence is thus the 
textualization of Google’s mediation, which is based on an algorithmic 
processing. It is a paradoxical textualization, however. The technical 
mediation is displayed as a technological prowess in the sense that the 
calculation time, which is indeed quite short, is shown in a strategic po-
sition on the page; at the same time, this technical mediation is kept on 
the background by the format of the text and the fact that the terms in 
which it is expressed suggest that it is “immediate” or “very fast” – as if 
the calculation time was so fast that it is “practically” instantaneous so 
that from a semiotic point of view, it is invisible, all the more so as it is 
presented so discreetly as to be practically unnoticeable.
Second, on the level of the textual content, the technical process is 
denoted by two numbers, one corresponding to the approximate num-
ber of pages found (32 million) and the other corresponding to the time 
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taken by the algorithms to scan these documents and to select some of 
them. What do such formulae express? In our view, they convey (i) an 
anthropocentric perspective with respect to computational activity and 
(ii) a mythification of the action of the machine.
First, these formulae express an anthropocentric vision of the action 
of the machine. From the point of view of a human, these intervals of 
time or numbers of documents hardly make any sense. Whether there 
are 32 million results or 400,000 makes no difference to human beings. 
Whether scanning these documents took 0.60 or 0.61 seconds is irrele-
vant. They cannot grasp such orders of magnitude. For computational 
machines, however, there is a real difference between 0.60 seconds and 
0.61 seconds. This is an interval of time within which they are capable 
of operating: they can scan 32 million pages in 0.60 seconds, but they 
could go faster or scan more documents in the same period of time. In 
this context, the difference between 0.60 and 0.61 seconds is relevant.
When human beings see the formula “0.60 seconds” displayed, they 
know that it refers to the computational action, but they interpret it as 
practically instantaneous because such a short interval in time makes 
little sense to them. The scale of time that people use is one that does 
make sense to them. They interpret these signs according to their own 
regime of meaning, although these signs designate an action that takes 
place in a very different regime. When they do so, humans make no ef-
fort to decenter themselves: they keep to an anthropocentric posture and 
project instantaneity into something that, for the machine, is a genuine 
duration. This amounts to imposing a human regime of interpretation, 
with the consequence that the mode of existence of computational ma-
chines is overshadowed. The way is then open for the human to occupy 
the entire space, relegating the machine to the status of a mere tool.
However, this transformation of a period of time into instantaneity, 
by way of an anthropocentric interpretation, is also the creation of a 
myth, in the sense developed by Roland Barthes (1957). According to 
Barthes, a myth is created in three stages: diversion, essentialization, 
and the negation of otherness. First comes the diversion, through what 
Barthes calls a “theft of language” (Barthes 1957, 239): the human steals 
a sign that already exists, and attributes a new meaning to it. What 
are the rhetorical effects when the human takes the sign “32,300,000 
results (0.60 seconds)” and gives it the meaning of “the machine works 
very fast”? The initial sign is no longer taken in its literal sense, but to 
indicate an extraordinary performance: the outstanding power and ef-
ficiency of the machine. The human thus diverts the primary meaning 
to fix and essentialize the action of the machine, which is to supply a 
response so instantaneous as to be practically magical.
This essentialization is the second stage in myth creation. It no lon-
ger matters whether the machine has taken 0.61 or 0.62 seconds: the 
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variations of the initial sign are abolished; only the performance counts. 
In fine, the myth establishes a process of drawing everything into itself, 
which is profoundly ideological: according to Barthes, the bourgeoisie, 
through this process of mythification, takes ownership of the Other by 
transforming it into its own image. This, the third step in mythification, 
is the negation of otherness, in this case the otherness of the machine. 
Google is now understood only as a service that some humans (the devel-
opers of the firm) place at the disposal of other humans, via a process of 
technical mediation (the PageRank algorithm). The involvement of the 
machine in the mediation is relegated to a purely subsidiary role, as an 
adjuvant to benefit humans and their desires.
This is why mythification and anthropocentrism feed on each other: 
while the process of mythification is grounded in anthropocentrism, 
it also reinforces it. Anthropocentrism amounts to apprehending the 
whole of reality on the basis of the human perspective, thereby wiping 
out all the differences that cannot be digested into its own system. 
This anthropocentrism neutralizes the specific mode of existence of 
machines and is thus both the starting-point and the outcome of the 
process of mythification. The way Google Search results’ computation 
is made visible and readable can thus be understood as the creation of 
an anthropocentric perspective on computational machines. But this 
introduction has nothing creative about it, contrary to the (trivial) pro-
cess described by Yves Jeanneret (2008). It merely reinforces an already 
deeply rooted ideology: an ideology that is only capable of  conferring 
an existence to the machine by bringing it back into a human order 
of understanding. Anthropocentrism and mythification operate in a 
closed loop: their redundancy leads to their mutual reinforcement. 
This is why undermining anthropocentrism effectively interrupts 
this  process of self-propagation. And it is here, in this interruption – 
 however momentary – that the possibility emerges for humans to open 
up to the mode of existence of machines.
Of course there are other ways of reading “32.300.000 results (0,60 
seconds)”. A software engineer who has the task of optimizing the 
 algorithm knows that 0.61 seconds is not the same as 0.60 seconds – 
just as an online gamer will be sensitive to any change in the response 
time of the server (or ping), to the millisecond. These various interpreta-
tions  depend on the literacy of each person, that is, on their knowledge 
and expertise with respect to the machine and the way it functions. Just 
as for Barthes, in his analysis of advertising (Barthes 1964), there are 
 several levels of interpretation according to the culture of the person 
concerned, so there are different ways of reading and understanding the 
way the activity of the machine is put into signs.
To produce other ways of interpreting the calculation time of the ma-
chine, one must shift away from anthropocentrism. These other ways 
210 Cléo Collomb and Samuel Goyet
are techno-logical (Collomb 2016), in the sense that they pay attention 
to the technical reality (whereas anthropo-logy is centered by human 
reality). However, this technological approach to the activity of com-
putational machines represents only a tiny minority compared to the 
dominant ideology consisting of an anthropocentric interpretation of 
computational activity (“the machine works fast”). This ideology is so 
powerful precisely because it is the major interpretation. In fact, Google 
paves the way for this anthropocentric interpretation since the formula 
“0.60 seconds” is already an approximation. It is highly probable that 
the algorithmic calculation actually took 0.5983687 seconds (for ex-
ample), depending on the degree of precision chosen by the software 
developers according to the capacities of their servers. Such a degree 
of precision points to a different relationship with the machine, a re-
lationship that is focused on its actual mode of operation (calculation) 
and on the fact that, for the machine, a thousandth or even a millionth 
of a second is an operational duration. Google, through its choice of 
the number of decimals to be displayed, is not only enabling but also 
sustaining a relationship between humans and computational machines 
that tend toward anthropocentrism, while drawing a veil over the tech-
nical reality of calculation.
Reconfiguring Relationships Between Humans and 
Nonhumans: toward Non-Anthropocentric Semiotics
We have just shown, through a semiotic analysis of an ordinary web 
page – the Google Search service in this case – how the activity of a 
computational machine is textualized, meaning put into signs in the 
interface. We have insisted on the fact that this textualization is based 
on, and reinforces, an anthropocentric view in which the temporality 
of humans takes precedence over that of the machines, which has the 
effect of promoting an ideological representation of the relationship 
between humans and machines that reduces technical reality to an an-
thropological and purely instrumental scheme.
Our aim, however, is not only to describe how interfaces configure 
the representations that humans have of machines. We also seek to 
propose alternative narratives that make it possible to see everyday in-
terfaces as a hybrid reality in which humans and machines are caught 
up in a common adventure. This means allowing nonhumans, in this 
case computational machines, to exist in their own right – that is, with-
out subjecting them to an anthropocentric scheme. But how, then, do 
we allow them to exist? By showing what it is that they actually do. 
This implies (i) identifying their activity in their own terms, which in-
volves what we can refer to as technological decentering (in the sense 
of switching the focus to the technical reality), and then (ii) revealing 
machine activity for what it is.
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Computational Writing as Machines’ Activity
What is it that computational machines do? According to Turing (1936), 
they can be described as machines that write. Not only because they 
enable humans to write, but because the way they actually function is 
based on a certain kind of writing, a form of writing that does not obey 
the same imperatives as human writing. Thus, binary writing, which 
obeys the elementary rules of arithmetic and Boolean logic, does not 
work to the same requirements as the alphabetic writing of humans. In 
other words, the writing that machines do (organized around calcula-
tion) is different from the writing of humans (organized around the text).
In seeking to resolve the problem of decision as posed by Hilbert and 
Ackermann, Turing – in On Computable Numbers, with an application 
to the Entscheidungsproblem (Turing 1936) – establishes a clear proxim-
ity between writing and calculation. First, when a machine calculates, it 
inscribes and scans across inscriptions: differences in electrical potential 
are engraved on a substrate, generally the magnetic tape of a hard disk. 
Next, because its activity is automatic, its states can only correspond to 
configurations that have been described in advance by humans, what is 
commonly called a “programme”. This writing of the machine, which 
we propose to call computational writing, does not work in the same 
way as human writing, or what we call textual writing. Incidentally, it is 
interesting to note that whereas the proximity between calculation and 
writing is very strong in Turing’s text, he never says that the machine 
“reads” or that it “writes”. The machine does not read, it scans, and 
the only symbol that enters into account is the one that it is currently 
scanning: “the scanned symbol is the only one of which the machine is, 
so to speak, ‘directly aware’” (Turing 1936, 236). In other words, the 
machine has no memory. But it does interpret: in reading a sign, it is 
informed as to the next operation it must perform. It acts according to 
what it scans. Scanning means detecting by moving the read head along 
the tape, so that it “reads” but in a one-dimensional fashion: to the left 
or to the right. According to Turing, the machine does not write either, 
since it notes, writes down, or prints symbols (Turing 1936, 230–231, 
245–246).
Thus, although he often relies on analogies between machines and 
human beings, Turing never crosses the line of attributing human be-
havior to the machine. In following Turing’s approach, we do not wish – 
when we state that computational machines are machines that write – to 
 project any human qualities onto them. On the contrary, we aim to rec-
ognize the specificity of the computational writing performed by these 
machines. What is at issue in our text, and in Turing’s, is the construction 
of a relationship between the human and the machine – a relationship 
that relies on writing. For the “Turing machine” to be conceivable, it had 
to involve a mechanical reduction of the human. The human-machine 
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relationship is therefore a kind of analogy. What is interesting, however, 
is that once the machine is conceived and described, the relationship is 
no longer analogical: the human and the machine do not do the same 
things – they are different. The human is not a machine, and the machine 
is not human. They do have something in common: writing. This is the 
crux of their relationship. The relationship is, however, clearly differenti-
ated, in the sense that humans and computers do not have the same sort 
of writing.
What then is the specificity of computational writing? It is one- 
dimensional, as we have just said, but it is also based on the monosemic 
nature of the signs: the machine scans a finite set of signs inscribed on 
a substrate. It then acts according to these signs and its current internal 
configuration, and then it moves on. Each sign must therefore indicate 
a single configuration, the only possible one. If, for a given sequence of 
symbols, there were several possible subsequent configurations, the ma-
chine would not be able to decide by itself which configuration it should 
adopt. This is why the computational sign is necessarily monosemic, 
whereas a sign read by a human is characterized in particular by the fact 
that it is polysemic, which means there is a plural relationship between 
the signifier and what is signified (De Saussure 1916).
What Turing clearly established in 1936 is that calculation is a writing 
of signs, an operation that reads and modifies states: the computational 
machine is thus at once a machine for calculating and a machine for 
writing. One might ask the point of continuing to use the term “writ-
ing” to refer to the activity of computational machines since Turing 
himself carefully avoided using it. The point is certainly not to support 
the myth of a human machine, a myth whose political and ideological 
effects are potentially dangerous and often harmful. But by keeping 
the term “writing” when referring to the activity of these machines, it 
is  possible to avoid excluding them from the domain of culture in the 
name of a humanist monopoly over the field of meaning – an exclusion 
which,  according to Simondon, is “the greatest cause of alienation in 
the contemporary world” (Simondon 1958, 11).
However, if as a matter of principle we admit that computational ma-
chines are machines that write, we come to the thorny question of their 
phenomenological expression. The fact is that these machines execute 
instructions that are inscribed in a space of less than 100 mm2 within 
a few ten-thousandths of a second. They therefore function outside 
the limits of human perception and comprehension of space and time. 
A  human being is not equipped with an adequate perceptual apparatus 
to detect the difference between 0 and 5 volts, although the difference 
is entirely meaningful for the machine since this is the binary code that 
structures the way it stores and processes data. The activity of the com-
putational machine – computational writing – is not directly percep-
tible as such by humans. It must be textualized, translated into signs 
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that humans can perceive. In other words, “bridges have to be built 
between the technical object and language” because digital technology 
breaks down the “close and permanent” relationship linking the sign 
and its substrate (Jeanneret and Souchier 1999, 103). There is a need for 
mediation to achieve the transition “between the requirements of the 
machine and those of social exchange” (Souchier and Jeanneret 2002, 
102). To take a simple example, between the data that a user enters via 
a  keyboard – letters – and what the user will see displayed on the screen, 
there is a need for a variety of mediating layers that “translate” be-
tween what is readable by a human and what a machine can manipulate. 
Between the “technical memory trace that is inaccessible to humans” 
and the “text displayed on the screen” (Souchier and Jeanneret 2002, 
102), and vice versa, various mediating layers are inserted to allow for 
the translating operations. The technical dimension, the space of the 
machine, remains inaccessible to the human user and needs to be textu-
alized before humans can grasp it.
The technical dimension, which is absent from “the scene of what is 
visible” (Souchier 1996, 108), is a space for texts that are “coded by and 
for the machine” (Souchier 1996, 108), which are literally unreadable 
by humans and beyond their comprehension. According to Emmanuël 
Souchier, it is a “secret” space which humans can variously people with 
fantasies, dreams, and fears: “Only the machine can preserve the space 
of the secret, but this space is purely technical and thus inaccessible to 
humans. The secret, the intimacy of the machine, is a matter for the 
algorithm or for fantasy” (Souchier 1996, 118). The technical space for 
calculation cannot be perceived by humans because it is organized not 
for them but for the machine. It therefore calls for processes whereby 
it can be transformed into signs and meanings that can be grasped 
“anthropo-logically” – in other words, for textualization.
the Problem of Computation for Semiotics
In attempting to make the activity of computational machines visible, we 
have established that we must first characterize this activity in its own 
domain: computational writing that occurs on a scale beyond the scope 
of human perception. Once we have characterized it, the question is to 
make it exist and be visible in our own daily lives. How can this be done, 
since what these machines do is beyond the human scale of perception? 
Hence, the need to textualize their activity, but the problem is then as 
follows: if we have to textualize computational processes so that hu-
mans can grasp it, how do we approach these computational machines 
without reducing them to an anthropocentric scheme? In other words, 
does the necessary textualization of calculation not make it impossible 
to apprehend computational machines in any way that is not already 
anthropocentric?
214 Cléo Collomb and Samuel Goyet
This amounts to questioning the relevance of semiotics in an approach 
to computational machines. Semiotics can address the textualization of 
calculation, but in this case it reduces the activity of the machine to an-
thropocentric signs. Semiotics can then address calculation itself (thereby 
becoming techno-logy in the sense that it is geared to the technical di-
mension), but since the latter, by definition, lies beyond graphic reason-
ing, it is difficult to describe it, because graphic reasoning only handles 
the organization of signs. In short, can calculation be apprehended on 
the basis of its textualization, or is the textualization of calculation al-
ways already a reduction of the latter to an anthropocentric scheme? 
Is semiotics the right method to approach the computational writing if 
calculation, by definition, always lies outside graphic reasoning (Goody 
1977)? Eventually, is it possible to perceive this kind of writing, to make 
it exist in its descriptions, to tell its story?
What a Non-Anthropocentric Semiotics Could Be?
The problem has therefore to do with the manifestation of a calculation 
on the screen. Where would it appear? What would be the objects that 
are specific to non-anthropocentric semiotics? Where would we find 
the marks of computational activity in ordinary web pages? What we 
need are marks that are not already a textualization of calculation as, 
for example, visitor statistics or numbers of “likes”, comments, and 
shares are.
Computer “calculation” is different from the statistical breakdown of 
clicks or visits. The machine manipulates 0s and 1s not to add them up 
but rather as elementary symbols whose encoding corresponds to certain 
actions. The phrase “18 likes” displayed on the screen is not a mark of 
computational activity. It is the translation into terms that a human can 
understand of an accounting breakdown followed by a display of clicks 
that are considered significant – but all from the viewpoint of the human.
More generally, it is very likely that everyday interfaces such as Google 
Search or Facebook are so deeply marked by an ideology of inter-human 
communication that they leave no space for the expression of computa-
tional actions in terms that are not already in textual writing; hence, the 
difficulty of constructing objects of analysis for the non-anthropocentric 
semiotics is required.
This being so, perhaps we should not be looking into cases where 
the interface “works” properly from the communicational point of view 
(i.e. organized with a view to human-human communication), but rather 
into cases where it does not work properly, where there is a breakdown, 
whether the breakdown is deliberately sought and provoked – for exam-
ple, in the case of an art project that is more concerned with potential for 
the expression of the machine than with the intelligibility for humans – 
or whether it is the fruit of chance, as in the case of a “bug”. A bug, 
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from this point of view, occurs when a computational writing sequence 
suddenly appears in the middle of a textual writing sequence. A video 
that cannot be read properly because a plug-in is out of date; the CSS 
of a site that does not upload correctly and the text looks disorganized 
and anarchic on the page; a Google Earth map that apparently defies the 
laws of physics – “bugs” like these demonstrate the machine-driven com-
position of every interface, which is frequently denied by the dominant 
anthropocentrism that refers to them as “bugs”. Such incidents are only 
“bugs” if we adopt the anthropocentric and instrumental perspective 
according to which the technical object must obey human requirements. 
In the examples given above, the machine is not making any mistakes; 
it is doing its job – it is calculating and providing a graphic rendering 
of the calculation precisely as it supposed to do based on the available 
information. There is only a “bug”, in the sense of an error, by virtue of 
the ideology of the computer as a tool that serves humans.
This brings us, finally, to the heuristic value of “errors”. Georges 
Perec, in his text on the infra-ordinary, tells that “trains only start to 
exist when they derail” (Perec 1989). In other words, they exist when 
the ordinary daily course of events goes wrong and we become conscious 
of the ideologies that shape our experience of the world. It is in these 
out-of-the-ordinary moments when the interface goes off the rails that 
we get a glimpse of the ideology that shapes the relationships between 
humans and machines. To push the point further, when ordinary daily 
routine goes offtrack, which is considered unacceptable, we forget that 
what is really unacceptable is in fact the ordinary situation, where the 
greatest violence is exercised. In the same way as “the scandal is not the 
firedamp, it is the working conditions in the mines”, the scandal is not 
that the interface goes derailed; rather, it is the systematic invisibility of 
the activity of the machine when the screens function “normally”. The 
semiotics that we propose could therefore start by taking “bugs” as op-
portunities to test our hypotheses. Looking into the out-of-the-ordinary, 
when the normal daily routine has not yet made the ideology invisible, 
is a good way to start learning how the machine itself acts and how to 
detect the signs of computational writing. The empirical content (bugs) 
of these non-anthropocentric semiotics may be somewhat limited for the 
moment, but they will necessarily evolve. Because we are still only in the 
early stages of this new approach, we have to start by investigating what 
is ignored and hidden in current semiotics, and the ideology that under-
lies our representations of computational machines, with the ultimate 
aim of making them evolve.
Conclusion
In this chapter we have shown the existence of an anthropocentric and 
instrumental conception of computational machines in ordinary web 
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pages like Google Search results. We have done so by using semiotics, 
and particularly by paying close attention to the way the machine op-
erations are signified. To be able to pay that kind of an attention, we 
had to understand how a computational machine works and what kind 
of computation it does. To qualify this computation, we proposed the 
term “computational writing”: the machine writes, but in a way that is 
significantly different from human writing. This led us to acknowledge 
the limits of semiotics to analyze computational activity. Even if writing 
can be a common ground to analyze this activity and the relationship 
between humans and computational machines, due to the anthropocen-
tric conception we have shown, text is less likely to be a conception that 
tends to make machines invisible – unless one adopts a technological at-
titude (Collomb 2016) toward digital texts. This attitude allows paying 
different attention to these texts, without quickly discarding everything 
that makes no sense to humans. The example of Google Earth’s “bugs” 
showed the results of this approach, and how it acts both as a way to 
counteract ordinary anthropocentrism and a way to create new narra-
tives of the relationships between humans and machines.
Eventually, these non-anthropocentric semiotics open up to a political 
dimension – in the ecological sense that Latour or Descola would give to 
the term (Latour 2007) – since we use the discourse of the research scien-
tist as a way of intervening in the economics of narratives by introducing 
new ones. Our hope is that this text will contribute, however modestly, 
locally, and provisionally, to the reconfigurations of the relationships 
between humans and nonhumans that we need for the world to make 
sense.
Translation from French to English by John Stewart and Ilona 
Bossanyi.
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In the end, you know it’s all just blocks.
akkashtin (Minecraft Forum, n.d.1)
Once again, I find myself and other entities in a random location in 
world that is constantly being generated – block upon and next to 
another – as far as my avatar’s body and location let me see. And beyond 
that, ever so far are the unreachable edges and countless wonders of the 
virtual world I have just entered. The end of the world is unreachable as 
the world is constantly, randomly, and infinitely generated as my avatar 
moves forward in the world. As a result of this procedural creation, the 
world in question does not exist, yet. Only the algorithm and the code 
do, but everything else is on the verge of being actualized. This process 
happens as a shared activity between the player and countless other ele-
ments and agents, such as pixels, algorithms, and game developers.
This engagement to creation and co-agency happens inside the player 
experience of a commercial product called Minecraft. Minecraft is a 
sandbox videogame first developed by Mojang AB in 2009. In 2018, it 
was the second best-selling videogame of all time – after Tetris – and 
available for various platforms including consoles, PCs, and mobile de-
vices (Wikipedia 2018). It can be played both as a single-player and as a 
group of many players via the Internet, and it has several game modes, 
which vary in difficulty.
The basic idea of Minecraft is to explore and build a world of one’s 
own. The world consists of blocks of different materials, and the player 
digs, chops, shovels them up, and then organizes them again in different 
formations such as houses and railroads. Food is acquired by hunting, 
gathering, or farming. The basic gameplay has no specific goals; the only 
set objective is to survive in a sometimes-perilous environment. The game 
does not end if the player dies; they merely drop all they are carrying at 
that moment and then respawn again to previously determined coordi-
nates. Even though the game has no set goals or quests, the players easily 
set them for themselves. The urge to accomplish something – whether it 
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is a huge castle or a gate to the Netherworld – makes Minecraft a highly 
addictive game. As the possibilities are almost endless – limited only by 
the rules of the game and the players’ imagination – one can never win 
or finish the game.
As said, the world is created and constructed in front of the avatar’s/
player’s eyes, and it is tied to the movement of the avatar and thus to the 
choices of direction or speed of movement and action the player makes. 
Herein lies the immersive power of Minecraft: everything is always new 
and exciting even though the player might have seen every single block 
type many times before. It is the specific way the blocks organize; this 
time is always different from the last. As Minecraft is filled with little 
bugs and strange incidents, such as a tree growing from air or an aban-
doned well in the middle of the desert, the player never knows what to 
expect. The player is constantly invited to wander a step further or to dig 
one cube deeper. Desire to go further and to dig deeper can rouse desire 
to possess and to leave traces or signs of one’s presence in the virtual 
environment. This desire can be interpreted as colonial: the narrative of 
the game rests upon the trope of the great (male) explorer bravely ventur-
ing into uncharted, uninhabited lands. This desire is obviously more dis-
tinct in multiplayer games, where the players express their presence and 
accomplishments to other players. However, even when playing alone, 
the desire to leave a mark on the environment is present.
This chapter sets out to map the human and nonhuman co-agencies at 
work in videogames and gameplay situations. Videogame studies have 
multiple and contradictory definitions for the concept of a game. The 
main disagreement has long been about the ontology of games: whether 
they are essentially systems of rules, or narratives. I wish to pass this 
conflict of narratological and ludological theories by relying on Ian 
Bogost’s definition: “video games are a mess” (Bogost 2009). Bogost 
states that games are by nature vague and effusive and as such they 
cannot be pushed to fit into strict categories. Games are never either/
or but always both – and thus it is beneficial to abandon hierarchical 
definitions altogether. Some common elements – which are also present 
in Minecraft – can, however, be defined. All videogames have some sort 
of rules limiting and guiding gameplay (e.g. Suits 1978), and they are all 
characterized by the interaction between human and the game device 
(Galloway 2006, 2). In addition, all videogames are play, paidia, which 
is by definition voluntary and meaningful in itself (e.g. Huizinga 1967; 
Suits 1978; Caillois 2001; Salen and Zimmerman 2004).
This chapter has three key points. The first is to deconstruct the 
 subject-object dichotomy surrounding human interaction with other 
materialities. Drawing from the works of Baruch Spinoza, Jane  Bennett, 
and Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, I argue that we cannot take 
responsibility nor glory for our actions, as they are always produced in 
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cooperation with forces sometimes unknown and unseen to us. Spinoza 
argues that everything in this world is made of the same substance. 
All separate bodies – human and nonhuman – are  manifestations of 
this divine substance (see Spinoza 1994). Deleuze and Guattari fol-
low  Spinoza with concepts of rhizome and assemblage, which both 
are  horizontal ways of organizing agencies and relations (Deleuze and 
Guattari 2014). In her book Vibrant Matter – A political Ecology of 
Things (2010), Bennett builds upon Spinoza, Deleuze and Guattari, 
and suggests ways of taking inorganic matter seriously in the contem-
porary anthropocentric atmosphere.
Second, I build on Pasi Väliaho’s (2014) work, which suggests that 
videogames and their immersive qualities have a role in building docile 
neoliberal subjects constantly ready for change and insecurity in today’s 
capitalist societies. These building processes rest on the use of “neuro-
power”, which Väliaho defines as follows:
capturing the brain’s capacity to simulate in order to teach the po-
litical reality of life today based on the management of risk and 
the securitization of the future, whether through military action, 
financial speculation, or other means.
(Väliaho 2014, xiii)
Though examples used by Väliaho are mainly from first-person shooter 
games, similar processes are at work also in Minecraft: the logic of cap-
italism, conquest, and possession are offered through the narrative and 
the game mechanics. As previously mentioned, Minecraft is in its infin-
ity an addictive game. This addiction is crucial to videogames as capi-
talist consumer products, which – however pleasant or educative they 
might be – invite players to invest both their time and money in global 
corporations.
Third, I will explore the concept of counterplay used by Rika Na-
kamura and Hanna Wirman (2005), and Thomas Apperley (2010). 
Counterplay is a collection of tactics the players can utilize when they 
wish to do something un-thought of by the developers of the game in 
question. Toward the end of this chapter, I will discuss two possible 
ways of resisting the capitalist agenda of colonialism and docile subjec-
tivity available for the player in Minecraft. I wish to draw a (part of a) 
map of possible resistance through aimless wandering and immobility, 
which are both seen here as journeys in intensity.
The perspective in this chapter is that of my own body, mind, and 
avatar; this is an auto-ethnographical piece based on my experiences. 
Something else, however, is lurking behind the human-produced body of 
text. Because the perspectives of countless other human and nonhuman 
entities are constantly influencing my experience of the game, I am never 
alone on my adventure in this block-shaped world.
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Co-Agencies
You are the player, and I am the block. Together we make Minecraft.
Pizzamanilla
When I start Minecraft on my Xbox, I am greeted by a random word or 
a phrase chosen first by the people who created the game and then pre-
sented to me by the algorithm managing this particular function. One 
day this greeting is “Polynomia!!!” I become immediately fascinated by 
this word. It is the plural of “polynomium”, which is a noun for some-
thing that is “polynomial”. Polynomial is a term used in algebra to mean 
“an expression of more than two algebraic terms, especially the sum of 
several terms that contain different powers of the same variable(s)”, or in 
taxonomy to mean “a Latin name consisting of more than two terms”. 
The word consists of the Greek word poly (“many”) and the Latin word 
nomen (“name or part”) (Oxford Dictionaries, n.d.). Polynomials are 
also used in coding, which is probably the reason the word has found its 
place among other, more content-related words, in the Minecraft menu.
All this seems perfectly understandable in the context of Minecraft. It 
can indeed be considered an expression consisting of a sum of more than 
two terms and variables as well as a designation consisting of multiple 
terms. As such, the word provides an entry point to the co-agential, 
 material rhizomes that are in action and existence during and around 
my active gameplay sessions.
Gameplay as an action reaches beyond the representational levels 
of the game in question, and can thus be seen as material activity cre-
ated through and in the bodies of my human and nonhuman peers and 
myself. All agencies involved in my game experience are physical bod-
ies, though some of them cannot be reached directly by human senses. 
A concrete, material body in direct contact with the player is the game 
device: the computer or the console. It is a composition of metals and 
plastics that can be extended by additional parts, like a mouse, a screen, 
or an Internet cable. More bodies can be found behind this device’s vis-
ible materiality: for example, the body of programming language, that 
manifests and moves the pixels, and that of electricity, which powers up 
both my experience and the processes of programming and development 
before that. Electricity and pixels can easily be seen as something less 
material, something from the other realm. However, their materiality is 
undeniable.
All the nonhumans and humans – coders, other players, and design-
ers among others – are located in the common rhizome on the same 
plane of immanence that is in existence during my gameplay sessions. In 
other words, I am never alone but always unavoidably connected with 
countless others and other worlds. This connection surpasses the limita-
tions of time and place and relies on co-agency beyond the differences in 
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materiality. In Minecraft, I am connected with all the forces mentioned 
above. As also argued above, gameplay is never merely a human experi-
ence. In Minecraft, the materiality of the blocks is, in the end, connected 
to my own as gameplay can be seen post- or antihumanist in nature.
Baruch Spinoza, the philosopher of joy, has been considered one of 
the first antihumanists. Spinoza implies that if humans are different 
and separate from the rest of the world and its beings, then humans 
cannot exist (Hardt and Negri 2005, 103). For Spinoza, there is only 
one infinite godly substance that is everything and everything is a part 
of this substance (Spinoza 1994, 54). The world, every single thing in 
the universe, every single body and being are moduses of this substance 
(Spinoza 1994, 145). That is to say, all of us, all of these human and 
nonhuman bodies that form and manifest themselves in this world, are 
embodiments of the same substance or material. This is Spinoza’s anti-
humanism at its barest: humans cannot be separated from everything 
else. In other words, hierarchies between beings are – or at least should 
be – fundamentally non-existent.
Even though all beings have the same fundamental desire to remain 
in existence, it is hard not to slip into an anthropocentric view of hu-
man dominance, in this case myself and my playership, as something of 
higher relevance to this specific gameplay experience. However, when I 
strive to see and recognize the ways in which the other agents affect me, 
this attempt to build a hierarchy with me on top as a facilitator is met 
by objections. I do not dictate gameplay situation; I am by no means 
responsible or at the top of the imagined hierarchy. That being said, it 
is also crucial to recognize the fact that accepting others as equals does 
not erase all hierarchies. Nonetheless, active attempts to shake them can 
and should be made. In the era of global environmental catastrophes, 
deconstructing the dream of human dominance over other species and 
materialities is crucial. Analyzing videogames through materialist the-
ories is important: videogames, virtual reality, and augmented reality 
have an increasing influence on how humans – at least in the Occident – 
perceive the world around them, and the agents present in these new en-
vironments differ from the ones humans are used to taking into account.
Political philosopher Jane Bennett uses the concept of vibrant mat-
ter to show a glimpse of the world in which we humans change our 
perception of the things normally seen as lifeless. Matter, according to 
Bennett, is to be taken seriously as companions: active, vibrant bodies of 
something, which have affective relations with humans (Bennett 2010, 
viii). At the same time, Bennett sets out to grasp subjectivity outside the 
notion of humans as the rulers of the world and themselves. This goal 
can be achieved by searching for horizontal and equal practices in inter-
action with human and nonhuman matter (Bennett 2010, ix).
According to Bennett, the idea of matter as dead and inactive empha-
sizes the notion of human as the king of the world. This human dream 
of omnipotence leads to destructive practices of control, conquest, and 
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possession. As humans are eager to trivialize the sensations received 
from other materialities, we tend to over-emphasize our own liability 
and control of our actions. However, there is always more in action 
than a mere human: rhizomes of social relations as well as nonhuman 
actants influence our actions in unforeseen, yet unavoidable, ways 
(Bennett 2010, xii).
Bennett’s aim is to render the multidirectionality of all relationships 
visible. In Minecraft, this relationship is seen clearly, as I, as a player, 
have the power to modify and enhance my environment. That is not 
all: I operate with pixels directly impacted by the algorithms, which of 
course are coded by humans, but which inside their margin of operation 
act freely and sometimes unexpectedly.
This engagement happens in a rhizome of different materialities and 
entities. Rhizome – a concept used by Gilles Deleuze and Félix  Guattari – 
is a way in which agencies organize. It takes its form from the mushroom 
kingdom and stands in opposition to binary tree-like models of organi-
zation. All the points of the rhizome can be connected with all the other 
points; there are no hierarchies in this model. Everything happens in 
these lines of connection, not in their meeting points (Deleuze 1992, 27). 
As every single point of the rhizome is potentially connected with all the 
others, it can be broken, yet it continues its existence infinitely toward 
other bodies and via other lines. Deleuze and Guattari use an ant colony 
as an example of rhizomatic organization. The fate of a single ant or a 
single nest is meaningless in regard to the fate of the colony, which will 
continue to grow and exist (Deleuze 1992, 30).
Rhizome is a territory of affiliation and fleeing, which produces end-
less indeterminate multiplicities and potentialities for infinite freedom of 
creation. Every single element and entity possible in a videogame, such 
as Minecraft, comes into existence solely through the lines connecting 
them. This means that every physical and virtual body – of mine, of the 
machine, and of the others – is created in relation to other bodies in that 
specific rhizome.
Assemblage is a form of rhizome, often explained through the concept 
of love. According to Deleuze and Guattari, love is not love for a person, 
but rather for an assemblage consisting of the loved one, the lover and all 
the emotions and memories associated with that relationship.
Acting with the Others In Minecraft
Gravity is a lifestyle choice for many elements of the world.
Hexus_One
Now that we have acknowledged the others connected to the Minecraf-
tian rhizome, it is time to look more closely at the ways their agencies 
manifest. The agency of the machine, in this case my Xbox, becomes 
visible through mistakes. We usually think of computers as extensions 
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of our brains or mind, or – in the case of, for example, game consoles – 
as some kind of cyborg-style extra limbs providing access to the world 
on the other side of the screen. However, the agency of a machine has 
always been present, but we only take it into consideration when some-
thing unexpected happens, when the computer crashes, freezes, or 
breaks. The idea of being in control of the machine was thus merely 
imagination, as the mistake opens up a possibility of withdrawal for all 
the agents involved.
We can harness and use electricity, but as it is flowing, bouncing, wild, 
and in a constant process of becoming by nature, its body is beyond our 
grasp. It can break free from cables and cause blackouts and short-cir-
cuits. It can, in cooperation with other agents of the grid, disturb my 
game experience as well as the infrastructure of entire cities. This mo-
ment of interruption and disturbance is where the nonhuman force run-
ning our lives becomes and manifests its agency (Bennett 2010, 25–28).
Gameplay as a co-agential rhizome can be explored through Spinoza’s 
philosophy of joy. All entities pursue happiness and greater perfection, 
and happiness for one is usually happiness for others, the co-actors, close 
by. For humans, this greater perfection can be pleasure; for electricity, 
the chance to flow and sparkle; and for the pixels, the chance to arrange 
themselves repeatedly. Here the danger of anthropocentrism and anthro-
pomorphism, however, lurks near. My knowledge of the sought-after or 
avoided perfection or imperfection of the nonhuman is always limited; 
one could say it is merely a guess. However, as I previously argued, for 
nonhumans there exists a chance to leave this relationship through a mis-
take: electricity can, for example, fry the circuits, thus allowing for con-
sole to crash. As long as our cooperation runs smoothly, I can only assume 
we are engaging together, somewhat freely, in this rhizome of gameplay.
Above I have discussed human and nonhuman agents. However, this 
division is problematic. I can declare my body to be human, but I am 
already many, a mixture of human and nonhuman entities. Together, we 
are involved in constant processes of subjectivation, of multiplicity, of 
becoming-something (see Guattari 2010). As Donna Haraway says: “To 
be one is always to become with many” (Haraway 2008, 4).
Gaming as action is essentially materialistic, rhizomatic, and mimetic, 
and it is constructed in cooperation with human and nonhuman agen-
cies. As such, it is always in motion, both physically and conceptually. 
All human actions are constructed in similar cooperative unions. When 
playing videogames, we gain contact with materialities often thought 
to be non-material or somehow out of reach. A multitude of electric-
ity, machines, players, and algorithms engages in an assemblage that is 
Minecraft, and every moment in this assemblage is a potential moment 
both for creation and for a mistake as a manifestation of human or non-
human autonomy.
The rhizomatic, shared materiality does not end where the game ends. 
The acts conducted in-game resonate off-game into and through my 
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body, in the electric wires, and so on, forever. The first step toward un-
derstanding co-agential rhizomes of humans and nonhumans is to ditch 
the idea of separateness or material uniqueness.
However, back to polynomia: what captured my attention was the roar 
of power and freedom embedded in that word. Polynomia resonates, in 
my ears, with the word autonomia (autonomy). When associated with 
Minecraft, it uncovers the potential sovereignty of the rhizome, of the 
collective engaged in the gaming experience. Polynomia reaches beyond 
me as a subject, inviting along the multiple agents involved. It opens up a 
possibility to start a journey of finding new ways of resisting immersive 
passivity of Minecraft. These ways of resistance can be approached via 
the theory of counterplay.
The power of polynomia is the notion that sovereignty is also shared. 
It cannot be achieved alone, and thus it is parallel to freedom. Every 
single agent in Minecraft acts with and in relation to others. Becoming- 
something is always rhizomatic: all my tactics and practices inside 
 Minecraft are the result of cooperation. Polynomia is thus an active, 
political word. It is more than a word: it is a philosophical approach.
Neuropower
You haven’t played Minecraft until you forget what year it is.
Stealthman917
When playing, I become immersed, drawn into the creative process of 
gameplay. I lose track of time; I lose track of my body. Robbie Cooper has 
photographed people engaged in immersive situations, such as gameplay 
or movie screenings (Open Culture 2013). The kids portrayed mid-game 
stare with unseeing eyes, their facial muscles are relaxed, leaving their 
mouths somewhat open. I, too, feel the muscles in my face relax as the 
muscles in my shoulders and arms tense. These sensations vanish quickly 
and return only when something interrupts my immersion. Immersion is a 
thorough experience; it engages all of me: my brain and my body.
What, then, is immersion, and how does it affect my fellow gamers 
and me? Pasi Väliaho has written about videogames as the site for 
production of neoliberal, docile subjects. Väliaho reminds that, in 
modern neuroscience, the brain is considered an adaptive, creative, 
and constantly self-modifying organ. It is thus not merely copying or 
picturing but actively predicting and hypothesizing. Brain’s primary 
function is to anticipate the things to come, in other words, to predict 
the future so that the rest of the body knows what to do and how to 
react (Väliaho 2014, 40).
Videogames tap into this function and thus into the core characteris-
tics of humanness. In first-person shooter games, the player is sucked into 
a constantly changing and evolving web – or rhizome – of actions and 
reactions, which, according to Väliaho, is an accurate portrayal of the 
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way games offer “movement and contingency as an adaptive challenge”. 
This is a way in which the biopolitical power structures of the techno 
age operate: the player engages with preemptive processes that happen 
somewhere out of reach of conscious awareness. The rhythms and ex-
citements produced by the speed of certain games engage the brain: they 
ready all our senses in the face of this virtual danger (Väliaho 2014, 40). 
This is the desire of conquest and thus colonization. Even though Mi-
necraft has a different pace and visual identity than first-person shooter 
games, it is no less efficient in generating immersion and engaging the 
player with colonial, capitalist practices. The game itself as well as the 
materialities engaged with the player are active participants and agents 
in this production of desire and neoliberal subjectivity.
Väliaho writes:
For player, then, the screen exists as a simulated future, capturing 
our bodily rhythms and prenoetic adjustments through which the 
affective and predictive functions of the brain merge with the video 
screen and vice versa.
(Väliaho 2014, 41)
The body, however, does not engage merely through simulations of bodily 
functions. In Minecraft, the movements of the character are not repro-
ductions of human movements, but something existing in their own right. 
The character is stiff, “unnatural”, more of a pixel than a representation 
of an actual human entity. It can be seen as an extension of human agency, 
although it clearly has agential qualities itself. The likeness, or mimicry, 
does not play a significant role here. The immersion emerges from the 
actual bodily engagement of the human player, and screen is merely a 
device in between. I would argue that the simulated future is thus created 
within the player, in the desire of conquest and possession, and manifested 
through the cooperational rhizome of the gameplay situation. The whole 
gameplay situation is thus inherently nonhuman.
Minecraft caters to the desire of infinite conquest and colonization, 
the infinite lust of being in control. It is a platform for domination and 
god-like fantasies, however educational its uses might sometimes be. But 
are there ways to immerse oneself in Minecraft without being subjected 
to these oppressive and compelling processes?
Counterplay
Thank you for helping us help you help us all with building.
Axalto
Contemporary theories of gameplay build upon Roger Caillois’s theory 
of play. Caillois defines two modes or opposites that govern all play, 
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paidia and ludus. Ludus – which also gives the name to ludology – is a 
disciplinary form of play, which is characterized by skill, effort, patience, 
and other such traits. Paidia is an opposing (or complementing) type of 
play: it is based on joy and improvisation (Caillois 2001, 13). Most forms 
of play obviously contain both characteristics with varying intensities. 
According to Caillois, ludus-guided rules are essential to play: for play to 
be play, basic freedoms and stimulation for fantasy are needed. The two 
are always complementary and related, though Caillois considers ludus 
to be a refinement of paidia (Caillois 2001, 27–29).
Thomas Apperley (2010, 141) brings up the discussion over the im-
portance and meaning of paidia. Ludus has been considered to hold 
some meanings that contribute to institutional practices, such as rites 
and sports. Paidia, however, is another thing entirely: it opens up a 
view to play as something that does not necessarily provide any cultural 
values outside itself. According to Apperley, Caillois seems to set ludus 
and paidia in a hierarchical order. Ludus refines and disciplines paidia 
and turns the wild and naive elements of play into something that has 
meaning outside the playing field. This does not mean that paidia is 
insignificant outside the play act, rather that the significance of it is 
extracted through/with ludus.
The relevance of ludus and paidia and their different hierarchical 
positions comes clearer when approaching the areas where counterplay 
happens. Apperley describes these areas as the margin where one is free 
to express oneself within the limits set by the rules (and their errors) and 
the material requirements and limits of the game. This margin is created 
when the creative and unruly forces and practices are combined with the 
formal rules. As the “margin” is not, according to Apperley, “a realm 
of pure potentiality”; it is vulnerable to exploits or acts of counterplay 
(Apperley 2010, 140).
According to Apperley, “there is a tension between the society of con-
trol, or ‘algorithmic culture’ and counterplay: the emergent practices of 
digital game players”. This tension comes from the alleged notion that the 
algorithms of a game already contain all the possible meanings, leaving 
no room for critical approach or new engagements (Apperley 2010, 132). 
Apperley sees counterplay as something unthought of by the developers, 
practiced by the players on the margins of possibility offered by the game. 
This approach distinguishes it from counter-gaming, which relies on 
interference to the code as its method (see Galloway 2006).
The significance of the human player is, according to Apperley, to be the 
force that sets things into motion. As long as the human does not use or 
tap into the code, it is mere potential. However, everything is in existence, 
material, yet dormant until utilized (Apperley 2010, 143). In other words, 
counterplay can be perceived as active participation that arises from the 
human need or will to do something. As long as the code just exists, it is not 
counterplay, even though everything needed for an action already exists.
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Is potentiality action? Or is something considered an action merely 
when human influence is added to the mix? Apperley seems to think 
that human activity is the catalyst, the force that can bring forward the 
hidden potentialities embedded in the mishaps and the unthought-of 
thought of the code. This is clearly an anthropocentric approach, which 
sees the human as the only relevant actor. Everything else is just pre-
paring. However, if we look at Minecraft as an example, things happen 
without direct human engagement. If we look past the act of turning 
the game on, all sorts of processes run even when the player does not 
actively practice counterplay. Thus, the potentiality is always more than 
mere opportunity waiting to be seized. Apperley’s approach also sees 
action as something related to movement: something must be done to 
actualize the potentialities left in the margins of the code. Yet we can as-
sume that there are other modes of moving and resisting than those that 
require movement in space: for example, those that concern the body of 
the player or temporal engagement.
Apperley points out that as gameplay is always situated and created 
through the human body, there are limitations to the modulation of the 
algorithmic culture. In order for the gameplay to actually happen, the 
algorithms must work in some cooperation with the rhythm of every-
day life. The rhythm of everyday life is the location where, according 
to Apperley, the practice of counterplay takes place and from which 
it arises (Apperley 2010, 132). When approaching games as material 
environments, one may easily become stuck with the idea that the code 
somehow limits what one can and cannot do. It is clear that the  material 
foundation formed upon code and algorithm do define the actions one 
may perform inside a game world as every single choice has to be coded 
in order to be made. This, however, is only one and clearly limited 
 approach to materiality and games themselves.
According to Apperley, in order to understand the effects of everyday 
life and its rhythms in digital games, we must see games as more than 
mere codes and algorithms (Apperley 2010, 134). He does not deny the 
influence the regime of compulsion or discipline has on gameplay, but 
emphasizes the more complex ways gameplay affects and is affected:
Rather than in relation to compulsions it is ambiguous and para-
doxical; disciplinary and adaptive. It operates both as a mediator 
and intermediary; consequently game play is in some contexts an 
impartial transferor of culture, but in others, a source of new cul-
ture and relations. This is not a binary relationship: adaptation and 
compulsion exist in an imbricated spectrum.
(Apperley 2010, 134)
To move beyond the binaries of compulsion and adaptation, Apper-
ley draws from Bruno Latour and his discussion of mediators and 
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intermediaries. In Latour’s actor-network theory, the roles of actors 
tend to be largely immaterial. An object, such as a videogame, can func-
tion in a social ensemble undictated by its essence or status. Instead, the 
role or function is formed in relation to other actors and connections. 
Apperley states that reducing games to their code is to reduce a com-
plex activity into a closed circuit of player and the game, which already 
contains everything, all the meanings and possibilities (Apperley 2010, 
134). With the concept of counterplay, Apperley strives to open that rela-
tionship and to follow human and nonhuman interactions further down 
or around the rhizome.
Following Apperley’s theoretical approach does not undermine the 
importance of the materiality of games and gameplay. Rather, it opens 
up a possibility to take in consideration the different materialities en-
twined in gameplay processes. Counterplay can thus be seen as some-
thing that may get a little out of human or machine hands, thus creating 
something that cannot be described solely as one or the other. In other 
words, counterplay emphasizes play over gaming, which downplays the 
role of calculated achievements.
Counterplay is formed and practiced through actions and affordances 
that are already available and allowed within the rules of the game. 
However, actions of the counterplayer are typically something that was 
left to be done by mistake or that was not intended to be of any/much 
relevance to the gameplay. Apperley calls these actions emergent forms 
of play, which overlap and cross with the ways the game is meant to 
be played. The player may cooperate in these intersections with other 
human players via Internet or with machinic forces (Apperley 2010, 
140). Counterplay is thus a shared affair and hence one manifestation 
of polynomia.
In their article “Girlish Counter-Playing Tactics”, Rika Nakamura 
and Hanna Wirman list various ways of practicing counterplay in vid-
eogames still very much dominated by male players and developers. 
These tactics include “non-violence”, “peaceful pace”, and “alternative 
pathways” (Nakamura and Wirman 2005). As my emphasis lies within 
resisting the capitalist, goal-oriented ways of gameplay, these tactics are 
useful, as they highlight a more equal relationship between the game and 
the player.
In order to take the agency of the nonhuman seriously, the possibility of 
nonhuman counterplay must also be considered. Do the pixels, algorithms, 
game devices, or electricity have a desire to commit counterplay? One way 
of looking at this is to consider mistakes or bugs as forms of nonhuman 
counterplay. As I argued previously, machines and also algorithms make 
their agency noticeable through mistakes, or when something the player 
had not expected occurs. In Minecraft, it can be a non-player character 
getting stuck behind a rock or in mid-air, a tree growing from air, or other 
such quirks. If the agency of the machine is shown through the mistakes it 
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makes, is it not possible to see misbehaving pixels and NPCs as an act of 
a rebellion? Algorithms have means of deciding for themselves. It is true 
that their actions are limited to the programming, but so are – according 
to Apperley – the possibilities of humans in a similar situation. Everybody 
operates in the margin defined by the developers of the game. A problem 
lies, however, in the access to nonhuman counterplay and its intentions. 
As I can never know the intention of a pixel or a specific NPC, I can only 
guess and hypothesize about it.
The restrictions imposed by the mysteriority of the other guide my at-
tention to another realm of counterplay. I am interested in processes that 
happen mostly in the player herself. This aspect of counterplay resides 
in the area of imagination and thus play, paidia. It is something undis-
ciplined and therefore beyond strict limits or characteristics. It is also 
without direct consequences or benefits. This imaginary act of counter-
play can be called a journey in intensity. It stems from doing much and 
nothing simultaneously. Counterplay is thus expanded to the body of 
the player: it is relevant how and what the player feels at a specific mo-
ment, what kind of resonances leave and return to the body, what is the 
relation between my body and, for example, the controller I am holding, 
and so forth. The things done or left undone are equally important: the 
practice can thus sometimes be situated solely in immobility. Practices of 
resistance and counterplay can also take place in the body of the player/
performer. As discussed earlier, gameplay alters human tissues with its 
immersive potential as well as with the physical injuries and aches that 
prolonged gaming session may produce.
Counterplay may sometimes be as simple as choosing to immerse in 
the game world without moving the avatar at all. Immobility may, how-
ever, be intense and thus active gameplay in itself. What is active then is 
the performative aspect of both the player and the avatar. What is radi-
cal in this exercise is the refusal to anticipate the future, refusing to an-
ticipate the stimuli the game is about to offer. In other words, the player 
rises, no matter for how briefly or incessantly, against the production of 
neoliberal subject described by Väliaho.
Nomadic Resistance
It’s a big world. But someone has to explore it.
Tic_Tac_Toe
My counterplay in Minecraft has taken the form of nomadic expedition, 
which challenges the urge for productivity that the game promotes. I will 
give two examples of my own counterplay practices: aimless wandering 
and immobility. In order to truly open their potentiality, a brief explana-
tion of nomadism as a philosophical concept is in order.
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Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari describe the nomad as someone 
who does not move. This may seem weird, as wandering and displace-
ment is characteristic to traditional nomads, but Deleuze and Guattari 
point to a conceptual difference. Movement requires a plan, a destina-
tion; it is something that happens between two or more predetermined 
points. Nomad has no plan and no destination, nomad travels via speed 
and intensity (Adkins 2015, 206). For Rosi Braidotti, nomadism “refers 
to the kind of critical consciousness that resists settling into socially 
coded modes of thought and behavior”. Thus, a nomad does not nec-
essarily travel along physical roads or paths but engages on journeys 
that take place in a specific place. Nomadism is defined by its power to 
unravel and break conventions and norms (Braidotti 1994, 5). Deleuze, 
 Guattari, and Braidotti all see nomadism as an active practice, which is 
possible in both philosophy and art, and in other areas of life.
As mentioned before, the modulation of the algorithmic culture has a 
material limit. The practices I am proposing do not erase the materiality 
of gameplay, but rather tap into different kinds of materialities. When 
traveling in intensity and engaging in speed rather than in movement, 
the limits of actions inside the game world are no longer of concern. In 
other words, nomadic attitude to counterplay is more a philosophical 
than an operational practice and, as such, relevant for developing a dif-
ferent approach to game studies.
As Minecraft is all about building and establishing locations of vir-
tual residence, wandering around aimlessly can be seen as a means of 
counterplay. If I start Minecraft in “Survival mode” in the easiest setting 
possible, “Peaceful”, I will face no enemies nor will I die of hunger. This 
means that there is nothing I need to do or avoid – the only exception is 
falling from a place high enough for the blow to be lethal – in order to 
keep existing in the world (Figure 11.1).
Figure 11.1  Wandering.2
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When the players choose to exist in a wandering state, they refuse to 
stop and claim ownership of the possible wonders and quirks they en-
counter. This is obliviously a goal in itself, but one that resists the basic 
hierarchies provided within the gameplay ideals. Leaving things behind 
can be a challenging practice, at least in my own experience. When I 
encounter a village full of non-player-characters or a temple rising in the 
middle of a jungle, a part of me wishes to claim some kind of ownership 
or to acquire a lasting memory of that place. However, there is nothing 
to possess or acquire; the fleeting moments spent inside the game leave 
material mementos within the game, but they tend not to be accessible 
to the player and their materiality. This acceptance of the impossibility 
of colonialism and, thus, power, can be considered one of the possible 
radical implications of counterplay.
Remaining in immobility is the other form of counterplay I have prac-
ticed on my adventures. This means that the player spawns to the world 
and then remains immobile. The avatar does not do or accomplish any-
thing, and neither does the player. This results in something that can 
be described as traveling in intensity. I, both my physical body and my 
avatar’s, engage in active nothingness, active non-movement that still 
resonates with speed. Intensity is traveling in place. We choose not to 
engage in movement and, thus, choose not to deliver the expected be-
havior. This tactic pushes Nakamura’s and Wirman’s “peaceful pac” to 
the extreme (Figure 11.2).
Both of these practices set the player against the inherent colonialism 
of the game: my objective is no longer to expand, own, and possess. In 
fact, I no longer have an objective. Thus, this approach is the refusal to 
succumb to the logic of capitalism. As all means of counterplay, these 
as well are provided to the player by the game and its mechanics. How-
ever, these practices cannot be absorbed or capitalized on by the game 
company – there are no added value or innovations present here. The in-
tensity produced in the player in cooperation with nonhumanity around 
them is all that it is.
Figure 11.2  Traveling in intensity.
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A nomadic way of playing, of remaining in immobility can be a way 
to engage in resistance and in counterplay. When both, the player and 
the avatar, remain in fixed locations, the prospects for the future change 
radically.
Conclusion
The thing is, there’s only six sides to a block.
Direwolf20
This chapter has pieced together a picture of gameplay – especially 
that of Minecraft – as a rhizome of human and nonhuman co-agencies 
affecting our brains and our bodies. Practices of colonialism, conquest, 
and possession intertwine with immersive pleasure during gameplay, 
thus strengthening and enforcing harmful, capitalist, and anthropo-
centric power structures. To challenge these processes, I have intro-
duced some tactics of counterplay practices by Nakamura, Wirman, 
and Apperley, and then expanded the concept with my own examples 
from Minecraft.
The force of these practices lies in the refusal of the player to be sub-
jected as a vehicle of capitalist dreams of expansion. My interpretation 
of counterplay is that it is a philosophical practice, which extends out-
side mere gameplay. In other words, taking passive actions and engaging 
in resistance in videogames are bound to have an effect on the player 
also in other situations. Acknowledging one’s position in the hierarchy 
helps to undermine and deconstruct it. It is also crucial to see other agen-
cies and materialities affecting the player.
Doing nothing is, however, still a choice, and a choice is always a 
question of internality that somewhat dismisses other agencies despite 
their influence on me. The choice here restores the hierarchy in favor 
of the human: it makes room for oppression of the other. The power 
of capitalism is to restore human rule, ensure that the human – and a 
very certain kind of human – stays on the top of the hierarchy. Coun-
terplay might not be able to abolish hierarchies, but it can make them 
visible.
The absence of plan and destination in my examples of counterplay 
is set against the logic of capitalism, however brief these moments of 
resistance may be. The possibility for the subject to choose such an 
approach, one that acts or at least tries to act outside a possessive and 
destructive ideology, is indeed a contested one. The notion of the end 
of the history, of current status quo as the best and final one is hard to 
overcome. Cultural and artistic practices are, however, keys to resis-
tance, as they approach the question through pleasure and play instead 
of pain and gain.
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Notes
 1 All the quotes are from the same discussion thread on Minecraft Forum. In 
the thread, players invented their own Minecraft-related quotes.
 2 All the images are screenshots from Minecraft taken by the author and used 
under fair use according to Digital Games Research Association guidelines.
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The evolution of wearable technology is blurring the boundaries be-
tween the inside and the outside of the body. Wetware1 (Borresen and 
Lynch 2009) extends the reach of traditional hardware to the biological 
spaces of the internal body; electronics are becoming smaller and flexi-
ble, embedded into our textiles and our bodies; concurrently, bio-textile 
materials are being grown rather than woven. This chapter proposes 
that the emergence of wearable technology offers opportunities for an 
expanded understanding of what it means to be human. It describes 
how human perception and sensual capacity are augmented with wear-
able technology. This techno-genesis of the body, in collaboration with 
advanced materials and tools, has the potential to foster interconnected 
ways of understanding our place within the Neganthropocene. This 
chapter adopts Bernard Stiegler’s use of the term Neganthropocene to 
highlight a nonhuman-centric era, as opposed to the dystopic notion 
of a self-fulfilling, nihilistic Anthropocene (Stiegler 2017). The authors 
propose a flat ontology between human and nonhuman actors, making 
reference to historically, anthropologically, and ethnographically diverse 
examples that illuminate the polarization of our current epistemology. 
Drawing a critical theoretical framework influenced by Rosi Braidotti, 
Karen Barad, Donna Haraway, Bernard Stiegler, Peter-Paul Verbeek, 
and Bruno Latour to arrive at a theory of cyborganic2 wearables, the 
following pages describe the potential of these artifacts in reconfigur-
ing the way human beings live in, participate in, and understand the 
world around us. The cyborganic describes a fictional posthuman entity, 
a  human-nature-machine hybrid. The section concludes with the prop-
osition that redefining what it means to be human in relation to cybor-
ganic mutation and creativity is an essential requirement for humanity’s 
understanding of its future sense of self.
Speculative Research with Experimental Wearables
Bamboo Whisper is the latest in a series of experimental wearables 
by the authors of this text, Tricia Flanagan and Raune Frankjær, that 
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explores body-centric human to nonhuman relationships. In this specu-
lative project, participants wear conical forms of woven-bamboo around 
their heads, reminiscent in shape to Victorian bonnets. Through the 
headwear, communication between human and computer is made pos-
sible without conscious thought. Bio-data in the form of voice sonance 
is transformed into a kinesthetic experience surrounding the head of 
a second person. Oscillation is experienced through the vibration of 
the bonnets’ brim sticks that rattle and shake in response to the other 
hat wearer’s voice intonation and volume. When in motion, Bamboo 
Whisper “speaks” like the wind in the trees in an isolated immersive 
experience. There is an innate emotional response to being immersed in 
such an environment, as if trees were talking, warning of an approach-
ing storm or gently lulling us humans to sleep. Experience has taught 
humans to respond to environmental cues, for example, in adrenaline- 
induced excitement or fear when the wind picks up before a storm hits. 
Just as in weather environments, the wearer of the Bamboo Whisper 
may experience a torrent of notes, a thunderous ending, or a vacuum 
of silence (Vella). The systems work in pairs by exploring language and 
communication between the wearers. The devices generate patterns of 
information in the form of rhythmic percussive structures that represent 
the source bio-data in new forms. In this way, anomalies that were pre-
viously invisible can become apparent (Figure 12.1).
The first wearable created in the series is Blinklifier3 (Flanagan, Vega, 
and Fuks 2012), which converts eye blinking into a visible light array in 
a wearable headdress. In this work, the eye muscle movements act as a 
switch: the participant wears electroplated false eyelashes and conductive 
eyeliner to connect the bio-data signal to an Arduino microcontroller 
(Figure 12.2).
Figure 12.1  Bamboo Whisper, Tricia Flanagan and Raune Frankjær.
Photo ©Tricia Flanagan 2012.
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Another experimental design, BIOdress (Walter Collective 2015), 
expands the bodies perceptive capacity in order to enhance empathy 
with entities other than human. By streaming and mapping environ-
mental and plant-generated data through a textile interface onto the 
wearer’s body, the plant’s experience is reinterpreted as a haptic and 
aesthetic experience. In both works, bio-data is directly connected to 
techno-data, and systems modify behavior through feedback loops that 
trigger certain outputs (Figure 12.3).
The creation of environmental systems such as Bamboo Whisper, 
BIOdress, and Blinklifier can be viewed as sensory explorations, and 
Figure 12.2  Blinklifier, Tricia Flanagan and Katia Vega.
Photo by Dicky Ma. ©Tricia Flanagan 2012.
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their deployment as ethnographic devices or cultural probes. These ar-
tifacts demonstrate different ways of perceiving environmental data and 
so provide experiences that enable empathetic relationships with others, 
outside of what is generally constituted as part of the human experience. 
This could extend to plants, insects, and other animals residing out-
side of the experiential realm of the human, thus inducing experiences 
usually reserved for the sensory impaired, participants in shamanistic 
practices, the mentally ill, or the severely intoxicated. Our research is 
primarily praxis-based, an iterative process of research and experimen-
tation where new questions and knowledge are generated.
Figure 12.3  BIOdress 2014, The Walter Collective (Sara Adhitya, Beck Davis, 
Tricia Flanagan, and Raune Frankjær).
Photo by Nick Ashby.
240 Patricia Flanagan and Raune Frankjær
Applications extend to human-computer interaction and haptic in-
terface design. This chapter describes ideas conceived whilst making 
and conducting experiments with the aforementioned wearables. It 
describes and analyzes key questions that undermine the traditional 
conception of human to nonhuman relations by using wearables as 
catalysts, probes, and test cases. At a time when wearables are col-
onizing spaces without regard to traditional boundaries of the inter-
nal and external body, as seen, for example, in nanotech and biotech, 
critical and speculative design can leverage the affordances of wear-
able and implantable technology to reimagine the human-nonhuman 
Neganthropocene.
The haptic stimulation of sensing another body’s rhythms as expe-
rienced when wearing the Bamboo Whisper, paradoxically creates an 
intimate yet estranged relationship between wearers. Dislocating the 
spoken word from its origin illustrates its nonverbal components. The 
percussive rhythmic movement of the sticks from which the device is 
constructed resembles original language patterns, and the tacit stimula-
tion activates memories of intimate touch – as inter-human haptic con-
tact is usually experienced in close physical relationships. On the other 
hand, the public experience of body-worn technologies propagated 
through fashion, sport, and medicine tends to feel overtly artificial and 
futuristic, and is generally met with considerable resistance. The fear of 
the machine taking over our humanness has long been part of our cul-
tural narrative, expressed, for example, in stories of malicious androids 
or the novel Frankenstein (Shelley 2010) and amplified with the advent 
of the assembly line. In contrast, applying ancient crafting techniques, 
such as basketry, weaving, and felting, creates an organic augmentation 
that is not alien to the human but feels integral, safe, and trusted due to 
its deep cultural and historical intertwinement.
Augmentation by haptic sensation of organic objects alludes to the 
innate vibrations at the atomic level of matter. In this way, this proj-
ect explores the concept of a flat ontology between objects and human 
actants. The research is a physical manifestation of the evolution of 
objects, that is, in our perception of them, and expresses the intercon-
nectedness between us and between objects and materials in the world.
Experiencing the Nonhuman in Ontological Practice
In his seminal text from 1974, “What Is It Like to Be a Bat”, philosopher 
Thomas Nagel argues that due to the elusive nature of consciousness, 
ontological inquiry into the nonhuman can only remain speculative. 
Enclosed in its own humanness, the human viewpoint will at all times 
remain anthropocentric and incapable of comprehending not being 
human. In the future, it may well be possible to connect the human 
brain to other neurologically functioning beings and transmit sensory 
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input. For example, researchers at Harvard University have developed 
a non-invasive brain-to-brain interface, effectively linking a human 
and nonhuman brain (Yoo et al. 2013), and research in brain- machine-
brain-interface technology is exploring transmission of tactile input to 
help humans control prosthetics. But even if humans do develop the 
ability to access the experiential faculties of nonhumans, then the meth-
ods of processing will differ through the way an individual’s neural 
networks have been forged through a lifetime of experience. In other 
words, any attempt to understand the essence of the nonhuman is, and 
most likely will remain, fictional, as direct experience is not possible. 
However, this does not mean that we, as humans, should refrain from 
trying, nor that it necessitates resorting to guesswork, as a substantial 
amount of knowledge about animal perception is available. The sonar 
of a bat, or a dog’s dichromatic vision, is widely explored and to a large 
extent quite easily transferrable to human understanding. Granted, an-
imals are biological creatures just like us and we share a genetic past. 
Mediating non-biological perception may prove more difficult.
How do we go about learning the experiences of something so “other” 
that its perceptual facilities are fundamentally different from our own? 
Traditional folk-wisdom states: “You cannot understand another’s ex-
perience until you’ve walked a mile in their shoes”. In other words, one 
has to immerse oneself in the environment of the other, use the artifacts 
they use, live with the possibilities and restrictions they live with, and 
try to feel like the other by emulating their conditions as closely as pos-
sible. Toisissa Tiloissa (In Other Spaces), a Finnish art collective, has 
developed over one-hundred different bodily exercises through which, 
the group claims, the “human shape and state of being starts to become 
permeable to other states, shapes and spaces” (Elo 2013). Storytelling, 
with its use of metaphors and allegories, is a method for accessing the 
unapproachable and dates back to the beginnings of human history. 
These myths and fables, which often aim to explain incomprehensible 
phenomena, constitute the foundation culture. But as fictional stories 
constitute representational experiences, they have certain caveats, most 
notably the exclusion of materiality and embodied ways of knowing. 
Imagining, rather than enacting, lacks the possibility of validating the 
properties of the fictional narrative by obtaining feedback from the sur-
rounding environment.
In Alien Phenomenology, Ian Bogost suggests adopting a pragmatic 
form of applied object-oriented ontology by practicing what he terms 
“carpentry”. This is antonymous to discourse, which Bogost rejects as 
“the consequences of the semiotics obsession […] [due to] […] an over 
abundant fixation on argumentation, such that pedantry replaces cu-
riosity” (Bogost 2012, 9). The notion of “carpentry” is a constructive 
example of applied ontology, practiced by making and doing. Being, ac-
cording to Bogost, can only be understood by working with things that 
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“are” on a material level. The constructed artifacts become philosophy, 
illustrating the perspective of objects (Bogost 2012, 93). In line with Na-
gel, Bogost recognizes the limitations imposed by the subjective nature of 
experience, and so alien phenomenology can only be performed by anal-
ogy, using tools such as misrepresentation and distortion to approach 
and approximate the essence of that which is nonhuman (Bogost 2012, 
65). Bamboo Whisper simultaneously restricts and alters the sensorial 
experience of the wearer, and so, framed within the practice of carpen-
try, wearing the device provides an experiential ethnographic study of 
“cyborganic being”. It offers an insight into a sensory realm, similar to, 
yet profoundly different to, that of the human and so allows its wearer 
to develop a conceptual apparatus which can be used to approach and, 
depending on the level of engagement of the human wearer, even recon-
figure human and nonhuman states of being.
Sensoriality is fundamental to how any biological being experiences 
and engages with its environment. However, since the Enlightenment in 
Western culture, vision has taken a dominant position over all the other 
senses, and modern screen-based technology increasingly exacerbates 
this heavily ocular-centric mode of perception in humans. In addition, 
most research on the senses operates with a standard five senses model 
under the assumption this represents a biological universal standard 
applicable to the entire human species. In fact, the sensorium is much 
more fluid; scientists estimate there are between ten and thirty-three 
senses (Howes 2009, 22–25). Surprisingly though, the perception and 
processing of sensorial input is not bound to physiology, but is to a 
large extent culturally defined (Jütte 2005, 33). For example, old medi-
eval languages including Old English deploy sensory taxonomies that 
differ greatly from the “Roman idea” of individual sensory faculties. 
The Hausa, a  Nigerian tribe, differentiate between two senses, gain 
(sight) and ji. The latter signifies an assemblage of hearing, smelling, 
tasting, touching, understanding, and emotional feeling, seemingly 
forming a synergistic whole (Howes 2013). Classical Indian philosophy 
distinguishes between eight senses, ascribing superior importance to 
Prana, the breathing organ, that is, the nose, and includes the mind 
as a sense in stark contrast to the Western division of body and mind 
(Elberfeld 2003, 483). The sensory confusion induced by wearing the 
Bamboo Whisper triggers a certain amount of cognitive dissonance, 
which is necessary to break from the habitual and subconscious pro-
cessing of sensory input through which we as humans normally expe-
rience the world. Ethnographer  David Howes stresses the importance 
of overcoming one’s own sensory bias to develop sensory objectivity: in 
other words, cultivate a multiplicity of sensory expressions and the “ca-
pacity to be in two sensoria about things” in order to understand how 
others relate (Howes and Classen 1991, 260). Sense-based approaches 
to ontological inquiry have been extended across species boundaries 
and have explored the experiences of animals (Forister 2007; Kirksey 
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and Helmreich 2010), plants, and even cells (Myers 2006, Myers and 
Dumit 2011; Chamovitz 2012).
When donning the Bamboo Whisper, the wearer potentially becomes 
an ethnographer of a possible cyborganic future of biological other-
ness, as the device alters the senses so that speech becomes a kinesthetic 
experience and movement translates to tactility. This kind of displace-
ment of input onto other sensory channels than customary can cause 
the brain to analyze and interpret signals otherwise discarded. The 
mapping dislocates the signal from its usual processing centers, and 
so interrupts automatic interpretation. In extreme cases, the incoming 
data may even activate an alternate form of processing. For example, 
Ben Underwood, a boy whose eyes had to be amputated at the age of 
three because of cancer, taught himself to echolocate so proficiently, 
he claimed to be able to visually perceive the objects around him. His 
claim was supported by the fact that his calcimine cortex, the part of 
the brain that normally deals with visual processing, was shown to be 
stimulated by the audible input of the returning echoes of the clicks 
of his tongue. In addition, he was able to navigate completely auton-
omously without use of any mobility aids, even on skates and bicycle 
(McCaffrey 2014).
Speculating that speakers of clicking languages may have a differ-
ent spatial awareness through the addition of data perceived from 
non-conscious echolocation to speakers of non-clicking languages, the 
Bamboo Whisper may allow its wearer to approximate this kind of 
experience in a non-invasive and experiential manner. Using clicking 
sounds within speech is an integral part of many Southern African 
languages believed to constitute the original languages of humankind, 
as spoken before the African diaspora. For example, the very complex 
phonetic systems of the indigenous African Khoi and San languages 
have more than one hundred different sounds, whereas English has 
about forty-five. Hawaii, which was one of the last places to be settled, 
has a mere thirteen. These findings correlate with a decrease in genetic 
diversity in relation to distance from Africa (Atkinson 2011) and so 
pose the question not as to why the tribal languages of Southern Africa 
include clicks but rather as to how the rest of humanity lost theirs and 
to what effect.
“The eyes reach but the ears receive” writes Juhani Pallasmaa, refer-
encing architectural spaces in The Eyes of The Skin (1996). He uses the 
term “acoustic intimacy” to explain that sound infers an interior experi-
ence, whilst sight infers exteriority. Through the eyes, we look out to the 
world, but through the omni-directional experience of sound, the body 
experiences centering. We gain an understanding of space through hear-
ing. Sound incorporates, whereas sight isolates. Pallasmaa attributes the 
dominance of vision in our culture and the subsequent loss of integ-
rity of the audible world to a mental loss of a sense of center, of which 
he claims the contemporary world suffers (Pallasmaa 1996, 53). In line 
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with the work conducted by the Russian futurist poets Khlebnikov and 
Krucënykh who coined the term Zaoum in a search for a primal and 
preadamic language that could be instinctively understood by all  people, 
and the Dadaist Hugo Ball who performed non-lexical phonetic poems 
with the aim to rebirth a pure language (Watts 1988), the Bamboo 
Whisper – by reintroducing clicking sounds as a part of speech – brings 
its wearers closer to the original language of humankind and hence to a 
time when humans themselves were nonhumans.
Emplacement and Embodiment
Recent findings in cognitive science support what Donna Haraway 
(1988) has long insisted: that “knowledge is situated” – the same data 
means different things in different contexts. In digital culture, time and 
place are disembodied, so context between communication nodes may 
have little in common, resulting in dislocation and miscommunication. 
How can we communicate empathetically even though we may not have 
a common culture, environment, or language? In addition to presenting 
an assemblage of meta-level meanings, mannerisms of speech also affect 
the perception of individual being in relation to the world. As with the 
senses, the linguistic concepts of varying cultures challenge the Western 
idea of stable universal structures defining the world around us into dis-
tinct and intrinsically predictable objects. Other cultures use different 
taxonomies along the color spectrum, different means of gendering, and 
deploy varying concepts of time and coordinate systems. As an example, 
the Guugu Yimithirr, an aboriginal group native to Australia, used a 
global coordinate system to locate as opposed to the Western local sys-
tem of left and right, which is based on individual orientation.4 In order 
to communicate with others, they would at all times need to be aware 
of their geographical positioning, which they did even when removed 
from their accustomed environment and placed inside buildings with no 
access to outside markers (Hong and Deutscher 2012). Being so acutely 
attuned to the world around them is inconceivable to most Westerners 
and suggests a vastly different sense of emplacement. The user of a local 
coordinate system sees the world in relation to themselves.
Creating an encapsulating structure, such as the Bamboo Whisper, 
highlights the user’s emplacement. The protruding brim-sticks provide 
a respectably steady or unsteady environment for the wearer, subject 
to the auditory conditions of the environment and the behavior of the 
cyborganic “other”. Inactivity signifies silence, whereas vocal intona-
tions provide vibrancy, movement, and the appearance of life-likeness of 
the object. Similar causations can be found in various creation myths5 
 (Wilson and Fitzedward 2008), with equivalents in contemporary quan-
tum mechanics, that state all matter exists as vibration. In the future, 
objects and materials may be augmented to amplify the vibrating matter 
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at the core of their molecular structure. In this way, Bamboo Whisper 
explores the concept of a flat ontology between objects and human ac-
tants (Flanagan 2014, 675) as well as raises questions about the distinc-
tion between zoé and bios (Braidotti 2008).
Bio-centric thought defines organic, that is, carbon-based, organisms 
as being life per se, whereas the notion of zoé extends the concept of life 
to encompass non-organic systems, such as the sky and water (Ziarek 
2011, 24). Lovelock’s Gaia Theory, and Earth System Science, support 
the definition of life to extend beyond commonly accepted biological 
restrictions (Lovelock 1995; Skinner 1999). Likewise, advances in the 
life sciences have raised questions to what extent humans and other an-
imals can be viewed as discrete organisms at all: should they rather be 
regarded as systems themselves, delicate assemblages of thousands of 
symbionts reacting to the environment (Turnbaugh et al. 2007, 804)? 
Almost fifty years ago, Gregory Bateson stated that “the unit of survival 
is organism plus environment” (1972, 491). In spite of evidence that a 
discrete and singular self does not exist, current developments show that 
political and technological trajectories are moving deeper toward an in-
dividualized, neo-liberal world where all responsibility of survival and 
well-being is removed from the collective and placed on the subject, con-
tinuing the ideal proposed by the Enlightenment project of a perfected 
liberal subject.
Human computer interface design has been dominated by ocular- 
centrism, relying on visual semiotics and screen-based interfaces. Alter-
nately, by technocrafting cyborganic artifacts, in the case of Bamboo 
Whisper, augmenting communication with haptic and vibrational sen-
sation, organic objects seem to come to life. In this manner, we perceive 
our research as a physical manifestation of the evolution of objects as 
actants. The cyborganic expresses the interconnectedness between us 
and between objects and materials in the world. In the hand crafting 
of cyborganic artifacts, the direct trace of human action on materials 
can be viewed like archaeology, a physical manifestation of memory of 
the materials. This can also be said of digital crafting, only rather than 
the direct mark of the hand, computer-aided design augments thinking 
beyond the physical confines of body-bound perception. A keyboard or 
a touch pad may serve as the interface, but the outcome is an object as 
a physical manifestation of an idea that was drawn in the mind’s eye. 
What new modes of expression can be deduced from digital traces? Tacit 
experiences with materials need to be acknowledged as intra-active pro-
cesses. Karen Barad’s notion of “intra-action” offers an alternative to the 
word “interaction”, which is based on the assumption that two entities 
are separate to begin with; alternatively, intra-action describes the same 
space but with full awareness of the agential nature of each entity. Barad 
offers a theory that hinges on causal relationships between materials and 
practices which can be viewed as an alternative to representationalism, 
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and in this sense, intra-action is a profound conceptual shift (Flanagan 
2016). She writes, “phenomenon is a dynamic relationality that is locally 
determinate in its matter and meaning as mutually determined (within 
a particular phenomenon) through specific causal intra-actions” (Barad 
2003, 820). In line with Barad, neuroscience’s discovery of mirror neu-
rons identified empathy in a physiological sense (Keysers 2009). Mirror 
neurons not only exist between humans but extend to nonhuman en-
tities; hence, the shaking of brim-sticks in a cyborganic wearable can 
stimulate a physiological reaction in another wearer.
In the post-industrial era, we have the opportunity to re-unit skill 
and intellect. The challenge is to design digital tools that enable empa-
thetic relationships in holistic ecosystems, and in this way maintain the 
humanity inherent to craft (Ingold 2013). The craftsperson’s knowledge 
extends beyond materials and techniques, out into the world:
[…] his eyes stopped in awareness of the earth around him. He 
looked at the granite. To be cut, he thought, and made into walls. 
He looked at a tree. To be split and made into rafters. He looked at a 
streak of rust on the stone and thought of iron ore under the ground. 
To be melted and emerge as girders against the sky. These rocks, he 
thought, are here for me; waiting for the drill, the dynamite and my 
voice; waiting to be split, ripped, pounded, reborn; waiting for the 
shape my hands will give them.
(Rand 1993, 16)
Written in the 1940s, Ayn Rand’s description above reflects a time when 
nature appeared endless and boundless. Traditional crafts were often di-
rectly connected to the environments in which they were practiced, simply 
because materials usually needed to be locally accessible. In globalized 
societies facing environmental degradation, the notion of thinking glob-
ally and acting locally is a fundamental principle of sustainability. In 
predominantly urban environments, do we still have the knowledge and 
ability to read the landscape in these terms? Robert  Lawlor describes 
this connection in less hedonistic terms than Rand above:
Aborigines maintain that the masculine role is not to act on the ma-
terial world but to participate in the balance of natural creative forces 
on the metaphysical plane. To act on that which has entered the phys-
ical world is already too late; once spirit energy has materialized, a 
chain of reactions changes the entire pattern of nature.
(Lawlor 1991, 181)
According to this sentiment, the “self” is deeply connected to the eco-
system. Across the globe, a new mind-set is emerging, which sees the 
need to renegotiate the resources we have at hand rather than simply 
producing more artifacts (Openshaw 2015, 6). Instead, we must build 
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to protect the biological and cultural historicity of the human being. We 
must acknowledge that being human is biological and historical and that 
it is through the material world we construct and remember who we are.
We have remnants of the tail in our skeletal structure deriving from 
our arboreal life tens of millions of years ago, we have traces of the 
horizontally closing eyelid in our eyes to remind us of our reptilian 
past, and we even have remains of gills in our body as a reminder of 
our aquatic life hundreds of millions of years ago. It is clear that we 
also have a number of existential reactions secured in our nervous 
systems, and they need to be acknowledged in architecture.
(Pallasmaa 2013, 215)
The Bamboo Whisper can be viewed in this light, as architecture around 
the body. References can be drawn from history: the form is not unlike 
a Victorian bonnet or the reed headdress worn by South African  Xhosas 
to perform the ceremonial rite of passage to manhood. In the late twen-
tieth century,6 North Congo Ngbende initiates still wore grass outfits 
that include a fringe of grass concealing their face.7 *In Japanese his-
tory originating in the late Ashikaga period, we find examples of woven 
grass-reed, rattan, or bamboo basket-shaped hats called  Tengai (天蓋). 
 Etymologically  – ten “sky-heaven” and gai “cover”, worn by Komoso 
“straw mat monks” whose numbers grew rapidly in the Tokugawa period 
and came to be known as (薦層) Komūso or “monks of no-thing-ness” 
(虚無僧). The basket hats hide the identity of the individual and hence 
 reinforce the collective identity. A parallel can be drawn between the func-
tion of Tengai and the Bamboo Whisper in that they are used as a tool to 
help suppress the ego and encourage people to focus on listening by di-
minishing visual distraction (Sanford 1977, 413) (Figures 12.4 and 12.5). 
By adopting ancient crafting techniques and blending them with tech-
nological materials and data, we attempt, in experimental wearables 
such as the Bamboo Whisper, to create organic augmentations that are 
not alien to the human, but integral, safe, and trusted due to their deep 
cultural and historical intertwinement. The cyborganic embraces both 
the artificially constructed and the organically grown, thereby propos-
ing a third construct that transcends the divide of artificial and natural. 
Blending digital and artisanal practices results in a composite, a material 
that combines digital computations with material properties, enabling 
that material to behave beyond its usual capabilities (Vallgårda and 
Redström 2007, 513–522). Examples of such combination are extremely 
varied as any material can potentially become part of such composite. 
Organic materials are unruly and chaotic: they can never be subdued to 
absolute consistency of expression as their inherent uniqueness is fur-
ther enhanced by hand-processing and deploying age-old techniques – 
for example, felting and weaving that date back to the Paleolithic. 
Combined with digital technology, temporal hybrids of prehistoric and 
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Figure 12.4  Malawi boys in initiation ritual.
Photo by CCBY2.0 Steve Evans. (Image courtesy of Creative Commons – 2.0 Generic 
license)
Figure 12.5  Japanese Komuso wearing Tengai.
Photo by CCBY3.0 松岡明芳. (Image courtesy of Creative Commons – 3.0 Unported 
license)
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contemporary technologies emerge. Spanning “The Great Divide” be-
tween the archaic and the modern is described by Bruno Latour (1993) 
as the main concept of separation which traps humanity in a destructive 
modernist narrative. The temporal hybridity of the object reveals the 
longitudinal fluidity of time and the errors of assuming a linear and 
one-directional temporal reality. Cyborganic objects are not unique in 
this regard as most – if not all – of our materializing practices consist of 
these kinds of temporal assemblages.
Cyborganics, Agency, and Sociotechnical Misbehavior
At the end of the last millennium, Esther Dyson (1996, 295) declared:
[t]he central event of the 20th century is the overthrow of matter. In 
technology, economics, and the politics of nations, wealth – in the form 
of physical resources – has been losing value and significance. The pow-
ers of mind are everywhere ascendant over the brute force of things.
The cybernetic paradigm continued the Cartesian trajectory of liberating 
the eternal mind from the finite flesh, and the liberal humanist subject 
of the Enlightenment project seemed to finally have reached its destiny as 
the spirit triumphed and gained immortality and embodiment ceased to 
be a requisite for human being. Soon, the mind could be mapped into a 
binary signal and uploaded onto a computer, which – complete with bi-
onic, serviceable, and replaceable limbs – would constitute a new, highly 
improved superior species. Situated somewhere between Six Million Dol-
lar Man, Bionic Woman, Star Trek, Tron, and Bernard Wolfe’s Limbo, 
this narrative still carries appeal to early tech adopters and Silicon Valley 
culture as personified by Google’s chief engineer Ray Kurzweil and the 
transhumanist movement. The transhumanists believe the merging of 
humans with technology signifies the next evolutionary step of human-
ity, effectively eliminating disease and bestowing the human species with 
eternal life. The key is “whole brain emulation”, where the basic premise 
is to produce a digital copy of a persons’ mind, which will then control 
an artificial body. Whilst this might sound somewhat fantastical, the re-
search is well on the way. Over the last decade, a slew of heavily funded 
initiatives has emerged with the purpose to reverse-engineer the human 
brain, such as the BRAIN Initiative (USA, see National- Institute-of-
Heath 2017), Human Brain Project (EU), and Blue Brain (Switzerland). 
In 2014, the connections between the 320 neurons found in a round-
worm (Caenorhabditis elegans) were successfully mapped, simulated in 
software, and given a Lego body which subsequently behaved and moved 
like a worm (Szigeti et al. 2014, 137).
However tempting the prospect of immortality and the ending of suf-
fering and disease might be, the idea of a cyborg future is still generally 
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met with severe resistance. In the USA, the majority of the population 
believes augmentative technologies will have an overall negative im-
pact if they become commonplace (Smith 2014, 4). Surely this can be 
viewed as a general fear, which always accompanies transitions into new 
and unknown territories. On the other hand, the fear of the machine is 
deeply ingrained in the cultural narrative, and its potency does not seem 
to diminish, even though machines have become an integral part of hu-
man life. The machine – the cold, hard, emotionless super-brain – robs 
the human of empathy and enslaves it with its overpowering and grue-
some logic. In Technophobia, Daniel Dinello examines the narratives of 
dystopian science fiction dominating popular culture. He argues that the 
fear of technology is closely related to the fear of the virus, which has 
replaced the cold-war era’s fear of the bomb. Technology, according to 
Dinello, is perceived as an insidious and invasive force that, just like a 
viral infection, invisibly infiltrates and undermines human integrity by 
manipulating and mutating its host to promote its own existence and 
evolution (Dinello 2005, 211).
In this narrative, humans are no longer in control of the technology 
they have created. In Autonomous Technology: Technics-out-of-control 
as a Theme in Political Thought, Langdon Winner writes: “Under pres-
ent conditions men are not at all the masters of technological change; 
they are its prisoners” (Winner 1977, 55). The notion of the technolog-
ical creation developing its own unforeseen and uncontrollable agency 
can be traced back 200 years to the novel Frankenstein written by Mary 
Shelley in 1818. Here, the protagonist Dr. Frankenstein seeks to gain 
power over nature, yet realizes he has created a monster and exposed 
the world to it, without any previous consideration of the consequences. 
Subsequently, his creation – the monster – becomes
an autonomous force, with a structure of its own, with demands 
upon which it insists absolutely. Provided with no plan for its ex-
istence, the technological creation enforces a plan upon its creator.
(Shelley 2010, 313)
Yet the machine may still become something else completely: it could 
be warm, ancient, and organic; even alive. The posthuman project, as 
predominantly proposed by feminist, postcolonial critics, opposes the 
objectivist, disembodied, and dominating mind-in-control, with its un-
relenting desire for mastery and subduing of nature. The posthuman, as 
opposed to the transhuman, suggests an entity of embodied wisdom, dy-
namically intertwined with both the intelligence of machines and the in-
telligence of nature. In the posthuman, humanity’s progressive thought 
and constant technological striving for invention result in the creation 
of ever evolving and expanding ecologies of being, for both humans and 
other life-forms, whether biological, artificial, or both.
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The materiality of the Bamboo Whisper transgresses the natural- 
artificial dichotomies by using digital technology to augment and 
amplify natural elements. It rejects the Cartesian narrative of the dis-
embodied machine-mind by transcending the culture-nature divide and 
invites us to adopt a perspective of a holistic posthuman possibility. Hu-
mans possess an innate propensity toward natural environments; this 
bias was coined by Edward Osborne Wilson as the Biophilia Hypothesis 
and has been affirmed by a substantial body of research, especially in 
the area of child development (Verbeek and De Waal 2002). The Bio-
philia Hypothesis states that “humans have an innate tendency to focus 
on life and life-like processes” (Kellert and Wilson 1995, 4). According 
to Wilson (1984), as a result of biocultural evolution, biophilia is not 
an instinct but sets of complex rules of learning that fall along several 
emotional spectra, that is, attraction, aversion, awe, peacefulness, and 
anxiety. The hypothesis states that when humans remove themselves 
from a natural environment and move into an artificial environment, 
the biophilic learning rules are not abandoned and replaced by modern 
ones that would be better adapted to a world of artifacts but survive in 
atrophied forms. One aspect of particular relevance to cyborganics is the 
aesthetic response which, although not completely understood, remains 
an indisputably powerful factor (Ulrich 1983). Experiencing nature pro-
duces feelings of awe, tranquility, peace of mind, well-being, and con-
fidence. So far, the Biophilia Hypothesis has influenced developmental 
psychology (Kahn 1997), preventive medicine (Frumkin 2001), and ar-
chitectural theory (Joye 2007; de Chardin 2015). Over the last decade, 
biophilic theory has increasingly been incorporated into urban design, 
as ecology and greening have become central elements in city planning 
and development (Kenworthy 2006).
Scaled down to artifacts, the effect is equally observable: traditional 
modernist interiors and objects comprised of steel, concrete, and glass 
are perceived as cold and alienating, whereas structures and furnish-
ing made from natural materials make the space warm and welcoming. 
This principle can even be extended to the machine, as observable in 
the elaborate objects and garments crafted and used by adherents of the 
steampunk movement. Steampunk can best be explained as “Victorian 
science fiction”, and since the 1980s, it has slowly grown from a literary 
subgenre into a multifaceted counterculture built around Neo-Victorian 
physical artifacts strongly influenced by the Arts and Craft Movement of 
the turn of the twentieth century. Steampunk envisions an alternate fu-
ture as if digital technology had become a reality in the beginning of the 
nineteenth century, when Charles Babbage and Ada Lovelace8 succeeded 
in building a computer. This vision was described by William Gibson 
and Bruce Sterling in The Difference Engine, one of the founding nov-
els of the steampunk movement. Steampunk embraces technology, but 
rejects the modernist factory mass-production of sleek, interchangeable, 
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and disposable objects (Onion 2008, 1). The mostly self-made steam-
punk artifacts are striking, with the essence of the machine brought to 
the fore as an impressive and tangible construct of cogs, wheels, gears, 
copper, brass, leather, and wood. Another example of this are the weird, 
wonderful, and strangely “alive” “Strandbeests” by Theo Jansen. These 
wind-powered animal-like kinetic machines, which roam the beaches 
of the Netherlands, provide a striking example of craftsmanship and 
engineering skill. Just like the “Strandbeests” and steampunk artifacts, 
cyborganic wearables explore the aesthetic possibilities of the machine, 
transcending temporal confines, and the separation of artificial and or-
ganic, dead and alive.
As humans, we tend to view technical devices that demonstrate odd 
behaviors as socio-technical misbehavior. There is a tendency to anthro-
pomorphize that leads to deductions and explanations, resentment of the 
seemingly autonomous misbehavior, or imaginary conspiracy theories of 
collaborative misbehavior between technological devices. This could be 
understood as “configuring the user” (Woolgar 1991) or, as Lupton pro-
poses, a case of humans facing the dilution of their agency (Lupton 2015). 
During the design process of the Bamboo Whisper, the artifact developed 
a sense of entity that was not anticipated. It grew in the gap between what 
the (human) designers expected it to do and the capacities and sensibil-
ities that surround the materials and components it embodied. Human 
bias makes us distinguish between voice and other auditory input. The 
microphone in Bamboo Whisper does not make such distinctions but will 
amplify and mediate any signal without imposing a system of hierarchical 
classification, other than a predefined threshold level. What starts out as 
a human conversation soon transforms into a much broader exchange 
including environmental signals such as ambient noises. Also included 
are signals from the object itself as the clatter from the reeds gets picked 
up by the microphone, which, in turn, transmits a signal to the other de-
vice, and so on. Not only does this make the Bamboo Whisper appear to 
“talk back” and so develop an emotional character which communicates 
directly with the human capacity, it also dramatically changes the power 
balance between the wearer and the device. Where the Bamboo Whisper 
was initially perceived as an appendage to a human subject, the shift in 
activity now suggests the wearer should rather be considered a host facil-
itating the agency of the device (Figures 12.6 and 12.7). 
Similarly, the transmission of the auditory signal has a fundamen-
tally different functionality in the Bamboo Whisper’s radio-based way 
of “hearing and talking”. Humans perform these tasks continuously, as 
a flow, whereas Bamboo Whisper bundles signals and transmits them 
in little data packages, which are then subsequently mapped kinetically 
onto the reeds. Its single processor renders it a rather simple creature 
without the ability to multitask, that is, it is unable to listen and talk si-
multaneously, much like communicating through walkie-talkies. From 
an anthropocentric perspective, this may be perceived as a flaw or fault. 
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It could, however, also be accepted as an expression of the agency of 
the object itself, meaning that nuances such as delay in the signal and 
the perceptive ability of the sensor to pick up ambient sounds are ways 
to experience “being” with fundamentally foreign sensory and pro-
cessing abilities. This signifies the emergence of entirely new forms of 
sociality, a techno-sociality. It is a performative nexus of intra-actions 
between semi-autonomous digital objects that form social bonds and 
interrelations among humans, between humans, and amid digital arti-
facts (Michael 2016).
Conclusion
In this chapter, we have presented the Bamboo Whisper, a body-worn 
artifact that, deployed as an ethnographical sensory device, explores 
Figure 12.6  Inter-human communication in the form of speech is generally 
mastered and internalized once past toddlerhood. The act of 
speaking is accompanied by series of nonverbal cues, performed 
as well as received and analyzed subconsciously by both sender 
and receiver. As 70–90 percent of the process is nonverbal, and 
predominantly takes place unconsciously, it is not uncommon to 
see people interact almost automatically with the subtle signals of 
the other, in mutually reinforcing feedback loops (cf. Hogan and 
Stubbs 2003, 121).
Figure 12.7  The agency of the Bamboo Whisper is disruptive to the experi-
ence and expectations of the human wearers (or hosts) within the 
system.
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body-centric human to nonhuman relationships. We defined the Bam-
boo Whisper as a cyborganic wearable, that is, a human-nature- 
machine hybrid framed as a fictional posthuman entity. We position this 
research within speculative and critical design practice, framed as a form 
of experiential and applied ontology. We have shown how both the con-
structed objects – the cyborganic device and the construction process in 
itself – provide opportunities for valuable insights into the nature of the 
nonhuman. The immersive experience provided by wearing the Bamboo 
Whisper offers direct experience of a sensory realm different from what 
is generally accepted as human.
Understanding how others relate presupposes overcoming one’s own 
sensory bias, a process which the Bamboo Whisper facilitates through 
inducing a certain amount of sensory displacement and confusion. Ad-
ditionally, we have offered the theory that the clattering sounds pro-
duced by the Bamboo Whisper may induce an altered perception of the 
spatial environment, that is, provide its wearer with alternate means of 
both perception and embodied knowing; whilst linguistically bringing 
the human wearer closer to its nonhuman origin. Likewise, the physical 
limitations and the emplacement enforced by the Bamboo Whisper, in 
communication with its cyborganic twin, positions the wearer in a sym-
biotic experience of the other-in-space as a synergy arises between the 
self and the other, relating to a surrounding environment.
Bamboo Whisper emerged through a generative and iterative de-
sign praxis that embraced the inherent behaviors and diversity of the 
deployed materials to produce results that were not predetermined. 
Emergent qualities resulted from the intra-action of many elements and 
produced outcomes that equated to exponentially more than what would 
be obvious from their individual properties. An analogy can be drawn 
to biomimicry as the simulation of natural processes. Biomimicry de-
notes the branch of technological development which emulates nature’s 
patterns and strategies. Swarm behaviors of insects, for example, reveal 
highly complex, unpredictable behaviors generated from many individ-
ual organism’s compliances with relatively few simple rules. In Bamboo 
Whisper, relationships developed as haptic communication that induced 
reactive behaviors, or feedback loops. Sociotechnical relationships such 
as these represent new possibilities for design.
In our human techno-genesis, trial and error provides the evolution of 
our technical development. In biological terms, we may refer to Darwin’s 
notion of natural selection. In a simulation of this process, “un-natural” 
selection can be found in the space we have articulated in this chap-
ter, between the objective of the designer and the reality of what is de-
signed, between the black and white of Cartesian logic, between human 
and nonhuman agency. This cyborganic mutation grows in unexpected 
places: in the unassisted survival of Theo Jansen’s “Strandbeests” on the 
beaches of the Netherlands and in the apparent entity of the non-living 
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assimilation of data and materials into speculative designs as exem-
plified by the Bamboo Whisper. It demonstrates how the relationship 
between human and nonhuman actants can be reconfigured through 
practice-based construction with organic and digital materials, where 
the affordances and capabilities of the materials can extrapolate mate-
rial agency when emerging as composites.
We have argued that redefining what it means to be human in response 
to the increasing techno-genesis of our species is an essential requirement 
for humanity to comprehend the essence of its future self. Building on the 
Biophilia Hypothesis that claims humans have an innate propensity to-
ward natural materials and systems, we have offered the notion of the cy-
borganic as a materially manifested fictional concept in order to approach 
humanity’s mutation unencumbered by technophobia, the age-old fear of 
the machine that is deeply embedded within Western cultural narratives – 
similarly to the way myths and fables  offer a safe space of nonhuman 
encounter. Lastly, we propose that the development of the cyborganic 
transcends the Cartesian divide and its transhuman endpoint, in line with 
the call for a posthuman entity of embodied wisdom, gently interweaving 
the intelligence of the machine with the intelligence of nature.
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Notes
 * Malawi boys from southeast Africa similarly concealed their face with rat-
tan head covers for their initiation ritual.
 1 Wetware is the principle of using biological neurons to perform digital cal-
culations and logical operations. See, for example, research by Borresen and 
Lynch (2009).
 2 Not to be confused with the pioneer internet collective of the 1990s of the 
same name: Cyborganic was an online and face-to-face collective which 
brought Wired magazine online; launched Hotwired, set-up web produc-
tion for CNET; led the open-source Apache project; and staffed and started 
dozens of other Internet firms and projects – from Craig’s List to Organic 
Online – during the first phase of the web’s development as a popular plat-
form (1993–1999). See Cool (2008).
 3 See also project website http://triciaflanagan.com/blinklifier/.
 4 The Guugu Yimithirr are an Australian aboriginal tribe of Far North 
Queensland.
 5 For example, the Bible states “in the beginning was the word” (John 1:1), 
whereas Vedic tradition ascribe the beginning of creation with the sound 
“Aum”. See Wilson and Fitzedward (2008).
 6 As photographed by Alfred I. Hart, of Xhosas doning reed outfits for a rite 
of passage to manhood, South Africa 1925. In Cathy Newman National 
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Geographic Fashion, National Geographic Society, Washington, 2001, 
26–27.
 7 As photographed by Carol Beckwith and Angela Fisher of North Congo, 
 Africa, Ngbende initiates wearing grass skirts, late 20th century. In Koda 
Harold, Extreme Beauty The Body Transformed, The Metropolitan, 
 Museum of Modern Art, New York, 2001, 122.
 8 Charles Babbage (1791–1871) is credited to have invented the first mechanical 
computer together with Ada Lovelace (1815–1852).
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How can we make sense of the emergent, self-organizing capacities 
of the material world? This question has been recently addressed by 
two otherwise quite divergent fields of literary and narrative theory – 
cognitive narratology and material ecocriticism. In both approaches, 
the problem of anthropocentrism is often a guiding principle of inves-
tigation. For cognitive narratology, this is typically a question about 
how narrative fails in the representation of a certain kind of complex 
causality, and how “we”,1 as members of a certain natural species, al-
most invariably use narrative logic to make sense of both ourselves and 
our environment. According to the situated and enactivist paradigm of 
the field, human understanding of temporal phenomena is, at its heart, 
based on narratives; storytelling is an ability that allows us, as human 
individuals, to manage time by discovering or imposing links between 
different cultural and material phenomena. There is, however, an an-
thropocentric and anthropomorphic bias in the narrative logic used by 
such sense-making: we have a general tendency to approach the world 
through narrative explanations, even when they crudely misrepresent 
the systemic logic of emergent behavior under investigation.
In the theoretical horizon of material ecocriticism, a similar question is 
more standardly addressed in terms of nonhuman agency. Drawing from 
the recent discourses of “new materialisms” and the wider  “material 
turn”2 in humanities and social sciences, material ecocriticism investi-
gates the capacity for material objects to act with effectivity – to have 
agency or even a “voice” (or several voices) of their own. This is con-
trasted to the more traditional, anthropocentric view of human individu-
als as the only beings endowed with mind and agency, a perspective where 
the material world – including both “inanimate” matter and nonhuman 
forms of living – is seen as largely passive, inert, and unable to com-
municate any independent expression of meaning. Material ecocriticism 
aims to situate human agency in an ecological field of  more-than-human 
forces and substances, which often merge with the life of our bodies and 
environments. In this complex landscape of both human and nonhuman 
“actants” – to use Bruno Latour’s terminology – agency is not the sole 
property of intentional human beings but something that also belongs 
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to such entities as hurricanes, rocks, environmental pollutants, or non-
human animals, to mention just a few examples. Critically informed by 
Karen Barad’s theory of agential realism, material ecocriticism situates 
all phenomena as the “intra-actions” of material and discursive practices 
and agencies, which co-emerge at once in the world’s “ongoing becom-
ing”. In contrast to the usual “interaction”, which presumes the prior 
existence of independent entities, the notion of intra-action proposes that 
distinct entities do not precede, but rather emerge through, their intra- 
actions (Latour 2004, 237; Barad 2007, 33; Iovino and Oppermann 
2014, 1–10).
One of the key concepts of material ecocriticism is storied matter, 
which emphasizes the capacity of nonhuman matter to participate in 
the construction of stories. The two foremost architects of the field, 
Serenella Iovino and Serpil Oppermann (2012, 83), posit that matter, 
“in all its forms, becomes a site of narrativity, a storied matter, embody-
ing its own narratives in the minds of human agents and in the very 
structure of its own self-constructive forces”. In this way, material eco-
criticism sees material reality as endowed with a narrative agency – an 
ability to partake in the narrative process. In fact, Iovino even questions 
our conventional notions about storytelling as a mere human activity. 
For her, “every living being tells us evolutionary stories of co-existence, 
co-dependence, extinctions and survivals” (Iovino 2015, 71), and for a 
similar reason, she also wonders:
[W]ho is the storyteller of these stories narrated through and across 
bodies by actants such as toxic waste, sick cells, individual organ-
isms, and social forces? Who is really the “narrating agent”, if 
things’ agency is a narrative agency? Rather than (metaphorically, of 
course!) “killing” the author, we should maybe re-draw the bound-
aries of authorship in a more realistic way.
(Ibid. 83; emphasis in the original.)
In Iovino’s account of material ecocriticism, human individuals are not 
the true “authors” of the stories we tell about our nonhuman surround-
ings. According to her, part of the story is always “told” by nonhu-
man agencies – such as electricity, toxins, fungi or climate patterns, and 
their entangled co-dependencies – in the creatively emergent becoming 
of the material world. From this perspective, “reality emerges as an in-
tertwined flux of material and discursive forces, rather than as complex 
of hierarchically organized individual players” (Iovino and Oppermann 
2014, 3). This means that the anthropomorphization of things, places, 
natural elements, and nonhuman animals is recognized as a narrative 
technique employed to stress the agentic power of matter and the hori-
zontality of its elements. Drawing upon the assumption that narratives 
about the agentic capacities of matter can be enlightening and important 
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ways to involve nonhuman entities into our social, cultural, epistemo-
logical, and ethical landscape, material ecocriticism treats stories as a 
form of “strategic” anthropomorphism, which liberates things from 
their silence.
With its task of giving voice to nonhuman matter, material ecocriti-
cism has so far remained silent about the failures of narrative in address-
ing the complex behavior of the material world. In this chapter, I will try 
to remedy this oversight: rather than focusing upon the “storied” nature 
of matter – the capacity of nonhuman agencies to influence our narrative 
sense-making – examined so far by the majority of studies in material 
ecocriticism, I will employ the theoretical landscape of cognitive nar-
ratology as an entry-point to the inherent creativity of “unnarratable” 
matter. With this move, I aim to highlight how a central attribute of 
complex natural-cultural systems is actually unrepresentable in narrative 
discourse and thought, and how narratives are often antithetical to our 
aspiration to grasp the true complexity of material processes. By explor-
ing the creative tendencies of matter beyond narratives, I will thus try to 
demonstrate why the creativity of matter should not be equated to mere 
narrative agency. In fact, my intention is to sketch out a notion of unnar-
ratable matter, of material agency that defies our human sense-making 
by not conforming to the implicitly anthropomorphic logic of narrative.
Narrative and Complex Material Systems
Material ecocriticism, as defined by Iovino and Oppermann (2014, 7),
is the study of the way material forms – bodies, things, elements, 
toxic substances, chemicals, organic and inorganic matter, land-
scapes, and biological entities – intra-act with each other and with 
the human dimension, producing configurations of meanings and 
discourses that we can interpret as stories.
Intrinsically, it is a theory which “investigates matter both in texts and 
as a text” (ibid., emphasis in the original). This means, first of all, that it 
is an approach which focuses on the way matter’s (or “nature’s”) nonhu-
man agentic capacities are described and represented in narrative texts. 
As such, material ecocriticism can be seen as a method for literary and 
cultural interpretation: it is an approach for analyzing narrative represen-
tations with its focus on the agentic power of matter. Second, however, it 
also means that material ecocriticism focuses on matter’s own “narrative” 
power of creating configurations of meanings and substances. Matter 
itself is seen as a “text”, where “dynamics of ‘diffuse’ agency and non- 
linear causality are inscribed and produced” (Iovino and Oppermann 
2012, 79–80) – material ecocriticism attends to the stories and the narra-
tive potentialities that develop from matter’s process of becoming.
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Taking matter as a text means, quite obviously, questioning the 
very idea of text: for material ecocriticism, text includes both human 
material-discursive constructions and nonhuman things such as water, 
soil, stones, metals, minerals, climate, bacteria, toxins, food, electricity, 
cells, atoms, and all cultural objects and places. The characteristic fea-
ture of these material configurations is that they are not made of single 
elements, isolated from each other. Rather, they form complexes that 
are both natural and cultural, and in many cases, human agency and 
meanings are intensely entwined with the emerging agency and meaning 
of these nonhuman beings. From such a perspective, the separation be-
tween human and nonhuman agency is ultimately blurred: it is often im-
possible to draw clear lines between the subjects and objects of actions 
in line with modern thought. In our contemporary world, this is rather 
uncomfortably demonstrated by global environmental problems such as 
climate change, where the material “nature” is always escaping from the 
assumed human control.
Cognitive narratology may seem like a strange bedfellow to the dis-
courses of this kind of ecocritical theory: cognitive science is not a 
field particularly well known for its environmental awareness. Con-
temporary narratological theory, however, is often informed by the 
post-computational, embodied, and enactivist paradigm of cognitive 
science, which shares a significant number of similarities with the 
basic tenets of new materialisms. Most importantly, it is based on a 
non- anthropocentric view of human cognition: it approaches human 
individuals as biological organisms among others, and is typically 
concerned with embodiment as well as the interactive “structural cou-
pling” of all organisms with their environments. According to cogni-
tive narratologist Richard Walsh (2011, 75), for example, “the laws 
of natural selection represent the base level of a complex system from 
which genes, organisms, species, ecosystems, and the whole of natural 
history are emergent phenomena”. Why is this kind of evolutionary 
view of the material world relevant for narrative theory? Mainly be-
cause of the limitations of our narrative understanding: in narrative 
accounts of evolutionary processes, we can only attribute agency to 
one or other of these phenomena and so “inevitably traduce the way 
the laws of natural selection operate” (ibid.).
One of the inherent key characteristics of all narrative representation, 
as noted by Walsh, is the fact that it tacitly gives agency to both human 
and nonhuman entities, be they individual organisms (such as humans 
or ants), collectives (human societies or ant colonies), inanimate objects 
(power lines or pheromone trails), or abstractions (the stock market or 
natural selection). As the theories of material ecocriticism and the new 
materialisms suggest, we can use such narratives to make sense of the 
complex “intra-actions” of the material and the cultural spheres. The 
problem with this kind of narrative representation is, however, that it 
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also imposes an anthropocentric perspective on the ongoing processes; 
it renders them intelligible, as Walsh (2016, 274) puts it, “by representing 
them in fundamentally human terms”. With this quasi-automatic act of 
narrative sense-making, we are actually actively reducing the complexity 
of the more-than-human world to deceptively clear narrative patterns 
and causalities.
According to Walsh, there are several problems associated with the 
anthropocentric and the anthropomorphic features of narrative repre-
sentations. First of all, they ascribe human-like intentionality to non-
human entities: narrative agents are portrayed as the initiators of their 
own actions – as if they chose what they do and what they want to 
do (Walsh 2016, 274–275). Here, the problem of anthropomorphism is 
not really the attribution of agency to the nonhuman environment, but 
rather the mistaken notion that all agency is based on centralized “top-
down” control. Even when the creative tendencies of matter are wholly 
appreciated and approved, this kind of intentionality typically seems like 
a misrepresentation of the complex actions of the material processes. 
Nonhuman entities and material bodies can certainly “do stuff”, act on 
each other and on us with different kinds of meaningful effectivity, but 
not really in the same manner as human individuals. Ignoring the dif-
ferences between human and nonhuman agency might seem like a move 
that disputes human exceptionality, but in actuality, it may just as well 
serve as a universalizing cognitive strategy, which reduces the threaten-
ing unpredictability and the causal complexity of the material world to 
more humanly understandable terms.
Second, Walsh also notes the perspectival quality of narrative. Nar-
ratives are constrained by the fact that “every unit of narration involves 
selection, from the systemic network of relations in any conceivable sit-
uation, of a foreground, a line of action, a protagonist” (ibid. 275). This 
means that we cannot represent the systemic interaction (or, for that 
matter, intra-action) of multiple concurrent events in narrative. We can 
either follow the behavior of one ant, for example, or the congregate 
behavior of a collective group of ants, but we cannot form a satisfying 
narrative representation of all the reciprocal and recursive networks of 
interaction in a complex system. Since the logic of narrative is sequen-
tial, it is inherently based on the idea of a chain of cause and effect, 
which cannot really account for the multi-causally interrelated behavior 
of material systems. Finally, Walsh (ibid.) also mentions how “the global 
logic of narrative is driven by its orientation towards an end”: instead of 
focusing upon the systemic logic of complex material and cultural pro-
cesses, we use the logic of narrative to explain the behavior in terms of 
humanly understandable goals and conclusive endings.
Keeping these observations in mind, it is rather easy to see why the 
stories or the narrative potentialities that emerge from matter’s process 
of becoming should not be too eagerly accepted as the central objects 
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of inquiry for material ecocriticism. Once we have acknowledged that 
“all constituents of nature from the subatomic to the higher levels of 
existence possess agency, creativity, expression, and enduring connec-
tions that can be interpreted as a mélange of stories” (Oppermann 
2013, 57), we should be able to move on to the next question: can we 
really understand the creative dynamics of matter through narrative 
logic? From the point of view of both material ecocriticism and today’s 
cognitive narratology, the notion of nonhuman agency is inextricably 
linked to meaning. Nevertheless, in the light of the recent discussions 
in narrative theory, it would seem like a rather unfortunate mistake 
to assume that the meanings produced by such agency are already 
in some sort of narrative form. Stories, instead of pre-existing in the 
matter as meaningful units to be picked up by us, are employed in or-
der to make sense of the complex interchanges between innumerable 
human and nonhuman agencies. Matter can, sure enough, produce 
meaningful actions, which can then be represented and interpreted as 
stories by human individuals and collectives. The problem with non-
human agency, however, is exactly the fact that these actions are not 
compatible with narrative explanations, and for this reason, instead of 
positing these nonhuman “voices” as our narrative partners in crime, 
it might be more reasonable to recognize our own limitations in inter-
preting them.
Plausible Stories
According to contemporary cognitive narratologists such as Walsh and 
H. Porter Abbott, our narrative logic fails us every time we try to make 
sense of emergent behavior in natural or cultural systems. In fact, Abbott 
(2008, 228) even defines “emergence” as a certain kind of complex cau-
sality which cannot be readily represented in narrative form. This kind 
of behavior includes – among other things – such systemic processes as 
traffic, the stock market, the immune system, ant trails, hurricanes, land-
slides, flocks of birds, schools of fish, the growth of cities, the construc-
tion of beehives, and the neurology of thought. All of these behaviors 
demonstrate the coming into being of objects or patterns that are not the 
result of any kind of intention: they are not caused by any sort of central-
ized authority, plan, guiding hand, or any other kind of overarching con-
trol. Instead, they are the result of countless local interactions. There are 
several ways in which this kind of temporal action can be converted into 
a coherent narrative, but the most obvious in producing the impression of 
narrativity is causality. Indeed, many narrative theorists hold the opinion 
that there is no narrative without a causal sequence of events. According 
to Abbott, emergent behavior presents a special challenge to our need or 
desire to perceive narrative “belonging”, meaning some sense of how the 
details of events in time make it possible to perceive a story of change. 
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In effect, he explains that emergent behavior can actually be understood 
as a gap between different levels of narrative explanation.
The main example provided by Abbott (2008, 234–238) concerns 
the logic of natural evolution. By examining the evolutionary story of 
dolphins and their ancestors, for instance, we can readily see the gaps 
between different levels of narrative. The species of Ambulocetus – also 
called the walking whale – was an ancestor of modern whales and dol-
phins that lived in the Early Eocene (50–48 million years ago), and could 
both walk and swim. The fossilized remains of Ambulocetus belong to 
so-called transitional fossils as they show how whales evolved from 
land-living mammals. Based on the fossil remains of Ambulocetus indi-
viduals, we can create a story or several stories about a specific male Am-
bulocetus that lived during that time period. We can follow the temporal 
progression of the individual’s life – how he was born, how he grows up, 
suffers hunger, escapes from predators, mates, and how he finally dies. 
This kind of a chain of events can be readily portrayed as a narrative, 
and with millions of instances of comparable narrative material, this 
story belongs to the micro level.
Out of these actions of Ambulocetus individuals emerges another 
story – the story of the evolution of modern dolphins. Without any 
overarching plan, guidance, or coercion, and without any intention of 
their own, the individuals participate in the production of a macro-level 
story, where the protagonist is no longer the individual Ambulocetus but 
the whole species. The story goes like this: Ambulocetus evolves into 
Kutchicetus; Kutchicetus evolves into Protocetus; Protocetus evolves 
into Basilosaurus; and so on, until we get to the modern, extant family 
of dolphins, Delphinidae. This narrative, which tells the evolutionary 
story of dolphins, has the phrase “evolves into” as its moment of causal 
action. We can narrate this story just as we can narrate the fluctuations 
of the stock market, the construction of a beehive, or the growth of a 
nation, without any reference to the emergent processes that actually 
bring them into being. In each case, the pattern of change at the macro 
level is produced by aggregate behavior at the micro level, yet we cannot 
tell a coherent story about the relationship between the two.
In emergent behavior, the necessary sense of narrative “belonging” is 
lost in a massive distribution of cause among agents, all of which inter-
act, to some degree, by chance and each of which lacks a dominant role 
in the emergent behavior of which it is a part. The changes that occur at 
the macro level are the combined consequence of thousands, millions, or 
billions of small stories that play out at the micro level. For this reason, 
there is no narratable thread between the micro level and the macro 
level: massive distribution of causal agents means that there is “action” 
but not really a “chain of events” needed for a coherent story. In fact, ac-
cording to Abbott (2008, 233–234), emergent behavior is by definition 
unnarratable: it is action that specifically defies the formal structure of 
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narrative for its representation. Something happens, and we can see it 
happening or even chart its progress, but we cannot really employ narra-
tive logic to explain what is actually going on – how the changes at the 
macro level emerge out of the systemic actions at the micro level.
According to Abbott (2008, 238), the unnarratability of emergent be-
havior means that we are prone to representing such action as a narrative 
of centralized control, which assumes that the collective behavior of a 
process must be under the control of an entity distinct from the mass. 
Typically, this leads to misinterpretations about the causal relationships 
between the participants responsible for the emergent phenomenon. For 
example, before the bottom-up approach to producing emergent behav-
ior was introduced in modern computing, the flocking of birds was often 
thought to be based on the leadership of one bird. Similarly, we are also 
prone to introducing anthropomorphic gods and spirits into our stories 
about our environment and our own coming into being. If we are to 
believe Abbott, these sorts of stories with centralized control actually 
indicate a fear of losing cognitive control. By reducing causal complexity 
and the role of chance and unpredictability, the narrative of centralized 
control allows the perceiver to gain the sense of cognitive control in their 
imagination. Especially in times of personal or national stress, we have 
a tendency to use cognitive heuristics and produce quick, reductive nar-
rativizations of cause and effect, somewhat plausible stories that help us 
manage the complexity of the world – with often disastrous results.
The language we have for describing any kind of action over time is 
almost inevitably saturated with narrative discourse. In the words of 
Abbott (2008, 240): “[i]t is the language of characters and events, of action 
and reaction, feeling and intention”. In fact, each and every narrative about 
emergent processes is responsible for reducing hugely complex causal rela-
tionships into stories with single causal actors. Narratives are then based 
on such anthropomorphic actors as Evolution, Nature, Nation-State, City, 
Climate Change, Stock Market, or Intentional Human Individual, which 
are portrayed as the protagonists or antagonists responsible for different 
actions and changes. Instead of explaining the complexities of the stock 
market, we can simply note how “the market responded with panic to 
today’s news”. Instead of explaining the full range of, for example, social, 
neurological, bacterial, chemical, and ecological complexities behind all 
human actions, we can tell a story about an intentional human individual 
writing a scholarly chapter. With such stories, we are constantly misrepre-
senting the reciprocal interactions of the system by assigning agency to a 
singular actor with “humanlike” motives and objectives.
Agency in the Anthropocene
Agency, in modern philosophy and sociology, has typically been de-
fined as the human capacity to make choices and act on them. In the 
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discourses of new materialisms and material ecocriticism, in contrast, 
matter is considered as a form of “emergent” agency that is combined 
and interferes with every act of “intentional” human agency – and for 
this reason, none of our intentional acts is restricted to the sphere of pure 
intentionality, but always “situates itself within a setting of co-emerging 
material configurations” (Iovino and Oppermann 2012, 86). Heather 
Sullivan (2013, 147–150) explains that this viewpoint modifies the mod-
ern conception of agency in two important respects. First, it expands the 
sense of agency to include the more-than-human world, where such en-
tities as nonhuman animals, power grids, environmental toxins, floods, 
rivers, or blood cells are moving through space and creating an effect 
in their surroundings. At the same time, however, it also diminishes the 
agency of the human subject as it is no longer seen as an outside force 
freely shaping the world: embodied human individuals are examined as 
part of a larger, interlinked system of things, matter, and living beings, 
where people, animals, artifacts, technologies, and elemental forces 
share powers and operate in entangled but often disharmonious con-
junction with each other.
One of the defining features of our current time period of the 
Anthropocene – the geological epoch during which humanity has 
come to play a critical role in the planet’s ecology and geology – is 
the emergence of the human species as a material agency of its own. 
Perhaps the most prominent indication of this newly gained agency is 
the global environmental crisis set in motion by anthropogenic climate 
change. According to historian Dipesh Chakrabarty (2009, 201–212), 
anthropogenic explanations of global warming have led to a collapse 
of the modern distinction between natural and human history: in this 
day and age, humans are considered a force of nature in the geological 
sense. Thinking of humans as a geological force involves positing “hu-
man species” as an actor responsible for the current ecological prob-
lems. As Timothy Clark (2015, 14–15) has noted, this “transpersonal 
agency” of the species consists of the emergent effects of collective hu-
man actions on the scale of the entire planet. As such, this species-level 
agency is not “capable of voluntary action or planning” (ibid. 15) – it 
arises from the typically unforeseen consequences of the plans and 
acts of its constituents.
With the methodological framework of material ecocriticism, the 
emergence of the human species as a geological force could be inter-
preted as a material story – a story about the combined effects of hu-
man activity as a material agency among others. In fact, Bruno Latour 
(2014, 3) has recently suggested that in the age of the Anthropocene, 
human history is to be joined to planetary ecology in what he calls 
a “geostory” – a dynamic unfolding of human and nonhuman forces 
where neither humans nor ecosystems are in complete control. If one 
actually tried to construct such a story, however, one would quickly 
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encounter the restrictions of narrative in representing the complex 
causality of material processes. At the outset, one would have a hard 
time identifying the main actors – protagonists and antagonists – of 
the story. Climate change and other global environmental problems are 
based on numerous, interrelated changes in our environment, none of 
which are truly “responsible” for the potentially catastrophic outcomes 
of the current developments. In order to narrate the progress of the on-
going environmental crisis, one would need to be able to point out such 
individual anthropomorphic actors as the Greenhouse Effect, Carbon 
Dioxide, Fossil Fuels, Livestock, Deforestation, Waste, Human Species, 
Ecological Footprint, Natural Processes, Ecosystems, Petroleum Indus-
try, or Global Capitalism, all of which then supposedly contribute in 
different ways to the permanent changes in global weather patterns. 
With such a multiplicity of active participants – which vary depending 
on the choices made by the storyteller – narratives have a tendency to 
become perplexingly complex, and even then, they cannot account for 
the true complexity of the ongoing material processes. Furthermore, 
narrative logic struggles to track the nonlinear behavior of the systems, 
and it cannot really explain, for example, the emergence of climatologi-
cal “tipping points”, where a relatively slight rise in Earth’s temperature 
can cause an intensely more dramatic change in climate. It is no wonder, 
therefore, that the typical everyday representation of the climate change 
still consists of a hugely simplified narrative of centralized control – one 
in which the intentionally acting “Humanity” has unconsciously dis-
turbed the peaceful functioning of the outside “Nature”, and now needs 
to revert this process or at least minimize its impact.
The problem of agency in narrative sense-making has already been 
tacitly implicated by much of the discussion surrounding the emergent 
notion of the Anthropocene. One of the most pertinent criticisms of 
the concept has stemmed from the purported role of the entirety of the 
human species as the main perpetrator of planetary-scale ecological 
problems. In their critique of the “Anthropocene narrative”, Andreas 
Malm and Alf Hornborg (2014) point out how the standard story of the 
newly found Anthropocene epoch essentially ignores the socio-critical 
fact that uneven distribution and exploitation of resources is a basic 
condition for modern fossil fuel technology. By tracing the historical 
development of fossil energy as the quintessential productive force in 
modern capitalist economy, Malm and Hornborg suggest that the global 
ecological impact of fossil fuels has not truly been effected by human-
kind in general, but rather by the richest subset of the human popula-
tion. The Anthropocene narrative, which depicts the emergence of the 
entirety of humankind as a geological force, is thus based on a crude 
misrepresentation of intra-species inequality. With the abstract ensem-
ble of Anthropos as its main actor, the story of collective human impact 
and responsibility evades any questions of the unequal role of different 
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social and ethnic groups, genders, and social classes or societies in the 
production of global-scale ecological change.
Similar issues have been raised by Christophe Bonneuil and Jean- 
Baptiste Fressoz (2016), whose historical account of the Anthropocene 
strives to critically deconstruct the standard story of the newly found 
geological epoch. This naturalist “grand narrative” of the new geological 
epoch dominated by human activity originates from the same group of 
specialists in Earth system sciences whose work helped to establish the 
entire scientific debate on the question of the Anthropocene. Rather than 
simply producing data about the current state of the planet or suggesting a 
systemic view of its possible future, the scientists who named the Anthro-
pocene also provided it with a certain history – an authorized narrative 
account of the Earth system and its co-evolution with the human spe-
cies over the last centuries. Approaching the issue from the point of view 
of humanities and social sciences, Bonneuil and Fressoz remain acutely 
critical about several aspects of this naturalized account of geohistory. 
As historians of science, their objective is not to undermine any of the 
empirical measurements or material realities related to the concept of the 
Anthropocene but rather to question the relevance of the official narrative, 
especially in its managerial and depoliticized overtones.
As stated by Bonneuil and Fressoz, a major issue of the standard story 
of the Anthropocene stems from its depiction of history as a contest 
between the human species and the planet, “with societies as ignorant 
and passive masses who can only be guided by scientists and saved by 
green technologies” (2016, xiv). With this kind of narrative orientation, 
the Earth is habitually represented as a totality to be governed: historical 
facts are only relevant in as far as they can be measured as quantifiable 
data, and the entire planet is routinely observed from a strategic external 
viewpoint from which it can be “objectively” studied as a global system 
subjectable to human management and control. The managerial emphasis 
of the naturalist grand narrative is accompanied by the abstract category 
of “humanity” as a universal agent uniformly responsible for the Earth’s 
new geological regime. The historical story is regularly construed around 
the idea of sudden enlightenment: after hundreds of years of ill-fated igno-
rance, during which the human species has unconsciously destroyed the 
planet to the point of shifting it into new geological epoch, “we” are now 
finally awakening to the planetary-scale environmental consequences of 
collective human action. According to Bonneuil and Fressoz, however, 
such a shift from unawareness to awareness only exists as a story main-
tained by present-day scientists: historical evidence clearly suggests that 
the destructive practices and technologies of the modern capitalist econ-
omies have not been adopted in any sort of blissful ignorance, but more 
often in full knowledge of their potentially harmful effects.
With similar reasoning to Malm and Hornborg, Bonneuil and  Fressoz 
argue against the dominant conception of the Anthropocene as the 
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collective result of undifferentiated human action: in the standard nar-
rative of the new epoch, the abstract category of “human species” ef-
fectively masks huge dissimilarities of responsibility between different 
actors and institutions in the complex production of global ecological 
disturbance. The problem stems mainly from the natural scientific back-
ground of the main popularizers of the Anthropocene narrative: while 
the Earth system sciences can productively continue to pursue their quan-
tifiable research interest with a generalized notion of human impact, any 
kind of social or cultural analysis of the development of planetary-scale 
environmental change would clearly require a more differentiated view 
of humanity. In order to confront the main issues of the naturalist nar-
rative, Bonneuil and Fressoz seek after a more culturally and socially 
informed perspective on the questions of Anthropocene – a view that 
would “have to take into account social asymmetries and inequalities, 
exploring how these are mutually constructed – on different scales, in-
cluding the global – with the distribution of flows of matter and energy 
through economic, political and technological mechanisms” (Bonneuil 
and Fressoz 2016, 69). In their account, such a differentiated viewpoint 
is needed not just to maintain historical accuracy, or to evaluate the re-
sponsibilities of the past, but also to pursue future policies that would be 
more impartial and more effective.
While the above evaluations of the standard narrative of the Anthro-
pocene bring forth a number of important insights about the question-
able results of utilizing the abstract totality of “human species” as an 
anthropomorphic narrative actor, their socio-critical viewpoint comes 
with its own set of problems and dilemmas. One of the most pressing 
issues concerns the distinctly anthropocentric orientation of the cri-
tique: by focusing their attention on the questions of social action and 
responsibility, researchers in the humanities and social sciences run the 
constant risk of overemphasizing the role of intentional human agency 
as the main causative factor responsible for the future of the Earth. 
Pinpointing the guilty parties through social and cultural analysis, even 
when it is ourselves who are shown to be guilty, can generally produce 
a false sense of agency: as Slavoj Žižek (2011, 423) has argued in his 
account of the Anthropocene, “we like to be guilty” for environmental 
threats since the admission of guilt can successfully delude us to think 
that the situation depends primarily upon our own choices. In the time 
of the Anthropocene, however, human agency can no longer be con-
ceived as existing in such a void. The new geological epoch indicates 
a reunion between human and natural histories; it bridges the great 
divide between nature and society that widened in the nineteenth and 
twentieth centuries, and suggests a co-entangled relationship between 
human and nonhuman agencies.
Even though the concept of the Anthropocene is commonly conceived 
in predominantly anthropocentric terms, as an account of how “we” 
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have presently arrived at a new geological epoch due to the emergence of 
human species as a geological force, the consequential effects of global 
environmental transformation also suggest the idea that humanity is not 
making its history by itself but in constant interaction with a dynami-
cally changing planet. In the words of Nigel Clark, the Anthropocene 
is thus “as much about the decentring of humankind as it is about our 
rising geological significance” (Clark 2014, 25; emphasis in the orig-
inal). According to Clark (2014; Clark and Gunaratnam 2017), there 
exists a widespread tendency to portray humans, and humans alone, as 
the sole actors and players of environmental changes. While much of 
the discussion surrounding the Anthropocene adheres to this idea, the 
notion of a new geological epoch also proposes a decidedly less anthro-
pocentric viewpoint on the matter: it allows one to “replace the narra-
tive of humanization of geology with an approach to the geologization 
of human history” (Granjou 2016, 145). As stated by Clark, there has 
been a growing consensus in natural sciences of past decades that Earth 
systems are inherently changeable, with or without human influence. 
From the perspective of the Earth system sciences, the Anthropocene can 
thus be considered as merely one more set of transformations in the vast 
and eventful history of the planet – a history in which human agency is 
portrayed as one kind of physical agency among numerous others. This 
means a fundamental shift in the basic orientation of the narrative – the 
story of increasing human impact upon nature is substituted with a big-
ger picture of dynamic Earth processes whose timescales reach back far 
beyond recorded history. Such a shift in narrative scale extends agency 
to nonhuman telluric elements and forces, and explains human history 
as conditioned by the Earth’s powers of transformation.
In the light of the recent interdisciplinary discussion relating to the 
Anthropocene, the foremost eco-narrative problem of the current situa-
tion does not truly seem to concern the narrative agency of nonhumans, 
but rather the newly required merging together of socio-cultural and 
natural perspectives in the interpretation of planetary environmental 
changes. While the global environmental issues characteristic to the new 
epoch can certainly give rise to different kinds of stories, their narra-
tive agency appears secondary to their raw material effectivity – the cli-
mate change or the ongoing mass extinction of species, for example, can 
hardly be described as processes that are primarily related to questions 
of narrative. Both the causes and the effects of anthropogenic planetary 
changes take place as dynamic material shifts resulting from a complex 
interrelationship between innumerable human and nonhuman partici-
pants. When these co-entangled material forces are subjected to nar-
rative form, their physical effectivity is reshaped into narrated agency 
of clear-cut actors acting upon each other. Depending on the scale and 
orientation of the narrative, the complex planetary changes may then be 
explained as the effects produced by such actors as greenhouse gases, 
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fossil fuel technologies, human individuals, social groups, the human 
species, or the entire Earth itself. As the Anthropocene erodes the mod-
ern separation between the sphere of actively produced human history 
and the slow changes of natural processes, it also brings forth the di-
lemma of selection: since narrative choices always delimit the scale and 
the perspective of the narrative, there is no real possibility for a con-
struction of a neutral, singular “geostory” of human and nonhuman 
agencies in action.
The Anthropocene seems to involve a narrative impasse, which man-
ifests itself as a set of incompatible stories about the origins and the 
future of the latest planetary epoch. On one end of the spectrum, there 
are the anthropocentric stories of human action on either physical or 
social level – narratives of the entire human species or different social 
groups acting upon natural systems and altering their behavior. Some of 
these accounts tend toward a more structural view, emphasizing the role 
of anthropomorphized social institutions and policies in the production 
of planetary change. On the other end, human agency is diminished 
to the point of non-existence as it is situated within a vast history of 
climatic and geophysical transformation. Such a viewpoint highlights 
the creative role of more-than-human material forces but can also ulti-
mately lead to a political or ethical paralysis: by downplaying the impact 
of intentional human agency, narratives focused on the fluctuations of 
Earth systems provide very little room for socially induced change. In 
all varieties of Anthropocene narratives, the perspective always remains 
limited – instead of providing a clear view into the dynamics of distrib-
uted and diffuse agency, narrative form binds environmental change into 
the shape of human or natural protagonists and antagonists, subjects or 
objects of the Earth’s ecological shifts.
Conclusion
Contrary to some recent accounts of material ecocriticism, there are 
really no “ongoing stories” in the material world – no previously un-
accounted Great Book of Nature opening before our eyes. Instead of 
continuing stories, matter consists of countless emergent processes which 
can never be reduced to our narrative representations. Thus, when we 
interpret the more-than-human world through a narrative lens, we must 
also remain wary of our own tendency to narrativize complex, emergent 
behavior into simplified and anthropocentric stories. If we want to re-
spect the creativity of matter in its own terms, we have to acknowledge 
that its numerous agencies are not performing stories for the human au-
dience, but exist and act of their own accord. No matter how hard we try 
to fit this world into our cultural landscape of narrative sense-making, 
a major part of its behavior always remains unreachable.
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On the whole, better understanding of the agential capacities of 
nonhuman things and processes seems to require a clearer distinction 
between two different notions of material agency. The first variety of 
agency is the actual, distributed agency of emergent processes: it is the 
agency of entangled, non-specified human and nonhuman “forces” that 
continuously come into being without plan or intentional guidance. 
This entails the intertwined, systemic behavior of material objects and 
organisms – the entwined activity of different agencies – which can later 
be interpreted as narratives. There is, however, no pre-given meaning 
attached to this agency – the behavior of material systems does not con-
sist of any kind of narratives, and can go on just fine without narrative 
explanations. When approached through narrative logic, a major part 
of the complex entanglements of human and nonhuman agencies is ul-
timately lost and ignored. Thus, this kind of agency might be termed a 
“semiotic agency” or “meaning-producing agency”, but identifying it as 
a “narrative agency” seems like a definite misnomer. Outside the most 
metaphoric use of the term, material things are not telling their “own 
stories” to anyone, but are simply behaving in a way that can be inter-
preted as a story or several stories.
The second type of nonhuman agency is an attribute assigned to 
someone or something in narrative representation. This kind of narrated 
agency is always ascribed after the fact or in anticipation of a fact, in 
an effort to make sense of the temporal progress of the action. With 
this interpretative act, one projects agency to singular actors within the 
systemic behavior: the non-definable intra-actions of material processes 
are transformed into subjects and objects, protagonists and antagonists 
of narrated events. Here, one can encounter such entities as human in-
dividuals, genes, seas, volcanoes, methane, carbon sinks, evolution, or 
climate change acting upon each other. Even though these narratives are 
based on the actual agency of creative matter, they are bound to narra-
tive logic, which ultimately fails in its representation of the complex cau-
sality of material systems. With their limited perspectives, unwarranted 
human-like intentionality, and tendency toward teleological explana-
tions, narratives skew the emergent, distributed agency of matter to far 
too familiar forms. Paradoxically, however, we still need these stories to 
make sense and respect the role of the world beyond us.
Narrative, of course, is not the only cognitive strategy we can use to 
make sense of the world, but it is one of the most prominent and weighty. 
Accordingly, instead of endless celebrations of the “narrative” agency 
of matter, it might often prove more fruitful to analyze the numerous 
ways in which matter escapes our desire for narrative descriptions. With 
only a slight change of perspective, material ecocriticism could even be 
seen as the study of all the complex relationships that are lost when 
active and emergent matter is in fact “storied” and brought into our 
278 Juha Raipola
cultural  landscape. The focus would no longer be on the question of 
nonhuman agency, which is taken as a given, but on the question of how 
even the most accommodating narrative representations of matter inevi-
tably leave out important details, disentangle significant interdependen-
cies, or simplify the ongoing emergence and emergency of the material 
world into linear stories of cause and effect. Stories, in such an approach, 
would not be seen as the patent answer to our global environmental cri-
sis, but rather as a major part of the problem.
Notes
 1 As can be deduced from the overall argument of the chapter, usage of in-
clusive terms such as “we” or “one” is highly problematic in the context of 
environmental humanities. This kind of imprecision in discourse is, how-
ever, hardly avoidable, and I will continue to use these terms throughout the 
chapter for the sake of rhetoric.
 2 The material turn, as a field of inquiry, generally considers inanimate matter 
to possess agency and vitality. In the new modes of materialist analysis, com-
plex issues such as climate change or population dynamics are approached as 
subject matters that require a reorientation in the methodology of the human-
ities and social sciences. By highlighting the significance of material factors 
and corporeality in different aspects of social and cultural life, scholars in 
new materialisms wish to abandon the idea that the main task of cultural 
theory is to study the world as it is represented and interpreted by human 
beings. Matter, in such an approach, is to be understood as a vibrant force, 
and culture is to be reconceptualized as a material entanglement of humans 
and nonhumans. For an overview and a philosophical introduction about 
the material turn, see Coole and Frost’s introduction to New Materialisms 
(2010).
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